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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the topic of insomnia in British and American 
modernist literature, focusing primarily on the ways in which the condition of 
insomnia and the identity category of the “insomniac” intersect with other aspects of 
subjectivity, such as gender, occupation, race, and social class.  Through examining 
insomnia from a narratological perspective, using fictional, philosophical, 
psychological, sociological, and medical literature, I discuss the discursive function 
of both this disorder and identity category during the Modernist period.  It also 
explores the relationship between insomnia and Modernism itself, regarding both the 
discursive production of knowledge of insomnia and the insomniac during this period 
and the ways that the modernist literary text discusses, interprets, utilizes, and 
structurally reproduces phenomenological aspects of insomnia.  Further, I argue that 
insomnia shapes identity, and therefore, perception, in a dialectical manner; as such, 
insomnia is a device of character and plot development.  I consider the questions, 
“Why did those during this period, in America and the United Kingdom, need to 
define and interpret insomnia and the insomniac in the ways they did, and what are 
the literary and discursive implications of these interpretations?” 
My introduction lays out my theoretical framework, arguing that sleep habits, 
behaviors, and practices (including insomnia) constitute a type of self care that 
intersects with other expected behaviors relating to one’s identity, sometimes creating 
or revealing a conflict between expected and “normal” behavior based upon 
generalized assumptions and individual will and desire.  Further, I argue that while 
the diagnosis of insomnia and the label “insomniac” subject the individual to 
disciplinary and normalizing measures, this condition and label provide the individual 
  
 
 
with a means of exposing and resisting assumed identity categories and the power to 
garner resources, time, and space for personal development and reflection.  I explore 
the ways in the insomniac body reveals and challenges norms and normative 
procedures.  Additionally, I provide an etymological inquiry into the origins of the 
word insomniac, and situate this term and its use historically—a produced identity 
belonging to a particular time and place with implications regarding the production of 
knowledge about individuals and the motivations behind producing such knowledge.  
Finally, I explain the relationship between the phenomenological and ontological 
experience of insomnia to the phenomenological and ontological experience of World 
War I in order to justify the war as a key turning point in the discursive production of 
the insomniac.  The second chapter traces the production of knowledge of insomnia 
and, eventually, the insomniac through the nineteenth century until today, in an effort 
to further elucidate the significance of this condition and figure historically and 
currently.  It considers questions of the origins of the modernist figure of the 
insomniac and the implications of this figure today. 
The subsequent chapters focus on the intersection of insomnia with other 
aspects of subjectivity.  Chapter three discusses the insomnia of soldiers and war 
workers during World War I, using the fictional texts Parade’s End by Ford Madox 
Ford, A Farewell to Arms by Ernest Hemingway, and Memoirs of an Infantry Officer 
by Siegfried Sassoon.  This chapter argues that the experience of insomnia is, in 
significant ways, akin to the experience of participating in World War I, thus provides 
a useful device through which to discuss war experience and its related anxieties.   
Chapter four compares the diagnosis, perception, and treatment of insomnia in those 
  
 
 
with differently gendered bodies.  In this chapter, I argue that insomnia is a form of 
bodily inscription, revealing cultural norms and beliefs, as well as allowing the 
individual to expose and resist these norms.  This chapter focuses on the Pilgrimage 
series by Dorothy Richardson, The Soul of a Bishop by H. G. Wells, and The Last 
September by Elizabeth Bowen. 
The fifth chapter explores the relationship between insomnia and social status, 
specifically regarding class, occupation, race, and citizenship.  As I argue in this 
chapter, insomnia is simultaneously demonized as a form of resistance to capitalist 
work ethics, represented as a marker of social privilege, and lauded as a time and 
space of insight and reflection.  Further, insomnia reveals an anomic tension within 
the individual insomniac, indicating a conflict between his or her desires and 
capabilities within a given social structure.  The literary texts covered in this chapter 
are F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Beautiful and Damned, Waldo David Frank’s Holiday, 
and E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India.   The final chapter discusses the relationship 
between insomnia and authorship, describing the ways in which the experience of 
insomnia is translated into the experience of creating and reading literature.  The texts 
covered in this chapter are Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, James Joyce’s Ulysses, and 
Richard Wright’s Black Boy.  In this chapter I argue that an affinity exists between 
the condition of insomnia and the structure of the modernist text, and a reading of the 
modernist text, to an extent, recreates the experience of insomnia in the reader.  
Essentially, this dissertation looks at insomnia as a battleground between various 
elements of one’s identity and subjectivity and explores the ways in which this battle 
both affects and is expressed in the literature of the Modernist period.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In her essay “On Being Ill,” (1926) Virginia Woolf describes the way in 
which illness changes perception:  “we cease to be soldiers in the army of the upright; 
we become deserters.  They march to battle.  We float with the sticks on the stream; 
helter-skelter with the dead leaves on the lawn, irresponsible and disinterested and 
able, perhaps for the first time for years, to look round, to look up—to look, for 
example, at the sky” (12).  Her use of the language of war, with phrases such as 
“soldiers in the army,” “deserters,” and “march to battle,” is certainly deliberate, 
given the temporal proximity of World War I to the writing of this essay.  On a 
practical level, illness, for many, did provide a respite from war, at least spatially, if 
not psychologically.  Though Woolf initially seems to associate illness with disability 
and helplessness, with her use of images like desertion and floating “helter-skelter,” 
her language ultimately illustrates illness as a different sort of ability, an ability to 
observe life from a new, more insightful perspective. Perhaps she has a figure like 
Siegfried Sassoon in mind, who, through illness (both real and contrived), was 
granted separation from the war, enabling him to view it in a new way, as he 
describes in his semi-autobiographical war text, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer.  
Illness has the function of separation; one is parted from the rest of society, and, 
therefore, able to view it from a different vantage point. 
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More importantly, however, she is writing of the ontological power of illness, 
to change one’s way of thinking; through illness one can see “how the world has 
changed its shape” (8).   Illness, for Woolf, becomes “the great confessional” in 
which “things are said, truths are blurted out, which the cautious respectability of 
health conceals” (11).    Her phrase those “great wars,” echoes the Great War itself, 
the cause of mental and physical illness for many.  The solitude of illness, its ability 
to remove the sufferer from daily habits and responsibilities, allows for 
contemplation, and consequently, revelation.  As Miriam Henderson thinks in 
Dorothy Richardson’s chapter novel Deadlock, “[Solitude] was necessary, for 
certainties.  Nothing could be known except in solitude” (3: 63).  World War I, with 
its resultant physical and emotional scars, provided illness and its consequent solitude 
en masse in such a way that it altered the consciousness of nations. 
Insomnia, not necessarily an illness by itself, but a symptom of many, fits well 
into the paradigm Woolf envisions.  It renders one conscious and isolated within the 
bed, making one view the world from said bed, rather than through a more active 
form of participation in the external world.  Additionally, insomniac consciousness is 
different from regular, daytime consciousness, as it is void of the distractions and 
activities which shape daily thought.  As Elizabeth Bronfen argues, “Insomnia, 
calling forth a state of psychic tarrying, transforms the time between dusk and dawn 
into a poignant nocturnal countersite to the logic of the ordinary everyday” (159).  
She continues, “[Insomniacs] are compelled to endure a state of body and mind that 
severs them from the consciousness of the day” (160).  Woolf’s description of the ill 
person as “[floating] with sticks on a stream,” reminiscent of William James’ model 
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of consciousness itself as a stream (described in his essay “Stream of Consciousness”) 
accurately describes the thought process of insomnia, in which thoughts float by 
seemingly at random.  For example, in an essay about insomnia, “Lying Awake,” 
Charles Dickens describes his multiple failed attempts during a bout of insomnia to 
focus his mind on sleep:  “But, Sleep.  I WILL think about Sleep.  I am determined to 
think (this is the way I went on) about Sleep.  I must hold the word Sleep, tight and 
fast, or I shall be off at a tangent in half a second.  I feel myself unaccountably 
straying, already, into Clare Market” (1).  Throughout the rest of the essay, Dickens 
describes the stream-like movement of his thoughts, which range from politics, to 
places he has visited, to family members, to death, until he eventually decides sleep is 
futile and decides to take a late-night walk (4).  This essay illustrates Woolf’s point 
about the randomly contemplative nature of illness, which, as she argues, allows 
words to “possess a mystic quality.  We grasp what is beyond their surface meaning” 
(21).  As Dickens attempts to focus in on the word “Sleep,” it becomes sort of a 
talisman for him, but because of his insomnia, he realizes that his grasp of sleep is 
only fleeting.  Here, Dickens’ thoughts are clearly motivated by his insomnia and he 
is writing through his symptoms, as Woolf envisions in her essay.  Most significantly, 
however, his insomnia shapes the flowing nature of his thoughts. 
Dickens, of course, is a figure of the nineteenth century.  But, because of the 
Great War, and its related traumas, which I will discuss in more detail to come, the 
experience of insomnia became much more widespread in the early part of the 
twentieth century.  As physician Guthrie Rankin argues in his 1918 article, “Broken 
Sleep,” “This terrible war has exacted from those who participate in its activities, as 
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well as from those who ‘watch and wait,’ an enormous toll of misery both by day and 
by night” (77).  He continues, “Peace of mind and safety of body, being alike 
imperilled, sleep, which is the guardian of both, has become fickle and unsatisfying” 
(77).  After the war, insomnia became seemingly endemic, as did its related influence 
on thought and perception.  Fortunately, as Woolf suggests, a lot can be learned from 
and expressed through such a condition.  In this sense, insomnia becomes a 
productive force, allowing for a new time and space from which to contemplate and 
interpret one’s experience. 
Insomnia as Activity 
Yet, despite this seemingly productive type of insomnia, not all individuals 
see the traditional awake-in-bed type of insomnia, or its relief in sleep, in such 
sympathetic terms.   In 1914, Thomas Edison proclaimed, “Sleep is an absurdity, a 
bad habit.  We can’t suddenly throw off the thralldom of habit, but we shall throw it 
off” (qtd. in Derickson 1).  Edison, notorious for his insomniac work habits, fully 
embraces the “moral opposition to any idleness,” which “informed a Protestant work 
ethic that celebrated perseverance at one’s vocational calling and implicitly 
denigrated sleep as a form of idleness” (Derickson 2).   Time not sleeping, then, for 
figures like Edison, was not best used in bed, thinking, but rather better spent actively 
working.  According to Alan Derickson, Edison is “the paragon of modern 
sleeplessness to legions of journalists, commentators, and other historians.  No 
American has done more to cast sleeplessness in hegemonic terms.  None did more to 
frame the issue as one of simple choice between productive work and unproductive 
rest” (5).  Edison’s most famous invention, the light bulb, became the double-edged 
  
 
5 
 
sword of the insomniac.  On the one hand, the light bulb permits people to work 
through all hours of the night, allowing them to labor at times more suited to 
individual preference; one who prefers to work when everyone else is asleep can now 
do so with relative ease.  On the other hand, the light bulb permits people to work 
through all hours of the night; thus, no time exists when one cannot be working, 
whatever the nature of that work may be, whether by choice or requirement.  Rest, 
then, is no longer built into the daily cycle when the light that facilitates work fades 
away, but requires a willful decision to stop working. 
Starting near the turn of the twentieth century, insomnia takes on a new 
dimension.  Not only is insomnia not sleeping when one ought to be or wants to be 
sleeping (under the proper conditions for sleep—not sleeping, even though one may 
want a nap, during a boring meeting is not insomnia in Western culture), but now it is 
also not sleeping with the knowledge that something other than sleeping can, and 
probably should, be done.  In a capitalist paradigm of maximized, perpetual 
productivity, insomnia in the traditional sense (lying in bed, staring at the ceiling, 
cursing one’s inability to sleep, experiencing the flow of thought) is pure waste, 
contributing neither to active production, nor to recuperative rest needed for optimal 
productivity.  For any insomniac who has suffered repetitive thoughts of what one 
hopes to accomplish or should accomplish, or in other words, how one can better be 
using one’s time than lying awake in bed hoping for sleep to come, it is clear that 
such thoughts are not conducive to rest.  As F. Scott Fitzgerald puts it in his essay, 
“Sleeping and Waking,” during his bouts of insomnia, he experienced a sense of 
“Waste and horror—what I might have been and done that is lost, spent, gone, 
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dissipated, unrecapturable” (67).  His insomnia is spent regretting what he has failed 
to accomplish.  In this context, the insomniac has two options:  to feel guilty over 
wasted time, as Fitzgerald does, or to forego the possibility of sleep (or at least time 
in bed) for “productive” activity and learn to cope with the resultant exhaustion. 
One of the other most admired figures of the early twentieth century, Charles 
Lindbergh, like Edison, was lauded for his ability to embrace the latter approach.  
Lindbergh’s solo trans-Atlantic flight was largely discussed in media of the period as 
a story of a man’s ability to conquer the bodily need for sleep.  As Derickson argues, 
“Sleeplessness immediately became an integral part of the storyline,” and one of 
Lindbergh’s backers attributed his ability to sustain wakefulness to his “resilient 
constitution . . . and rigorous self-discipline” (12).  Gaining international acclaim, 
Lindbergh did his best to downplay the effects of fatigue during his flight of more 
than thirty-three hours, and despite visible signs of grogginess upon landing, he 
claimed, somewhat dubiously, that he was “not sleepy at all” (qtd. in Derickson 13).  
Lindbergh, like Edison, became a model of man’s ability to overcome fatigue for the 
sake of accomplishment. 
I use the phrase “man’s ability” intentionally, here, as women’s sleeplessness 
was viewed in a much different light during this period.  As A. W. MacFarlane argues 
in his 1891 text Insomnia and Its Therapeutics, “Men require less sleep than women. . 
. .  As a rule, the female possesses more nervous excitability, and being more 
impressionable than the male, she requires more sleep for the restoration of her 
energies” (40), which is problematic because “women bear the strain of life less 
buoyantly than men, and so are more liable to insomnia” (41).  Slightly later in the 
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text,  he seemingly contradicts himself, arguing that “Women . . . bear the loss of 
sleep better, for a time, than men” evidenced by “the length of time they can devote 
themselves to night-nursing in response to the calls of affection or duty” (41).  Yet, he 
resolves this contradiction by distinguishing between the loss of sleep of motherhood 
and the insomnia of general feminine susceptibility.  In other words, women can only 
handle lack of sleep because motherhood requires it; outside of motherhood, insomnia 
is particularly harmful to women who typically require more rest than men because 
they are essentially weaker and less able to cope with life’s conflicts.  Insomnia is 
paradoxically a consequence of and threat to motherhood, which is MacFarlane’s 
tacitly assumed role for women.  Governmental regulations on work from the early 
twentieth century apply the same principles as MacFarlane to the sleep of women.  
Despite the fact that women, often the primary caregivers of children and other family 
members, were often required to keep late hours in order to care for their children or 
the sick, they were subjected to more rigorous controls over hours worked outside of 
the household because their fatigue was thought to interfere with their ability to bear 
and care for children, which many viewed as dangerous to society (Derickson 27).  
Broadly speaking, motherhood and sufficient rest are far from synonymous, yet, 
while men struggled for more controls over the length of the working day in the early 
half of the twentieth century, women struggled to be allowed to work as many hours 
as men (Derickson 27). 
Insomnia and Contemplation 
Regardless of gender disparities, if we look to literary texts of the early 
twentieth century, we will see that the dichotomy of insomnia I have just drawn, a 
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choice between “productive” sacrifice of sleep or time “wasted” in insomniac futility 
is a false one, as Woolf’s essay indicates.  Literature and philosophy present us with a 
third option.  Inasmuch as insomniac time is a time for thought—if one is not sleeping 
or doing other work, one has no choice but to think— it allows for a different type of 
productivity.  For the philosopher Emil Cioran, writing in 1934, insomnia, painful as 
it may be, is a means of attaining knowledge.  He writes, “The importance of 
insomnia is so colossal that I am tempted to define man as the animal who cannot 
sleep. . . .  God punished man by taking away sleep and giving him knowledge” (85).  
Laziness, the ability to forego worldly productivity perhaps by lying idly in bed, is 
essential for insight, according to Cioran who “[prefers] an intelligent and observant 
laziness to intolerable, terrorizing activity.  To awaken the modern world, one must 
praise laziness.  The lazy man has an infinitely keener perception of metaphysical 
reality than the active one” (105).  The latter Cioran quotation in this section came 
from a chapter from his text From the Heights of Despair, tellingly entitled 
“Degradation through Work,” in which he argues for work’s “tendency to dull the 
spirit” making the perpetual worker the “impotent slave of external reality” (104).  
The most valuable time, for Cioran, is neither time working nor time sleeping, but 
time of thought and isolation, made possible through insomnia. 
Cioran’s expression of the value of insomnia is in direct opposition to that of 
Edison, Lindbergh, and their admirers.   Insomnia need not be either time wasted or 
time for even more work.  For the capitalist, insomnia can have either a positive or 
negative value.  Its value is positive if it is “productive” time, negative if “wasted” 
time.  As E. P. Thompson argues, “In mature capitalist society, all time must be 
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consumed, marketed, put to use; it is offensive for the labour force merely to ‘pass the 
time’” (90-91).  For the doctor, insomnia’s value comes as a symptom pointing to a 
larger, hopefully curable, condition (insomnia is almost never only an exclusive 
condition), but is negative in the sense that it detracts from overall health and well 
being (factors necessary for “productivity” in the capitalist sense).  Yet, for the 
literary or philosophical writer, insomnia’s value lies in its capacity to isolate the 
individual in a state of virtual immobility, resulting in a time devoted to thought and 
insight.  Insomnia, then, helps authors shape their perceptions of the world, which is 
then transferred to their texts.  For this reason, insomnia becomes an important 
literary device when conferred upon a character, a time during which the character 
can contemplate sources of anxiety, motivation, suffering, or happiness—to explore 
his or her world and place in it.   
However, as Cioran and Woolf also argue, insomnia is not simply a time for 
thought, but allows for thought that alters one’s perception of the world.  It is 
dialectical:  it shapes identity, which shapes perception.  Fitzgerald recounts a 
conversation in which someone says, “The world only exists through your 
apprehension of it” (“Sleeping” 74).  When one’s apprehension of the world is 
filtered through insomnia, insomnia necessarily shapes that apprehension.  Further, 
insomnia reflects one’s struggle with his or her identity.  Maurice Blanchot writes, 
“To sleep badly is precisely to be unable to find one’s position.  The bad sleeper 
tosses and turns in search of that genuine place which he knows is unique.  He knows 
that only in that spot will the world give up its errant immensity” (Space 266).  For 
the author or character attempting to explore and forge an identity, insomnia is a 
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useful and necessary tool, indicating both the search for the self and the knowledge 
that the self has been misplaced. 
This conception of insomnia, as both productive conceptually and reflectively, 
counters the traditional conception of sleep and insomnia as related to economic 
productivity in the capitalist model.  As Blanchot argues, “the workplace is 
everywhere; work time is all the time.  When oppression is absolute, there is no more 
leisure, no more ‘free time.’  Sleep is supervised” (Disaster 81).  In such a model, 
supervised sleep means insomnia must be corrected and sleep must be normalized to 
meet the needs of the larger society rather than the individual, or, in other words, the 
individual’s need to function within the larger society.  As we see will in the literary 
texts I will discuss, insomniac characters often receive push back:  advice on how to 
sleep better, lectures on the need for sleep, inquiries into mental and physical health,  
and numerous forms of corrective measures, medical or otherwise.  The body 
becomes the battleground between warring factions:  the character who “needs” 
insomnia for insight and development, to find his or her own, rather than prescribed 
place, and the society (or family or army) that needs the character to sleep well. 
Sleep Discourse 
The physiological need for sleep, despite its temporal and spatial variations 
for individuals, is one element of life that has remained relatively consistent 
throughout the course of human existence; however, the discourse regarding sleep 
fluctuates contingent upon the conditions of the given historical period and cultural 
group.   For reasons that we have yet to fully explain and still debate, all people 
seemingly require sleep to survive and have for human history thus far, yet the 
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concept of sleep represents much more than simply something one needs to do 
regularly.  In addition to discursive representation of sleep as a biological necessity, 
as the literature I will examine indicates, sleep habits and failures are also related to 
issues of psychological well being, physical and emotional strength, morality, gender 
roles and expectations, and self-control.  The importance of sleep, for personal, 
medical, and societal reasons, can be illustrated by examining the way both an 
individual and the social group of which he or she is a part react when that individual 
fails to sleep in a way that the larger culture deems proper and appropriate, a 
condition we currently refer to as insomnia.  Therefore, examining the discourse that 
produces understandings of the condition of insomnia and the insomniac as an 
identity category reveals not only a great deal about the relationship of the individual 
to his or her own body and mind but also of the individual to the larger society.  Such 
an examination of sleep habits and failures reveals a great deal of tension between the 
individual’s will and desire and the expectations placed upon that individual 
inasmuch as they govern the seemingly “private” (isolating) behavior of sleep. 
In his essay “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 
Michel Foucault provides a useful model through which to explore the way in which 
the discourse of insomnia has been historically produced.  Using the concept of 
“madness” as an example, Foucault explains his epistemological concerns:  “[His 
research] was a question of knowing how madness, under the various definitions that 
have been given, was at a particular time integrated into an institutional field that 
constituted it as mental illness occupying a specific place alongside other illnesses” 
(297).  My exploration of insomnia will be similar:  my goal in this dissertation is to 
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illustrate how, but more importantly, why, insomnia “at a particular time” (the period 
directly preceding and following World War I—the period of literary Modernism), 
came to be constituted as a disorder, but more significantly a disorder that specifically 
identifies and categorizes an individual, “occupying a specific place” alongside other 
disorders and deviant identity categories in ostensive need of normalization.   
Before 1907, the “insomniac” did not exist.  Certainly, as sleep historians like 
A. Roger Ekirch and Eluned Summers-Bremner assert, history is laden with both 
famous and anonymous individuals who have, at times, suffered from or reveled in 
troubled, reduced, or broken sleep.  However, the communal need to classify such 
individuals through the use of language into an identity category, thereby creating a 
new semantic understanding of the relationship between sleeplessness and identity, 
was not apparent in the English language until its formal introduction into medical 
discourse in a 1907 lecture by physician Alexander Morison, entitled “A Lecture on 
Sleep and Sleeplessness.”  This lecture was printed in the British medical journal The 
Lancet in 1908 under the same title (OED).  It introduces the “insomniac” in the 
following quotation:  “[An increase in urinary secretion] is, like the phenomenon of 
sleeplessness, most evident in the neurotic insomniac” (OED).  The coining of a new 
label and this quotation’s implications are significant.  The focal point of insomnia 
itself has shifted from an event or state happening to a person to a specific identity 
category.  In other words, the inability to sleep is now regarded not as an external 
condition but as an internal trait; the label itself allows for a person to be solely 
defined in terms of his or her insomnia.  When sleep habits are deemed faulty or 
abnormal, as with insomnia, they are then subject to scrutiny and normalization, from 
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the medical discipline in this particular instance.  But more significantly, not only are 
the insomniac’s sleep habits called into question, the insomniac himself or herself 
becomes the subject of inquiry.   
With regard to the process of normalization, an informative parallel may be 
drawn here between the insomniac and the criminally delinquent.  Foucault argues 
that in the case of the criminal, delinquency is seen as an attribute of the person rather 
than merely a consequence of the crime; thus, the individual, rather than the offense, 
becomes the subject of scrutiny (Discipline 252).  In other words, in the view of 
disciplinary authorities (medical, educational, criminal, religious), something about 
the person, independent of the actual crime, caused his or her delinquency—the same 
case can be made for the insomniac.  Arguably, one is not an insomniac simply 
because one cannot sleep, but because some other attribute of one’s personality or 
physiology causes one to become an insomniac.  Foucault writes, “The delinquent . . . 
is not only author of his own acts (the author responsible in terms of certain criteria of 
free, conscious will), but is linked to his offence by a whole bundle of complex 
threads (instincts, drives, tendencies, character)” (Discipline 252-53).  Through the 
act of labeling the “insomniac,” the individual is now implicated, and perhaps even 
blamed, in his or her own insomnia and also represented as responsible, to an extent, 
to the larger society for treating the problem.  This semantic shift indicates a larger 
practice in medical discourse rooted in attributing “unhealthiness” to some flaw of 
personality, character, history, or constitution, and is evident in both the 
aforementioned novels and medical literature of the time.   
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Etymology of the Insomniac 
To be fair, Morison was not the first to use the word insomniac to describe a 
sleepless individual hoping for a “normal” night’s rest; however, he was the first 
physician to have his use of this label recorded and introduced into the medical 
discipline.  The word insomniac has been used colloquially a handful of times prior to 
Morison’s lecture.  The first such instance I could trace comes from the “Household 
Matters” section of the 5 February 1887 edition of The Leeds Times, written by “A 
Yorkshire Housewife.”  Her article, sandwiched between the “Fashion and Dress” 
and “Recipes” columns, cites the advice of several medical authorities on the 
treatment of insomnia, but the use of the word insomniac appears to be her own 
creation.  She writes, “In exceptional cases [of sleeplessness] the insomniac makes a 
fair recovery” (6).  Despite the anonymity of the author of this article, as well as its 
less-than-prominent placement on the sixth page of a local newspaper, the 
“Housewife’s” column makes several important points about causes and 
understandings of sleeplessness that will persist for the next several decades.  Firstly, 
she asserts, mostly through the citation of medical authorities, the negative 
consequences of prolonged, untreated insomnia, including confusion, indecision, and 
nervousness (6).  She uses the pronoun “he” to describe the poor sleeper, emphasizing 
the male as the normal standard of judgment, but claims, as do physicians 
contemporary to her, that young women, especially those who have the “bad habit of 
taking too limited a supply of sleep, at irregular hours” are the most prone to and 
most negatively impacted by the effects of insomnia (6), an assertion Richardson’s 
character Miriam comes to resent.  The author also equates insomnia with mental 
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overwork, lack of exercise, and poor nutrition (6).  Her proposed cure is either 
through the use of prescribed drugs or through the regulation of one’s sleeping habits 
(6).  In short, within her article this “Housewife” summarizes much of the 
contemporary medical discourse on the causes and treatments of insomnia. 
The next instance of usage of the word insomniac comes in a creative non-
fiction piece in the 7 July 1888 section of the Manchester Courier and Lancashire 
General Advertiser, entitled “Our Domestic Circle,” by an author identified only as 
“Beryl.”  “Beryl’s” short narrative about an experience of insomnia is of particular 
interest in that this individual claims to have invented the term.  Beryl writes, “I 
should have been told that I was suffering from this insomnia.  Luckily for me, I am 
neither, viz., a person of consequence nor an insomniac—excuse the word.  I have 
coined it expressly for the occasion, feeling sure that the Goddess of Sleep in her 
coyness will pardon any words she may put me in a strait for” (5).  Beryl’s claim of 
authorship of the term insomniac suggests that this word was not in common, if any, 
usage at the time.  The definition the article provides implies not only sleeplessness, 
but chronic sleeplessness, is associated with being “a person of consequence,”  
echoing MacFarlane’s assertion that “idiots, the feeble-minded, and even healthy 
persons whose brains are inactive, sleep much longer than active-minded men” (28).  
Beryl illustrates further inventiveness through the possible creation of the “Goddess 
of Sleep.”  In Roman and Greek mythology, sleep was a male god, Somnus or 
Hypnos respectively.  Hypnos’s wife, Pastithea, is the goddess of rest, but is also 
associated with hallucinations or hallucinogens rather than sleep itself.  Perhaps, 
Beryl is referring to the Norse goddess of the night, Nótt, but provides no evidence 
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for this association.  Regardless, the choice to feminize sleep is an interesting one, 
perhaps related to contemporary discursive views of the need for sleep as a form of 
femininity or weakness. 
Two more instances of the use of the word insomniac occur in British 
newspapers prior to the 1908 usage the Oxford English Dictionary cites as the word’s 
first appearance in print.  The first of these two is in a short poem from the “Comic 
Cuttings” section of the 31 May 1894 edition of The Yorkshire Herald, and the York 
Herald.  An author named only “Putch” uses the word in the title of a poem called 
“Impromptu by an Insomniac.”  The text of the poem is as follows: 
(In the small hours, after long sleeplessness). 
Ah! Labour—that slumbers—may say its long say 
On the boon—or the bane—of an Eight Hours day; 
But what should I hail with ecstatic delight 
Would be, oh sweet Somnus! a sound Eight 
Hours Night! (6) 
 
This poem reinforces the importance of eight hours of sleep, commonly thought to be 
the ideal amount for most adults, but also puts this eight hour sleep in contrast with 
the eight hour work day.  In doing so, the poem points to the necessity of sleeping at 
night for laboring during the day.  Thus, sleeping night is, in essence, merely an 
extension of the working day, enabling one to cope with the necessity of labor.   
The final instance that I found prior to 1908 is in an article entitled “A Cure 
for Insomnia” from the 13 February 1896 edition of London’s Morning Post, in a 
letter to the editor by Alice M. Werge.  Werge encourages the use of technology to 
cure insomnia, specifically in the form of a machine (which she would hypothetically 
invent) designed to rock a bed back and forth, thereby simulating the rocking cradle 
in which an infant sleeps.  If a mechanized bed is too expensive, she claims a more 
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cost-effective rocking footstool placed near a comfortable chair might serve the same 
purpose.  However, if these items either do not work or are financially unattainable, 
“The insomniac may lie on either side, the knees resting on each other, the feet ditto, 
the toes firmly fixed on the tightly tucked in sheet, then with them sway the body 
gently” (2).  Werge’s assertion of the ability of technology to cure insomnia reflects 
the prominence of technological advancement in Victorian society.  As I will discuss 
in the chapters to come, new technologies, including the use of electricity, were often 
embraced as a means of treating disorders, including insomnia.   
What these four appearances of the word insomniac have in common is the 
relative anonymity of the authors, all but three lacking a full name as identification.  
Similarly, none of the authors are in the medical profession (at least none claim to 
be).  They all use the word as a noun, in the same way it will come to be used 
medically, and use it to point to a chronic condition of sleeplessness.  Further, in 
varying manners, they all assert the necessity of treating this type of individual, 
whether that treatment is to prevent one from feeling confused and nervous, to 
prepare one for work, or to provide one with the innocent and childlike rest of 
comfortable slumber, thereby relating sleep requirements to mental health, work, and 
morality.  However, most significantly, right from its invention as a term, even when 
spread out over various and somewhat random sources, the insomniac is always 
heavily tied to contemporary discourse.  He (or, she, less commonly as male is the 
assumed norm) is never simply presented on his (or her) own terms, but related to 
gender, labor, mental illness, moral strength, and technology.   
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That said, the research I conducted included a scan of an archive of millions 
of British newspaper articles dating back to the seventeenth century and a selection of 
major American newspapers dating back to the mid-eighteenth century, just prior to 
the Revolutionary War.  Aside from those four instances of the word appearing in 
print before 1908, I could find nothing before the 1887 British article and nothing 
whatsoever in American newspapers.  Of course, while it is possible to prove that 
something has occurred, it is much more challenging to prove that it has not, or, in 
other words, that no one in any time prior to 1887 has ever used this word.  So, 
perhaps other examples exist.  But clearly, the fact of the apparent emergence of the 
word in this specific historical period of the late nineteenth century, and more 
importantly its emergence in medical discourse of the early twentieth century soon 
thereafter, is historically significant.  As Foucault traces the origins of the madman, I 
am doing the same with the insomniac, beginning with its emergence in discourse. 
Production of Knowledge 
Through its appearance in language, the word insomniac enables the 
individual to be constituted as an insomniac on the basis of his or her sleep habits.  
Foucault explains the process of producing the individual within a diagnostic 
category using the example of hysteria:   
Hysteria, which was so important in the history of psychiatry and in 
the asylums of the nineteenth century, seems to me to be the very 
picture of how the subject is constituted as a mad subject.  And it is 
certainly no accident that the major phenomena of hysteria were 
observed precisely in those situations where there was a maximum of 
coercion to force individuals to constitute themselves as mad.  On the 
other hand, I would say that I am now interested in how the subject 
constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, 
these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the 
individual himself.  They are models that he finds in his culture and 
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are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, 
and his social group. (“Ethics” 291)  
 
Similarly, the coining of the term insomniac and diagnoses and treatments of 
insomnia coerce the individual into adopting this identity and owning its implications; 
yet, the subject himself or herself plays an active role in constituting the self as an 
insomniac, through his or her practices of the self—practices which are socially, 
culturally and medically mediated. 
My intent is to explore the conflicting ways in which the literature of the 
Modernist period becomes a battleground for the purpose and value of insomnia and 
regulation of sleep as a “practice of the self” and a “practice of self formation.”  
Foucault’s concept of “care of the self,” which he defines as “an exercise of the self 
on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain a 
certain mode of being” (“Ethics” 282) becomes a valuable way through which to 
argue that sleep habits are a form of self care, which, in effect, enable the individual 
to prioritize which self requires the most attention.  Foucault argues that the self is not 
unified; one has a multiplicity of selves reflecting the various roles one has in life:  
employee, family member, citizen, and so forth.  Thus, how one comes to define 
“care of the self” reflects not only how one wants to go about developing oneself, but 
what “self” one wants to develop, a hierarchical prioritization of one’s numerous 
roles—this issue, which “self” should take precedence and receive the most “care,” is 
the issue at stake in medical and literary narratives.  In medical narratives, the self 
that deserves the most care is the social self:  the employee, parent, citizen.  Yet, 
oftentimes in literary narratives, the self that deserves the most care is the inner, 
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creative or intellectual self:  the student, artist, poet, philosopher—that part of the self 
that performs the “work” of interpreting experience. 
The insomniac comes to represent a body and mind in conflict during a 
specific historical time and place.  It is an identity category produced just prior to the 
start of World War I, and one that I will argue is, like WWI a culmination of 
processes of medical and scientific advancement as well as the rationalization of both 
industry and, eventually, warfare.  Because of the war, the significance of the 
category of the insomniac takes on a heightened meaning because of its rootedness in 
conflict between personal obligations and social obligations.  This conflict of the 
prioritization of the self becomes all too apparent when the self is also a soldier or 
war worker serving his or her country.  Care of the self takes on a role beyond merely 
being “successful” at earning money or raising a family, but instead includes 
implications not only for individual life and death, but also for the prosperity and 
survival of whole nations relying on individuals to devote their “selves” (bodies and 
minds) to the war effort.  World War I, often noted being temporally related to the 
origin of Modernist period, a notion with which I agree for reasons I will explain to 
come, became a sort of turning point in the history of psychology (as the medical 
discipline produced studies of shell shock and its related conditions), in part because 
of a change I have noticed in literary texts about the nature of insomnia (post-WWI 
insomnia often involves reliving or recreating traumatic or regretful memories or 
fearing sleep because of its likeness to loss of self and death), and in part specifically 
because of the shift in emphasis in literary texts of the nineteenth century from 
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unconscious states (dreams, trances, somnambulism) to insomnia in literary texts of 
the twentieth century.   
Insomnia in Literature 
The difference between the presentation of insomnia in literary texts of the 
nineteenth century and those written in the twentieth, during and after World War I, 
reveals a shift in the nature of the insomniac’s anxiety, or, in other words, what is 
keeping a character awake.  Often, in nineteenth century texts, the anxiety depicted in 
scenes of insomnia is an anxiety over the future.  Take, for example, the following 
passage from Charles Dickens’ novel Great Expectations (1860-61): 
If I [Pip] slept at all that night, it was only to imagine myself drifting 
down the river on a strong spring tide, to the Hulks; a ghostly pirate 
calling out to me through a speaking-trumpet, as I passed the gibbet-
station, that I had better come ashore and be hanged there at once, and 
not put it off.  I was afraid to sleep, even if I had been inclined, for I 
knew that at the first faint dawn of morning I must rob the pantry.  (15) 
 
In this passage, Pip describes his anxiety prior to his impending robbery of his sister’s 
pantry as demanded, on threat of his life, by Magwitch.  The passage incorporates a 
sense of uncontrollable forward movement (“driving down the river on a strong tide”) 
in the direction of imminent demise.  He is unable to sleep not because of the 
knowledge of what he has done, but what he must do in the future.  He fears sleep, 
but not because he will lose himself in sleep, but may lose himself to his future 
actions.  His insomnia is an insomnia of anxiety over the future. 
In another example from the same text, Pip awakens at night and is unable to 
return to sleep.  Pip narrates: 
As I had grown accustomed to my expectations, I had insensibly begun 
to notice their effect upon myself and those around me.  Their 
influence on my own character, I disguised from my recognition as 
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much as possible, but I knew very well that it was not all good.  I lived 
in a state of chronic uneasiness respecting my behavior to Joe.  My 
conscience was not by any means comfortable about Biddy.  When I 
woke up at night . . . I used to think, with a weariness on my spirits, 
that I should have been happier and better if I had never seen Miss 
Havisham's face, and had risen to manhood content to be partners with 
Joe in the honest old forge. (302) 
 
As in the passage discussed earlier, Pip’s insomnia is related more to his fear of the 
future than to his past.  Certainly, he contemplates his previous ill-mannered and 
selfish behaviors with regard to Biddy and Joe, yet only insofar as these behaviors 
represent the direction in which his character seems to be taking as time progresses.  
His regrets over the past are limited to his fears over the type of person they suggest 
he is becoming, rather than has already become.  He believes his manhood and 
character would have been better served had he taken a different direction in life, only 
because he sees himself as not becoming the person he wishes to be in the future. 
Charlotte Brontë’s novel Jane Eyre (1847) includes a similar example of a 
character unable to sleep because of anxiety over the future.  In the passage cited 
below, Jane has insomnia on the eve of her soon-to-be-botched wedding to Mr. 
Rochester.  Brontë recounts Jane’s thoughts: 
This prediction [of blissful slumber] was but half fulfilled:  I did not 
indeed dream of sorrow, but as little did I dream of joy; for I never 
slept at all.  With little Adèle in my arms, I watched the slumber of my 
childhood—so tranquil, so passionless, so innocent—as soon as the 
sun rose I rose too. . . .  She seemed the emblem of my past life; and he 
I was now to array myself to meet, the dread, but adored, type of my 
unknown future day. (208) 
 
As with Pip, Jane is reminded of her past during her futile attempt at sleep.  Yet, these 
memories are not the reason for her inability to sleep.  Instead, her anxiety over her 
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future union with the “dread” Mr. Rochester keeps her awake.  Her past, in its 
“emblematic” form, slumbers peacefully, but her future self induces insomnia. 
We can see a similar pattern of insomnia based in anxiety in American 
literature.  For example, Lily Bart, protagonist of Edith Wharton’s The House of 
Mirth (1905) often suffers from insomnia.  In one case, Wharton describes Lily’s 
thoughts, as she “lay in the darkness reconstructing the past out of which her present 
had grown” (28).  As with Pip, Lily’s insomnia focuses on her past, but only in order 
to view her life teleologically.  She is not haunted by past memories, but her present 
and future, so like Pip and Jane, the person she will become.  The past is only 
significant inasmuch as it affects her present and future situation. The occurrence of 
Lily’s insomnia comes after she spends (and loses) more money at cards than her 
budget allows.  She is anxious over her economic condition and her future prospects.  
This fear of the future keeps her awake; thus, her anxiety is based in the future, even 
when her thoughts focus on her past.   
Perhaps the reason for this future-centric, teleological form of insomnia as 
depicted in these pre-WWI texts has a lot to do with pre-WWI fears of the future.  
The nineteenth century was a time of great change in both the United Kingdom and 
America.  These nations were industrializing and urbanizing, thereby drastically 
changing the day-to-day lives of citizens.  Technology was developing rapidly, and in 
the second half of the nineteenth century we see such advances as the introduction of 
the railways (and Railway Standard Time) and widespread use of electric lighting, 
enabling people to both be out in public and perform labor, whether domestic or 
professional, at night.  Additionally, the countries were expanding geographically 
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through conquest of colonial lands.  Further, especially in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, we see changes within the domestic sphere, with women 
assuming a more public presence and petitioning for the right to political 
involvement, as with the Women’s Suffrage movement, which gained a great deal of 
social and political traction during the end of the nineteenth century. 
Fears associated with these technological, scientific, and social changes are 
reflected in the literature of this period.  For example, texts such as H. G. Wells’ The 
Invisible Man (1897) and Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886) 
describe fears of the scientist overstepping the laws of nature and unintentionally 
creating something monstrous and uncontrollable.  Similarly, fears of the 
consequences of colonial expansion are present in texts such as Edgar Allan Poe’s 
“Murders in the Rue Morgue” in which a colonial import, an ourang-outang from 
Borneo transported by a sailor, escapes control of his (white, male) master and 
murders two virginal white women living in their seemingly impenetrable apartment 
(late at night).  One reading of Poe’s story is as a tale of fear of the uncontrollable 
other, brought back from colonial realms and unleashed in Western society.  Sadly, 
one common association made in Poe’s time (and specifically by one of his friends, 
Thomas Dew), is the equation of the black man with a beast.  According to Dew, with 
“the free black . . . the animal part of the man gains victory over the moral” (qtd. in 
Dayan 243) and in this story we see the destructive power of the ourang-outang once 
he frees himself.  Joan Dayan argues that “Poe’s reconstructions depend upon 
experiences that trade on unspeakable slippages between men and women, humans 
and animals, life and death” (244).  In this story, Poe depicts the ape both as human 
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(trying to shave, to speak, to conceal its crimes), and unspeakably inhuman, because 
in the brutal nature of the murder “there was something . . . altogether irreconcilable 
with our common notions of human action” (Poe 26).  The ape symbolizes this 
slippage between human and animal, the type of slippage that becomes possible 
through colonial domination when one race tries to take possession of another, 
dehumanizing the colonized (and the colonizer) in the process.   
The popularity of the vampire tale of the nineteenth century also speaks to a 
sense of future-oriented anxiety over social change.  According to Lois Cucullu, the 
vampire tale reveals “uneasiness over blood and kinship ties, social mores and class 
standings, and . . . gender and sexual norms” and does so through its disruption of 
waking and sleep (305).  For example, in Bram Stoker’s Dracula, we see numerous 
examples of women, who during their bouts of vampire-induced insomnia, become 
overtly sexual, insist on solitude, and wander alone in the evenings to pursue sexual 
encounters.  Joseph Sheriden Le Fanu’s Carmilla provides another example of this 
motif.  The action of the novel begins with the unexpected arrival of three strange 
women at the narrator, Laura’s, father’s home.  The women who arrive behave 
shockingly, the elder one approaching Laura’s father as an equal rather than her 
superior, making demands of him immediately.  Laura describes the elder one as “so 
distinguished, and even imposing, and in her manner so engaging, as to impress one . 
. . with a conviction that she was a person of consequence” (412).  These women are 
travelling independently (the only males are servants), and in a surprisingly un-
motherly manner of behavior, the older woman requests that Laura and her father 
provide a temporary home for her alleged daughter Carmilla, so that she can attend to 
  
 
26 
 
her “journey of life and death” (411).  After bestowing upon Carmilla a “glance 
which [Laura] fancied was not so affectionate” (412), the elder lady drives away, 
leaving Carmilla behind.  The elder lady’s rude and abrupt manner, her commanding 
presence, and her willingness to abandon her sick “daughter” to strangers point to her 
unfeminine nature; whereas, Laura wants only to take on the feminine role of 
caretaker for the supposedly ill girl.  Carmilla’s “illness,” as it turns out, is a show of 
false helplessness meant to make her hosts vulnerable to her machinations.  A 
governess notes that there was a third woman in the carriage as well, one who is “a 
hideous black woman, with a sort of coloured turban on her head . . . with gleaming 
eyes and large white eyeballs, and her teeth set as if in fury” (414), which expresses 
anxiety both over female independence and the colonial other.  The arrival of 
Carmilla, the vampire, is associated with two decidedly unfeminine women.   
Carmilla effaces gender and sexual norms, openly pursuing Laura sexually, 
even violating Laura’s bed, which simultaneously attracts and repulses Laura.  
According to Cucullu, “The [vampire] novels broadly hinted that no young woman is 
safe, even in her bedroom, a version of ‘you snooze, you lose’ or, worse, become 
loose” (306). We see this “looseness” with Laura who describes her “lassitude and 
melancholy” as “almost luxurious” (437).  Carmilla symbolizes the destructive 
consequences of females disregarding “natural” (sexually reserved) female behavior, 
but notably, she destroys other women rather than men.  Her presence indicates an 
anxiety over the danger of the sexually overt and independent female and her 
detrimental effects on other women.  In a sense, she is even more dangerous than a 
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male vampire like Dracula because she can both play the part of the helpless woman 
and use that role to fool others into admitting her into their homes and confidence. 
In short, insomnia was not absent from texts before World War I, but it was 
treated differently after the war because of its connotations with anxiety over the 
future (with thoughts of the past working in service of predicting or explaining the 
future), as opposed to a backwards movement to the past, which is often regarded 
with shame and regret; in other words, where pre-war texts use insomnia to analyze 
the past’s impact on the present and display anxiety over the future, post-war texts 
illustrate the past as a source of shame and dwell in, rather than reflect upon, the past.  
Post-war insomnia may contain a sense of anxiety over the future, but significantly 
places much more focus on both the past and present.  By the second decade of the 
twentieth century, people witnessed the consequences of modernization.  
Industrialization, conflicts over territory, and changes in the nature of the domestic 
sphere and its related values had already taken hold, and the Western world witnessed 
the consequence:  the Great War.  There was no longer need to fear what these 
movements might bring because it had already happened (though I would place more 
emphasis on the former two than the latter here).  The Great War, the culmination of 
the uglier side of industrialization’s capacity advancement without reflection and its 
related dehumanization, illustrated the consequences of “progress.”  Therefore, as a 
fear of the future morphed into both a sense of regret over the past and the need to 
analyze it to understand why circumstances turned out as they did, the nature of the 
way in which insomnia is depicted in literary texts changed as well.  As Carl Jung 
notes, after having a dream in 1926 of being shelled during the war, “The happenings 
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in the dream suggested that the war, which in the outer world had taken place some 
years before, was not over yet, but was continuing to be fought within the psyche” 
(qtd. in Fussell 113). This stronghold of the war upon the psyche is reflected in the 
ways in which texts describe scenes of insomnia, whether or not the texts are overtly 
about literal war.   
Examining the works of Wells, a writer who produced works spanning from 
the Victorian era to the period following World War I, provides an interesting 
example of the shift of the focus of insomnia even in the works of the same author.  
In his text The Invisible Man, published in 1897, Wells explores the dangers of 
scientific overreach when not coupled with moral considerations, as he tells the story 
of a man who, through the use of scientific innovation (making himself invisible), 
abuses his powers and becomes a force of greed and destruction to all he encounters.  
This tale is one of anxiety over the future and the negative consequences of scientific 
progress, and these concerns are reflected, at times, in the thoughts of characters 
during periods of insomnia.  For instance, Wells describes the thoughts of Dr. Kemp, 
a scientist, as he stays up late at night working in his study.  Taking a break from his 
work, Kemp allows his mind to wander.  Wells relates these thoughts during his 
period of restlessness, or productive insomnia “during which his mind had travelled 
into a remote speculation of social conditions of the future, and lost itself at last over 
the time dimension” (73).   In this passage, Kemp’s late night thoughts focus not on 
the past or present, but on the future as a source of anxiety. 
Yet, in his work written during World War I, Wells offers a different view of 
insomniac thought.  In his 1917 text, The Soul of a Bishop, the main character’s 
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insomnia is not focused on the future, as it is for Kemp in The Invisible Man, but 
rather on the past and present.  Whereas the previous text describes the dangers of 
scientific progress without moral progress, The Soul of a Bishop discusses the 
inability of existing moral and social institutions, specifically the Anglican Church, to 
combat the moral decay progress engenders; older ways of being are inadequate to 
handle present circumstances and have, in fact, generated these present conditions.  
Rather than being a text of anxiety over the future, it is a lament over problems of the 
present.   In a chapter aptly entitled “Insomnia,” Wells describes some of the causes 
for the bishop, Edward Scrope’s, insomnia.  Immediately, Scrope’s insomnia is not 
focused what will be, but rather on present circumstances:  
It was as if he had fallen suddenly out of a spiritual balloon into a 
world of bleak realism.  He found himself asking unprecedented and 
devastating questions, questions that implied the most fundamental 
shiftings of opinion.  Why was the church such a failure?  Why had it 
no grip upon either masters or men amidst this vigorous life of modern 
industrialism, and why had it no grip upon the questioning young? . . .   
This was not as things should be.  He struggled to recover a proper 
attitude.  But he remained enormously dissatisfied. . .  (36-37) 
 
In this passage, Scrope is thinking obliquely of World War I, but his thoughts are 
centered on the current state of spiritual and moral crisis, which he links to 
industrialization and religion as a force of disunity.  He does not fear coming change, 
as Kemp does in the aforementioned passage, but rather knows that change has 
already occurred but cannot be handled by former methods, and his insomniac 
thoughts reflect this revelation. 
A bit further on in the same chapter, Scrope links his insomnia more explicitly 
to the war:  “He rolled in [the bath tub] in spite of ill-health and insomnia, and all the 
while he was tormented by the enormous background of the world war, by his 
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ineffective realization of vast national needs, by his passionate desire, for himself and 
his church, not to be ineffective” (54).  Just prior to this passage, the bishop recalls 
another instance of insomnia in which he was awakened in the night by a “shameful 
memory” of a stolen cigarette (54).  Again, we see insomnia focused not on fear of 
the future but on past regret and present struggle.  As in the previous passage, Scrope 
is not anxious over what may come, as Kemp is, but rather, current affairs and his 
ability to cope with them.  The reference to past insomnia and shame is significant in 
that it implies a chain of causality:  past behaviors lead to present circumstances, so 
the past must be regarded shamefully.  He is anxious over what is, and what is takes 
precedence in his insomnia over what will be.   
Such a way of describing insomnia is not exclusive to Wells.  In Jean Rhys’s 
Good Morning, Midnight (1939) written more than two decades after Wells wrote 
The Soul of a Bishop, we see a similar pattern.  Central character Sasha Jensen 
narrates her insomnia:  “Last night was a catastrophe” (9).  She explains how “last 
night” keeps her awake:  “That [humiliating experience] was last night.  I lie awake, 
thinking about it” (11).  She describes both her memory of her humiliation and her 
inability to sleep, “rolling from side to side” while listening to “the clock ticking on 
the ledge” (12).   Sasha’s insomnia is not based, as is Pip’s, Jane’s, or Lily’s, in a fear 
of the future, but rather her behavior in the past, which she remembers shamefully.  
Even though Sasha’s memories are not directly linked to the war, we can see in these 
examples a shift in the content of the insomniac’s thoughts—from future anxiety to 
contemplation of memories and their subsequent impact on the present moment. 
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Similarly, in an American text such as John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath 
(1939), insomnia is also oriented in present anxiety rather than fear of the future.  For 
instance, the preacher, Jim Casy, discusses the causes of his anxiety in terms of his 
inability to effectively deal with the moral decay of his society (much like Scrope in 
Wells’ novel):  “[The ability to save souls] worried me till I couldn’t get no sleep.  
Here I’d go preachin’ and I’d say, ‘By God, this time I ain’t gonna do it.’ And right 
while I said it, I knowed I was” (23).  Like Scrope, Casy eventually turns his back on 
organized religion, which he feels is ultimately ineffective in meeting the demands of 
modern morality.  Instead, also like Scrope, he turns towards his own individualized 
sense of morality resulting from his sense of the failure of organized religion.   
Insomnia and Modernism 
In part, because of this shift in the presentation of insomnia, I am situating my 
discussion of insomnia and the beginnings of Modernism alongside the start of World 
WWI.  While I would not disagree that novels written prior to WWI have modernist 
stylistic tendencies (one might read Laurence Stern’s Tristram Shandy as similar in 
significant stylistic ways to James Joyce’s Ulysses, see examples of stream of 
consciousness writing in Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, and view the metafictional 
structure at work in Wharton’s novella Ethan Frome), Modernism needed the Great 
War to fully come into being precisely because it was the symbolically calamitous 
culmination of the advances of the nineteenth century.  Accordingly, numerous 
changes in several areas of discourse relevant to insomnia took place directly because 
of the war.  These discursive shifts include changes in the nature of medicine and 
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psychiatry, changes in the conception of time, and changes in the ways in which 
language  and art functioned, all results of the war. 
Beginning my discussion of insomnia and the insomniac after WWI is also 
important given the war’s structural affinity to insomnia.  The Great War and the 
phenomenology of insomnia are similar for many reasons.  The war was one of 
attrition, or in other words, exhaustion, and exhaustion was felt by many during the 
war, one soldier even stating that he “felt [he] would barter [his] soul for a few hours 
of uninterrupted slumber” (qtd. in Eksteins 151).  The war was won by the side that 
could cope with its exhaustion the most effectively.  Additionally, WWI was largely 
fought nocturnally.  It turned the soldiers and war workers into insomniacs, requiring 
them to remain awake long into the night to reinforce the trenches, launch attacks, 
and conduct other business of war that the visibility of daylight rendered too 
dangerous.  Modris Eksteins explains that as a result of the nocturnal nature of trench 
life, “The normal bourgeois approach to time and to the clock was reversed” (150).  
Consequently, the war altered perceptions of time and created a reversal of night and 
day.  Further, the length of the war and the sense of its endlessness mimics the 
insomniac waiting for sleep.  Logically, one knew the war must end, much as the 
insomniac knows sleep will eventually come.  The problem was that no one could 
predict either the end of the war or the end of insomnia.   
Finally, the war had an important impact on perceptions and treatments of 
mental health problems.  In an article entitled “Shell Shock and Its Lessons,” 
published in the British Medical Journal in 1917, author G. Elliot Smith 
acknowledges the ignorance of mental health authorities on their ability to treat 
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mental disorders:  “There is hardly any department of medicine which has been so 
neglected in this country, not only from the clinical and therapeutic but also from the 
research standpoint, as that of psychopathy as apart from definite insanity” (47).  
Consequently, research increased.  Because of the traumatic nature of the war 
experience, fostered by both the often stagnant conditions of the war, as well as the 
devastating nature of injuries made possible by new technologies such as poison gas, 
air strikes, more accurate and deadly munitions, and repeated shellings and bombings, 
even soldiers who remained physically uninjured often suffered psychologically and 
emotionally.  Eksteins writes that “one of the great fears of soldiers was that they 
might break under stress, that they might lose self control, that their legs or nerve 
might fail them in an emergency” (180).  Because, prior to the war, mental illness was 
viewed as more of a women’s problem, related to constitutional and emotional 
weakness, the mental breakdown of soldiers and others involved conflicted with the 
traditional conceptions of masculine stoicism.  As Elaine Showalter argues, “shell 
shock was related to to social expectations of the masculine role in war.  The Great 
War was a crisis of masculinity and a trail of the Victorian masculine ideal” (Female 
171).  Yet, after the war, “The image of idle middle-class women as the chief 
clientele for nervous disorders had been substantially modified” (Showalter, Female 
195).  The mental breakdown of many otherwise healthy individuals lead to changes 
in the perceptions of psychological disorders as feminine problems or indicators of 
weakness, which will be discussed in the chapters to come. 
In addition to the changes I have just described, WWI had an influence on the 
ways in which individuals understood their relationship to time beyond differentiating 
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day and night.  As Fussell explains, “The image of strict division clearly dominates 
the Great War conception of Time Before and Time After, especially when the mind 
dwells on the contrast between the prewar idyll and the wartime nastiness” (80).  
Thus, not only does the war act as a culmination of scientific, political, and 
technological innovation, but also as a fixed dividing line between past and present 
society and mode of life.  Not only is history divided into two distinct periods, one’s 
actual experience of time itself changed.  Bryony Randall explains:   
The First World War radically disrupted the ways in which human 
temporality was or could be conceived. . . .  Not only was the war an 
event without precedent, in brutality and scale, radically challenging 
attempts to create an historical narrative that would be able to 
incorporate it, but, as [Paul] Fussell emphasises, there was a 
widespread belief in circulation at the time that ‘the war would 
literally never end and would become the permanent condition of 
mankind.’  Fussell describes how the experience of fighting at the 
front, characterised by often apparently meaningless routine, the 
carrying out of illogical or downright contradictory orders, and the 
absolute ignorance of what was going on even a few hundred yards 
down the line, let alone miles away, conspired to deprive temporality 
of its familiar characteristics of causality, logical succession and 
change. (3-4) 
 
One could express insomnia in largely the same terms Bryony Randall uses to 
describe the war’s effect on notions of temporality.  Like war, insomnia appears to be 
a “permanent condition” at least as it is being experienced.  Often, for the insomniac, 
fear of insomnia itself is enough to elicit insomnia, perpetuating the sense of the 
infinite.  Because the insomniac sometimes does not know when he or she sleeps or 
even that he or she may have been asleep in the midst of what seems to be a state of 
wakefulness, insomnia does indeed incorporate a sense of endlessness.  Additionally, 
because medical texts emphasize the importance of establishing proper bedtime 
routines and habits, insomnia reveals these routines to be ineffectual, illustrating the 
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“apparently meaningless routine, the carrying out of illogical or downright 
contradictory orders” in this case given by doctors or well-meaning friends or 
relatives in futile attempts to help the insomniac.  Insomnia also often includes “the 
absolute ignorance of what was going on even a few hundred yards down the line” as 
the insomniac is typically isolated from others and ignorant of what is happening 
beyond his or her (non)sleep space.  Finally, insomnia can appear to be “conspired to 
deprive temporality of its familiar characteristics of causality, logical succession and 
change” as it robs the individual of participation in “normal” diurnal cycles of 
sleeping and waking.  Preparing for bed should logically lead to sleep, but for the 
insomniac, who is unable to make the change from the waking state to the sleeping 
one, such a notion of succession and causality unravels.  Thus, as war-time mentality 
and memories of war experience took hold of the population, the literature produced 
evidences these changing notions of time through the frequent incorporation of 
insomnia into literary texts.   
The binary division of time into “before” and “after” reflects a greater change 
in the language habits of individuals, as Fussell notes: 
The physical confrontation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is an obvious 
figure of gross dichotomy.  But less predictably the mode of gross 
dichotomy came to dominate perception and expression elsewhere, 
encouraging finally what we can call the modern versus habit:  one 
thing opposed to another, not with some Hegelian hope of synthesis 
involving a dissolution of both extremes (that would suggest ‘a 
negotiated peace,’ which is an anathema), but with a sense that one of 
the poles embodies so wicked a deficiency or flaw or perversion that 
its total submission is called for . . . one of the legacies of the war is 
just this habit of simple distinction, simplification, and opposition. (79)   
  
One can relate this dichotomous language with a binary distinction between sleeping 
and waking.  While it is not always the case that either can necessarily be presented 
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as “a deficiency or flaw or perversion” by itself, we do get repeated images of either 
sleep as valued over waking, or waking over sleep.  Similarly, sometimes sleep is 
presented as an enemy, as in the case of Ernest Hemingway’s short story “Now I Lay 
Me” in which the narrator, an injured and traumatized WWI soldier, does everything 
in his power to stay awake at night because he fears the consequences of sleeping.   
However, insomnia is a liminal state, between sleeping and waking.  Though 
many tended to resort to binary language, insomnia presents another option, 
indicating the failure of binary categorization.  Understanding the space between 
sleeping and waking as a sort of nether-region of consciousness has origins before the 
war.  The nineteenth century text often focused on altered states of consciousness in 
which one did not know whether one was awake, asleep, dreaming, hallucinating, 
hypnotized, mesmerized, or in some other way experiencing altered consciousness.  
Consciousness itself was a variable and unstable state.  Jenny Bourne Taylor argues 
that during the nineteenth century, psychology as a discipline developed rapidly:  
The emergence of psychiatric medicine, or ‘mental pathology,’ as a 
newly respectable branch of the medical profession with the 
development of the county asylum system and the state care of the 
insane, contributed to the ways in which discussions of the working of 
consciousness, the unconscious, and memory formed part of a much 
wider debate on the nature of social identity. (142) 
 
Importantly, the nineteenth century gave rise to a sense of connection between 
identity and forms of consciousness, contributing to the development of the identity 
category of the insomniac at the start of the twentieth century, indicative of this push 
towards clear classification through identity categories.  While in the modernist text, 
we see a great reduction in the use of states like somnambulism, hypnosis, 
hypnogogia, and altered states of consciousness apart from the occasional bout of 
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drunkenness, we see a lot more insomnia, which, by its very nature resists binary 
classification.  Interestingly, more recent scientific studies, which I will discuss in 
detail in the next chapter, postulate that frequently the insomniac sleeps without 
awareness of sleep, so the sleeping/waking binary becomes further muddled.  Perhaps 
one of the reasons insomnia becomes such a focus of discussion within the modernist 
text is a general sense of discomfort with the tendency towards binary classification 
and the simplification of the individual into fixed, readily-definable identity 
categories.  Perhaps, these texts react to the tension between the two dichotomous 
states of sleeping and waking, revealing the problems with such a dichotomy. 
 Language was further altered in tone, particularly for the British as Fussell 
asserts.  He describes “the style of British Phlegm”:  “The trick here is to affect to be 
entirely unflappable; one speaks as if the war were entirely normal and matter-of-
fact” (181).  This practical use of language to describe unimaginable horrors was 
bureaucratized by the Field Service Post Card, in which a soldier could send a letter 
home by simply erasing inapplicable phrases and leaving relevant (though often 
dishonest) ones present on the form.  For example, one might cross out “I have been 
admitted into hospital” if this were not the case, but leave “I am quite well” or “I am 
being sent down to base” as applicable (Fussell 184-85).  Such a form, (the first form 
ever created for widespread use, according to Fussel (185)) denied soldiers the ability 
to include any sense of emotion or personal experience.  Unsurprisingly, those with 
literary inclinations likely balked at the reduction of experience to a worksheet. 
Even less surprisingly given this simplification and condensation of language, 
a subsequent growing sense of the failure of language as a means of expression 
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begins to take root in period.  Another change in language Fussell describes to be a 
consequence of the war is a sense of the inadequacy of language.  Fussell writes: 
Logically, one supposes, there’s no reason why a language devised by 
man should be inadequate to describe any of man’s works.  The 
difficulty was in admitting that the war had been made by men and 
was being continued ad infinitum by them. . . .  [T]he presumed 
inadequacy of language itself to convey the facts about trench warfare 
is one of the motifs of all who wrote about the war. (170) 
 
This growing discomfort with the ability of language to convey wartime experience 
might also contribute to the prevalence of insomnia in the modernist text.  Because 
sleeping and waking were seen medically and scientifically in a black and white 
manner, as polar opposites, and also because people perceive this black and white use 
of language to be ultimately inadequate in its capacity to describe the war, literary 
texts often seek to explore a state that is not so black and white.  During this gray 
space of insomnia, the individual can process experience and express the collapse of 
these simplistic, dichotomous world-views.  
In addition to changes in language, the war essentially destabilized the world.  
As Eksteins explains,  “As the war’s meaning began to be enveloped in a fog of 
existential questioning, the integrity of the ‘real’ world, the visible and ordered world, 
was undermined. . . .  And as the external world collapsed in ruins, the only redoubt 
of integrity became the individual personality” (211).  Thus, in the modernist literary 
work, we see both the collapse of the ordered, rational world (Joyce’s Nighttown 
section of Ulysses is an excellent example here given its hallucinogenic qualities), as 
well as an intensified focus on individual psychology.  Even in the work of Wells, we 
can see this shift in the difference between his aforementioned texts, The Invisible 
Man and The Soul of a Bishop.  Whereas The Invisible Man is a story largely told 
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from an omniscient perspective, presenting the thoughts of many characters with no 
more specific focus on the psychological workings of one character over another and 
often offering only fleeting insights into each character, The Soul of a Bishop deals 
extensively with the psychological conflicts of one particular individual.  
Unsurprisingly, given all I have argued thus far, insomnia is often the medium 
through which the protagonist of the latter text’s conflicts are exposed and discussed. 
Ultimately, the war itself became regarded as “a form of art” (Eksteins 210).  
This artistic expression of the war, as Eksteins explains, is due to the fact that the 
horrific nature of war experience “had . . . little interpretive potential except in very 
personal terms” (214). Eksteins continues: 
[War writers] connected the sights and sounds of war with art.  Art 
became, in fact, the only available correlative of war; naturally not an 
art following previous rules, but an art in which the rules of 
composition were abandoned, in which provocation became the goal, 
and in which art became an event, an experience.  As the war lost 
external meaning, it became above all an experience. (214) 
 
War, in other words, is not re-presentable through traditional means of expression, 
and language, by itself, often failed.  Thus, after the war, literature, even literature not 
about war specifically, became more experiential.  Texts like Joyce’s Ulysses, even 
though not about war directly, are clearly motivated by this new approach to art.  
Neither presents a story in the traditional sense; events happen, but the actual 
experience of reading the text takes precedence over the plot of the text.  When 
combined with the aforementioned changes in the nature of understanding of cause 
and effect and time, as well as changes in language, we can see the importance of the 
war in shaping the modernist text. 
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Conclusions 
By the time the war did finally end on 11 November 1918, these associations 
between war and modernity had become so ingrained in the lives of Americans and 
British, the impossibility of a return to pre-war ways of life became apparent. Such 
changes were reflected culturally in new styles of art, including literature. As Fussell 
asserts, “Very often, the new reality [of life after World War I] had no resemblance 
whatever to the familiar, and the absence of a plausible style placed some writers in 
what they thought was an impossible position. . . .  [This change in language and 
literary style] was a matter of leaving, finally, the nineteenth century behind” (174).  
Literature changed accordingly, and literary uses and depictions of insomnia followed 
suit.  Much like the modernist text, insomnia is not a story, but an experience.  During 
bouts of insomnia, typically, nothing happens.  As Blanchot explains, “insomnia is . . 
. percussive stillness” (49).  Insomnia may fit into a plot, but by itself has no plot.  It 
marks the passage of time, but is itself without movement.  Consequently, insomnia 
becomes a very important literary vehicle of the modernist text because it fits so well 
with changes that took place in literature after the war.  It allows for intense focus on 
individual psychology, it disrupts traditional notions of cause and effect (I am tired 
and want to sleep, and I am in bed awaiting sleep, but I cannot sleep), and it reflects 
the same sense of time (infinite waiting with no end in sight) as the war experience. 
In order to explore insomnia in the modernist text, I have divided this 
dissertation into five further chapters.  The second chapter provides an overview of 
the discourse of insomnia from the nineteenth century until modern times.  As I 
argued earlier, the insomniac is a figured produced by discourse, thus his or her 
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disorder is always tied into contemporaneous values, beliefs, morals, and ethics.  The 
main purpose of this section is to situate the creation of the insomniac historically, as 
well as illustrate the ways in which the Modernist period influenced our 
understanding of insomnia and the insomniac today.  The next three chapters are 
devoted to insomniacs in different social identity categories, or, more specifically, the 
way the category of the “insomniac” intersects with other identity categories.  
Chapter three examines the insomniac as a product of the war, as well as the 
relationship between the phenomenology of insomnia and the phenomenology of the 
war experience.  Chapter four looks at insomnia as related to the gendered body, 
because, as I will argue, insomnia in bodies of different genders has different 
discursive representations and implications.  The fifth chapter discusses insomnia as it 
relates to social class, further emphasizing the relationship between social identity 
categories and the causes, treatments, and perceptions of disordered sleep.  Insomnia 
is regarded both a consequence and disorder of privilege, illustrating again its 
paradoxical nature.  My final chapter breaks from examining various categories of 
identity in order to illustrate the ways in which insomnia shapes perception and 
thought, and therefore, literary productions of authors.  If experience, but more 
importantly perception of experience, which is always filtered through language and 
discourse structures reality, then insomnia, as experience, has the ability to influence 
one’s perception of the world, and, therefore, one’s interpretation of it as expressed in 
the literary text.  The final chapter explains the ways in which the experience of 
insomnia translates to the structure of the text. 
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Ultimately, literature deals with conflict.  The four basic literary conflicts 
involve a person struggling against the self, another person, nature, or society.  And, 
what is insomnia if not conflict, whether the conflict lies in the struggle to sleep or the 
struggle to keep oneself awake despite exhaustion?  But, what makes insomnia so 
interesting is that it, sometimes simultaneously, envelopes each of these types of 
conflict.  Interpersonal relationships may certainly cause insomnia, as may internal 
conflict.  Similarly, one’s difficulties with social position or expectations are often 
reflected in insomnia, as is one’s battle with his or her own physiology, nature, or the 
external, physical world.  Conflict, when combined with the changes in art, literature, 
psychology, and medicine brought about by WWI, lead to a type of literature in 
which insomnia becomes particularly significant and relevant as a means of 
expression.  The treatment of insomnia in literature presents both a standard discourse 
in which sleep-time is essential to the working day, or, in other words, productivity, 
and may also be equated with immoral behavior or contradicting “natural” social 
roles, yet, the counter-discourse, as represented in literary texts, presents insomnia as 
essential to a different type of self care, one which comes through exploring one’s 
internal and external conflicts.  Insomnia, as a device, provides the time and space for 
such exploration, and as an experience, alters perceptions of both the day time and 
night time worlds.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SNOOZERS AND LOSERS:  A GENEAOLOGY OF SLEEP STUDIES 
 
“Sleeplessness is a human tragedy—great or small according to its severity,” 
begins the “Sleeplessness” section of Dr. W. Johnson Smyth’s 1923 “Address on 
Sleep and Sleeplessness” (226).  Smyth’s statement, made nearly a century ago, 
accurately represents the medical field’s perception of insomnia as antagonistic, a 
condition hampering human life, and necessary to prevent through intervention.  A 
cursory internet search done today reflects Smyth’s sentiments; the phrase “insomnia 
treatments” results in 32.7 million hits on Google.  The pursuit of sound sleep also 
makes for profitable business.  According to David Randall, in 2010 a full 25% of 
adults in the United States possessed prescription sleeping pills, and advertising for 
these pills accounted for more than $1 billion from 2005-2006 (237).   
These numbers are not unexpected given the prevalence of insomnia today:  
“As the NSF [National Sleep Foundation] documented in its 2002 Sleep in America 
poll, 58 percent of Americans identify from one to four of the symptoms of insomnia 
as occurring in a given week, and 35 percent of respondents claim insomnia 
symptoms running for an entire year” (Wolf-Meyer 161).  More recently, the 2014 
Sleep Health Index created by the National Sleep Foundation reports that “35% of 
Americans report their sleep quality as ‘poor’ or ‘only fair’” (NSF).  Statistics in the 
United Kingdom are similar:  
In a recent [2007] UK study by Morphy and colleagues, 37% of 
respondents reported insomnia at baseline; a year later 69% of these 
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still had problems sleeping, while 15% of those without insomnia at 
baseline had developed it.
 
 Insomnia is also a persistent condition. In a 
recent [2009] longitudinal study of people with insomnia at baseline, 
74% still reported insomnia after a year, and 46% still reported 
insomnia after 3 years. (Calem et al.) 
 
Given that more than a third of American and British adults regularly have trouble 
sleeping and more than half have intermittent trouble sleeping, our current interest in 
sleep and insomnia and the amount of money and resources the sleep industry 
generates are unsurprising. 
Despite the current statistics, the interest in insomnia and its remedies is not a 
recent phenomenon, nor is relatively widespread insomnia exclusive to contemporary 
times.  Sleep and insomnia have long been literary, philosophical, and poetic tropes, 
but the emergence of modern medical sleep studies in the USA and UK came about 
primarily in the second half of the nineteenth century, coinciding with the second 
Industrial Revolution in Europe and America.  Cultural studies sleep researcher 
Matthew Wolf-Meyer cites Robert MacNish’s 1824 text, The Philosophy of Sleep, as 
the “first modern monograph on sleep” (27), and further notes that “by the 1880s a 
robust body of literature [on sleep] existed” (52).  This new scientific and medical 
interest in sleep studies in part reflects industrial developments of the nineteenth 
century rooted in the “principle of unlimited productivity that made fatigue both 
inevitable and inadmissible” (Summers-Bremner 100), as well as the emergence of 
the fields of psychology and psychiatry, as described in the first chapter.  Increased 
interest in the production and use of energy, when combined with the growth of both 
manufacturing industries and the widespread use of publically produced gas and 
electric lighting, arose alongside inquiries into the maintenance of proper sleep habits, 
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also known as “sleep hygiene,” the goal of which was the prevention of  fatigue and 
the maximization of productivity. 
Around this period in the mid-nineteenth century fatigue, a primary 
consequence of insomnia, became a social and medical “obsession” (Rabinbach 20).  
More importantly, however, scientific and medical communities viewed fatigue as a 
“conquerable” state, one that could be regulated and prevented (Rabinbach 21), 
thereby resulting in the intervention of the medical branch into people’s sleep habits, 
but also other elements of their daily behavior or even morality with implications 
regarding sleep.   Anson Rabinbach argues that medical literature of the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century depicts fatigue as a moral and social ill (20), and “considered 
fatigue as the chief sign of the body’s refusal to bend to the disciplines of modern 
industrial society” (38).  In this sense, the chronically faulty sleeper came to be 
understood as a sort of social outcast and rebel.   
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, medical discourses often 
complemented the industrial mentality of the maximization of productivity through 
emphasis on the correlation between sleep habits and contributory citizenship and 
moral behavior.  For example, when giving advice to parents as to how to handle 
children with troubled sleep behaviors, Henry Munson Lyman writes in his 1885 
book Insomnia; And Other Disorders of Sleep: 
Wakefulness sometimes occurs merely as the result of a bad habit.  
This is usually observed among delicate children of a nervous 
temperament, whose inclinations have never been thwarted.  Such 
patients have been sometimes cured, after the failure of a long and 
expensive course of treatment with homoeopathic globules, by the 
adoption of a systematic moral training reinforced by the occasional 
forcible application of the parental hand to the gluteal region of the 
child.  Of course such a method must not be recommended without 
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certain knowledge that no lurking disease of the nervous system has 
escaped detection.  Fretfulness and wakefulness are not associated 
with proper living and good health.  (112) 
 
Lyman’s suggestion to cure troubled sleep habits through spanking (which he 
euphemizes beautifully) implies both the relationship of good sleep to morality, but 
also of good sleep to appropriate socialization.  Lyman implies that the troubled 
sleeper lacks moral strength and discipline, and he regards such a child as a drain on 
the family in two significant ways:  as spoiled (“inclinations have not been thwarted”) 
and “expensive” in terms of the cost of treating the child medically.  Overall, these 
descriptions of the poorly sleeping child reflect the child as not actively productive of 
resources or “earning” them, but as one who unfairly demands and depletes the 
family’s attention and finances.  The insomniac child is an economic drain on the 
family, just as the insomniac citizen becomes a drain on his or her society.  Thus, he 
illustrates the relationship between “proper” and disciplined sleep habits and financial 
prosperity.  Consequently, Lyman emphasizes moral education as necessary in 
instilling good sleep habits, enabling the child to not be a drain, but a productive, 
disciplined individual. 
Sleep and Industry    
This interest in fatigue and sleep reflects a developing nineteenth century 
consciousness of the preservation and utilization of energy rooted in the rise of 
industry and technology.  However, society was essentially dichotomous, and the 
effects of industrialization were inconsistently spread through urban and rural areas:  
“the nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth were effectively a patchwork 
of disjunct spaces and times, some rationalized and shaped by new institutional and 
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market-based requirements, while in many others premodern patterns and 
assumptions obdurately survived” (Crary 66).   The rise of interest in fatigue 
correlated with a society in transition between older, pre-modern and newer, 
industrial ways of being.   Here we see a dichotomy between rural lives and the goods 
they produce still regulated by natural cycles, but others in more modernized areas 
living according to the idea that “the rationalization of production was predicated on 
the rationalization of the body” (Rabinbach 243).   
This increased interest in studies of fatigue reflects the rationalization of the 
body required by industry.  According to Eluned Summers-Bremner, “The need to 
accept the limit to reason of the body’s secret knowledge about when it will sleep or, 
as with democracy, an opacity key to the system’s functioning, can also be mapped 
onto social concerns about the future of urban labour in America in the 1880s” (120), 
but this statement certainly applies to British society as well.  Here, we can see an 
anxiety over understanding the workings of “natural” sleep, the body’s secrets about 
why and when it can sleep, for the benefit of industry.  Interestingly, complaints of 
insomnia increased alongside industrial developments (Summers-Bremner 83).  
Paradoxically, the more social discourse focused on maintaining and maximizing 
energy use, the more the public felt that their energy was being depleted and 
experienced an increased sense of fatigue.  This relationship is similar to the 
insomniac’s relationship with sleep:  the more one obsesses over the need to sleep, 
the more difficult falling asleep becomes.   
One of the major figures involved in the regulation of bodily functions to 
increase the productivity and profitability of labor is Frederick Taylor, developer of 
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the Taylorist system of industrial management, or “the first truly scientific method of 
organizing modern industrial work based on efficient procedures” (Rabinbach 239).  
Taylor presented a view of sleep research different from labor scientists interested in 
eliminating fatigue.  Taylor’s goal was not necessarily to reduce fatigue, as we see 
with some other practitioners of the labor science, but rather to eliminate wasted 
movement and energy (Rabinbach 243).  When presented in the light of insomnia, 
views of fatigue management researchers and views of Taylorists can be applied in 
both convergent and divergent ways.  Both see fatigue and insomnia as counter-
productive; however, where those who study fatigue management see insomnia as a 
cause of decreased energy, Taylorists view it as wasted time.  Either way, the need to 
study and control the sleep of laborers, and by extension, all citizens, essentially 
makes the work-day (regardless of the type of labor) unending.  Now, in addition to 
time spent working being a marker of productivity, time spent at home, sleeping or 
not sleeping, also becomes a factor subject to discipline.  The industrial anxiety over 
wasted time, or in other words, wasted productivity and profits, resulted in a medical 
discourse of sleep and habit regulation as associated with productivity, but also put 
the work-day on a continuum, which extended through the night.  This view persisted 
into twentieth century devaluations of sleep, as those of Thomas Edison and Charles 
Lindbergh discussed in the first chapter. 
This view of the individual as twenty-four hour machine (whether working or 
not) is apparent in the language of the medical discipline.  For example, in the 1869 
book Sleep and Its Derangements, John Hammond writes, “The more active the 
mind, the greater necessity for sleep, just as with a steamer, the greater number of 
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revolutions the engine makes, the more imperative is the demand for fuel” (50).  In 
another example of mechanistic language, Hammond makes the following 
comparison:  “To use the simile of the steam-engine again, the fires are lowered and 
the operatives go to work to repair damages and put the machine in order for the next 
day’s work” (43).  Here Hammond clearly compares the individual to a machine, 
reflecting the relationship between the necessity of sleep and industrial productivity, 
which Wolf-Meyer explains as “an appeal to efficiency . . . and the continued ability 
of individuals to labor” (60).  In Hammond’s view, the human as machine is either 
working or “repairing” itself for work; thus, it is always in some state of work.  
Hammond provides a clear example of the interrelationship of the medical discipline 
to industry.   A. W. MacFarlane provides another example:  “the need for sleep is 
well explained by the fatigue of daily toil, in which waste products are manufactured 
quickly and energy is expended . . . a time of rest is required for the removal of the 
one and the recuperation of the other” (25).  Though MacFarlane does not overtly 
refer to the body as a machine, his language implies this correlation.  Using terms like 
“manufactured” and “products,” MacFarlane presents a comparison of the body to a 
factory, and like Hammond, views the time of sleep as a period of mechanical repair.  
MacFarlane and Hammond utilize an economic model of the body, incorporating 
sleep as a necessary part of the manufacturing process.  Marxist writer Paul Lafargue 
is heavily critical of this mechanistic view of the worker, arguing that for the 
capitalist, “it is ideal to reduce the producer to the smallest number of needs, to 
suppress his joys and his passions and to condemn him to play the part of a machine 
turning out work without respite and without thanks” (21).  Lafargue notes the 24-
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hour model of individual as worker and finds fault with this conception of man as 
now presented both by industrialists and the medical field. 
Night Lights 
Another industrial-medical correlation in sleep studies comes with the 
increased study of the relationship between the newly developing use of electricity 
and sleep or fatigue.  The first central electricity station was built in New York City 
in 1883, facilitating the introduction of electric lighting in people’s homes and its 
widespread public use (Schivelbusch 66).  Electric lighting, safer and cleaner than 
gas, was enthusiastically embraced by the public (Schivelbusch 70-71).  The use of 
electric lighting opened up new economic possibilities, allowing businesses to stay 
open later and increasing the safety of travelling the streets at night.  Jonathan Crary 
argues, “The illumination of nighttime was a symbolic demonstration of what 
apologists for capitalism had promised throughout the nineteenth century:  it would 
be the twin guarantee of security and increased possibilities for prosperity, 
supposedly improving the fabric of social existence for everyone” (16-17).   
However, the increased use of electricity had somewhat paradoxical 
implications, many of which are detrimental to sleep.  Wolfgang Schivelbusch notes 
that when gas is in use, when going to sleep, “people preferred to sever all connection 
with such a dangerous element and restore the household’s original autonomy for a 
few hours” (38), but electricity renders lighting not “individualistic,” but rather makes 
one part of a “collective,” unable to be cut off in order to temporarily sever household 
ties to the rest of the world (76).  Schivelbusch claims, “Just as the public sphere 
gained access to the home with daylight, so big industry forced its way in with the 
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light of the gas flame and electric bulb” (186).  Thus, much as industrial and fatigue 
management systems extend the workday into the evening through their interest in 
sleep, electric lighting ensured that the household always remained “open,” dependent 
upon, and accessible to the influence and power of industry. 
Night Work 
One additional sleep-negating implication of the widespread use of industrial 
lighting is the ability to turn night into day.  Smyth notes that “Most people sleep 
during the night.  The silence of the night and other circumstances co-operate to bring 
this about” (226).  However, as early as 1845, nearly forty years before the 
widespread use of electric lighting, critics of industry began to notice the implications 
of disrupting this typical pattern and equate the disruption of sleep for the purpose of 
labor with capitalist greed.  Frederick Engels writes that the aim of capitalists: 
[W]as to make the capital invested in the building and machinery to 
produce the highest return, by every available means, to make it work 
as actively as possible.  Hence the manufacturers introduced the 
shameful system of night-work.  Some of them employed two sets of 
operatives, and let one set work the twelve hours of the day, and the 
other the twelve hours of the night.  It is needless to picture the effect 
upon the frames of young children, and even upon the health of young 
persons and adults, produced by permanent loss of sleep at night, 
which cannot be made good by any amount of sleep during the day.  
Irritation of the whole nervous system, with general lassitude and 
enfeeblement of the entire frame, were the inevitable results, with the 
fostering of temptation to drunkenness and unbridled sexual 
indulgence.  One manufacturer testifies that during the two years in 
which night-work was carried on in his factory, the number of 
illegitimate children born was doubled, and such general 
demoralization prevailed that he was obliged to give up night-work. 
(161) 
 
Engels’ critique places him in a unique position in relation to the medical discipline’s 
views of the relationship between sleep and productivity.  On the one hand, Engels 
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agrees that the disruption of sleep cycles and irregular sleep habits are problematic in 
that they both decrease a person’s energy and perpetuate vice.  MacFarlane, for 
example, notes effects of exhaustion in “the poor, who are obliged to continue their 
work into the night to eke out their means of subsistence” and relates exhaustion to 
vice for the “searchers after pleasure who convert night into day” (39-40).  In this 
sense, Engels is in accord with the prevalent medical views of his time, such as the 
ones discussed by MacFarlane above and Lyman earlier.  Engels decries the moral 
and physical consequences of a break from sleep cycles dictated by natural cycles of 
light and darkness, noting a marked increase in the vice of night-workers.   
On the other hand, Engels acknowledges, in a way many doctors do not, the 
relationship between the presence of industry and disrupted sleep.  Of course, the 
medical discipline did cite “overwork” as a cause for insomnia; however, “overwork” 
typically referred to mental, rather than physical toil (MacFarlane 64), thus was 
dissociated from industrial practice.  In another example, with regard to the railroad, a 
major symbol of industrialization, MacFarlane denies any relationship between it and 
sleep:  “Much was written at one time concerning the effects of railway travelling in 
preventing sleep, but the writer, after careful inquiries, which, as medical adviser to 
two railway companies, he had extensive opportunities for making, was unable to find 
any evidence in support of this opinion” (46).  Not surprisingly, MacFarlane, 
acknowledging in this statement that he is paid by railway companies, has a stake in 
disconnecting railway travel from insomnia, which Engels does not in the case of 
industry; in fact, Engels is determined to find fault with industrialists.  Those who 
worked for and with industry, as many medical professionals and fatigue researchers 
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did, did not readily acknowledge the correlation between industrialization and sleep 
loss, but rather emphasized the role of individual health and habit.  Others, like 
Engels, view industry’s drive towards increased productivity as a source of sleep 
disruption on a massive scale.  One’s view of the relationship between industry and 
sleep heavily reflected the bias of the individual analyzing this relationship. 
It would be inaccurate to argue that workers did not labor at night prior to the 
Industrial Revolution, and in “nascent enterprises—the mills, forges, and mines of 
early modern Europe—we can glimpse the profound contributions that nighttime 
would one day make to industrial productivity” (Ekirch 161).  However, industrial 
night work was the exception rather than the rule.  What was not an exception, 
though, were other forms of labor that commonly took place at night, such as street 
cleaning (including the removal of excrement and corpses), the work of servants, 
laundry, and other tasks that did not require bright light for detailed construction.   As 
A. Roger Ekirch argues in At Day’s Close, a study of nighttime and sleep practices in 
pre-industrial times, a great deal of labor did, in fact, take place at night (156).  
However, unlike the perpetually running factories Engels describes, as well as the 
alienation of the worker from products of these factories, night work of pre-industrial 
times had two distinct characteristics:  idiosyncrasy and personal necessity.  Ekirch 
notes the “irregular hours that marked some laborers’ travail”:  “Not all times of day 
or days of the week for these workers were alike in intensity” (157).  Further, it was 
“the pressures of subsistence” which drove workers to night work (Ekirch 158). Night 
work was done not as an alternative to, but in addition to daytime work.  I am not 
arguing that the laborer in a factory does not work for subsistence, but he or she 
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might have the same level of subsistence if granted a day shift instead.  The pre-
industrial worker’s subsistence, however, relied upon the addition of this night work, 
making it not an alternative to daytime work but a supplement.   
One major advancement made in the ability to do work on a massive scale at 
night is the use of electricity.  Unsurprisingly, the case of electricity provides another 
example of the medical discipline embracing industry and its products is evident in 
discussions of electricity and lighting.  Not only does the rise of gas and electrical 
lighting facilitate the ability to stay awake later into the night, it also disrupts the 
privacy and isolation equated with sleep, though electricity more so than gas, as 
discussed earlier.  However, despite the changes in sleep allowed through the ability 
to light up hours of darkness, the medical discipline, rather than criticizing the 
prevalence of nighttime lighting, quickly embraced the use of electricity in treating 
fatigue.  According to Schivelbusch: 
Electricity was believed to be, and was used as, a means of restoring 
exhausted energies.  In a study of the late-nineteenth-century obsession 
with exhaustion, we read that “in chemical and technological warfare 
against fatigue one weapon stands out among the rest:  electricity.  If 
fatigue was the disorder of energy, electricity held out the promise of 
restitution.” (71) 
 
Many sleep studies after 1880, including MacFarlane’s Insomnia and Its Therapeutics 
(1891), Lyman’s Insomnia; And Other Disorders of Sleep (1885), Edward Payson 
Hurd’s Sleep, Insomnia, and Hypnotics (1891), and George M. Beard and A. D. 
Rockwell’s On the Medical and Surgical Uses of Electricity (1891) offer descriptions 
of the uses of electricity in treating insomnia.  MacFarlane, for example, asserts its 
efficacy:  “This remedy, whether in the form of central galvanization or general 
faradizations, is often attended by an improvement in the quantity of sleep. . . .  The 
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writer has found it beneficial in about three-fourths of the patients who have used it 
for insomnia” (294).  Here we begin to see a dichotomy between public perceptions 
of electricity as a means to forestall sleep and the medical and industrial view of 
electricity as a means to prevent fatigue, similar to the discrepancy between Henry 
David’s Thoreau’s famous illustration in Walden of the railway as disruptive to sleep 
and MacFarlane’s denials of this relationship. 
Creating the Insomniac 
Given this convergence of various factors, including industry, studies into 
fatigue and productivity, and widespread public and domestic nighttime lighting, the 
early twentieth century gives birth to a new medical diagnostic category:  the 
“insomniac,” which I discuss in my first chapter.  I will not repeat my discussion of 
the general implications of this new term here, but rather illustrate ways in which 
sleep studies incorporated the idea of biographic inquiry as a method of treating 
insomnia.  Regarding the insomniac, in a 1923 article on the treatment of insomnia, 
British physician Robert Hutchinson explains, “A careful inquiry should be made into 
his past history and present conditions, his daily routine, the arrangement of his 
meals, the hours and conditions of his work” (776).  Hutchinson’s statement 
emphasizes that insomnia is now not only a condition to be studied, but rather, the 
person who suffers from insomnia becomes a character to be studied.   The idea of 
inquiry into character as a means of both diagnosis and treatment as we see with the 
case of the insomniac was intensified by the outbreak of World War I in 1914.  
Another product of the rise of industry and mechanization, the use of industrial 
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warfare precipitated a spike in the amount of studies done into insomnia, as a 
symptom of nervous disorder and fatigue.  Rabinbach writes: 
Apart from the manpower needs served by the psychophysics of 
aptitude testing and the rehabilitation of the wounded, the 
psychological effects of combat, especially pathological fatigue and 
neurasthenia, also emerged as a universal concern.  The war brought in 
its wake a voluminous literature on the psychology of the emotions, in 
particular the nervous disorders of the combatants. (266) 
 
Much as medicine and industry worked together to use industrially produced 
electricity as a form of treatment and ensure a rested workforce, so then did medicine 
and industry work in the rehabilitation of soldiers to return them to productivity both 
during and after the war:  “In short, two systems were ultimately compatible.  It was 
not good intentions or a new intellectual synthesis, but World War—especially the 
reorganization of national industry for war production—that accomplished the 
amalgamation of the science of work to the Taylor system” (Rabinbach 258).  In 
other words, the war allowed for a culmination of the goal of sleep studies initiated in 
the nineteenth century:  to enable the medical discipline to ensure a productive labor 
force, but also a labor force dependent on the very systems that render it productive 
(electricity and medicine). 
Part of the methodology of applying work science to both the military and 
industry involved inquiries into the nature of the individual as reflected in the creation 
of the diagnostic category of the insomniac.  As Smyth observes, “There are few, if 
any, human ailments requiring so fine a comprehension of our patient’s individuality, 
his physique and surroundings, as the condition of insomnia” (227).  Part of the 
understanding of the individual comes with an understanding of his or her habits:  “In 
order to affect this desirable end [to insomnia] an attempt ought to be made by every 
  
 
57 
 
middle-aged person who suffers from insomnia in whatever degree to mend matters 
by some attention to the details of routine habits” (Rankin, “Broken Sleep” 77).  
Because sleep is a habit, correcting the habit of disrupted sleep requires discipline; 
however, discipline also involves outside coercion (as that from a doctor) into daily 
individual behaviors.  As Foucault argues, “Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is a 
specific technique of power that regards individuals as both objects and instruments 
of its exercise.”  He continues, “The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism 
that coerces by means of observation” (Discipline 170).  The diagnosis of insomnia, 
or more significantly, of being an insomniac, opens one’s life up to both discipline 
and observation of an individual’s past and present circumstances and coercion into 
“improved” sleep hygiene and habits. 
According to Elaine Showalter, the period from 1870 to World War I was 
“dominated” by Darwinian psychiatry.  This particular branch of psychiatry “sternly 
maintained that hereditary organic taint compounded by vicious habits caused 
madness” (Female 104).  While madness and insomnia are far from synonymous 
(though the latter is often a symptom of the former), the methodology of this 
Darwinian branch of medicine has strong resonances with the ways in which 
insomnia was diagnosed and treated in the time period surrounding the coining of the 
term insomniac.  Showalter writes that Darwinian psychology “brought with it 
changes in the view of the psychiatrist’s role and of the proper conduct of treatment” 
(Female 105).  Most significantly: 
Claiming a new social authority as experts on the laws of heredity and 
the operations of the mind, Darwinian psychiatrists extended their 
professional role far beyond the asylum walls.  They sought to capture 
a wide sphere of power in late nineteenth-century society:  in the 
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courtroom, where they made pronouncements on the family and 
education of youth; in the bedroom, where they defined acceptable 
sexual behavior; and in the state, where they proposed mental hygiene 
as the model of social discipline. (Female 105)  
 
This invasion of psychiatry into the “bedroom” and other realms of a patient’s life, as 
Showalter argues, goes beyond just the diagnosis of madness to the regulation of 
overall social hygiene, reflecting a medical discipline imbued with a strong sense of 
social responsibility.  
This sense of responsibility only increased with the outbreak of WWI in 1914 
and the subsequent cases of war trauma, then commonly referred to as “shell shock.”  
Many believed that “shell shock was dependent upon a psychoneurotic history, and 
that it was highly contagious, more frequent among the nervous, weakly, and 
maladjusted, and among undisciplined units” (Showalter, Female 170).  Thus, again, 
we see a condition that is not interpreted as a product of its immediate circumstances, 
but rather, one that is regarded as a culmination of circumstance, character, and 
biography.  Significant parallels exist between the diagnosis of insomnia and the 
treatment of the epidemic of “shell shock” that occurred as a result of the war.  On the 
most basic level, insomnia is one of the most consistent symptoms of shell-shock.  
Additionally, the diagnosis and treatment of both shell-shock and insomnia involve 
inquiries into the character of the afflicted, as well as an association between 
character type and propensity to suffer from either disorder.  Finally, the goal of 
treatment for either was the ultimate return to “normal” productive daily life.  In a 
passage on the relationship between shell shock and insomnia, in the 1918 article 
“Broken Sleep,” physician Guthrie Rankin writes: 
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This terrible war has exacted from those who participate in its 
activities, as well as from those who “watch and wait,” an enormous 
toll of misery both by day and by night.  The man whose nervous 
system breaks under the strain of the horrors of active conflict finds his 
clinical counterpart in the mother, wife, or sweetheart at home, whose 
mental poise has equally, and after a similar manner, yielded to the 
burden of long-continued anxiety.  Both have reached, through 
different channels, the limit of endurance, and the periodical repose 
which the nervous system can only obtain during sleep is interrupted, 
or, it may be, permanently broken. (77) 
 
In this passage, Rankin effeminizes the soldier who suffers from shell shock, 
comparing him to a housewife.  As Showalter argues, “Built on an ideology of 
absolute and natural difference between women and men, English psychiatry found 
its categories undermined by the evidence of male war neurosis” (Female 168), and 
this undermining of categories is evident in Rankin’s linkage between soldier and 
housewife.  While he does acknowledge the horror of war as an intrinsic part of the 
breakdown of one’s sleep, his wording suggests the importance of character.  For 
example, he says “The man whose nervous system breaks,” rather than “The horror of 
war breaks the man’s nervous system.”  His use of the passive voice defers agency 
from the war experience to the character of the man incapable of resisting its effects. 
The Modernist period, roughly concurrent with the start of World War I, 
provided a dichotomous representation on the function and purpose of sleep studies.  
On the one hand, the medical discipline continued along its previous trajectory of 
emphasizing the evils of disrupted sleep, associating insomnia with flaws of 
temperament or constitution, and conducting inquiries into the character and history 
of the insomniac.  On the other hand, literary authors began to incorporate their own 
critiques of the medical discipline in their texts, and often did so through illustrating 
the futility of medical treatments of insomnia and attempts at regulation of sleep.  We 
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see such critiques in the works of modernist authors like Virginia Woolf, Dorothy 
Richardson, H. G. Wells, Siegfried Sassoon, and Ford Madox Ford.  Other authors, 
including F. Scott Fitzgerald, Franz Kafka, Marcel Proust, and James Joyce include 
within their texts a different presentation of insomnia from that of doctors, not as a 
condition diminishing productivity, but a state necessary to artistic and creative 
production.  I will address both approaches in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that during this period we also see the rise of 
the insomniac as a character, which this dissertation discusses in much detail.  Kenton 
Kroker argues that “The 1920s and 1930s saw the evolution of the full-blown 
insomniac, whose routine struggle for adequate sleep provided psychiatrists and 
neurologists with a typology, and patients with an identity” (349).  As Kroker notes, 
during this period insomnia was viewed as an “organic condition . . . thoroughly 
grounded in the personal and medical care of the body,” and this condition also had 
important resonances with overall mental health (351).  Though I argue that WWI 
itself had a great deal to do with the seemingly endemic nature of this condition, 
Kroker argues that some contemporaries saw discussion of insomnia in media as 
being part of the problem as well.  For example, he cites the sleep researcher Robert 
Kingman, who viewed insomnia as a “circular madness” that was so exaggerated 
within media that people developed a “pathological fear of wakefulness” thereby 
proliferating the condition of insomnia (351).  Interestingly, Kingman largely viewed 
insomnia as a delusion, and believed that modern individuals required less sleep than 
their pre-industrial counterparts (Kroker 351).   Much as Kingman feels that insomnia 
is “circular madness,” his argument about the media involves circularity as well:  did 
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media make this condition “popular” through discussion?   Or did it discuss this 
condition because of its popularity? 
Modern Sleep Studies 
Ultimately, the goal, purpose and discourse of sleep studies remains fairly 
consistent through the Modernist period in the ways I have previously described and 
will explore in more detail in chapters to come.  In fact, some maintain that, with the 
exception of an increased production of information about the brain, body chemistry, 
and circadian rhythms, little has changed in the study and practice of sleep over the 
last century.  Jim Horne, author of the 2006 book Sleepfaring:  A Journey through the 
Science of Sleep, argues that “our sleeping life has not really changed and, if 
anything, is better today than for the average worker 100 or so years ago” (205).  He 
cites a passage from an 1894 editorial on sleep published in the British Medical 
Journal, which states, “The hurry and excitement of modern life is held to be 
responsible for much of the insomnia of which we hear” (qtd. in Horne 184), 
commenting after the above quotation: “All that needs to be done [to the article] is 
change the writing style a little to fit the modern idiom and the message is fit for 
today!” (184).   In short, we still see “modern life” as responsible for lost sleep and 
consider sleep as a major part of overall health practices. 
Current studies on sleep have taken two different and widely oppositional 
directions.  On the one hand, modern sleep science continues the work of maintaining 
a productive and alert workforce, offering lifestyle advice or medications in order to 
prevent insomnia and ensure quality sleep, and detailing new research producing 
knowledge of the medical role of sleep in our lives.  However, one major difference 
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between the sleep studies of today and the sleep studies of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries rests in their relationship between insomnia and morality.  While 
some today still view being awake at odd hours a sign of suspicious behavior, 
medical studies of sleep do not tend to argue that morally culpable individuals are 
more likely to suffer from insomnia.  On the other hand, and only recently, studies of 
sleep science itself (as opposed to scientific studies of sleep) have become relatively 
popular, giving rise to a number of authors critiquing the function and necessity of 
sleep research.  Up until very recently (the twenty first century), critiques of the 
medical sleep industry were generally limited to literary narratives, many of which 
will be explored to come.  Today, we see some researchers in the social sciences 
becoming involved in questioning the discourse of sleep and presenting the modern 
sleep industry (ranging from developers of prescription drugs to manufacturers of 
mattresses and sleep accessories) as having increasing cultural and discursive 
significance. Many current sleep research critics depict insomnia as a battleground for 
individual autonomy and identity.  Others, often more philosophically or literarily 
motivated, study sleep and insomnia from an ontological perspective, and argue that 
insomnia is a necessary and productive state, not to be eliminated, but to be embraced 
and explored.  All sleep studies researchers, whether from the sciences, social 
sciences, or humanities are currently continuing the work of interpreting, resisting, 
and shaping discourses of sleep and insomnia that I argue was begun by modernist 
literary authors about a century before. 
For the purposes of simplification, I will focus on texts produced within the 
twenty-first century and divide sleep studies today into three main disciplinary 
  
 
63 
 
branches:  sciences, social sciences, and humanities (there is also a “fine arts” branch 
of sleep studies that inquires into sleep/insomnia in visual arts, but that is beyond the 
scope of my research).  While often, there is a correlation between researcher and 
disciplinary conventions, this correlation is not absolute.  Just as sleep and insomnia 
are “interdisciplinary” (biological, psychological, philosophical), so are sleep studies; 
for example, social science texts sometimes quote literature and personal narratives of 
insomnia quote scientific texts, so no approach is without interdisciplinary tendencies.  
In fact, all branches of sleep studies utilize narrative forms.  The division these 
categories itself is culturally produced, but it is useful in creating an overall picture of 
approaches to sleep studies today.  Generally, scientific sleep research focuses on 
“objectivity”: evidence from studies, medical research, and analysis of brain waves.  
Social scientific texts utilize more media-based evidence, such as advertisements.  
Humanities text employ personal testimony and examples from literature, art, and 
philosophy.  That is not to say scientific texts do not mention advertising for sleep 
medications or humanities texts do not cite studies conducted by physicians.  The 
differences exist in the motivation of the text:  scientific texts seek to diagnose, 
explain, and treat sleep disorders; social science texts examine the cultural impact of 
sleep discourse; and humanities texts describe the impact of sleep discourse and 
behavior for the individual.  At the same time, disciplinary conventions also shape the 
content of each text and become relevant to their interpretation and understanding of 
the way in which they present sleep and insomnia.  My goal in this section is not to 
provide reviews of each individual book, nor is to cover every sleep studies book in 
print, but rather to get a general sense of the ways in which sleep and insomnia are 
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currently understood and discussed, especially inasmuch as our discussion of sleep 
and insomnia today is predicated upon the Modernist period on which I am focusing.  
 As I stated earlier, the scientific branch of sleep studies extends exactly what 
the science of sleep studies did in the nineteenth and twentieth century:  the 
understanding and optimization of sleep and the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention 
of insomnia.  Two examples of scientifically-based sleep studies texts include David 
Randall’s Dreamland:  Adventures in the Strange Science of Sleep (2012) and Jim 
Horne’s Sleepfaring:  A Journey through the Science of Sleep (2006).  To be clear, 
David Randall is not a scientist, but an American reporter and Professor of Journalism 
writing about recent and past advances in sleep studies, with the goal of making 
scientific studies palatable for the average adult reader.  Horne, on the other hand, is a 
Professor of Psychophysiology and Director of the Sleep Research Centre at 
Loughborough University, UK, as well as Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Sleep 
Research, but, even given his scientific background, he presents his material in 
Sleepfaring in such a way that the lay-person can clearly understand the science.     
This very idea of making the “science” of sleep accessible to the masses 
emphasizes the importance of sleep in our current era and mimics the work of earlier 
sleep researchers from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who often 
published, in addition to monographs on sleep, newspaper editorials meant to educate 
the average citizen on proper sleep hygiene.  In addition to the similarities between 
the titles of the two aforementioned books, both of which include “the Science of 
Sleep,” as well as their goal of general accessibility, their formats are largely similar.  
Both books incorporate a general background on the history of sleep research, discuss 
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current innovations in the science of sleep, devote separate chapters to issues or 
ailments that prevent “normal” sleep (significantly, insomnia, but also issues like 
sleep apnea, somnambulism, and narcolepsy), and offer advice as to how to avoid 
insomnia.  Another interesting feature of both books is that they present sleep science 
in two separate parts:  sleep science of the nineteenth century and sleep science after 
World War II, skimming over the Modernist period (essentially jumping from the 
late-nineteenth century to the 1950s), which is, of course, my main area of inquiry.  
With regard to insomnia more specifically, both texts echo medical texts of a 
hundred years ago and present insomnia as a matter of individual causation and 
responsibility and defer to scientific discovery and methodology for treatment.  David 
Randall writes, “[I]nsomnia is a unique and difficult condition to treat because it is 
self-inflicted.  The cause is often the brain’s refusal to give up its unequaled ability to 
think about itself, a meta-phenomenon that Harvard professor Daniel M. Wegner has 
called ‘the ironic process of mental control’” (229-30).   Interestingly, David Randall 
refers to the “self” as cause (“self-inflicted”), but then through his use of synecdoche, 
the “brain” substitutes for the “self” in his explanation.  Within this statement exists a 
paradoxical relationship between the brain and the self; the “self” is implicated in the 
functioning of the brain, but at the same time, the brain resists the self’s control.  
David Randall acknowledges the difficulty in treating insomnia, partially because 
“science, as a whole, has a fuzzy definition of what constitutes the disorder” (232).  
Again, he makes a revealing statement, arguing that the self’s inability to control the 
brain is the cause, yet the resolution rests with more scientific understanding.  In 
essence, he appears to be searching for scientific solutions to seemingly ontological 
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problems, begging the question as to whether we really want science to be able to 
determine the way we “control” our thoughts.  To put it a different way, if insomnia 
rests in our inability to control the functioning of our brains, are we looking for a cure 
that entails scientific understanding and manipulation of thought processes?  I cannot 
help but envision a Hegelian dialectic that is not between the self and other (self), but 
rather the self and scientist. 
Horne, like David Randall, argues that we do need medical intervention into 
our thoughts to prevent and treat insomnia.  The treatments he suggests are mainly 
psychological:  “For a start, the sufferer must avoid getting angry about the insomnia 
and blame it for all their problems—it is probably the other way around” (216).  He 
continues, “Do not worry about not having enough sleep” (217).  He concludes that 
the best course of action, assuming there are no underlying physical reasons for the 
insomnia (like chronic pain or uncomfortable sleeping conditions), rests with therapy:  
There is often anger and frustration over other aspects of [insomniacs’] 
lives, focused on when trying to sleep.  Which is all the more reason 
for sorting out the personal problems and getting these other issues 
aired during the day rather than taking them to bed.  Here is where 
good counselling can be so very effective, in highlighting these 
problems and demonstrating why insomnia is not so much a sleep 
disorder, but one that largely permeates all of wakefulness. (219-20) 
 
Horne, like sleep researchers a century before him, views the root of insomnia as a 
matter to be dealt with through therapeutic inquiry.  The insomnia does not need the 
treatment; the insomniac does.  Given his view of insomnia as something that 
“permeates all of wakefulness,” intervention into sleep involves a more holistic 
intervention into waking life, inversely mirroring sleep studies of the nineteenth 
century in which the requirements of waking life entailed intervention into sleeping 
  
 
67 
 
habits.  Again, we see the self on a continuum between sleep and waking, where both 
become unified in their need for intervention and normalization. 
Another idea proposed by both David Randall and Horne is the idea that 
insomniacs often sleep a lot more than they believe they do, adding an additional 
layer of complexity to the mind-body relationship of the insomniac.  Horne writes, 
“Apart from anxiety [the insomniacs’] problem also lies with a loss of the ability to 
realise that, during the first hour or so of seemingly endless tossing and turning, for 
what seems like interminable periods during the night, they are dipping in and out of 
what can become beneficial sleep” (214).  David Randall makes a similar argument: 
Patients who have spent a night in a sleep lab, for instance, often 
complain that it took them more than an hour to fall asleep when a 
chart of their brain waves shows they were asleep within ten minutes.  
Problems of self-reporting aren’t limited to judging how long it took to 
get to sleep.  Some patients wake up in labs claiming that they didn’t 
sleep at all during the night, despite hours of video and brain wave 
evidence to the contrary.   
 It is part of the paradox that sleep presents to a conscious mind.  
We can’t easily judge the time that we are asleep because that time 
feels like an absence, a break from the demands of thought and 
awareness.  The times that we do remember are those that we wish we 
couldn’t:  staring at the clock in the middle of the night, turning the 
pillow over desperately hoping that the other side is cooler, kicking the 
covers off or pulling them up close.  Those experiences, even if they 
last only three minutes, often become exaggerated in our minds and 
overshadow the hours we spent sleeping peacefully, simply because 
we remember them.  (232-33) 
 
In other words, not only is insomnia all in the insomniac’s head (as cause of 
insomnia), but it is also all in the insomniac’s head (as experience of insomnia).  
Again, according to this presentation of the experience of insomnia, the actual 
insomnia is not the problem; rather the way we think about the insomnia is the real 
issue at stake.  We think we are not sleeping; therefore, even if we do sleep, we 
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cannot realize that we have, which further exacerbates the sense of sleeplessness and 
perpetuates its existence (or perceived existence). 
 Both of the explanations above of the discrepancy between the amount of 
sleep an insomniac “actually” gets and the amount of sleep he or she perceives raises 
an interesting question:  what is more important, sleep or the feeling of having slept?  
Both David Randall’s and Horne’s approaches point to a privileging of the scientific 
over the ontological:  getting “beneficial” sleep trumps the benefits of feeling like one 
has slept.  Insomnia becomes a mere chimera, but an extraordinarily powerful one.  
Yet, the “illusion” of insomnia appears to be what truly motivates the insomniac and 
perpetuates the ongoing sense of insomnia.  The body may have slept according to 
scientific “evidence” like brain wave patterns, but the mind does not feel this way.  
The subject then perceives the reality to have been lack of sleep, though, as Horne 
argues, most sufferers “are not particularly sleepy in the daytime, are ‘bright eyed’ by 
day, and do not complain of sleepiness—only that they cannot go to sleep” (214).  He 
concludes, “No daytime sleepiness equals no real sleep loss” (214).  The area of 
contention becomes the state between “real” (Horne’s word) and perceived, but also 
raises another question:  if the insomniac is not really tired or suffering other health 
effects, why is insomnia a complaint at all?   
Sociological Sleep Studies 
The answer to this question comes, at least in part, from a different approach 
to sleep studies, which examines discursive perceptions of the importance of sleep 
and the “harm” of insomnia.  Taking a different route from the scientific analysis of 
sleep are the social-science texts such as Jonathan Crary’s 24/7:  Late Capitalism and 
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the Ends of Sleep (2013), Matthew Wolf-Meyer’s The Slumbering Masses:  Sleep, 
Medicine, and Modern American Life (2012), Simon J. Williams’ The Politics of 
Sleep:  Governing (Un)consciousness in the Late Modern Age (2011), and Eluned 
Summers-Bremner’s Insomnia:  A Cultural History (2008).  The authors of these 
texts come from a wide range of academic disciplines:  Crary is a Professor of 
Modern Art and Theory, Wolf-Meyer is an anthropology professor, Williams is a 
sociology professor, and Summers-Bremner is an English professor.  Despite their 
divergent fields, all approach sleep from a social/cultural perspective if not from the 
social sciences directly.  Rather than explaining the content and conclusions of sleep 
research, these texts trace the impact of sleep research on Western life both 
historically and currently, and do so through examining both scientific and cultural 
texts.  They do not offer advice on insomnia cures or analyze sleep with the end of 
understanding and improving one’s rest, but instead emphasize the ways in which 
sleep research, rather than sleep itself, contributes to our daily behaviors and 
interpretations of the world.  The first three texts, while they include some historical 
perspectives generally from the last half of the nineteenth century, are mostly focused 
on sleep in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, adopting the general 
position that the current state of scientific sleep studies, as well as the sleep industry, 
reflects, supports, and emphasizes a frenetic sense of production and acquisition 
apparent in modern capitalist life.  Summers-Bremner focuses more broadly on the 
history of sleep studies, beginning in the ancient world, but also concludes with the 
effects of modernity and capitalism on sleep today; she also includes historical 
examples from literature within her research.  One common feature of all texts is that 
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they present the way we discuss sleep, but more importantly, the way we actually 
sleep, as intrinsically connected with economic and social forces in action today. 
One conclusion these sociological texts share is the perspective that capitalism 
devalues sleep-time, essentially because it is time spent neither earning nor spending 
money.  Crary, for example, argues: 
The huge portion of our lives that we spend asleep, freed from a 
morass of simulated needs, subsists as one of the great human affronts 
to the voraciousness of contemporary capitalism.  Sleep is an 
uncompromising interruption of the theft of time from us by 
capitalism. . . .  Sleep poses the idea of a human need and interval of 
time that cannot be colonized and harnessed to a massive engine of 
profitability, and thus remains an incongruous anomaly and site of 
crisis in the global present.  (10-11) 
 
As of yet, scientific endeavors have focused on the ability to reduce or eliminate 
sleep, rather than the ability to eliminate wakefulness through the “productive” use of 
sleep time (in the sense of putting sleeping people to work in their sleep), but his 
comments suggest the future possibility of such a movement.  Currently, we have 
some nascent examples of this trend, as anyone who has ever tried to quit smoking or 
learn a foreign language in their sleep could attest.  Crary traces sleep’s 
“incompatibility with modern notions of productivity and rationality” back to 
Enlightenment philosophers like David Hume, Rene Descartes, and John Locke, who 
“disparaged sleep for its irrelevance to the operation of the mind and the pursuit of 
knowledge” (12).  “Sleep,” Crary asserts, “is the only remaining barrier, the only 
enduring ‘natural condition’ that capitalism cannot eliminate” (74).   
 However, just because capitalism has not yet managed to eliminate sleep, that 
does not mean it has not tried to do so.  For example, David Randall notes that the 
American military’s “goal was to develop a way for a soldier to go without sleep for 
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one hundred hours and still perform common tasks.  The military spent millions of 
dollars testing theories, such as whether it would be possible to put half of the human 
brain asleep at a time, essentially allowing a person to sleep like a dolphin” (135).  
All these tests failed, and to date, no medication has been developed that can 
substitute for sleep.  Additionally, psychologist Ray Meddis, writing in the 1970s, 
hoped to find a way to rewire the brain so as to avoid the “wasted time” associated 
with sleep (Wortham 2).  Meddis viewed sleep as an unnecessary by-product of 
evolution, no longer essential, but simply a product of habit (Wortham 2).  A 
movement towards reducing or eliminating the need for sleep points to a mechanistic 
conception of the individual as a 24/7 machine evolving from the nineteenth century 
portrayals, such as those of MacFarlane and Hammond:   
A 24/7 environment has the semblance of a social world, but it is 
actually a non-social model of machinic performance and a suspension 
of living that does not disclose the human cost required to sustain its 
effectiveness. . . .  An illuminated 24/7 world without shadows is the 
final capitalist mirage of a post-history, of an exorcism of otherness 
that is the motor of historical change.  (Crary 9) 
 
Humans no longer simply resemble machines, as nineteenth century comparisons 
indicate; rather, according to Crary’s view, with the drive towards sleeplessness 
(which must be distinguished from insomnia), humans become the machines, fully 
integrated into a larger network of machines.  Part of this de-individuation comes 
through the devaluation of sleep. 
Historically, the discursive view of sleep has changed.  Prior to the Industrial 
Revolution, sleep was regarded as “something to be striven for, a quiet state that 
needed to be gained” (Summers-Bremner 8).  Rather than being regarded as a 
passive, unproductive state, Summers-Bremner argues that the ancients saw sleep as 
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“an active part of life whose only distinction from waking activity was that it usually 
took place in darkness” (8).  Like Crary, Summers-Bremner aruges that modernity 
devalues sleep (8).  Thus, we see this movement from sleep as an active, desired state 
to a currently devalued one, with a turning point essentially being the emergence of 
capitalist economic systems in which increased time spent working is equated with 
increased profits (Summers-Bremner 50).  However, the Industrial Revolution, given 
its focus on the rationalization of the body to foster efficiency, created a middle 
ground of sorts between sleep as an active, desirable state and sleep as a waste of 
time.  According to Wolf-Meyer, “Since the industrial revolution, Americans have 
become invested in a form of social organization that limits varieties of sleep.  
Moreover, this limiting organization also forces the medicalization of particular 
normal sleeping patterns, rendering them pathological” (254).  Wolf-Meyer’s 
argument makes sense in the context of the sheer amount of sleep studies that took 
place in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  Sleep was certainly seen as 
desirable, but only inasmuch as it fit into and prepared one for the workday.  
Summers-Bremner writes, “Not only does capitalism count on its workers having had 
a good night’s sleep before they have had it, but it adds the future value of future 
sleep, required to keep the worker working reliably, into its forward accounting of 
time” (99).  As I argued earlier, in the nineteenth century, so much sleep advice 
existed because sleep was seen as essential to productivity.  Today, as technology 
changes, science has begun to question whether or not sleep actually is essential or to 
what extent it can be eliminated.   
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Though Crary and others argue that capitalism currently devalues time spent 
asleep, in a way that did not take place a century earlier when time asleep should be 
maximized rather than eliminated, some researchers describe ways in which 
capitalism can, in essence, reclaim the value of sleep, not by eliminating it, but by 
selling it.  Profits from lost sleep come largely in the form of sleeping pills, which as I 
noted earlier, 25% of Americans have been prescribed.  This widespread use of 
pharmaceuticals indicates an ironic (and cynical) attempt at re-establishing “natural” 
rhythms of sleep and waking.  Wolf-Meyer notes that “At the turn of the twenty-first 
century, American everyday life is fundamentally tied to ideas of the rhythmic, 
emblematized in the repetitive use of pharmaceuticals, which produce and depend 
upon everyday notions of time and space” (92).  Modern life and technology have so 
far removed us from “natural” (I use this term skeptically—if a cave person ate some 
soporific berries, is his or her sleep “natural”?) time and space that their effects can 
now be recreated medically. 
We can see the extent to which pharmaceuticals have become profitable 
through the sheer number of their sales; Williams illustrates that the global market for 
sleeping pills, both prescription and over-the-counter, exceeded $4.3 billion in 2005, 
with predictions of sales exceeding $11 billion by 2012, nearly a three-fold increase 
(Politics 138).  In America alone, according to an NBC News article, a reported 50 to 
70 million Americans suffer sleep disorders, and “about 59 million sleeping pills 
were prescribed in America in 2012” (Aleccia).  These numbers exclude other sleep-
related products, such as designer mattresses that can cost up to $10,000 (Hayes 77), 
white noise machines, Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) masks for sleep 
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apnea, fitness trackers that purportedly measure and record sleep time and quality, 
and even SmartPhone applications designed to improve the quality of sleep. 
Not only do we see a recent increase in the amount of sleep-inducing drugs on 
the market, but also in the use of prescription stimulants, such as Provogil, used to 
promote and extend wakefulness.  Originally used to treat narcolepsy and shift-work 
sleep disorder, as well as (more controversially) sleep apnea, Provogil has recently 
seen a spike in prescriptions for ordinary drowsiness, and “can now be prescribed at 
the whim of attending physicians for any number of drowsy conditions” (Wolf-Meyer 
146-47).  Wolf-Meyer quotes the website of Cephalon, the pharmaceutical company 
that manufactures Provogil:  “People with excessive sleepiness may feel as if they 
just don’t have the energy to do the things they need to do on a daily basis, such as 
spending time with their families or performing duties at work” (qtd. in Wolf-Meyer, 
147).  Analyzing these statements, Wolf-Meyer argues, “One might notice in these 
symptoms the very conditions of modern life” (147).  Interestingly, the “treatment” 
for modern life is not rest, but rather artificially induced wakefulness.   
Seemingly, then, given the fact that capitalism devalues time spent sleeping 
due to lost productivity in combination with the fact that sleep disorders are highly 
profitable given the numbers of pharmaceuticals and other sleep-inducing products 
sold, insomnia is one of capitalism’s greatest allies—the epitome of a “create the 
problem then sell the solution” driven market.  Yet, somewhat ironically, insomnia 
and capitalism have yet to become friendly bedfellows, and definite tension exists 
between the conflicting ideas of the push to get “proper” or “enough” sleep and the 
drive to eliminate the need for sleep and promote the value of spending more time 
  
 
75 
 
awake.  As Williams argues, “In response to this dominant or sleep-negative agenda, 
we may also now point to a second growing and altogether more concerned: sleep 
positive agenda . . . in which sleep is problematised as a matter of concern on the one 
hand, given the costs and consequences of poor sleep for society, and championed on 
the other hand” (Politics xiv).  So, while we are given every reason not to sleep today, 
from a multitude of responsibilities and distractions to the ability to conduct business 
at any hour, we are still told how important and necessary proper sleep is, essentially 
for the same reasons that existed in the nineteenth century:  it is necessary to be 
healthy and productive.  For Williams, “sleep is being or has become increasingly 
politicised in the late modern age” (Politics xvii).  I differ with Williams on this 
point,  as I argue that this politicization of sleep is far from a recent phenomenon, but 
his point is resonant in its understanding of sleep as a matter of public and political 
concern, but also one subject to conflicting discourses:  sleep is good, healthy and 
necessary as opposed to sleep is a waste of time and productivity.  The difference, for 
me, between today and the Modernist period is the balance between sleep as waste 
and sleep as health.  While, in the Modernist period, there was certainly a sense that 
excess sleep was waste, the idea of eliminating sleep altogether was not seen as the 
option it is today, especially given the social concerns over fatigue.  Even those who 
sought, like Edison, to limit their sleep, were viewed as supermen of sorts, not 
necessarily someone to be emulated by the majority, but outliers with a unique talent. 
An important distinction between insomnia and sleeplessness must be 
acknowledged, which is another significant different between the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and the twenty-first century.  Sleeplessness, as in the sense of the 
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hypothetical sleepless soldier mentioned earlier, is time spent awake and active, 
participating in the 24/7 network Crary envisions.  In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the ability to be sleepless yet rested was sometimes seen as admirable, 
especially in powerful men like Napoleon and Edison (albeit dangerous for women).  
But, eliminating sleep altogether was off the table in terms of lifestyle options.  
Insomnia is time spent awake, but awake in isolation, hence it implies non-
compliance, and was and is accordingly problematic.  If sleep is politicized and seen 
in a dual light, so then must be insomnia.  Interestingly, though nearly all of the 
aforementioned authors of cultural sleep studies argue that capitalism, 
industrialization, and modernization foster insomnia, they also present the view that 
insomnia is no friend to capitalism, despite the revenue it generates.  Crary, for 
instance, paraphrasing and adapting Emmanuel Levinas’ ideas, argues that insomnia 
is powerful because it is a form of resistance to the violence of modern society: 
Part of the modernized world we inhabit is the ubiquitous visibility of 
useless violence and the human suffering it causes.  This visibility, in 
all its mixed forms, is a glare that ought to thoroughly disturb any 
complacency, that ought to preclude the restful unmindfulness of 
sleep.  Insomnia corresponds to the necessity of vigilance, to a refusal 
to overlook the horror and injustice that pervades the world.  It is the 
disquiet of the effort to avoid inattention to the torment of the other. . . 
.  It is where we face the near impossibility of living humanely. (18-
19) 
 
Levinas, in Time and the Other, describes insomnia as “Vigilance without end” (48).  
He argues that insomnia is “a vigilance without refuge in unconsciousness, without 
the possibility of withdrawing into sleep as into a private domain” (49).  If we look at 
insomnia as a state of waking isolation, where one is not awake in the sense that one 
is being distracted by the goings-on of the world, but rather can merely contemplate 
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them, then insomnia becomes a time of questioning, realization, and resistance.  
Essentially, insomnia is a state of awake-ness without external stimulation, which can 
prevent analysis and insight.  Insomnia, in Crary’s view, forces the insomniac to 
reckon with the conditions of his or her existence, and Crary argues that these 
conditions are quite ugly.  We can be distracted from this ugliness by constant 
stimulation, but without that stimulation, as is the case of the person who lies awake 
in bed alone at night, we must confront the ugliness instead. 
Wolf-Meyer, on the other hand, has a different position as to why insomnia is 
problematic today.   He argues that our concern over insomnia today relates not as 
much to insomnia as a time for confronting the horrors of the modern world, but 
rather because of another form of resistance that the insomniac displays:  resistance to 
homogenization.  He writes, “The power of medicine lies in its ability to cure, in its 
ability to make bodies anew; the force of medicine is homogenizing; it makes bodies 
the same, it produces the masses” (94).  He continues: 
In seeing ourselves through medicine, we integrate ourselves into the 
body of the masses—that abstract set of data that rules normative 
expectations about bodies and their behaviors.  In so doing, we 
eradicate our differences by becoming subject to the power of 
medicine.  It is only when our bodies react poorly to treatments, when 
individuals become noncompliant, that difference is reasserted. (95) 
 
Insomnia, when it is resistant to treatment or normalization, essentially devalues the 
power of science, but the “problem” (if one sees it as such) is much larger.  Science, 
via medicine, is “a form of contemporary control of the natural” but also a way to 
“draw on American medicine’s colonial and industrial legacies of surveillance and 
control of individuals and the masses.  This control is the basis of our desires and 
intimacies” (93).  To phrase Wolf-Meyer’s argument in a different way, we are 
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essentially coerced through mainstream discourse to trust in the power and objectivity 
of science and medicine.  Wolf-Meyer argues that it is through this trust in science 
and medicine that we can be normalized, and our behaviors and desires are shaped.  
However, a condition that resists or rebels against scientific treatment, such as 
insomnia, illustrates the fallibility of science and shakes our faith in its efficacy.  As a 
result, we become more independent, and less subject to outside normalization and 
homogenization.  In other words, insomnia protects individuality in a society that 
strives for uniformity.  This idea of the non-participation of insomnia in the 24/7 
network to which Crary alludes to a point of agreement between Crary and Wolf-
Meyer despite their divergent views on the “danger” of insomnia:  they both feel, in a 
sense, that insomnia “protects” individual autonomy. 
Summers-Bremner offers a similar view on the “problem” of insomnia today:   
The wired world cannot help us manage contingency and dependence, 
the true price of interconnectedness, to the text that these are what it 
imagines it excludes.  In response to this world, insomnia is not only a 
nightmare mimicry of the idealized instantaneity, however—too many 
thoughts occurring all at once, too quickly!—but also a form of 
historical consciousness because in the absolute unknowing it calls us 
to—we are unable to continue worshipping ‘the now’.  Insomnia 
shows that although we can study the world repeatedly, we can never 
study it with our own being fully included, just as we cannot be awake 
and asleep in the same moment. (148) 
 
Summers-Bremner’s argument is a synthesis of the arguments made by Crary and 
Wolf-Meyer.  She shares Crary’s view of insomnia as revelatory and as a source of 
exclusion from the 24/7 network of capitalism and modern technology.  She also 
expresses Wolf-Meyer’s interpretation of insomnia as a form of non-compliance with 
social norms and the illusory capacity of medicine to truly eradicate individual 
difference.  For Summers-Bremner, it is not the insomnia that is chimerical, as Horne 
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and Randall posit, but rather the idea that we can fully illuminate both the world and 
ourselves that is the illusion.  She points to the inability of science and medicine to be 
fully objective because, after all, scientists are humans too.  We cannot eliminate 
ourselves in the study of ourselves, or as Louis Althusser argues: 
What seems to take place outside ideology . . . in reality takes place in 
ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take 
place outside it.  That is why those who are in ideology believe 
themselves by definition outside ideology:  one of the effects of 
ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of 
ideology by ideology:  ideology never says, ‘I am ideological.’ It is 
necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be 
able to say: I am in ideology (a quite exceptional case) or (the general 
case):  I was in ideology. . . .  Which amounts to saying that ideology 
has no outside (for itself), but at the same time that it is nothing but 
outside (for science and reality). (118-19) 
 
Science and medicine can create the appearance of being outside of ideology, but 
such placement is impossible. 
Williams supports Summers-Bremner’s view of insomnia as a nemesis to 
medicine.  He argues that insomnia “was a condition characterised more by 
controversy than consensus, idiosyncrasy than typicality, regarding its nature and 
status, including diagnostic difficulties and frequent discrepancies between subjective 
and objective estimates of sleep loss” (Politics 121-22).  Again, we see this recurring 
argument among the sociological studies of insomnia and sleep that points to 
insomnia as a condition that eludes and defies modern scientific-medical knowledge 
and the power of culture and science to effect homogenization and full integration.  If 
anything, insomnia cannot be treated en masse, and thus the insomniac individual 
remains apart.  Efforts to look at the insomniac as part of a group of insomniacs have 
ultimately failed in terms of consistency of symptoms, diagnosis, treatment, and 
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resolution.  Essentially, insomnia remains a citadel of individuality in an increasingly 
de-individualizing, interdependent, and inter-connected world, something that 
modernist literary authors, as well as physicians, pointed to decades before. 
Insomnia in the Humanities 
Then, if insomnia must and can only be regarded on a case-by-case basis, the 
humanities offers us the ability to truly examine the individual experience of 
insomnia, with various authors providing highly personal and divergent views.  The 
humanities presents a series of perspectives on sleep studies, which I will categorize 
in three general directions.  First, there are philosophical explorations of sleep and 
insomnia, the most recent of which is French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Fall 
of Sleep (2007), which examines the ontological implications of sleeping, falling 
asleep, and failing to sleep.  Additionally, writers like Blake Butler in Nothing: A 
Portrait of Insomnia (2011) and Bill Hayes in his autobiographical text Sleep 
Demons:  An Insomniac’s Memoir (2001), write phenomenological and ontological 
accounts of their insomnia and its impact on their lives and interpretation of the 
world, but both also incorporate philosophical, literary, medical, and historical 
perspectives on sleep and insomnia.  Finally, there are some recent studies of 
insomnia and sleep as it is presented in fictional literature as it relates to authorial 
experience, including Herschel Farbman’s The Other Night:  Dreaming, Writing, and 
Restlessness in Twentieth-Century Literature (2008) and Peter Schwenger’s At the 
Borders of Sleep:  On Liminal Literature (2012).  Similar to the insomniac memoirs 
mentioned above, these texts examine insomnia as a productive, generative state, but 
use literary and philosophical texts, rather than historical ones, as primary sources. 
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Nancy’s text focuses mainly on the space between sleeping and waking, the 
elusive moments during which one “falls” asleep, a word which implies movement 
though the body is still.  Though Nancy is French, his writing is applicable to both 
American and British society because of the homogenization of Western culture 
present in our increasingly globalized world, which Nancy addresses in his text.  
Nancy’s primary argument is that sleep eradicates the subject but preserves the self, 
again associating sleep with individuality and non-participation in larger systems of 
production.  For Nancy, “There is no phenomenology of sleep, for it shows of itself 
only in its disappearance” (13).  No “subject” can experience sleep because the 
subject does not exist in the sleeping state, at least to himself or herself.  He discusses 
the slippage of the self during the time of sleep, arguing that during sleep, “I myself 
become indistinct.  I no longer properly distinguish myself from the world or from 
others, from my own body or from my mind either” (7).  Nancy makes an important 
distinction between the self as “I” and the self as soul.  During sleep, the “I” (or self 
as subject) disappears, but “never does the soul sleep” (35).  Sleep is a “vanishing” of 
the individualized self, as well as a return to the self through the loss of the “I,” but 
more importantly, it is a respite from “the supposed heights of vigilant consciousness, 
from surveillance and control, from projection and differentiation” (11).  Sleep, then, 
for Nancy is an escape from an integrated, 24/7 world. 
Nancy demonstrates tension between the modern world and sleep, and here 
we see echoes of Crary’s vision of an inescapable 24/7 world in which one is always 
immersed in an interconnected network of a paradoxical combination of stimulation 
and somnolence.  In such a world, sleep has lost its import:  “occupying night, 
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invading it by work, is the obsession of systems of production” (22); sleep is again 
devalued.  Nancy writes of this “invaded” world in more detail: 
It is possible that the world today is that way:  without sleeping or 
waking.  Sleeping standing up, waking while dozing.  Sleepwalking 
and somnolent.  World deprived of rhythm, world that has deprived 
itself of rhythm, that has stripped away from itself the possibility of 
seeing its days and its nights correspond to the system of nature or 
history. . . .  World in shambles, out of balance, uneven enough to 
make sleep itself devastated by unevenness.  Sleepers harassed, always 
on the alert, less fallen asleep than thrown into sleep, precipitated by a 
numbness from short hours broken by knocking sounds in the head, 
knocks on the door, blows or gunshots.  Sleepers are not so much 
sleeping as knocked out, conquered at night as they were during the 
day. . . .  Nights shot through with flashes of fire, of frenzy, of famine.  
Nights stripped of their very night, uprooted from darkness and 
shadow, thrown into the harsh light of a nuclear blinding.  Sleeps that 
are nothing but parodies, caricatures of sleeps, heads kept buried 
beneath muddy water but kept from giving themselves over to the 
abandon of deep waters. (38-39) 
  
In this lengthy passage, Nancy creates a dire view of sleep in the modern world.  
Night no longer exists, rhythms of the natural world are disrupted, sleep cannot 
remain undisturbed, and we no longer “fall” but are rather “thrown into” sleep.   If we 
think of the 24/7 world in which we live today, with constant access to lighting, 
media, and various forms of stimulation, his arguments make sense.  The idea of 
being “knocked out” rather than asleep speaks to our society’s use of prescription 
medications and other self-prescribed substances to aid in sleeping.  His argument 
also resonates with Crary’s point of insomnia’s ability to expose the non-sleeper to 
the horror and violence of our current world.  One who is awake at night can witness 
the violence of the world. 
However tied into contemporary life as Nancy’s view of sleep and waking 
today seem, as Horne argues regarding our complaints of sleep over the past century, 
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the world Nancy depicts may have existed for a hundred years or more, not simply 
coming into being recently, but continuing along a trajectory that began in the middle 
of the nineteenth century.  Take the following passage from Thoreau’s Walden: 
We do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us.  Did you ever think 
what those sleepers are that underlie the railroad?  Each one is a man. . 
. .  The rails are laid on them. . . .  They are sound sleepers, I assure 
you. . . .  And when they run over a man that is walking in his sleep, a 
supernumerary sleeper in the wrong position, and wake him up, they 
suddenly stop the cars, and make a hue and cry about it, as if this were 
an exception.  (107)  
  
Much like Crary and Nancy, Thoreau offers a view of people as essentially 
sleepwalking through life, intertwined with and subjugated by the technology that has 
come to dominate both them and their lives.  Benjamin Reiss, in an article about 
Thoreau’s views of sleep entitled “Sleeping at Walden Pond,” writes, “Thoreau 
perceived modernity as a world of unasleep, unawake zombies, hooked onto 
machines, fueled by neural jolts delivered by caffeinated beverages and sensational 
news stories . . .  and occasionally being run over by the machines to which they are 
enslaved as they walk in a somnambulistic trance across the tracks” (15-16).  
Thoreau’s world is not that different from Nancy’s (ours), as Thoreau expresses a 
somnambulistic world deprived of “natural” rhythms, ruled by technology, and 
dominated by the violence of people being “run over” by their own creations.  
Additionally, Schivelbusch’s previously discussed arguments about the use of 
industrial lighting point to the fact that the nocturnal world has been turned into a 
state of unnatural daylight since the second half of the nineteenth century beginning 
the process of the dissociation of the modern world from “natural” rhythms. 
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Strikingly, Nancy excludes insomnia from his discussions of sleep:  
“Interruptions and perturbations, including those that arise sometimes from within 
sleep itself, like those nightmares that wake us up in anxiety and sweat—these 
accidents of sleep do not belong to it” (17).  His world may be sleepless, but it is not 
an insomniac world, just as one cannot be sleepwalking and have insomnia 
simultaneously.  According to Nancy, the soul has essentially two states:  vigilance 
and somnolence.  The vigilant soul watches us when we are awake, and the 
somnolent soul when we are asleep, but “it is not the insomniac, this soul” (37).  
Nancy’s view seems to correspond here with that of Horne and David Randall who 
argue that insomnia may be perceived, but is not necessarily “real” in the “objective,” 
scientific sense.  Rather, insomnia is a state of alternation between sleep and waking, 
described by Nancy as the heavily disrupted sleep of modernity, but by Horne and 
David Randall as the inability to distinguish between when one is asleep and when 
one is awake.  Paradoxically, for Nancy, insomnia seemingly does not exist (one is 
awake, falling asleep, or asleep), but it is also perpetual, as we live our lives not 
knowing the difference between sleep and waking, behaving as though we are asleep 
when we are awake and thinking we have been awake when we were really asleep.  
We are perpetually in a state of false insomnia, which we may see and understand as 
insomnia, but is only a series of unwitting vacillations between sleeping and waking. 
Whether or not insomnia is a “real” physical and psychological state, or only 
“real” as an ontological state, the perception of insomnia does in fact alter one’s 
relationship to the worlds of both sleep and waking.  Writers who study the power of 
insomnia in their own lives include Butler and Hayes, both of whom wrote memoirs 
  
 
85 
 
of their experiences with insomnia.  Their interdisciplinary works are largely hybrid 
studies of insomnia, pointing again to insomnia as a condition that is viewed as 
simultaneously medical, social, and psychological, as well as highly individualized 
and philosophical.  The one aspect of these two texts that differentiates them from 
others I have discussed is the focal point of the solitary individual (the author) as the 
primary insomniac of the text simultaneously studying and describing his own 
insomnia.  These authors, unlike the authors discussed earlier who study insomnia to 
study its role in either society or medicine, study insomnia to learn something more 
about themselves and their own lives and perceptions.  
Other commonalities are visible in Butler’s and Hayes’s descriptions of their 
insomnia.  Their texts include an important feature lacking in the more scientific texts 
mentioned earlier.  They both describe firsthand accounts of the emotional component 
of insomnia and its related sense of anxiety and frustration to a much more extensive 
degree.  They illustrate, rather than simply discuss, the linkage between insomnia and 
interconnectivity with technology.  Butler, for example, inserts repetitive keyboard 
symbols throughout his text, and Hayes refers to his “mind racing like the spell-check 
function on a computer, scanning all data” (3) during his bouts of insomnia.  Both 
Butler and Hayes express the futility of medical attempts at treating their insomnia 
and skepticism about the use of prescription drugs in its treatment.  The importance of 
these two memoirs comes primarily from the ability of these two authors to present 
extended case studies of insomnia that illustrate the role of insomnia in producing the 
individual and influencing the interpretation of the self and experience. 
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Despite choosing to write about insomnia and its impact on their lives, even 
the self-proclaimed insomniac authors see insomnia as a possible issue of perception 
rather than reality.   Lifelong insomniac Butler notes that: 
Problem sleepers often interpret their rest conditions to be more severe 
than recorded sleep times and depths may, to someone outside that 
skin, make them seem.  In some self-perceived ‘insomniacs’ there 
might be no sign of a disrupted state at all—and yet, in their mind and 
flesh, they feel arrested, turned out, scratched.  In this way, though the 
person never experiences a full-blown, calculable sleep session, he or 
she does transgress the phases of consciousness, blurring the mind, 
allowing rest.  Many claims to extensive insomnia are, then, not only 
questionable, but perhaps even delusional.  It becomes difficult to say. 
(35) 
 
Hayes also confesses to a failure to realize when he has slept.  He writes, “Every so 
often, [his partner] Steve begged to differ with my morning-after reports.  Adamant 
that I hadn’t slept more than an hour the night before, for instance, I’d be shocked to 
hear him say, ‘You were sound asleep from three to five at least.’ . . .  Uh oh, caught 
in a lie that I didn’t even know I’d committed” (267).  According to Hayes, 
sometimes an insomniac’s claims of sleeplessness stem from “a twisted pride”  in not 
sleeping, but Hayes acknowledges the possibility of a condition known as “sleep state 
misperception” in which despite “all evidence to the contrary, a person claims to be 
an incurable insomniac” (267).  
Both Butler and Hayes acknowledge not only the possibility of insomnia as 
delusion, but also insomnia as a state of unknowable alterations between sleeping and 
waking, thus, not necessarily a state distinct from either but a state of blurring of both, 
such as Nancy describes.  Butler comments, “Eventually, inside of troubled sleep, the 
sleeping and not sleeping begin to feel the same” (112).  Butler and Hayes both 
account for the possibility of insomnia as a state of delusion rather than reality, but do 
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so more tentatively.  Instead of saying “it is difficult to say” whether or not someone 
has “real” insomnia, Butler says it “becomes” difficult to say.  His use of the word 
“becomes” here implies this particular definition of insomnia not as lack of sleep, but 
lack of awareness of sleep, as a relatively recent development.  Similarly, Hayes 
proposes the idea of insomnia as a matter of self-perception with implications for 
identity:  “What I insist on calling insomnia, [my father] calls a few lousy nights’ 
sleep” (321).  What one may regard as an occasional inconvenience becomes an 
important component of identity to another—even if both have similar symptoms. 
If we take in combination the medical views of insomnia as presented by 
Horne and David Randall and the personal confessions of Butler and Hayes that they 
may be exaggerating their own insomnia, perhaps there is a current movement not 
only to eliminate sleep, but to eliminate insomnia as well.   This elimination of 
insomnia does not come through treatment, but rather denial, through simply 
changing one’s perspective on what insomnia is or is not.  This “trend” points to a 
paradoxical relationship between the mind and body.  Just as insomnia exposes a 
tension between desires of the mind and desires of the body, this movement towards 
viewing insomnia as a mere matter of misunderstanding of the self reveals a different 
tension.  Is the “true” self that we “know” the one that is measured through scientific 
standards like brain waves and objective observation?  Or, is the “self” a product of 
what we believe to be our experiences?  Ultimately, to treat a condition that involves 
a conflict of will and autonomy, one must will oneself to believe that the condition 
does not really exist. 
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Yet, there seems to be no doubt in Butler’s or Hayes’s minds that their own 
insomnia is quite real and plays a substantial role in their lives and relationships.  
Butler, for example, claims to have been awake for a full 129 hours (106).  Further 
emphasizing the reality of his own insomnia (but also its illusory nature), Butler 
describes it largely in spatial, physical terms. At one point, he describes insomnia as a 
barrier to entering the room of sleep (13-14).  He presents insomnia as a physical 
movement of the mind and reshaping of the body: 
The fear of sleeplessness breeds more sleeplessness, and the locks 
begin to change around the keys, the mind turning activated inside a 
tired body, full of no distinct direction.  The air of what wants out or 
on inside the head in growing tired and staying tired makes days seem 
brighter, thicker. . . .  As well, in the context of the body, the skull 
might seem thicker made around the eyes, or softing.  The pupils just 
set deeper in the head now, new fat black edges around the seen.  One 
might feel degrees warmer inside oneself, though the skin itself is as 
any day, as if cooking too deep beneath the outer surface to be 
detected.  The head may seem sunken in itself, unseen layers laid over 
layers, like a helmet or a gown. (102)   
 
In this passage, we again see the image of sleep as an inaccessible room with 
changing locks as the insomnia persists.  But, more significantly Butler presents 
insomnia not just as a delusion, but as a series of perceived changes to the structure of 
the body and mind.  Because the body is not literally changing in the ways Butler 
suggests, even the very real physical description he provides of his insomnia’s 
physical symptoms contains an element of illusion and non-reality.  He also 
dissociates himself from this particular passage, never referring to himself 
specifically, but rather as an amalgamation of generalized body parts.  Insomnia, 
despite its real effects on his day-to-day life, at least partially remains an illusion, and 
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throughout his memoir insomnia is described in terms of abstractions vacillating in 
and out through other philosophical and medical observations about sleep. 
For Hayes, insomnia does not take on the surrealistic quality it does for 
Butler.  Where Butler presents insomnia as amorphous and surreal, Hayes views it as 
having a clear, consistent relationship to ongoing circumstances in his life.  For him, 
sleep is “more like an emotion than a bodily function” (5).  Along these same lines, 
Hayes describes his insomnia as intrinsically connected to other emotional 
components of his life, specifically his relationships with his family.  He writes:   
My insomniac fate was sealed when the plane touched down in 
Spokane.  Dad ran the city’s main pop factory from the time I was a 
little boy until the year I left for college.  I drank so much Coca-Cola 
growing up, I cannot take a sip of it today.  I’ve often wondered if all 
that sugar and caffeine altered my neurochemical makeup, turning me 
into the altered, anxious man I am.  I suspect it still runs in my veins at 
night, nourishing my sleeplessness.  (44) 
 
Of course, he realizes logically that “The half-life of caffeine in adults is four to six 
hours, not thirty-six years” (44), but the important point he makes is that his insomnia 
is significantly connected to his family’s circumstances.   
Butler and Hayes are creating a contemporary insomniac text, indicative of the 
prevalence of insomnia today, but also the complex nature of insomnia as medical, 
psychological, and philosophical.  Despite the seemingly new nature of these two 
memoirs, insomnia has played a significant role in literary creation for the past 
century.  Modernist authors, many of whom were themselves insomniacs, created 
insomniac texts and personal descriptions of their own insomnia in diaries, essays, 
and letters.  Studying these modernist contributions to the discourse of insomnia is 
my primary goal, but other authors have also looked at the role of insomnia in the 
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literary work (though from a different angle than I will use).  Analyzing the role of 
sleep in literature is not a new idea.  However, texts such as Farbman’s and 
Schwenger’s do not simply examine sleep, but rather look at sleep as part of a larger 
continuum of consciousness and unconsciousness.  Their writing does not focus on 
the symbolic value of sleep alone, but rather examines the states surrounding sleep, 
including falling asleep, dreaming, awakening, insomnia, and sleep-like states, such 
as somnambulism and hypnogogia.  These texts are fairly recent and support the 
emergence of sleep studies as an important, interdisciplinary field, which looks not 
only to science but also philosophy and literature for answers about the significance 
of the threshold of separation between consciousness and unconsciousness.  Both 
examine this space between consciousness and unconsciousness as integral to 
processes of writing and reading, creation and interpretation. 
Farbman organizes his book around authors, focusing primarily on four:  
Sigmund Freud, Maurice Blanchot, Samuel Beckett, and James Joyce.  Even in his 
choice of subjects to examine (a psychologist, a philosopher, and two literary 
authors), we can see the interdisciplinarity of sleep studies on display.  Farbman’s 
main premise is to examine sleep and waking as oppositions that cannot exist 
simultaneously, but at the same time, are completely dependent on one another.  He 
writes, “Where there is no possibility of sleep, there can be no waking in this ordinary 
sense” (2) and “Waking life ends where sleep begins” (3).  However, despite the 
dependence of waking on sleep and vice versa, sleep and waking are in constant 
tension, represented by the dream, which he describes as “resistance to the stillness of 
sleep” (5).  Because “complete sleep would be death” (3), the dream is a reminder 
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that we are alive even though we are asleep; rather than being the guardian of sleep, 
as the dream is for Freud, it is the guardian of life itself.  He argues that “The dream 
is not an escape from the world and worldly responsibilities.  It is rather nightly 
evidence of the impossibility of escape, so long as one is alive—the impossibility of 
complete sleep” (18).  His text seeks to compare the dream to the act of literary 
creation, not in the sense that dreams inspire writing, but rather that dreaming and 
writing are phenomenologically similar.  He says, “This book argues that this nightly 
experience that can’t be shared is an experience of language as shared—of the sharing 
of language—and that experience is essentially literary” (10).  The dream is a paradox 
of unconsciousness and isolation only made possible through consciousness and 
communication.  It represents the impossibility of complete unconsciousness while 
alive, thus, the dream itself is a form of insomnia:  “The dream, for Blanchot, is the 
pure perpetuation of insomnia—‘the impossibility of sleeping’ that we encounter in 
the very heart of sleep” (51). 
Because the dream and insomnia resist complete unconsciousness akin to 
death, “it may imply a kind of triumph over death”  about which Farbman argues 
regarding Joyce’s image of the “ideal insomniac” in Finnegan’s Wake.  The “ideal 
insomniac” envisioned by Joyce, however, is “more like a dream than it is like the 
real ordeal of the real insomniac, who will in fact catch some sleep here and there” 
(91).  For Farbman, there are two distinct types of insomnia:  “real” and metaphorical 
in the sense Blanchot uses.  Real insomnia is a form of suffering, but one does 
eventually sleep, though sleep is delayed.  One wants to sleep and, subsequently, 
loses his or her sense of self when it arrives.  The metaphorical insomnia Farbman 
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discusses is not a postponing of sleep, but rather restlessness within sleep, an 
affirmation of life in the face of the loss of the self.  This restlessness is similar to the 
restlessness involved in literary creation:  “Though none of the writers studied in this 
book claims . . .  that works of writing are produced in his sleep, each brings to the 
fore of his work the restlessness that persists even in the depths of sleep, and each 
experiences that restlessness as an indication of the inevitability of writing” (17).  
Writing becomes an affirmation of living and means of resisting death—retaining a 
form of consciousness and communication from a space of unconsciousness and 
isolation.  Writing is an act of metaphorical insomnia. 
Again, we see an example of insomnia as a matter of perception (I perceive, in 
the dream, that I am awake even though I am “really” asleep), but also a form of 
perception that, as Butler and Hayes indicate, has profound implications for waking 
experience. Schwenger uses his analysis of insomnia differently than Farbman, but 
essentially views it in a similar manner.  He argues, “The desire for sleep, then, is not 
only a desire for rest so that we can ‘recharge our batteries’ for the day’s work; it is 
also the desire for a respite from existence itself, from its incessant, unrelenting 
movement” (57).  Like Farbman, Schwenger sees sleep as “the brother” of death (57), 
and insomnia is again a resistance to death.  Where Farbman uses the dream as 
insomnia, Schwenger takes the example of pre-sleep insomnia, arguing that “the 
writer’s relationship to insomnia goes beyond . . . such common causes as an inability 
to relinquish the concerns of the day or a subliminal fear of death; insomnia becomes 
the very source of writing” (58).  Basically, the difference between the perspectives 
of Schwenger and Farbman is spatial:  insomnia for one exists within sleep and for 
  
 
93 
 
the other outside of it, but for both, it is an essential and necessary part of the process 
of literary creation. 
Unlike Farbman, Schwenger structures his text not around authors, but around 
states of sleeping or non-sleeping, including falling asleep, failing to sleep, waking 
up, and disordered sleep.  This structure makes sense in his argument because he 
discusses the role of each of these states not only in creating, but more importantly 
structuring, the literary text.  For Schwenger, insomnia is a perpetuity of thought, but 
not as the normal daytime running monologue one might experience.  Rather: 
In the night one reaches no resting point, no conclusion or illuminated 
‘secret’ that is not immediately eroded by the continuing flow of 
thought; and with all the structures of daylight thinking dissolved in 
the night, the strangest adumbrations are free to appear.  Their 
strangeness means that they cannot be owned or intimate:  we do not 
think, it thinks. (60)  
 
Insomnia has a sort of “dream logic” but “is stripped of the acquiescence that carries 
us through our dreams” (63).  Insomnia itself does the thinking, rather than the 
insomniac.  This type of insomniac thought, or insomnia as cogito existing through its 
own thought, always running, but never reaching a conclusion, half way between 
conscious and unconscious, can be translated into literature in several different ways.  
Schwenger uses the example of Kafka, citing the “liminality” and “circular” nature of 
his writing (64-65).  Additionally, again with reference to Kafka, we see the failure of 
resolution in the insomniac text:  “The more the insomniac pursues problems in the 
night, the more they lead inevitably to a final dis-solution, which is not a resting 
point, but rather, ‘percussive stillness’” (66).  His final quotation refers to the work of 
Blanchot.  Insomnia, then, similar to writing is “something in the writer but beyond 
the writer” and both writing and insomnia occur “in a liminal realm between the 
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modes of daylight and night” (71).  While for Farbman, dreaming and writing are 
similar, both in their creation and their communicatory effects, the same is true for 
Schwenger with insomnia and writing.   
Thus, we have come full circle.  The only truly consistent factor in sleep 
studies is that they always present both one argument and its opposite.  Medical 
experts argue that insomnia hampers productivity.  Literary critics and authors argue 
that it is essential to productivity.  Medical experts argue that to study insomnia one 
must study the biography of the insomniac.  Insomniac memoir writers argue that 
insomnia generates the biography to be studied.  Scientists argue that the perception 
of insomnia is not necessarily reality.  Literary writers counter that perceiving 
insomnia makes it a reality.  Medical science and capitalist systems of production 
seek to cure insomnia through technology and medication.  Authors in the humanities 
and social sciences posit that technology and medication perpetuate the problem 
rather than present any sort of possible solution.  A condition that seems so easy to 
define—not being able to fall asleep when one desires sleep—resists definition.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
NO REST FOR THE WAR WEARY:  INSOMNIA AND COMBAT 
 
Towards the end of his World War I autobiography, Goodbye to All That, 
Robert Graves describes his physical and mental condition after the war as follows: 
“Very thin, very nervous and with about four years’ loss of sleep” (288).   Through 
this statement, “four years’ loss of sleep,” Graves relates the experience of war to the 
condition of insomnia.  His use of metonymy, substituting sleeplessness for war 
experience as a whole, creates a powerful metaphor through which he is able to 
express the restlessness, anxiety, exhaustion, isolation, helplessness, and physical 
discomfort associated with his life during the war.  Metaphors of exhaustion and 
insomnia are particularly relevant to World War I, a war which ultimately became a 
matter of which side could wear down, or tire out, its opponent first. Yet, as with the 
onset of sleep, neither side knew when the other would first exhaust its abilities to 
fight, making the war appear to be unstoppable, much as wakefulness seems to the 
insomniac.   
In his WWI novel A Farewell to Arms, Ernest Hemingway’s characters often 
comment on the way in which the war seems to carry on infinitely.  For example, a 
soldier named Passini remarks, “[The war] doesn’t finish.  There is no end to war” 
(50).  Narrator Lieutenant Frederic Henry thinks to himself, “Perhaps wars weren’t 
won any more.  Maybe they went on forever.  Maybe it was another Hundred Years’ 
War” (118).  And, Catherine Barkley, the British war nurse and then-pregnant 
girlfriend of Henry, jokes cynically, “For three years I looked forward very childishly 
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to the war ending at Christmas.  But now I look forward till when our [as yet unborn] 
son will be a lieutenant commander” (141).  The sentiment Hemingway’s characters 
express was commonplace during the war, which is one often described as a “war of 
attrition” (Fussell 10).  As Paul Fussell explains: 
[T]he likelihood that peace would ever come again was often in 
serious doubt during the war.  One did not have to be a lunatic or a 
particularly despondent visionary to conceive quite seriously that the 
war would literally never end and would become the permanent 
condition of mankind.  The stalemate and the attrition would go on 
infinitely, becoming, like the telephone and the internal combustion 
engine, a part of the accepted atmosphere of the modern experience.  
(71) 
 
Much as during a bout of insomnia, the insomniac feels that it will be the permanent 
condition of his or her life, so felt citizens and soldiers during the Great War.   
Significantly, Fussell notes the connection between war and modernity, 
positing an inextricable relationship between the two.  War, and its associations with 
perpetual stagnation, claustrophobia, and exhaustion, characterized the modern 
experience.  As such, many novels written about the war depict insomnia as an 
experience common to both soldiers and civilians.  Insomnia is a particularly 
significant device through which to expose this condition, in part because of its 
associations with helplessness, isolation, anxiety, and frustration, feelings that are 
familiar to many who have experienced war.  Further, insomnia mirrors the liminality 
of the war itself, which often left individuals feeling trapped between states of hope 
and hopelessness, activity and inactivity, bravery and cowardice, and patriotism and 
cynicism.  Insomnia is often symptomatic of a conflict between internally and 
externally constructed identity;  it puts in contrast identity as a soldier and identity as 
an individual.  In doing so, it reveals conflicting desires and the tensions these desires 
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create.  Insomnia can be described as a conflict of desire and need between the mind 
and body—one desires or requires rest while the other desires or requires activity.  
For example, even though the body of a soldier may be exhausted, fear of nightmares 
related to the war may make him reluctant to sleep. 
More importantly, the necessity of insomnia reveals the true extent to which 
modern society, especially a society at war, abolishes the “private” individual.  
According to Jürgen Habermas, “The fully developed bourgeois public sphere was 
based on the fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals 
who came together to form a public:  the role of property owners and the role of 
human beings pure and simple” (56).  If we substitute “soldiers” for “property 
owners” in this quotation, Habermas’ argument applies especially well to war; the 
soldier’s body becomes public property, so even the “privacy” associated with sleep 
and one’s control over one’s sleep are matters of public interest.  Insomnia exposes 
the tension this situation generates for individuals robbed of their sense of privacy, 
“fictitious” though it may be.  The soldier is expected to sleep when he can to be alert 
and prepared for duty, as his nation depends on his capabilities; the man, on the other 
hand, may find that the only time he has to himself is when others are sleeping, so 
might keep himself awake in spite of his duties.  Insomnia becomes a means of 
reclaiming a feeling of privacy within in a space (army camp, hospital, or trenches) 
where privacy is otherwise nearly impossible.   
The three texts I will discuss in this chapter are all fictional works that take 
place, at least in part, during World War I:  Ford Madox Ford’s Parade’s End 
tetralogy, Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, and Hemingway’s 
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aforementioned A Farewell to Arms.   These literary texts provide evidence of the 
way in which the contemporary discourse regarded sleep habits and failures and 
characterized and understood those who suffered from insomnia, as well as make 
specific connections between sleep behaviors and war experience.  They expose 
expectations regarding the depth of one’s obligation to one’s society, the society’s 
dependence on individual complicity, and the extent to which individuals during this 
time period were expected to maintain and subsume themselves to discipline over 
their bodies and minds, regardless of the degree to which that particular form of 
discipline is actually possible.  The texts use insomnia as a metaphor to represent the 
tension between allowing one’s body to be used for the “greater good” of the war 
effort and maintaining one’s independence of mind and body at the same time, a 
tension frequently resulting from idealized images of both men and women in a time 
when these ideals were both necessary to the war effort and in flux because of it.   
Both men and women were expected to sacrifice themselves and their bodies 
to the war effort, men through the giving over of their bodies to the army and women 
through their roles as nurses and ambulance drivers, but also as the encouragement 
and motivation behind the more obvious and immediate sacrifice of their sons, 
husbands, and brothers.  The tension created through this sacrifice involves images of 
idealized manhood in the form of the men’s ability to maintain self-control, stoicism, 
and taciturnity through conditions of extreme physical and emotional stress, yet still 
submit their bodies and minds to military discipline.  Females were no less subject to 
images of idealized womanhood as they were expected to maintain the role of 
domestic guardian, as well as facilitate male participation in the war, knowingly 
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encouraging loved ones to take substantial risks.  In short, men were expected to be in 
control of themselves and disciplined, and women were expected to protect and care 
for men through their jobs as nurses and mothers, as well as support the sacrifice of 
these same men through encouraging them to fight.   
War Fatigue 
Writing in July of 1918, Guthrie Rankin notes the connection between the war 
and insomnia:  “In these strenuous times there has been probably no greater 
interference with the ordinary comfort of humanity than the broken sleep that has 
become such a widespread experience since the outbreak of the war” (“Broken Sleep” 
77).  Not only does Rankin see the pervasiveness of insomnia as troubling, but also as 
more detrimental to health than disease more generally, arguing, “Life is no longer a 
struggle to escape accident and disease, but has become a purgatory of suspense and 
bereavement” (77).  His use of the word “purgatory” suggests his feelings, shared 
with many of his contemporaries, that the war is a sort of temporal punishment; it 
may eventually end, but no one knows when or what one must go through before that 
end.    Yet, while the war continues, people remain trapped in a hellish nether-world, 
awaiting their final judgment and the judgments on their loved ones. 
When faced with such a circumstance, a seemingly endless war that involved 
perpetual stalemates and long periods of stagnation, it is not surprising that one of the 
major concerns of those in charge of the war effort became the fitness and vitality of 
troops.  Fitness, both physical and emotional, was crucial, not only because troops 
needed to be strong to physically dominate the enemy, but also because they needed 
to be strong to withstand attacks for extended periods without breaking down 
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mentally.  As Fussell argues, “In the three lines of trenches the main business of the 
soldier was to exercise self-control while being shelled” (46).  Interestingly, Fussell 
does not describe the duty of the soldier as valiantly charging in an attack, using his 
strength to overpower an enemy soldier, or using his skill with a rifle to take one 
down, but rather being able to keep himself together the longest while under attack.  
Fussell uses the term “self-control,” but perhaps a better term might be discipline, as 
self-control implies personal agency; whereas discipline involves subsuming personal 
agency to training.  Discipline often took on the guise of self-control, but as General 
Campion in Parade’s End asks, “What was discipline for if subordinates were to act 
on their consciences?” (481), suggesting that discipline means simply having the self-
control to give over control of oneself to the military and one’s superiors.  In essence, 
to win the war one side had to be able to outlast the other side, hoping the other side 
became too exhausted and undisciplined to continue fighting or hold a position.  As a 
result, the war was fought not only militarily, but medically, with doctors being 
consulted not only to treat wounded soldiers, but also to discern the most effective 
ways to keep the soldiers in a prolonged state of controlled readiness by keeping them 
as healthy, sane, and alert as possible. 
According to Anson Rabinbach, “The fitness of troops became an important 
medical concern, as did the deployment of their skills in the war effort.  The war 
required the maintenance of their physical and psychological capacities to sustain 
morale and combat” (260).  In order to maintain this “fitness,” “Experts on fatigue, on 
production, on industrial hygiene, and on nutritional physiology were enlisted in the 
staggering redeployment of national energy” (Rabinbach 260).  In such a war in 
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which more often than not victory came not through killing other troops, but keeping 
one’s own troops alive, having troops available takes on a meaning more complex 
than simply having enough healthy men to fight.  The capability of fighting rested in 
more than a lack of physical ailments for the soldier, requiring the mental fitness 
needed to endure long periods of waiting in often very uncomfortable, stressful, and 
anxious situations.  As such, issues like fatigue came to the forefront of medical 
research during this period. 
David Randall explains the significance of combating fatigue in war through 
tracing battles that may have been lost due to nothing more than the fatigue of the 
troops.  Referring to the 1942 Battle of Guadalcanal in World War II, he argues: 
With so little sleep after days of combat and the need to maintain a 
constant state of readiness, the men aboard those ships simply weren’t 
able to react to an attack that came in an unexpected form.  Their 
brains could not shift their cognitive framework from scouring the 
skies to patrolling the waters, missing the [Japanese] boats in plain 
view because they had their minds locked on the idea that enemy 
planes were the greater danger. (142)   
 
Though David Randall claims the American military first “noticed that lack of sleep 
could severely undermine the discipline of troops going through routine chores” in 
1959 (142), Rabinbach situates this realization earlier, during World War I, as I have 
previously cited.  Regardless of their disparate timelines, the point remains that 
fatigue is a significant issue with which militaries must contend.  The efforts to 
control fatigue among troops persist today, and the stakes are quite high: 
Fatigue, long the overlooked nemesis of military efficiency, can soon 
be regulated and quantified as easily as food rations or bullets.  In one 
report, [Thomas] Balkin estimated that in future conflicts, the number 
of friendly-fire accidents will plunge toward zero, all on account of the 
increased decision making abilities made possible by sleep. (D. 
Randall 151)   
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If the military is able to ensure a supply of rested troops, accidental deaths can 
possibly be eliminated, keeping more troops alive and available to continue fighting. 
However, actually enabling soldiers to rest adequately is a problem that we 
are still not able to solve, and certainly had not overcome during WWI.  Rankin, who 
advises insomniacs to attend to regularized routines to treat insomnia acknowledges 
that his advice cannot often be applied to soldiers or others involved in the war 
because “under war conditions the normal nights of many have become disturbed and 
restricted” (“Broken Sleep” 77) thereby preventing them from regulating sleep habits 
effectively.  Fussell explains:   
Normally the British troops rotated trench duty.  After a week of ‘rest’ 
behind the lines, a unit would move up—at night—to relieve a unit in 
the front line trench.  After three days to a week or more in that 
position, the unit would move back for a similar length of time to the 
support trench, and finally back to the reserve.  Then it was time for a 
week of rest again. (45-46) 
   
Despite the apparent time for “rest” allowed during the weeks when troops were not 
in the actual front trenches, the disruptive, nocturnal schedule of trench life during 
which it was “after evening stand-to” that “the real work began” (Fussell 47) likely 
created havoc among the troops’ sleep schedules.  Even soldiers and war workers on 
the Italian front (and not in the trenches), such as the ones Hemingway describes in A 
Farewell to Arms, are required to transition to a nocturnal schedule.  For example, in 
the novel’s opening, Henry describes hearing the sounds of fighting and the flashes of 
shells in the dark, noting that “There was much traffic at night” (3-4). 
Being forced to continually rotate working shifts, sometimes following a 
traditional sleeping/waking schedule and other times being expected to sleep during 
the day and remain nocturnally active, creates myriad sleep-deprivation related health 
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issues.  The schedule Fussell describes resembles the shift-work schedule many 
employees adopt when working in fields, such as medicine or industrial work, in 
which businesses are open twenty four hours a day.  Stanley Coren defines shift-work 
as work in which the worker must labor outside of the traditional 7 am to 7 pm hours.  
The schedule of soldiers in the trenches, as Fussell describes, follows what Coren 
defines as a rotating shift-work schedule, which includes a fluctuating combination of 
day and evening work and wakefulness.  This type of schedule is extremely stressful 
for the individual.  According to Coren, “shift work is a remarkably efficient device 
for disrupting an individual’s normal sleep-wakefulness pattern” primarily because it 
“[disorganizes] our circadian rhythms” forcing the workers to “fight against their own 
internal clock” (209).  Rotating shift work of the nature soldiers experienced with 
their trench and duty schedules is particularly problematic because it prevents the 
individual from ever fully acclimating to a new sleeping-waking schedule.  Coren 
explains:  “If you stay on a particular shift long enough, your internal clock will 
eventually adjust to it.  Unfortunately, some people on the night shift never allow 
their body to make this adjustment because they never give it a chance” (211).  The 
consequences of a perpetually disrupted sleep schedule include “excessive fatigue, 
reduced work efficiency, and tendencies to be irritable, depressed, and generally 
unhappy” (Coren 211).  In effect, the military, in its attempts to give soldiers 
adequate rest by keeping them away from the front-line trenches and its related 
nocturnal routines for two weeks at a time, ultimately fostered and perpetuated 
insomnia, fatigue, and generally disrupted sleep schedules by never giving soldiers 
“the chance” to acclimate to a fully nocturnal routine. 
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Further complicating the issue of sleep at war is the perceived relationship 
between having the ability to go without sleep and the idealized masculinity expected 
of soldiers.  Coren uses the medical discipline and its tradition of requiring those to 
the field to work extended hours as an example.  According to his source, a medical 
school dean, requiring (initially male) doctors to remain awake for long periods of 
time is a Darwinian method of weeding out the ineffective, or weak, ones:   
Before World War I the way that you obtained your graduate medical 
education was through an actual apprenticeship.  You could say that 
the medical hierarchy was quite selective and exclusionary, and the 
gateway to the profession was the internship. . . .  This means that the 
profession dictates that you must make the training really hard and the 
hours really long so that it serves as an effective barrier screening off 
the domain of the practicing physician.  This will serve to limit the 
number of trainees who actually make it to the status of full-fledged 
physician. If you survive the long hours, the work, the lack of sleep, 
then you have shown that you, too, are a hero with super-human 
qualities.  As a hero, you can join the ranks of other heroes, those who, 
like you, have bested the challenge and have been rewarded with the 
honorific title of “Doctor.”  (qtd. in Fussell 204) 
 
The associations specifically within the medical discipline, stemming from pre-WWI 
values of masculinity (physical strength, vigor, self-control and endurance) create a 
real tension between expectations of fatigue tolerance and efforts to minimize fatigue.  
As I have noted earlier, Rabinbach points to the efforts of WWI doctors to combat 
and prevent solider fatigue.  But, conversely, these very same doctors were raised in a 
tradition in which masculinity is defined, in part, by the ability to tolerate and 
overcome fatigue.  Thus, we have a situation in which the values and practices of the 
medical discipline are in direct conflict with its ostensive goals on behalf of those it is 
attempting to treat, in this case soldiers.  The discourse on sleep and waking becomes 
itself a sort of tension:  fatigue must be controlled and monitored, yet the strong 
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individual should be able to tolerate fatigue internally rather than require external 
supervision or assistance. 
This mentality based in idealized masculinity is also reflected in beliefs 
regarding the treatment of soldiers for war trauma, also referred to as both “shell 
shock” and, aptly, “war fatigue.”  Such a mentality engendered the belief that the best 
treatment for war shock came not from a removal from the conditions of war, but 
rather through a reminder of the importance of military discipline.  An article entitled 
“’Nerve Shock’ in War” published in The British Medical Journal in July of 1915 
notes that in cases of “nerve shock” “the prospect of discharge from the army [for the 
afflicted soldier] was apt to delay recovery” (64).  As Paul Lerner argues regarding 
the military treatment of shell-shocked soldiers in Germany: 
One consequence of rationalized psychiatric treatment was that 
humanity and sympathy were removed from the psychiatrist’s office.  
Pity and charity were decried as effeminate and even pathogenic 
impulses; which the assertion of medical control over all phases of the 
diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation of neurotics, doctors exploited 
the therapeutic efficacy of military discipline and industrial 
functionalism. (20) 
 
Though Lerner comments specifically on the German military, his observations are 
equally applicable to the British and Americans.  An article by G. Elliot Smith 
published in The British Medical Journal in July of 1917 calls for “the more rational 
treatment of what might be termed more minor mental maladies” and laments that “a 
nation so humane as the British should be so surpassed in any regard by a nation 
which has proved itself so inhuman as Germany” (47) regarding the methods of 
treatment of shell shocked soldiers.  Another article, by F. W. Mott, also written in 
July of 1917, points to the necessity of discipline in the treatment of shell shocked 
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soldiers:  “Discipline is very essential; laxity of discipline, over-sympathy and 
attention by kind, well-meaning ladies giving social tea-parties, drives, joy-rides, with 
the frequent exclamation of ‘poor dear,’ has done much to perpetuate functional 
neuroses in our soldiers” (42).  Discipline, which Campion argues should substitute 
for conscience, also comes to substitute for self-control in cases of trauma.  
Paradoxically, in order to regain self-control, the soldier must first relinquish it. 
A literary example of the medical focus on discipline appears in Virginia 
Woolf’s post-war novel Mrs. Dalloway (1925), which explores the treatment of shell-
shocked war veteran Septimus Smith.  Woolf, who wrote in her diary in June of 1923 
that one of her goals in writing Mrs. Dalloway was to “criticise the social system, & 
to show it at work, at its most intense” (93), illustrates the damaging effects of that 
“social system” on Septimus.  Part of the damage done to Septimus comes through 
his doctor, Sir William Bradshaw, who believes Septimus can be cured by 
disciplining his mind into adopting a rational view of the world that Bradshaw 
explains as a sense of “proportion” (283).  Woolf describes Bradshaw’s societal role:  
“Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made England 
prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, made it 
impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of 
proportion” (283-84).  Later in the same section, Woolf notes that “Sir William was a 
master of his own actions, which the patient was not” (285).  Sir William’s 
“treatment” of Septimus, a suggestion of prolonged, isolated rest until Septimus could 
be made to see the world as Sir William does, leads to Septimus’ suicide, pointing to 
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Woolf’s opinions on both the lack of empathy she attributes to medical professionals 
and failures of the disciplinary model at healing traumatized soldiers. 
According to Frederic Jameson, “the will to read literary or cultural texts as 
symbolic acts must necessarily grasp them as resolutions of determinate 
contradictions” (80).  The model of the text as an attempt to resolve contradictions 
that Jameson articulates is useful in understanding the ways in which literary texts 
present and treat insomnia.  First and foremost, insomnia itself is a state of 
contradiction:  the desires of the body contradict those of the mind or vice versa.  
Insomnia can be described both in terms of lack (lack of sleep) and presence 
(presence of insomnia as a state).  But beyond insomnia itself, medical and military 
discourse is also contradictory.  It proffers the message that care of the self as a 
soldier is necessary for the survival of nations.  The men (and women) must be rested, 
healthy, sane, and prepared to fight for their country.  At the same time, those who 
purvey this message also feel that the truly strong and masculine self can transcend 
the need for self-care and expect the woman to willingly sacrifice herself and her 
loved ones for the good of others, as caretaker of her family or the sick and mother, 
sister, or wife of the soldier.  The will to serve one’s country should overcome to the 
will to serve oneself.  Hence, the discipline of the military serves two conflicting 
functions:  to teach oneself to behave in a manner that optimizes one’s ability to be 
productive (sleeping well, eating properly, avoiding vice) and to teach oneself to 
subsume the self’s needs for the greater good (go without sleep, food, or comfort).  
The literature of WWI, then, attempts to expose and resolve these conflicting views 
of one’s responsibility as a soldier and frequently does so through the medium of 
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insomnia.  In the texts of Ford, Sassoon, and Hemingway, insomnia becomes a 
vehicle through which one can both exercise (or exorcise) expectations of masculinity 
through self-deprivation, yet still focus on individualized care of the self through 
allotting insomniac-time to more private, individual needs.  Simultaneously, the 
function of insomnia is to valorize masculine strength and transcendence of bodily 
need, yet still afford resistance to the type of discipline which foregoes the 
individual’s interests for the needs of the masses. 
Discipline 
Given the reliance on the military of having soldiers fit for battle, not taking 
opportunities for sleep indicates a resistance to discipline on the soldier’s behalf, 
prioritizing his individual concerns over his role within the military when it comes to 
his “care of the self”:  an act tantamount to insubordination.  According to Michel 
Foucault, since the Classical Age, the human body was viewed as an “object and 
target of power,” allowing those in authority to see the “docile” body as something to 
be “subjected, used, transformed, and improved” (Discipline 136).  One of the means 
of objectifying and controlling the body is through discipline: 
Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of 
utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of 
obedience).  In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one 
hand, it turns it into an “aptitude,” a “capacity,” which it seeks to 
increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of energy, the power 
that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.  
(Discipline 138) 
 
Authorities, medical or military, attempt to control the actions of the body, and, in 
doing so, essentially exhaust the body’s capabilities thereby requiring the individual 
to sleep in order to begin the process of exhaustion anew.  Discipline, as a controlled 
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expenditure of bodily energy, serves two major functions:  the productivity of the 
body is increased in order to be used for production (profit) or power (war) and, 
through putting the body in constant motion, the ability to contemplate (and thus 
question) is lessened.  As Ford’s character Valentine Wannop thinks when she 
comments, “You could not run a dual physical and mental existence without some 
risk,” (534) many believed that keeping physically active prevents thought and 
immobility promotes thought.  A. W. MacFarlane, author of Insomnia and Its 
Therapeutics, argues that “we may predicate that sound nervous structures, properly 
nourished, adequately rested, and rightly exercised, are fundamental desiderata for 
good sleep” (29), indicating the belief that one who receives proper and balanced 
amounts of physical and mental exercise during the day will sleep well at night. 
The type of discipline described by Foucault applies quite fittingly to the body 
of the insomniac.  The disciplined body tires itself out during the working day, so it 
sleeps well at night; there is not that extra “insomniac-time” for excessive thought, as 
can be seen in Sassoon’s character, Sherston, who believes fully in the war while he 
is kept in action, yet begins to question the war when he is given time to rest and 
think about it in more depth and eventually adopts an anti-war stance, refusing to 
return to combat (510).  Sherston argues that “At three o’clock in the morning a 
sleepless mind can welcome improbabilities and renounce its daylight skepticism” 
(461).  Eventually, his early morning ponderings lead him to realize his desire to 
resist further participation in the war, which he ultimately succeeds at through 
pleading insanity (512).  In Sherston’s case, his insomnia enables him to prioritize his 
individual needs over those of the military.  Similarly, one may prioritize personal 
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needs over the war effort for using time awake for personal pursuits of pleasure and 
companionship as Henry does in his nocturnal relationship with Catherine Barkley, or 
purposes of thought, as we see with characters like Christopher Tietjens or George 
Sherston, the latter of whom stays awake to read a novel, acknowledging the obstacle 
the army’s day-to-day requirements presents to thinking “one’s own thoughts” (357); 
thus, he uses his “insomniac-time” as a time for personal thought.  “Proper” sleeping 
habits entail both physical and mental discipline, in the form of salubrious living and 
the avoidance of “over-thinking.”  Achieving this discipline increases the aptitude of 
the worker or soldier, allowing him or her to be more rested, and thus, more capable 
of fulfilling duties effectively and without question.  Yet, soldiers often refused to 
sleep properly in an effort to attend to individual identities and concerns. 
In short, because a society, and especially a society at war, relies on its 
individual members to be productive (produce goods, perform tasks), the larger 
society does indeed have a stake in how well its members sleep.  Prior to World War 
I, both American and British society were in the midst of a great movement of 
industrialization, with industrial models seeking to minimize waste in order to 
maximize productivity, and this mentality carried over into the treatment and 
discipline of soldiers.  Within rationalized society, “an attempt is also made to assure 
the quality of the time used:  constant supervision, the pressure of supervisors, the 
elimination of anything that might disturb or distract; it is a question of constituting a 
totally useful time” (Foucault, Discipline 150). Parade’s End, Memoirs of an Infantry 
Officer, and A Farewell to Arms all illustrate the idea that it is the obligation of the 
individual to be healthy and productive to benefit the larger group.  In fact, Tietjens, 
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central character of Parade’s End, asserts, “Sick bodies are not only of no use to the 
King, but are enormously detrimental to the army that has to cart them about” (581); 
therefore, taking responsibility for one’s health is “a duty to your children.  And the 
King” (616).  Tietjens, guardian of tradition and honor, considers these conditions 
“very reasonable and proper” (581), yet resists them, through his insomnia, 
nonetheless.  Sherston of Memoirs of an Infantry Officer considers the idea that as a 
soldier he “could no longer call [his] life [his] own” (359).  And, in A Farwell to 
Arms, illness is only a reason for being removed from the front if the illness is a direct 
result of physical injury; otherwise, soldiers, sick or not, must fight.  When Henry is 
wounded and in the hospital, he develops a case of jaundice.  Because his jaundice is 
a consequence of his illicit, and quite heavy, drinking, the head nurse, who initially 
pities him for having the illness when she thought it was a result of a shrapnel wound 
he sustained, comes to despise him, commenting “And I was pitying you for having 
jaundice.  Pity is something that is wasted on you. . . .  Unless you find something 
else [wrong with you] I’m afraid you will have to go back to the front when you are 
through with your jaundice.  I don’t believe self-inflicted jaundice entitles you to a 
convalescent leave” (144).  She is only concerned for Henry’s health inasmuch as 
Henry’s health relates to his physical war wounds, not his mental ones that lead him 
to drink excessively.  He is no less sick, but the knowledge that his illness is self-
inflicted leads his nurse to see him as more fit and prepared to return to duty than had 
his illness merely been a case of bad luck.  
These types of moral and behavioral judgments rendered against failures to 
establish regularity and self-control and to keep oneself healthy are present in the 
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texts of Hemingway, Ford, and Sassoon, further illuminating connections among the 
regulation of the body and its cycles, morality, and avoidance of over-thinking to 
sleep habits.  With regard to the regulation of behavior, Foucault argues that there are 
three primary ways to control time and activity:  “establish rhythms, impose 
particular occupations, regulate the cycles of repetition” (Discipline 149).  He points 
to the presence of such means of control in modern establishments such as armies, 
hospitals, and schools, and he equates the regulated and cyclical life led by members 
of monastic orders to “the regulations of great manufactories,” which “laid down the 
exercises that would divide up the working day” (Discipline 149).  This same type of 
regularity and discipline is emphasized by the medical authorities as a means of 
preventing insomnia and returning the insomniac to a state of “normalcy.”  In the 
three cases of Henry, Sherston, and Tietjens, “normalcy” is resisted through their 
insomniac behaviors.  Henry commits all of his rebellious acts at night:  from his 
drinking, to his relationship with Catherine, to his escape from the army, to the birth 
of his still-born, illegitimate child.  Sherston’s insomnia gives him the time for 
thought he needs to actually contemplate the war, and in doing so, he comes to see the 
war as pointless and futile, leading to his refusal to rejoin the army and commitment 
to a mental hospital, and Tietjens forgoes sleep in order to ponder interpersonal 
relationships, which may have seemed frivolous to many during a time of crisis on 
such a massive scale, but for Tietjens, such ponderings allowed him to maintain his 
sense of individuality in an ever-depersonalizing and dehumanizing world.  Insomnia 
is a vehicle through which all three characters can resist discipline and maintain their 
individualized sense of priority. 
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Though all three characters resist discipline through insomnia, these novels 
still emphasize the importance of physical and mental discipline in a wartime setting.  
The emphasis in Foucault’s aforementioned passage is on training the body through 
repetition and regularity, of which physical exercise is an example.  Foucault’s 
argument is reflected in a passage from Parade’s End in which Valentine considers 
her job as an athletic instructor.  Ford writes, “The military physical developments of 
the last four years had been responsible for a real exaggeration of physical values.  
[Valentine] was aware that in that Institution [the girls’ school], for the last four 
years, she had been regarded as supplementing, if not as actually replacing both the 
doctor and the priest” (535-36).  In this case, Valentine acts as the disciplinarian.  She 
is responsible for replicating the regularity and discipline associated with Foucault’s 
hospitals (“the doctor”) and monastic orders (“the priest”), instilling “physical 
values” in her pupils.  
Valentine understands physical discipline in relation to its ability to disrupt or 
prevent thought.  When one wants to avoid over-thinking, one can turn to physical 
exercise, and disciplining the body is a means of disciplining the mind.  Mental over-
work, which as MacFarlane claims is mostly “seen in the literary, scientific, 
professional, and commercial classes” is “one of the great sources of insomnia” (64).  
It is not coincidental, then, that in the aforementioned medical literature, both 
physical fitness and the avoidance of over-thinking are seen as means of preventing 
insomnia.  Valentine also considers the connection between fitness and morality, 
mulling over the possibility that “the [student’s] lie was the product of an 
overoxygenated brain” (535).  Lack of activity created an imbalance between oxygen 
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distribution in mind and body, leaving an abundance of oxygen left over for the brain; 
therefore, the student was over-using her brain, leading to the immoral act of lying.  
Had she been physically worn out, her mind would have been quieted and less prone 
to both immorality and fabrication.  Valentine’s cynicism regarding her role gives her 
some pause when drawing this conclusion, but she still does see at least a connection 
between physical discipline and the prevention of “immoral” behavior. 
In A Farewell to Arms, Hemingway also associates sleep and nocturnal 
behavior with morality, but does so through showing the ways in which the war has 
changed morality.  Early on in the novel, Henry admits to fearing God in the night 
(72).  Yet, as the novel progresses, his relationship with the night becomes more 
comfortable and positive.  As I have mentioned, Henry and Catherine have a 
nocturnal relationship; they are only able to see each other at night.  This night life of 
Henry’s becomes central to his morality though many of their contemporaries would 
at least claim to see their sexual encounters, which take place outside of wedlock, to 
be immoral, Henry, on the other hand, sees his faithfulness to Catherine and hopes for 
their future as guardian of his morality.  When discussing religion with a friend, 
Henry comments that “[his] own [religious feeling] comes only at night” (263).  
When asked what he believes in, he comments that he only believes “in sleep” (179).  
And, when he considers the purpose of his life, he thinks that it is to “Eat and drink 
and sleep with Catherine” (233), sleep meaning both sex and shared repose.  It is 
during his nights with Catherine, when he is shirking both his duties and conventional 
morality, that he finds himself to be at his most moral and with the most religious 
feeling.  War, for Hemingway, is the true source of evil, not Henry’s love for 
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Catherine.  But, of course, conventionally, war is valorized where extra-marital sex 
(especially when it leads to a child) is demonized.  Even when Henry commits the 
one action that many of his comrades would find unforgiveable by defecting from the 
army and escaping to Switzerland, rather than losing sleep over his supposedly 
cowardly and immoral behavior, he describes his sleep as peaceful, rather than full of 
nightmares and fears, as it had previously been:  “We slept well and if I woke in the 
night I knew it was only from only one cause and I would shift the feather bed over, 
very softly, so that Catherine would not be wakened and then go back to sleep again, 
warm and with the new lightness of thin covers” (293).  Now that Henry has pursued 
what he believes to be individually important (his life with Catherine) rather than 
nationally important (his participation in the war), he is able to rest comfortably. 
Hemingway equates sleeping well with being undisciplined yet able to pursue 
one’s own morals; Ford supports Hemingway’s argument through exploring its 
opposite.  Evidence of the value given to physical discipline and regulation appears in 
Parade’s End in several examples, and again, as in the medical literature, physical 
discipline is seen in terms of a connection to morality.  As Valentine contemplates the 
“immoral” act of becoming Tietjens’ mistress, she sees her own physical fitness as an 
obstacle to immorality and, in a sense, a protector of her chastity: 
“Well, I’m fit…”  She had an image of the aligned hundred of girls in 
blue jumpers and men’s ties keeping whom fit had kept her super-fit.  
She wondered how many of them would be men’s mistresses before 
the year was out.  It was August then.  But perhaps none!  Because she 
had kept them fit…  “Ah!” she said, “if I had been a loose woman, 
with flaccid breasts and a soft body.  All perfumed!” … And perhaps 
the price she paid was just that; she was in such a hard condition that 
she hadn’t moved him to…  She perhaps exhaled such an aura of 
sobriety, chastity, and abstinence as to suggest to him that… that a 
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decent fellow didn’t get his girl into trouble before going to be 
killed… (273)    
 
In this case it is her own fitness that Valentine sees as a barrier between her and the 
immoral behavior of becoming someone’s mistress, believing in the possibility that 
Tietjens, witnessing her physical fitness, was dissuaded from the idea of seducing her.  
She cannot even bring herself to articulate the relationship in explicitly sexual terms.  
Yet, she acknowledges that two other women in the novel, Sylvia Tietjens and Edith 
Ethel Duchemin (later Macmaster) are simultaneously physically fit and “immoral.” 
However, the novel makes quite clear that Valentine and Tietjens should pursue their 
relationship despite its social impropriety.  Parade’s End exposes the disconnection 
between the appearance of physical discipline and morality. 
Despite the adulterous actions of Sylvia and Edith Ethel, their physical fitness 
is still equated with a form of cleanliness, simulating the appearance of morality.  
Tietjens, upon learning his comrade is ill, thinks, “You don’t contact loathsome 
diseases except from the cheapest kind of women or through being untidy-minded” 
(614).  In this statement, Tietjens refers to disordered thought in terms of cleanliness, 
illustrating his belief in the connection between mental “tidiness” and physical health.  
Logically, a woman like Sylvia with multiple sexual partners is equally likely to 
transmit a disease as any woman, cheap or not, with an equal amount of partners; the 
difference is in the perception of her “clean” appearance.  Furthermore, Sylvia, one of 
the novel’s more morally flexible characters, prides herself on her physical fitness, 
which she equates with beauty and attractiveness:  “If [Sylvia] had no other training 
at her very expensive school she had had so much drilling in calisthenics as to be 
singularly mistress of limbs, and, in the interests of her beauty she had always kept 
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herself very fit” (393).  Sylvia is often despised by those who know of her immoral 
behaviors (Vincent Macmaster, Edith Ethel, Mark Tietjens), yet, seen as exceedingly 
moral and upright by those who are taken in by her charms, like General Campion, 
and, for a while, Valentine.  Within the novel, there is not so much a one-to-one 
connection between athleticism and morality, as there is between athleticism and self-
control, leading to the appearance of morality and propriety.  One need not have the 
self-control to be moral, but one needs self-control to appear moral.  The society 
depicted in this novel is extremely focused on the appearance of propriety (rather than 
actual propriety), as we see with the characters’ numerous attempts to make their 
actions appear socially acceptable, including Tietjens’ attempts to cover up his wife’s 
affairs and his certainty that his son was better off being known to “have a rip of a 
father than a whore of a mother” (77) as it is more acceptable (though likely equally 
common) for men to be unreliable and promiscuous than for women to be either.   
Tietjens’ character is somewhat contradictory in terms of physical discipline; 
he is often described as ungainly and even corpulent, but, at the same time, he 
possesses great physical strength.  At his first meeting with Valentine, on the golf 
course, he runs “like a rhinoceros,” yet is able to outrun all of the other men and keep 
pace with the exceedingly fit Valentine (much to her surprise) (67).  When he is in the 
trenches, at one point the trench is bombarded, and he must struggle to free one of the 
men under his command from a pile of debris:   
Thank God for my enormous physical strength!’  It was the first time 
that he had ever had to be thankful for great physical strength. . . .  It 
was a condemnation of a civilisation that he, Tietjens, possessed of 
enormous physical strength, should never have had to use it before.  
He looked like a collection of mealsacks; but at least he could tear a 
pack of cards in half. (638)   
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Tietjens acknowledges that his physical strength could be of great use to society; he 
sees it as a waste that he is not better used in this way a member of the lower classes 
might be.   
Yet, physical strength and discipline are not equivalents.  Tietjens’ strength 
does not come from physical training, as it is inherent, treated within the novel as 
constitutional.  And, Tietjens does have a physical weakness, his lungs, and is often 
regarded as being generally undisciplined, and, consequently, as an anomaly.  He is 
simultaneously strong but awkward, just as he is a master of social propriety, 
knowing exactly the right thing to say in every situation, but often viewed by others 
as odd and non-conformist, not having the same goals of monetary success as his 
peers.  Additionally, he is not easily reconciled to the discipline of the army.  When 
considering joining the army, as two of his brothers already have (both are dead), he 
knows that the type of discipline enforced by the army will not suit him: 
But no doubt he would not have liked the army.  Discipline!  He 
supposed he would have put up with the discipline: a gentleman had 
to.  Because noblesse oblige: not for fear of consequences… But army 
officers seemed to him pathetic.  They spluttered and roared to make 
men jump smartly: at the end of apoplectic efforts the men jumped 
smartly.  But there was the end of it. (127) 
 
He sees the power of the officer as only based in appearance.  They can control the 
bodies of the men, but that power, by itself, is hollow.  Regardless, Tietjens 
acknowledges that he must behave with social propriety and obedience to authority, 
but he displays a strong sense of discomfort with both being controlled and 
controlling others:  “It was detestable to him to be in control of the person of another 
human being—as detestable as it would have been to be himself a prisoner… that 
thing he dreaded most in the world…” because, at least,  “to control a prisoner even 
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under the compulsion of discipline on yourself, implies a certain free-will of your 
own” (619).  He equates the instillation of physical discipline by outside forces as 
control over the will.  Thus, he illustrates Foucault’s idea of physical discipline as a 
means of controlling the human mind and will, a powerful weapon of those in 
authority.  Tietjens is extremely uncomfortable both with using discipline to control 
and with having discipline used against his own person.  If anything, he desires to be 
complete master of his own mind and body. 
Sherston seems to share a similar viewpoint.  As his company prepares to go 
on a raid, he illustrates his willingness to participate, regardless of the danger:  
“Anyhow I meant to ask Kinjack to let me go on the Raid.  Supposing he ordered me 
to go on it?  How should I feel about it then?” (297).  Like Tietjens, Sherston 
understands the necessity of willingness to fight as well as take orders.  But, also 
similar to Tietjens, Sherston balks at the idea of having his body completely under the 
control of another person.  He would be content to volunteer for the raid, illustrating 
his ability to overcome his fear of physical danger or death, yet the idea of being 
under someone else’s control bothers him.  Volunteering for the raid is one issue, but 
being ordered to go is something entirely different.  He is not afraid to die or be 
injured, but he is hesitant to cede control of his will to someone in higher authority.  
The submission of the body to discipline is often required of a soldier, and 
both Tietjens and Sherston are required to follow orders throughout both texts, as is 
Henry as a medical worker.  Up until the point at which Sherston is sent away from 
the war to rest and begins to question the validity of the war itself, his capacity to be 
an effective soldier is not questioned.  Henry remains cynical about the war 
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throughout the novel, but because he is not a soldier who must take lives, but rather 
one who cares for the wounded, his moral position is less dubious.  However, he does 
become exposed to the dark underside of military discipline when he sees the army 
executing its own soldiers for alleged cowardice and ends up defecting (224-25).  The 
language that Hemingway uses in this section of the text is telling, as he repeats 
“questioning,” “questioned,” and “questioners” multiple times when describing the 
“trial” of the accused soldiers.    Literally, Hemingway is referring to the interviews 
with the accused defectors, but his language points more to the sense that these 
individuals “questioned” the war itself through their hesitancy to participate 
obediently.  As he escapes, Henry reflects that “I was not made to think” (233), but 
only does so because he knows the opposite to be true; he thinks this only to stop his 
other thoughts; however, his thoughts are never about the moral validity of his 
escape, but rather the friends he left behind.   
Tietjens proves to be slightly more contradictory in this regard.  Though 
Tietjens is reluctant to submit his body to discipline, he does have some of the 
characteristics of an excellent soldier, mainly coming from his desire to comply with 
orders given by those above him hierarchically.  Yet, in some ways he is extremely 
disciplined.  For example, in one scene when he is finally asleep after a long, 
emotionally-exhausting evening, he is able to wake up instantaneously, merely, he 
thinks, because of the presence of the general:  “Immediately upon awakening he was 
not perfectly certain of where he was, but he had sense enough to answer with 
coherence the first question the general put to and to stand stiffly on his legs” (444).  
The narrator comments that it was likely “voices from without” (444) that were 
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responsible for awakening Tietjens, but his ability to immediately and instinctively 
produce the appropriate response, before even realizing where he is, indicates his 
capacity, if not aptitude, for discipline.   
Tietjens’ body is adaptable to survival in difficult circumstances although he 
greatly fears having to go up to the front lines.  He grew up wealthy and privileged, 
but does not require luxury to be content.  In this sense he is hardened enough to 
survive the war, which he does.  To his brother Mark, who attempts to give him 
money, he says, “I loathe your beastly Riviera-palaced, chauffeured, hydraulic-lifted, 
hot-house aired beastliness of fornication” (218).  Tietjens would rather eschew 
comfort than accept money from a brother who doubts Tietjens’ character.  After the 
war ends and Tietjens returns home, he happily sells nearly all of his possessions in 
an attempt to begin a new life with Valentine.  Merely having the ability to be close to 
Valentine, for him, supersedes any desire he has for financial or material acquisitions.  
He will work, as a seller of antique furniture, to support Valentine and the child she is 
carrying, but requires very little in terms of material comfort.  In this sense, he rebels 
against the capitalistic and materialistic nature of the society of which he is a 
member, and this puts him at odds with many people who know him, including his 
brother, leading some, including Edith Ethel, to go so far as to doubt his sanity (504). 
Self-Control 
In Parade’s End having control over one’s body, the type of control that 
allows one to sleep at will or tolerate physically uncomfortable situations, is given 
great respect by nearly all of the major characters.  The same type of value is given to 
controlling one’s body in Sassoon’s novel.  In Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, for 
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instance, Sherston reiterates the importance of being able to control one’s body, and 
he does so with specific regard to the ability to sleep.  By necessity, soldiers either 
had to sleep in uncomfortable or anxiety-inducing circumstances, or they did not 
sleep at all.  Sherston describes sleeping under conditions most would find 
unthinkable, with slumbers that “were inured to noises which would have kept us 
wide awake in civilian life,” either because of physical or psychical discomfort (338).  
For example, Sherston writes, “I fell asleep to the sound of heavy firing toward La 
Boisselle, rattling limbers on the Citadel road, and men shouting and looking for their 
kits in the dark.  There are worse things than falling asleep under a summer sky.  One 
awoke stiff and cold, but with a head miraculously clear” (353).  He does not even 
need a bed to sleep:  “As for my flea-bad, it was no hardship; I have never slept more 
soundly in any bed” (322).  In addition to being able to fall asleep to the sound of 
machine gun fire, some soldiers were able to sleep right before launching an attack, or 
even while sitting up (341).  He refers to a friend named Leake who “had a talent for 
falling asleep in any position” (426).  In this case, Sherston and his fellow soldiers 
resemble Napoleon, so often praised for his controlled sleep habits. 
The self-control expected of Sherston had results surpassing merely the ability 
to sleep soundly under difficult conditions; it also entailed a great deal of control over 
one’s emotions, notably fear and anxiety.  Elaine Showalter argues that the extremity 
of the expectation of emotional control essentially disallowed many men to express 
any feelings at all during the war and even after, effectively rendering them 
“emotionally incapacitated”: 
This parade of emotionally incapacitated men was in itself a shocking 
contrast to the heroic visions and masculinist fantasies that had 
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preceded it.  The public image of the Great War was one of strong 
unreflective masculinity. . . .  Chief among the values promoted within 
the male community of the war was the ability to tolerate the appalling 
filth and stink of the trenches, the relentless noise, and the constant 
threat of death with stoic good humor, and to allude to it in phlegmatic 
understatement.  Indeed, emotional repression was an essential aspect 
of the British masculine ideal. (Female 169) 
 
British society expected a community of stoic men who could face any trial, life-
threatening or otherwise, with serenity or at least its appearance.  Unfortunately, the 
level of detachment needed to tolerate the conditions of the trenches was not 
conducive to easily returning to a less stoic state after the war; many had to be 
reconditioned to face and handle difficult or uncomfortable feelings.   
Even Sherston struggles with a growing sense of detachment; he is largely 
able to face his circumstances without complaint (and even with reckless bravery), 
but he does lose some sense of emotional connectivity with other humans, as 
displayed when he writes, “And the dead were the dead; this was no time to be 
pitying them or asking silly questions about their outraged lives.  Such sights must be 
taken for granted, I thought” (435).  Shockingly, the sight to which he is referring is 
“the mask of a human face which had detached itself from the skull” that is “floating 
on the surface of the flooded trench” (435).  He has trained himself not only to face 
the most horrific conditions without displaying any outward weakness, or arguably 
feel any inward vulnerability, but also comes to take it “for granted,” as something 
that is simply a matter of course during the war.  That Sherston remains affectively 
unmoved, or at least tells himself so, from this disturbing vision illustrates that he has 
experienced a significant degree of desensitization, both to his immediate conditions 
and his emotional reaction to those conditions.  Eventually, he is unable to retain his 
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stoicism and has himself declared mentally incompetent, but he does regain ability to 
feel and express emotion and comes to see the war as an outrage though only after he 
is separate from it.  Similarly, Septimus of Mrs. Dalloway has mastered his emotions 
so completely that he has managed to annihilate them almost completely:  “Septimus, 
far from showing any emotion or recognising that here [at the death of his comrade] 
was the end of a friendship, congratulated himself upon feeling very little and very 
reasonably.  The War had taught him,” but as a consequence, “he could not feel” 
(272).  When Septimus kills himself, his suicide is not a matter of feeling too much, 
but of feeling nothing at all. 
Like Sherston, Tietjens is displayed making numerous attempts to keep his 
emotions in check and control his thought processes; at times these efforts are related 
to his sleep behaviors.  In the beginning of the novel, prior to Tietjens’ enlistment, he 
is already aware (and a great supporter) of the British regard for masculine stoicism: 
“As Tietjens saw the world, you didn’t ‘talk.’ Perhaps you didn’t even think about 
how you felt” (6).  Even with Macmaster, his closest friend (excepting Valentine later 
in the novel), Tietjens rarely expresses any emotions over personal issues.  Ford 
writes, “Absurd as it seemed, Macmaster knew that he knew next to nothing of his 
friend’s feelings.  As to them, practically no confidences had passed between them” 
(15).  Tietjens differs from Sherston in that his hesitation to express emotion was not 
initially a product of coping with war trauma, but instead is rooted in his deep-seated 
beliefs in social propriety and convention.  In Sherston’s case, this convention is 
taken to an extreme, allowing him to face death and gore without horror.   
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Despite Tietjens’ ability to show a great deal of restraint when handling 
personal matters, such as his unstable relationship with his unfaithful wife and 
questions regarding the paternity of his son and only heir to his father’s estate, he 
does not display Sherston’s capacity for emotional detachment when faced with that 
very same death and gore.  As Ford writes: 
It has been remarked that the peculiarly English habit of self-
suppression in matters of emotions puts the Englishman at a great 
disadvantage in moments of unusual stresses.  In the smaller matters of 
the general run of life he will be impeccable and not to be moved; but 
in sudden confrontations of anything but physical dangers he is apt—
he is, indeed, almost certain—to go to pieces very badly. (178) 
 
This passage refers to a particularly daunting interview Tietjens must have with his 
banker, in which he actually does not go to pieces as he fears; however, he does show 
signs of instability when a fellow soldier to whom Tietjens had previously denied 
leave, O Nine Morgan, dies in his arms (308).   
Immediately after Morgan’s death, Ford depicts Tietjens’ attempts to control 
emotion.  Tietjens must be reminded to wash his hands of Morgan’s blood, as he does 
not do so on his own (310), suggesting his sense of culpability in Morgan’s death and 
feelings of responsibility towards his men—feelings that leave him with a sense of 
powerlessness.  To circumnavigate his realization of lack of circumstantial, and even 
ethical, control, he attempts to assert control over his thoughts by simultaneously 
working on two tasks, handling matters related to his job, while writing a sonnet in 
under three minutes upon being given rhymes with which to work.  Tietjens is 
abiding by a “rule” of his: “Never think on the subject of a shock at a moment of 
shock” (315).  Yet, throughout the novel, images of Morgan’s death recur to him, and 
he is unable to restrain himself from thinking about it.  The night of Morgan’s death 
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is also one instance in which Tietjens wills himself to have insomnia despite physical 
exhaustion.  He decides to devote the night to thinking over his problems with his 
wife and his potential mistress, Valentine, in large part to avoid thinking about 
Morgan’s death.  He knows how to handle social problems, like those with his wife, 
so even though his wife has put him in a difficult situation, he is much more 
comfortable dealing with marital problems than the death of one of his comrades and 
his sense that he may have somehow been responsible.  Tietjens knows that if he 
settles in to sleep, he will undoubtedly have to confront the horrors of what he had 
previously witnessed, so his choice of insomnia rather than sleep points to his efforts 
to prevent thinking on a subject he does not want to confront. 
Hemingway’s Henry takes another path towards the mastery of emotion.  One 
effort involves planning his thoughts in way similar to Tietjens.  He says, “I was 
going to try not to think about Catherine except at night before I went to sleep” (166).  
One of his reasons for doing so is likely the fact that he misses Catherine, but more 
significantly, his attempts to think of her only before sleep suggest his need to focus 
his pre-sleep thoughts on something less horrific than the war, implying that letting 
his mind roam freely would be dangerous to his well being.  He also attempts to 
assert control through relinquishing self-control via the abuse of alcohol.  Not a day 
or night goes by in the novel that fails to include Henry drinking heavily.  In fact, as I 
mentioned earlier, he drinks to the point of jaundice.  But, Henry’s drinking often 
fails him and he finds himself struggling to control his thoughts much as Tietjens and 
Sherston do.  In one such instance, Henry uses insomnia as a means of control:   
I watched [the search lights in the sky] for a while and then went to 
sleep.  I slept heavily except once I woke sweating and scared and then 
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went back to sleep trying to stay outside of my dream.  I woke for 
good long before it was light and heard roosters crowing and stayed on 
awake until it began to be light.  I was tired and once it was really light 
I went back to sleep again. (88) 
 
At first, he tries to control his dreams to avoid his nightmare, which he never 
describes.  Presumably, this attempt fails and once he reawakens, despite the earliness 
of the hour, he remains awake.  Staying awake in bed, when he could and should be 
sleeping, is a result of his efforts to keep his unconscious mind in check.  This 
passage contrasts interestingly with the aforementioned passage in which Henry 
mentions sleeping next to Catherine and knowing the only reason for awakening is 
her in bed next to him.  Once he has left the war, he does not need to control his sleep 
and can enjoy it freely.  However, during the war, sleep entails a great deal of fear 
over what he may have to confront. 
Hemingway’s short story “Now I Lay Me,” is a story about insomnia, which, 
upon reading, F. Scott Fitzgerald commented, “I thought there was nothing further to 
be said about insomnia” (“Sleeping” 63).  Much as in the way in which Henry from A 
Farewell to Arms avoids sleep to avoid nightmares, the narrator Nick uses his 
insomnia for a similar purpose.  Nick is in the hospital for an indefinite time (months 
at least) because he “had been blown up at night” (“Now” 276).  He describes himself 
as someone who has “practice at being awake” (“Now” 279), and does so through 
recounting memories of his past and reciting prayers.  He refuses to allow himself to 
sleep at night:  “I myself did not want to sleep because I had been living a long time 
with the knowledge that if I ever shut my eyes in the dark and let myself go, my soul 
would go out of my body” (“Now” 276).  For Nick, sleep must be conquered because 
sleep involves a horrific confrontation with his mind that he cannot endure.  He fears 
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that when asleep, he will lose himself completely, likely because he felt that he had 
already lost himself to the war.  Being awake and controlling his sleep is his only 
means of retaining self-control.   
The Function of the Binary 
Evidence of this tension between self-control and discipline comes through 
the textual treatment of insomnia and sleep, which, as the texts depict cannot be 
treated as a simple binary, one such as sleeping and waking, because of the 
complexity of the relationship between mind and body in the experience of insomnia.  
As I noted in my introductory chapter, Fussell argues that one of the outcomes of 
World War I in relation to the use of language and production of literature was a 
tendency towards representing war experience and post-war experience through 
binary language.  An interesting example of Fussell’s theory is present within A 
Farewell to Arms with Hemingway’s depiction of the binary between night and day 
as perceived early in the text by Henry.  Towards the beginning of the novel, Henry 
notes his inability to express this binary completely:  
I had gone to no such place [as Abruzzi] but to the smoke of cafés and 
nights when the room whirled and you needed to look at the wall to 
make it stop, nights in bed, drunk, when you knew that that was all 
there was, and the strange excitement of waking and not knowing who 
it was with you, and the world all unreal in the dark and so exciting 
that you must resume again unknowing and not caring in the night, 
sure that this was all and all and all and not caring.  Suddenly to care 
very much and to sleep to wake with it sometimes morning and all that 
had been there gone and everything sharp and hard and clear and 
sometimes a dispute about the cost.  Sometimes still pleasant and fond 
and warm and breakfast and lunch.  Sometimes all niceness gone and 
glad to get out on the street but always another day starting and then 
another night.  I tried to tell about the night and the difference between 
the night and the day and how the night was better unless the day was 
very clean and cold and I could not tell it; as I cannot tell it now.  But 
if you have had it you know.  (13) 
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This passage, which describes Henry’s wartime experience of regular drunken visits 
to brothels, both relies upon binary notions of day and night and confuses these 
binaries, illustrating the narrator’s tendency to resort to such binaries, but also their 
failure to express his experience.  He asserts that drunken nights can seem like the 
time when “you knew that that was all there was,” yet, simultaneously, “you must 
resume again unknowing and not caring in the night.”  He distinguishes the drunken 
blurriness of the night with the “sharp and hard and clear” morning, yet refuses to 
posit that the morning is a time of renewed stability, as one might face a “dispute” 
over the costs of a prostitute’s services or experience the “excitement” of waking in 
bed next to a new stranger each day.   The passage suggests that what makes the night 
knowable is its relationship to chaos and confusion; during war, chaos and confusion 
are really all one can be certain of.  The day seems clearer in the sharpness and 
hardness of its appearance, but it fails to prevent another confusing and chaotic night.  
Day only seems to provide honesty and clarity, but night, in its mystery is more 
revealing and truthful but only of more mystery and confusion.  Henry’s conclusion 
that he cannot express the true distinction between night and day, though he knows 
one exists, illustrates the circular, rather than linear model of the binary structure.  As 
Henry contends, there is “always another day staring and then another night,” 
suggesting that the two are not opposites, but simply different parts of the same cycle 
of confusion, one leading to the next and so forth. 
Later on in the novel, however, as Henry’s experience in the war continues, 
and he is both wounded in a shelling and witness to the death of his comrades, his 
sense of distinction between night and day stabilizes: “I know that the night is not the 
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same as the day:  that all things are different, that the things of the night cannot be 
explained in the day, because they do not exist, and the night can be a dreadful time 
for lonely people once their loneliness has started” (249).  Night and day have 
regained their binary distinction, but only because of their incompatibility.  The night, 
the time at which he was most active as a war worker or as a pursuer of distraction, 
becomes the inexpressible other to the more familiar and less isolating daytime.   
While Henry asserts that the night is lonely for most, his nights are not lonely 
at all.  Much of his life with Catherine takes place at night; the war has turned him 
into a complete insomniac.  After he is hospitalized for his injuries, as the result of a 
circumstantial coincidence, Catherine is transferred to his hospital and takes a job on 
the night shift.  Her desire to work on the night shift is motivated through her desire 
to be with Henry, as night is the only time they can be alone.  Hemingway writes: 
Catherine Barkley was greatly liked by the nurses because she would 
do night duty indefinitely.  She had quite a little work with the malaria 
people, the boy who had unscrewed the nose-cap was a friend of ours 
and never rang at night, unless it was necessary but between the times 
of working we were together.  I loved her very much and she loved 
me.  I slept in the daytime. . .  (108)  
 
Thus, though the level of intimacy that their relationship reaches is forbidden because 
they are not married, Henry asserts self-control, rather than discipline, through 
maintaining his nocturnal connection with Catherine.  He disregards hospital 
procedure, allowing Catherine into his room socially, but can only do so because he is 
able to sustain his insomnia.  His insomnia allows him to pursue individual interests. 
Hemingway further emphasizes the nocturnal nature of Henry’s relationship 
with Catherine through making the significant actions of their relationship take place 
nocturnally.  For instance, they first visit each other at night, when Catherine is off 
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duty (before her transfer and Henry’s injury).  More significantly, their first public 
liaison as a “married” couple (they claim to be married to a hotel manager and to 
themselves, but are not legally married) takes place on the night before Henry’s return 
to service.  They remain in a hotel together as a couple until Henry must take the 
midnight train back to the front (147).  They leave Italy at night as well, escaping to 
Switzerland in the dark (291).  Additionally, Catherine goes into labor with their child 
at three in the morning (313).  Every action Henry takes to pursue his own self-
interests, as opposed to national interests in the war, takes place at night. 
Anxiety 
The constant confrontation of trauma or the ubiquitous possibility of traumatic 
events, in turn, creates a sense of anxiety in many characters within both novels.  
Anxiety is often cited as one of the most prevalent causes of insomnia, and a feeling 
displayed by many characters throughout both texts, not only in relation to World 
War I, but also in relation to modernity itself.  Both Eluned Summers-Bremner and 
Ford, argue that modernity, especially with its related urbanization and effects of that 
urbanization such as crime and noise, creates anxiety, which then causes insomnia.  
For Summers-Bremner, when a village grows, it becomes a city, but a city can grow 
indefinitely, seemingly infinitely, much as “sleeplessness causes thought to feel 
unstoppable” (111); similar to the way in which a citizen may feel that urban sprawl 
has grown out of his or her control, the insomniac may feel his or her stream of 
thoughts is beyond control and ever multiplying.  According to Christina Britzolakis, 
Ford understood modern cities in much the same way as Summers-Bremner.  Ford 
viewed modernity as an excess of stimuli “caused by urbanization and by the various 
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technological and social changes that accompany it” (3).  Consequently, modernity 
and “metropolitan identity” were closely related.  Ford viewed modernity itself as a 
form of trauma, and, because he saw “metropolitan identity” as an essential element 
of the life of the modern individual, survival in the modernized world must be “an 
affair of anesthesia, of defensive non-sensitivity to an otherwise overwhelming 
burden of stimuli” (4).  Ford’s sense of the overstimulation of urban modernity is 
similar to that of Georg Simmel, who describes the modern urban experience: 
The psychological basis of the metropolitan type of individuality 
consists in the intensification of nervous stimulation which results 
from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli.  
Man is a differentiating creature.  His mind is stimulated by the 
difference between a momentary impression and the one which 
preceded it.  Lasting impressions, impressions which differ only 
slightly from one another, impressions which take a regular and 
habitual course and show regular and habitual contrasts—all these use 
up, so to speak, less consciousness than does the rapid crowding of 
changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single 
glance, and the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions.  These are 
the psychological conditions which the metropolis creates.  (409) 
 
Much as William James asserts that a reliance on habit, grounded in familiarity, 
prevents exhaustion by allowing us to minimize the amount of conscious attention we 
focus on a given habitual behavior (Habit 40), Simmel argues that the increased 
unfamiliarity of the urban setting due to its amorphous nature creates mental 
exhaustion through the over-exertion needed to perceive and interpret surroundings. 
The trench system of World War I that the soldiers inhabited mirrored the 
over-stimulation and chaos of the urban setting.  As Fussell notes, trenches were 
given decidedly urban names:  “a less formal way of identifying sections of trench 
was by place of street name with a distinctly London flavor.  Piccadilly was a 
favorite; popular names also were Regent Street and Strand; junctions were Hyde 
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Park Corner and Marble Arch” (42-43).  However, the likeness does not stop simply 
at urban-themed assignations.  Fussell presents a description of the trenches, 
illustrating their similarity to an urban setting:  “To be in the trenches was to 
experience an unreal, unforgettable enclosure and constraint, as well as a sense of 
being unoriented and lost.  One saw two things only:  the walls of an unlocalized, 
undifferentiated earth and the sky above” (51).  He then recounts the experience of a 
World War I vet, wandering through a city in India, whose experience of being lost in 
back alleys makes him feel as though he had returned to the trenches (51). 
In Fussell’s description of the trenches, the monotony of the landscape is 
certainly not reminiscent of the ever-changing and over-stimulating world Simmel 
describes.  But even then, one can imagine a shelling or explosion to create both 
sensory overload and a malleable landscape.  The sense of entrapment, chaos, 
claustrophobia, and disorientation Fussell illustrates further resembles the urban 
experience as described by Simmel as one in which the individual feels lost and 
isolated amidst a crowd.  One can imagine that in an urban landscape, the only view 
of the natural world is the sky; because the person is hemmed in by buildings on all 
sides, the only escape from this view is upwards.  The trenches elicit a similar 
experience.  Fussell argues, “It was the sight of the sky, almost alone, that had the 
power to persuade a man that he was not already lost in a common grave” (51).   
Both the trenches of World War I and the urban cityscape are products of 
modernization and can have the paradoxical consequence of de-sensitization through 
repeated over-stimulation.  Britzolakis argues that for “Ford, metropolitan anesthesia 
is a function of a culture marked by ever more highly developed powers of mass 
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communication and technological destruction alike” (15).  This belief translates into a 
form of “impressionism” in his writing, in which vision itself is the vehicle of both 
attempt and failure to understand the modern world.  Within Parade’s End, Ford’s 
outlook is arguably translated in the form of the visual illusions that Tietjens 
experiences when he has not been able to sleep, so becomes intrinsically connected to 
Tietjens’ insomnia:  “His eyes, when they were tired, had that trick of reproducing 
images on their retinas with that extreme clearness, images sometimes of things he 
thought of, sometimes of things merely at the back of his mind” (299).  During the 
scene from which the above quotation is taken, Tietjens is mulling over problems 
with his wife but also the human tragedy of war itself, and it is a reproduction of his 
wife’s image that he sees before him, but he is also trying to comprehend the world 
around him, indicating that these retinal illusions are his means of adjusting to and 
understanding the world of his experience.   
During this scene, Tietjens is introduced to Captain McKechnie (whom he 
mistakenly thinks of as McKenzie for quite some time).  McKechnie is assigned to 
Tietjens’ unit because McKechnie has been showing symptoms of war neurosis, yet, 
as Macmaster’s nephew, McKechnie is a person to be protected and not disgraced for 
his mental illness.  Tietjens’ unit is well behind the front lines, and Tietjens can act as 
sort of baby-sitter to McKechnie while he “recovers.”  Just prior to his conversation 
with McKechnie, Tietjens contemplates the true tragedy of the war:   
Heavy depression settled down more heavily upon him.  The distrust 
of the home Cabinet, felt by then by the greater part of that army, 
became physical pain.  These immense sacrifices, this ocean of mental 
sufferings, were all undergone to further the private vanities of men 
who amidst these hugenesses of landscapes and forces appeared 
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pigmies!  It was the worries of all these wet millions in mud-brown 
that worried him. (297) 
 
There is a parallel here between Tietjens’ sense of the war as out of control 
(especially his control) as viewed through a huge and ever expanding landscape and 
that same lack of control felt by those experiencing a seemingly infinite increase in 
modernity and urbanization.  His use of natural imagery, including vast landscapes, 
oceans, and mud associated with the masses of suffering soldiers, emphasizes the 
disconnection between the more natural world of the men and their individual worries 
and the modernized, dehumanizing world of the military authorities.  The vastness of 
the war landscape, similar to ever-expanding cities that dwarf their inhabitants, 
associates the expansiveness of modernization with the horrors of war. 
As Tietjens converses with McKechnie, McKechnie raises the subject of 
Sylvia.  Tietjens, who went to war at least in part to remove himself from the 
problems of his home life, is overwhelmed by the painful effect the mere mention of 
Sylvia’s name has on him:  “In the dark brownness, an intolerable pang went all 
through his heavy frame—the intolerable pang of home news to these desperately 
occupied men, the pain caused by disasters happening in the darkness and at a 
distance” (299).  Again, Tietjens is struggling with a lack of control that he equates to 
spatial expansiveness.  He is mostly unable to affect circumstances at home given his 
separation from his wife and family.  His mind’s tendency to reproduce images on his 
retinas can be seen as a reaction to a sense of being out of control and the subsequent 
anxiety that state creates. 
Tietjens is a decidedly pre-modern character, often referred to as being of the 
eighteenth century.  It is no coincidence that in his moments of exhaustion, when 
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experiencing visual illusions, Tietjens often sees “a woman in an eighteenth century 
dress looking into a drawer in his bureau” (418).  When he is exhausted or feels as 
though life is out of his control, his mind’s reaction is to focus itself on a scene from 
which he takes comfort.  Ford identified Tietjens as a man “whose body is tied in one 
place, but whose mind and personality brood eternally over another distant locality” 
(qtd. in Gose 446).  This brooding is often a product of anxiety, from which Tietjens 
certainly suffers, but his anxiety more related to “instrumentalizing relations,” or his 
innate opposition to “the shaping of human will to the designs of technical 
administration,” (McCarthy 178-79) as opposed to fear of pain or suffering, fear of 
not sleeping itself, or failure to live salubriously.  According to Jameson, “modernism 
. . . involves a whole Utopian compensation for increasing dehumanization on the 
level of daily life” (42).  Tietjens’ orientation towards the past in moments of 
rebellion against the modern world illustrates his frustration with the dehumanization 
he witnesses.  Ford’s inclusion of this tendency within the text serves to illustrate 
Tietjens’ utopian inclinations (he sees the eighteenth century as an idealized era in 
which interpersonal relationships take precedence over rationalized ones) in direct 
response to not Modernism, but modernity. 
When Tietjens is unable to sleep, it is primarily because he is concerned with 
interpersonal relationships, mainly those between himself and his wife or himself and 
his future mistress (243; 348).  In many ways, modernity diminished the practical 
necessity of  interpersonal relations, through increased bureaucracy, rationalization, 
mass production, mechanical warfare and countless other factors.  Tietjens, however, 
focuses his mental energy not on solving problems of productivity, but of working out 
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situations of interpersonal communication and conflict, differentiating himself from 
his modern counterparts.  Tietjens does believe that “it is proper that one’s individual 
feelings should be sacrificed to the necessities of a collective entity” (357), as is 
evidenced by his various attempts to control his thought processes.  However, unlike 
Sherston, Tietjens is not able to detach himself from interpersonal feelings and 
emotions, resulting in a unique type of anxiety from which Tietjens both suffers and 
is kept awake at night. 
An example of this social anxiety comes when Tietjens’ wife, Sylvia, decides 
to visit him at the front after he believes they had been permanently parted, never to 
interact as husband and wife again.  Rather than choosing to sleep after an exhausting 
day, Tietjens, “had appointed this moment of physical ease that usually followed on 
his splurging heavily down on to his creaking camp-bed in the doctor’s tent hut, for 
the cool consideration of his relations with his wife” (342).  This is a scene in which 
Tietjens chooses insomnia, deciding to use his “insomniac-time” as time for thought, 
as he forces himself to write down the story of his recent history with his wife.  
However, his marital difficulties are not all that are keeping him awake.  This scene 
takes place subsequent to the death of O Nine Morgan, and visions of Morgan’s death 
continue to occupy his thoughts, against his will.  He fails to come to any definite 
conclusions regarding his relationship with Sylvia, as he finds it difficult to 
concentrate on her and not on the trauma he suffered with Morgan’s death. 
As thoughts of Morgan overtake his mind, he begins to equate his exhaustion, 
and even sleep itself, with death:     
And at the thought of the man [Morgan] as he was alive and of him 
now, dead, an immense blackness descended all over Tietjens.  He said 
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to himself: I am very tired.  Yet he was not ashamed…. It was the 
blackness that descends on you when you think of your dead… It 
comes, at any time, over the brightness of sunlight, in the grey of 
evening, in the grey of the dawn, at mess, on parade; it comes at the 
thought of one man or at the thought of half a battalion that you have 
seen, stretched out, under sheeting, the noses making little pimples; or 
not stretched out, lying face downwards, half buried.  Or at the thought 
of the dead that you have never seen dead at all….  Suddenly, the light 
goes out… (356) 
 
In this passage, Tietjens is overtly discussing the horrors of mortality, especially for 
those left alive in the war, but his arguments about thoughts of horror parallel the 
result of exhaustion and the impending need for sleep.  He is considering a lack of 
control over thoughts, thoughts that come on a person seemingly randomly, much as 
insomnia in large part implies a lack of control over sleep.  Insomnia itself mimics the 
condition of human mortality, death being the ultimate form of isolation from 
communication with the rest of humanity.  Sherston, for example, sees soldiers and 
“was doubtful whether they were asleep or dead, for the attitudes of many were like 
death, grotesque and distorted” (431).  It is their isolation, their attitude of being cut 
off from the rest of humanity, that Sherston finds grotesque.  Sherston asks, “And the 
soldiers who slept around us in their hundreds—were they not like the dead, among 
whom in some dim region where time survived in ghostly remembrances, we two 
could still cheat ourselves with hopes and forecasts of a future exempt from 
antagonisms and perplexities?” (358).  We live our lives not knowing with any 
certainty when death will come, yet with awareness of our own mortality, just as the 
insomniac suffers from a heightened awareness of time’s passage, yet lacks 
knowledge of sleep’s arrival.  One who cannot sleep is also unable to capture the 
freedom from consciousness brought on by both sleep and death.  Standardized Time 
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and Taylorization sought to eliminate idiosyncrasy of time, as did the 1914 institution 
of Daylight Savings Time meant to lengthen the amount of daylight one experienced 
and save fuel (Coren 270); insomnia reclaims this idiosyncrasy because the sleepless 
individual gains a heightened awareness of time, yet also a heightened awareness of 
his or her lack of control over it.  This same idiosyncrasy reflected the idiosyncrasy of 
war and its disruptive effects on biological rhythms. 
Tietjens is kept awake by worrying not about himself, but about others in his 
life, whether they are comrades in the war or friends and family.  Similarly, he is not 
the only one kept awake by anxiety, though his anxiety takes on a unique form based 
in interpersonal relations.  Sherston, too, suffers from anxiety, which, even in spite of 
his aforementioned adaptability to uncomfortable circumstances, makes it difficult for 
him to sleep.  In this case, insomnia was almost expected from the soldiers, as 
Sherston’s comrade Dottrell observes, “[The soldiers] must suffer terribly from 
insomnia with so many guns firing fifteen miles away” (351).  After Sherston returns 
from Army School, he learns of an impending raid on the enemy trenches.  As a 
consequence of this information, he is kept awake.  He writes, “I was now full of 
information about the Raid, and I could think of nothing else.  My month of rest at 
Flixécourt was already obliterated” (296).  He had been away from the front lines 
prior to this point, and, consequently, he was able to rest.  However, his return to the 
front and the subsequent anxiety it caused had the effect of erasing all the benefits of 
his rest.  Sherston continues, “I wouldn’t mind going up there and doing it now, I 
thought, for I was wideawake and full of energy after my easy life at the Army 
School” (297).  Sherston implies that the time he is spending not sleeping is time 
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wasted in this case.  He would rather take action, though that action entails a great 
degree of physical danger, than spend time in anxious limbo, merely waiting to act.  
He would prefer a state of combat to the state of anxiety preceding combat, this 
anxiety creating a state of insomnia. 
Though Tietjens and Sherston were both active in the war, soldiers and other 
war workers were not the only people to suffer from insomnia related to the war and 
its anxieties.  In Parade’s End, both Sylvia and Valentine acknowledge being unable 
to sleep at night due to their concern for Tietjens and the war itself.  Valentine, for 
instance, exclaims, “I can’t sleep…never….I haven’t slept a whole night since… 
Think of the immense spaces, stretching out under the night…I believe pain and fear 
must be worse at night” (234).  And, Sylvia says, “I’m dog-tired…. I haven’t slept for 
six nights…. In spite of drugs” (443).  Valentine and Sylvia, despite their shared 
insomnia, are to be differentiated here.   Valentine’s insomnia is similar to Tietjens’ 
in that one of its causes is the horror of war itself; she is not concerned for herself, 
and, while she is concerned for Tietjens’ safety, she is more focused on the general 
suffering of all involved with the war.  She mentions “immense spaces,” echoing the 
Tietjens’ anxiety over the “hugenesses of landscapes” (297) and also Ford’s concerns 
over the uncontrollable expansion of urbanity that comes with modernization.  Sylvia, 
on the other hand, is more selfish.  Her insomnia stems from a lack of control, but this 
lack of control is not due to the suffering and seeming infinite nature of the war, but 
over her inability to control Tietjens himself.  He is no longer under her power, so she 
is kept awake by thoughts of how to regain some sort of mastery over him.  
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Furthermore, Valentine, like Tietjens, is willing to stay awake with her thoughts, but 
Sylvia uses drugs in an attempt to sleep. 
Whatever form the cause of anxiety contributing to insomnia may take, 
civilian insomnia was not uncommon during the war.  In fact, some civilians suffered 
from not only just insomnia, but also neurosis, similar to the “shell-shock” 
experienced by soldiers.   Initially, medical authorities did not believe civilians could 
suffer from neurosis caused by war-related anxiety; however, through imagining the 
horrors of the war, many civilians did indeed become susceptible to suffering, and the 
condition gained public recognition, skeptical as that recognition may have been 
(Tate 11-12).  Insomnia became one of the more frequently visible symptoms of 
civilian suffering.  Because civilians did not directly experience combat or even 
threats of physical danger, neurosis was largely related to stress associated with loved 
ones more directly involved in the war, complicating an understanding of it as related 
to neurotic responses resulting from more direct threats like bombings or air raids.   
Therefore, it stands to reason that the cure for insomnia and disturbed sleep 
often involved establishing control over both one’s thoughts and one’s environment.  
Mastery of the body and mind was the primary area of focus in the discussion of the 
treatment of insomnia, but medical experts provided practical advice as well.  Drugs 
were not the preferred method of treatment in the years following the war, but could 
be used as a method of last resort (“Broken Sleep” Rankin 78).  However, with or 
without sedatives, one should have a place to sleep that is “dark, quiet, and well-
ventilated.  A spring bed was best, and it should be placed away from the wall” 
(Hutchinson 777).   
  
 
142 
 
Ford gives an example of attempts at environmental control in order to 
alleviate insomnia.  Tietjens, after the war, arranges his bedroom in a manner 
conducive to sleep.  Ford relates Valentine’s thoughts upon seeing how Tietjens has 
arranged his room: 
These things looked terribly sordid and forlorn.  Why did he place 
them in the centre of the room?  Why not against a wall?  It is usual to 
stand the head of a bed against a wall when there is no support for the 
pillows.  Then the pillows do not slip off.  She would change… No, 
she would not.  He had put the bed in the centre of the room because 
he did not want it to touch walls that had been brushed by the dress of 
[Sylvia Tietjens]. (651) 
 
This passage gives Valentine’s interpretation of the arrangement of Tietjens’ room; 
Tietjens himself provides no explanation.  Yet, her analysis makes sense.  Earlier in 
the novel, we learn that Sylvia, Tietjens’ estranged wife, is a major cause of his 
insomnia, or at least it is mainly of her and their problems that he thinks when he is 
up late at night (Ford 79).  Tietjens is doubling Hutchinson’s brand of advice:  he has 
both placed his bed away from the wall and attempted, by doing so, to separate 
himself from the cause of his insomnia.  He has attempted to master his environment 
in order to master his thoughts.  
Fallout of Insomnia 
The consequences of insomnia for the individual may include exhaustion, 
decreased alertness and productivity, but the consequences of insomnia for the larger 
group are arguably revelatory of the stability of the society itself as well as the 
relationship of the individual to the larger group.  In his book The Rationalisation of 
Slaughter, Daniel Pick raises a crucial issue:  “The sense of crisis aroused by shell 
shock owed a great deal to the expectations of manliness fostered by the war 
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propagandists and to the wider presumption that mental illness was an index to the 
moral state of the nation—as though the sum of individual physical and psychological 
conditions formed a collective mind and body” (243).  Pick, much like the medical 
authorities seeking to prevent insomnia, illustrates the alleged relationship between 
mental health and morality (though he does not take this relationship for granted).  He 
points to the idea of “individual physical and psychological conditions” (which can 
certainly include insomnia) as more than just a reflection on the individual sufferer, 
but on the society itself.  If British authorities choose to point to lesser proportion of 
incidences of shell shock as proof of the superior strength of their psyche, then it is 
arguable that the cases that do exist point to cracks in that social armor. 
It was then very much in the interest of authorities to emphasize the 
individual’s personality or circumstances, rather than the society, as the impetus of 
the insomnia.  A useful parallel here may be drawn between insomnia and shell 
shock.  Lerner uses the actions of post-war German medical community to illustrate 
the extent to which “science” molded itself to serve the needs of government and 
industry.  One important generalization Lerner makes about the shift in psychiatric 
discourse regards the discipline’s widespread acceptance of the view that “traumatic 
events do not make healthy people sick, but rather sick people react pathologically to 
traumatic events” (15).   This mentality is not exclusive to the German medical 
industry.  An article written by several unnamed British doctors gives the following 
explanation of war neurosis: 
It is maintained that the nervous breakdown, which is a common 
sequel of participation in battles of to-day, is practically confined to 
persons who are already subject to nervous instability, or in other 
words, that the strain of modern warfare is merely an exciting cause of 
  
 
144 
 
“nerve shock,” and that many of the sufferers would, under ordinary 
circumstances, have broken down sooner or later. (“Nerve Shock” 64) 
 
Findings seem to indicate that the various symptoms of neurasthenia, including 
unconsciousness, amnesia, and aphasia, are not due to external conditions alone, but 
rather the patient’s “pre-morbid personality,” which is more worthy of examination 
than his or her actual trauma (“Nerve Shock” 64).  Not surprisingly, treatments were 
similarly self-serving for the government. 
Mental breakdowns of soldiers resulting from war trauma were largely viewed 
in the same light as industrial accidents, and insomnia was one of the indicators of 
mental breakdown.  Many treatments were designed not to allow the patient to 
reprocess his or her experience as cognitive and psychoanalytic models of treatment 
propose, but to influence the will towards “patriotism, altruism, and productivity” 
(Lerner 23).  This notion is exemplified by the rejection and marginalization of 
theories of Doctor Hermann Oppenheim who suggested war trauma was the true 
culprit for veterans’ conditions such as stuttering, shaking, and mutism (Lerner 16).  
Oppenheim’s theories were rejected for what amounted to economic reasons; if the 
war was to blame for the soldier’s illness, the state was morally and financially 
responsible for his cure.  Thus Oppenheim’s assertion that the war caused the illness 
was seen as “scientifically false, but perhaps more importantly, disastrous ‘for the 
economic interest of the state and the health of the individual’” (Lerner 16-17).  Not 
all doctors and psychologists agreed on this subject.  W. H. R. Rivers, for instance, 
argues that many soldiers repressed their war experience rather than confronting it 
outright, but this repression did not necessarily indicate mental illness on its own:  
“repression is not in itself a pathological process, nor is it necessarily the cause of 
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pathological states” (1).  For Rivers, the need to repress is not indicative of pathology, 
but may become pathological during “times of special stress”  at which “these failures 
of adaptation are especially liable to occur” (1).  Notably, Rivers emphasizes the 
external causes of the failure of the repressive mechanism rather than individual 
weakness.  He does not blame the soldier for his neurosis, but rather the soldier’s 
stress.  Even so, his considerations of treatment are not limited to the benefit of the 
soldier:  “When treating officers or men suffering from war neurosis we have not only 
to think of the restoration of the patient to health; we have also to consider the 
question of fitness for military service” (10).  Not necessarily an advocate of 
treatment through discipline like other medical professionals I have already 
mentioned, his concerns in sending back the soldier are not in the soldier’s interests 
alone; sending a soldier back prematurely “might have produced some disaster by 
failure in a critical situation or lowered morale of his unit by committing suicide” 
(10).  Despite his refusal to blame the individual for his own trauma, Rivers’ priorities 
of treatment remain focused on the best interests of the military as a whole. 
Yet, doctors like Oppenheim and Rivers were more the exception than the 
rule, at least initially.  For example, an article describing the “soldier’s heart” or “the 
irritable heart of soldiers” explains that “This strain (of war experience) inevitably 
finds out the impaired hearts” (Mackenzie 117).  Even though this article is talking 
about an ostensibly physical ailment, albeit one “to which soldiers are particularly 
liable” (117) rather than a psychological one, the language is telling, indicating that 
the war does not cause weakness, in this case heart trouble, but reveals it.  Although 
insomnia and shell shock are different conditions, the discursive treatment of these 
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issues is generally the same.  If the individual is implicated in his or her own 
insomnia, the individual, rather than the society, must take responsibility for the 
consequences of that insomnia.  Within the novels, we see various approaches to the 
consequences of suffering from insomnia or choosing not to sleep at night.   
In Parade’s End, there are a few occasions on which Tietjens goes without 
sleep.  After one particular occurrence, he becomes unusually forgetful:  “He had not 
been on the back of the animal two minutes before he remembered that he had 
forgotten to look it over.  It was the first time in his life that he had ever forgotten to 
look . . . before climbing into the saddle” (363).  He expects that riding the horse will 
help him become more awake and aware, “But the ride did not clear his head—rather 
the sleeplessness of the night began for the first time then to tell on him after a 
morning of fatigues” (364).  Later on, Tietjens becomes dizzy, and the hut he is in is 
“reeling a little” (450).  Other characters try to come to Tietjens’ rescue, McKechnie 
providing him with hot cocoa (364) and Levin providing him with smelling salts 
(450).  The willingness of others to help remedy Tietjens’ exhaustion shows the 
nature of their co-dependence and the necessity of Tietjens acting alert and awake 
despite having been unable to sleep.  Yet, Tietjens shows little concern with the 
consequences of his own insomnia, emphasizing both his refusal to prioritize himself 
as a soldier in terms of his self care, but also the extent of his masculinity, as Sylvia 
compares him to her lover, Perowne, in the following manner:  “He would not do 
anything to a girl like you.  He’s a man…” (381).  Later, she gives herself ten minutes 
to find a man comparable to Christopher in a room full of soldiers, but finds herself 
unable to do so (415).  Tietjens’ manliness extends to his ability to stay awake all 
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night without complaint: “It was the day after he had been up all night because the 
draft had been countermanded….  It didn’t matter” (448).  Tietjens does not express 
any concern over his ability to do his job after an extended period of sleeplessness.  
His focus is his relationship with his wife.  When he is offered the aforementioned 
smelling salts to help him become more alert, he does not comment on their effect, 
but on how they remind him of his wife (448). 
For Sherston, lack of sleep also has various effects, certainly not limited to 
exhaustion.  As a result of his insomnia, Sherston has a difficult time retaining mental 
focus consistently.  Sassoon writes, “During the next two days my mind groped and 
worried around the same purgatorial limbo so incessantly that the whole business 
began to seem unreal and distorted.  Sometimes the wording of my thoughts became 
incoherent and even nonsensical.  At other times I saw everything with the haggard 
clarity of insomnia” (508).  Two particularly interesting ideas are implicit within 
Sherston’s observation.  In one sense, the lack of sleep lessens Sherston’s ability to 
control and even understand his own thoughts, much as we see with Tietjens who 
suffers from hallucinations when he is tired.  Alternatively, and perhaps because of 
the additional time for thought afforded to him by his inability to sleep, he sees with a 
sense of clarity.  “Haggard” implies exhaustion, but he knows there is some truth to 
what he sees through the lens of this exhaustion; it is as if the world comes to him 
unfiltered and he can gain a new sense of reality and understanding. 
However, there are occurrences in which Sherston’s exhaustion does have 
definite repercussions in terms of his ability to perceive reality and to function 
interpersonally.  In one scene, Sherston is stumbling around in the dark trenches: 
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Once, when I tripped and recovered myself by grabbing the wall, my 
tentative patch of brightness revealed somebody half hidden under a 
blanket.  Not a very clever spot to be taking a nap, I thought as I 
stooped to shake him by the shoulder.  He refused to wake up, so I 
gave him a kick.  “God blast you, where’s Battalion Headquarters?”  
My nerves were on edge; and what right had he to be having a good 
sleep, when I never seemed to get five minutes’ rest?... Then my beam 
settled on the livid face of a dead German whose fingers still clutched 
the blackened gash on his neck. . . .  Stumbling on, I could only mutter 
to myself that this was really a bit too thick. (That, however, was an 
exaggeration; there is nothing remarkable about a dead body in a 
European war, or a squashed beetle in a cellar.) (437) 
 
Sherston’s jealousy of one who is sleeping takes some prominence in this passage.  
He does not sympathize with the soldier whom he thinks to be asleep (and perhaps 
even share his sense of exhaustion); rather, Sherston resents the soldier’s “nap” and 
kicks him in an effort to awaken him, even as Sherston believes this soldier to be a 
comrade.  Upon realizing the soldier is not actually sleeping, but dead, Sherston still 
expresses no sense of pity, sympathy, or empathy.  Instead, he likens the dead man to 
a squashed beetle, robbing him of their shared humanity (albeit somewhat 
understandably, as undoubtedly the German soldier’s intention in the trench was to 
kill as many British soldiers as possible).  Sherston points to the soldier’s hands, 
“clutching the blackened gash on his neck,” which seems to humanize the German, 
illustrating that he died with pain and fear, making him worthy of the reader’s pity, 
yet Sherston quickly disrupts this moment of humanization by declaring the site of 
the body to be “nothing remarkable” comparable to a “squashed beetle in a cellar.”  
This passage reveals an inadvertent effect of insomnia (and of the war itself) in that 
the soldiers are desensitized to each others’ humanity and also the tragic nature of 
death and destruction on such a mass scale.  The clarity that Sherston attains both 
reveals to him the dehumanizing effects of war, yet makes him apathetic as well. 
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Towards the end of the text just before his committal Sherston argues that 
insomnia can provide clarity, but prior to this observation clarity for him in the 
previous scene is akin to likening a dead human to a dead insect, providing an 
instance of the devaluation of the life of the individual.  Death is inevitable and 
unremarkable.  He has come to understand the hardness of the life he is forced to live 
during the war, but to be able to cope with this hardness is to renounce humanity to an 
extent without even realizing, at least at the time, that he is doing so.  Others, like 
Sigmund Freud, counter that sleep, rather than insomnia, is needed for understanding 
of the self.  Time spent sleeping is considered important for reasons other than 
physical and mental productivity or alertness, but also purposes of insight.  Some, like 
both of Hemingway’s lieutenants, choose to avoid sleep at night to avoid the insight it 
might provide, but arguably to their own detriment.  Freud, whose theories of 
psychology were particularly influential to the society represented in the novels, for 
example, views the state of sleep as necessary to gain a greater understanding of 
ourselves, our desires, and our fears; consequently, to avoid sleep means to avoid a 
confrontation with them.  When we are awake, Freud argues, our conscious mind acts 
as a censor, allowing us to pursue some thoughts, while suppressing others.  On the 
other hand, as we fall asleep, “the ‘undesired ideas’ emerge, owing to a slackening of 
a certain arbitrary (and, of course, also critical) action, which is allowed to influence 
the trend of our ideas” (Dreams 193).  The state leading up to sleep allows our minds 
to operate without conscious or even subconscious restriction, bringing to the surface 
thoughts we normally exclude from our internal monologues.  When one is able to 
suppress self-criticism, “an unlimited number of thoughts enter his consciousness 
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which would otherwise have eluded his grasp.  With the aid of material thus 
obtained—material which is new to the self-observer—it is possible to achieve the 
interpretation of pathological ideas” (Dreams 192).  One has to be able to sleep to rid 
oneself of pathology, so to not sleep might be a means of self-punishment through 
maintaining and perpetuating pathology.  Such an argument makes sense in light of 
the guilt Tietjens feels regarding Morgan’s death, Sherston feels regarding his 
participation in the war, and Henry might feel for his various moral transgressions.  
Their insomnia simultaneously prevents them from confronting the nightmares they 
may have, yet through preventing this confrontation, allows them to prolong their 
guilt and self-punishment. 
For Freud, dreaming, which primarily takes place when one sleeps, is also 
necessary to gain self-awareness, especially in cases of malady or neurosis because 
clues to the workings of the psyche lie within dreams.  He writes, “The theme to 
which [the dreams of the neurotic] point is, of course, always the history of the 
malady that is responsible for the neurosis” (Dreams 194).  Dreams were necessary 
for non-neurotics as well, as they were forms of “wish-fulfillment,” leading people, 
through psychoanalysis, to better understandings of themselves and their, sometimes 
hidden, desires (Dreams 208).  So, in addition to sleep being necessary for physical 
health, it is also necessary for psychological health. 
Again, Tietjens presents an interesting application of Freud’s ideas.  There is 
one scene in particular in which Tietjens talks in his sleep, giving prominence to 
issues with which he is contemplating, if only subconsciously (453).  Tietjens is not 
surprised that he has been talking in his sleep, claiming, “It’s nothing to write home 
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about!  With the overwork I’ve had and the sleeplessness…” (453).  In this instance, 
he echoes MacFarlane, acknowledging overwork as a cause for his inability to sleep 
and poor sleep quality.  He explains his sleep-talking when he says, “It means that 
one has been under mental pressure, but all mental pressure does not drive you over 
the edge” (453).  His mental pressure had a necessary outlet in his sleep-talking, 
allowing him to do something which Levin characterizes as indicating that one is “a 
bit dotty” (453), but is ultimately able to retain his sanity.  Tietjens’ awareness of 
great mental pressure supports Freud’s argument that dreaming provides an outlet for 
difficult emotions.  When he does sleep, his anxieties are given visual expression. 
Further bolstering Freud’s theories is the actual content of Tietjens’ sleep talk.  
Freud, as previously mentioned, believes that the content of dreams points to the 
cause of mental suffering; he further argues that sleep allows the sufferer to have 
thoughts that he or she would normally suppress during waking hours.  Both elements 
of Freud’s argument prove true in Tietjens’ case.  Tietjens, who cannot remember 
what he said while sleeping, asks Levin, who answers, “You were talking to a young 
lady about matters you don’t generally talk to young ladies about…. And obviously 
you were trying to let your…. Mrs. Tietjens, down easily…. You were trying to 
explain also why you had definitely decided to separate from Mrs. Tietjens….  And 
you took it that the young lady might be troubled….at the separation….” (458-59).  
To this point, Tietjens has consciously thought very little about Valentine, 
considering the impossibility of making her his mistress while he is away at war, 
primarily due to fear of impregnating her then dying and being consequently unable 
to care for her and the child, who would be a bastard.  Both sleep and trauma return 
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thoughts of her to his mind:  “He had not thought of that girl [Valentine] for over a 
fortnight now . . . She was certainly now obsessing him” (604).  However, even in 
sleep, he refers to her as “Miss Wannop,” illustrating the deeply ingrained nature of 
his social values and sense of propriety.  Yet, his dreams reveal his feelings towards 
her and his wife, even if he is hesitant to acknowledge them himself.  Prior to this 
point, Tietjens maintained that divorce should not be requested by a man, arguing that 
“such calamities [marital infidelities] are the will of God.  A gentleman accepts them.  
If the woman won’t divorce, he must accept them” (11).  Yet, in his dream, he 
attempts to find a way of releasing Sylvia from their marriage rather than just sticking 
it out as he previously thought was the proper course. 
The instance of sleep-talking follows a particularly painful exchange between 
Tietjens and Sylvia, in which her former lover, Perowne, attempts to enter her hotel 
room despite Tietjens’ presence there.  Tietjens physically throws Perowne out and 
causes a scene at the hotel, which also involves another officer, necessitating General 
Campion’s begrudging intervention given the personal and emotional nature of the 
conflict.  Even after Tietjens’ inner thoughts are revealed, he is still hesitant to talk 
about them openly, citing social propriety, specifically that of the British.  To Levin 
he says, “You’ll excuse my having been emotional so far.  You aren’t English, so it 
won’t have embarrassed you” (458).  Levin, who is Jewish (and therefore non-
English to Tietjens), takes offense, but Tietjens does not necessarily mean his 
statement as an insult, arguing that  there is “nothing in the world” the matter with 
Levin, which is “just what makes [him] un-English” (458).  Tietjens claims that “it 
doesn’t matter what’s wrong with us…” (458), but his argument here constitutes his 
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first real criticism of the expectation of the English stoicism that disallows him to 
publically discuss his innermost feelings and also dictates the nature of his 
interactions with Valentine.  Dreaming allows Tietjens a viewpoint from which he 
can consider feelings he has previously suppressed, but also opens for him the 
opportunity to talk about those feelings despite their impropriety.   
If Tietjens’ dream of discussing leaving his wife with Valentine signifies his 
true feelings if not hidden desires, and the dreams of soldiers often reveal the source 
of their neurosis, other dreams are equally revelatory, especially when those dreams 
are nightmares.  Nightmares are mentioned in both texts.  Cowley, one of Tietjens’ 
comrades claims that one of the most common nightmares during the war involved 
“seeing your dead” (441).  This too supports Freud’s ideas concerning dreams 
pointing to the source of a trauma.  Interestingly, Cowley argues that nightmares can 
be cured by “Epsom salts… And of course you should keep off women for a 
fortnight” (441).  The latter element of Cowley’s “cure” again refers to the idea of the 
relationship between faulty morality and faulty sleep, as immoral relations with 
women are said to contribute to one’s nightmares.  
Tietjens himself suffers from a recurring nightmare “of the mining Germans 
who desired that a candle be brought to the Captain.  At first, every night, three or 
four times every night, it had visited him…. Now it came only once every night….” 
(604).  This nightmare has several features relevant to Tietjens’ current situation in 
the trenches.  Present within the nightmare is the perpetual action of the “mining 
Germans,” representing the constant threat of danger and perpetual nature of the war.  
Interactions with authority are also included within the nightmare, the bringing of the 
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candle to the Captain as representative of a sense of duty.  In one instance of Tietjens’ 
experience of this nightmare, he is particularly on edge, unaware of the difference 
between consciousness and unconsciousness.  Ford writes: 
He had found the sound of the pickaxes beneath his flea-bag almost 
unbearable.  They were probably our own men.  Obviously they were 
our own men.  But it had not made much difference, for, of course, if 
they were there they would be an attraction, and the Germans might 
just as well be below them, counter-mining.  His nerves had been put 
in a bad way by that rotten strafe.  He knew his nerves were in a bad 
way because he had a ghostly visit from O Nine Morgan. . . .  A voice, 
just under his camp bed, said : “Bringt dem Hauptmann eine Kerze…” 
As who should say: “Bring a candle for the captain…”  Just like that!  
A dream!  It hadn’t been as considerable of a shock as you might have 
thought to a man just dozing off.  Not really as bad as the falling 
dream, but quite as awakening…. (561-62) 
 
Paradoxically, the dream itself leads to his awakening.  This dream occurs during a 
particularly stressful time for Tietjens, subsequent to the death of Morgan, for which 
he blames himself, pointing to the relationship between stress and nightmares.  In 
fact, during this particular sequence, Tietjens feels himself to be under so much  
mental pressure that upon awakening, “He cast about in his mind for some subject 
about which to think so that he could prove to himself that he had not gone mad” 
(564).  One of the signs of mental distress is Tietjens’ inability to distinguish between 
the state of sleep and wakefulness. 
Privacy 
Tietjens is not alone in his sleep talking; Henry talks in his sleep as well (198).  
A significant issue raised by the act of talking in one’s sleep is the issue of privacy.  
Military service, especially during war time, does not lend itself to privacy. 
Consequently, Tietjens observes that as an officer, his men “watched [him] eternally 
and knew the minutest gestures of [his] sleep” (570).   Ford’s use of “sleep” here is 
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significant; the men do not just know Tietjens’ behaviors, but his sleep behaviors, or, 
in other words, his behaviors at a time when he is unable to consciously control them.  
Tietjens struggles with this lack of privacy, as Ford describes:  
No scenes. Obviously for the sake of the servants—who are the same 
thing as the public. No scenes then, for the sake of the public. And 
indeed, with him, the instinct for privacy—as to his relationships, his 
passions, or even as to his most unimportant motives—was as strong 
as the instinct of life itself. He would, literally, rather be dead than an 
open book. (342) 
 
Talking in his sleep, and the revelations it allows those who witness it, is an 
extremely uncomfortable experience for Tietjens, who places such a high value on 
privacy.  Insomnia, then, might be interpreted as his act of resistance to revealing 
himself through sleep-talking.  Again, we see Tietjens prioritize his private self over 
his public self; he would rather forego sleep than risk his sleep-words being used 
against him.  Similarly, Henry attempts to protect his privacy through control of his 
sleep talking.  He is surrounded by Italians, but manages to limit his sleep talking to 
English so they are unable to understand him (198).  
Tietjens is not the only character within Parade’s End who talks in his sleep, 
as there is “a boy” who “was making such a beastly row in his sleep that they could 
not hear themselves speak,” so he must be removed to a different room (557).  The 
other soldiers “could not tell what had happened to the boy,” but “the acting sergeant-
major thought he must have got at some methylated spirits” (557).   Here again there 
is a connection between sleep-talk and trauma, but also disrupted sleep and morality.  
The officer in authority chooses to point to the boy’s allegedly unhealthy habit of 
consuming “methylated spirits” rather than “what had happened” (as the other 
soldiers acknowledge) as the source of the boy’s poor sleep quality.  Sherston, too, 
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witnesses sleep-talking, or at least talking during a state of semi-consciousness.  
Sherston writes: 
Everyone in the ward seemed to be asleep except the boy whose bed 
had screens round it. . . .  He must be jolly bad, I thought now, as the 
Sister came from behind the screen again.  His voice went on, in the 
low, rapid, even tone of delirium.  Sometimes I could catch what he 
said, troubled and unhappy complaining.  Someone called Dicky was 
on his mind, and he kept on crying out to Dicky.  “Don’t go out, 
Dicky; they snipe like hell!” And then, “Curse the Wood….  Dicky, 
you fool, don’t go out!”  All the horror of the Somme attacks was in 
that raving; all the darkness and the dreadful daylight.  (365-66) 
 
This soldier’s trauma had something to do with witnessing the death of his comrade, 
Dicky.  Sherston acknowledges that his ravings reveal “the horror” of the war, the 
true source of the boy’s trauma.  Perhaps the boy is reliving a scene in which he feels 
he could have saved Dicky’s life, bolstering Freud’s argument that what is revealed in 
the pre-sleep state of semi-consciousness is the “history of the malady that is 
responsible for the neurosis” (Dreams 194).   
 According to Simon Williams, Tietjens’, Henry’s, and Sherston’s diminishing 
sense of privacy is not without social context.  Williams argues that, in Medieval 
times, sleep was often a public affair, in the sense that people often slept, quite 
comfortably, in public, shared spaces; sleep “was a relatively ‘undisciplined’, 
‘undifferentiated’, affair at this time, not least as far as daytime sleep was concerned:  
anywhere, anytime, one might say” (Society 40).  Yet, as time moved on, “this 
unconcern disappears, slowly in the sixteenth century and more rapidly in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries; first in the upper classes and much 
more slowly in the lower classes” (Williams, Society 40).  As Hilary Hinds notes, by 
the end of the nineteenth century, the shared marital bed itself became an alleged 
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source of illness, but also loss of privacy:  “For [advocates of domestic hygiene] 
proximity to others was a source of pollution and danger, in the face of which the 
health of the individual could best be assured by demarcating his or her individuality 
more clearly through physical separation from others” (281).  Accordingly, many 
couples, at least those who could afford it, opted to sleep in separate beds (Hinds 
281).   Even as theories of miasma and disease changed, separate-bed sleeping 
remained fairly popular.  In her famous book Married Love (1918), Marie Stopes 
advises couples to retain separate sleeping quarters when possible (Hinds 298).  
However, as Williams asserts, “a slight relaxing of these strictures seems to have 
occurred since the First World War” (Society 40).  Indeed, by 1938, Stopes’ opinion 
changes somewhat, to regard the shared bed as “the arena in which the marriage is to 
be nurtured and sustained, through the sexual, and thereby emotional, merging of the 
couple” (Hinds 290).  While it makes sense that such strictures would have to have 
been relaxed because of the war, which required men and women to sleep in close 
quarters, the earlier anxieties over the inability of close sleeping quarters to allow one 
to protect one’s health and delineate one’s individuality helps, in part, to explain the 
anxiety these characters face over shared sleeping quarters and their lack of privacy. 
Idiosyncrasy 
If one must be under constant observation, then one does not want to be 
caught in a moment of weakness or embarrassment.  Thus, mastery over oneself, 
achieved through the mastery of routine and environment, is a motif present in both 
the novels and the medical literature of the period.  However, despite being lauded for 
its regulatory effects, the war actually presented an increased sense of the inability to 
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control one’s environment.  The condition of insomnia mimics the life of the soldier 
or war worker, whose schedule is largely determined by the course of the war.  As is 
depicted in the novels, the soldier or war worker is frequently unable to regulate his 
or her schedule, thus introducing the idea of idiosyncrasy to the habit of sleep.  
Regularity is the lack of idiosyncrasy, and much of the literature of sleep to date, such 
as in the aforementioned examples, focused on the establishment of good sleep habits 
through creating a sense of regularity.  However, the good soldier must be able to 
master idiosyncrasy.  Summers-Bremner argues that insomnia is idiosyncratic 
because the arrival of sleep is unknown.  In effect, the soldier must ape rationalized 
society itself in order to cope with the conditions of war, but the war itself reveals this 
type of rationalization to be impossible.  She writes, “Electric light and Railway 
Standard Time leach natural space and time of idiosyncrasy, and, like Taylorist 
method, both hide the fact that they are doing so” (122).  And so must the soldier, by 
becoming his own form of electric light or standard time.   
We see instances of the idiosyncrasy, in terms of lack of control over schedule 
or environment, in the lives of soldiers in all three novels.  For instance, Tietjens is 
kept up for two days straight to fulfill his duties, “because the draft had been 
countermanded” (448).  He is also subject to “physical irregularities” which have the 
inadvertent effect of lessening his propensity for self-control, rather than increasing it:  
“Tietjens wondered how long physical irregularities would inconvenience his mind.  
You cannot think well with a parched back to your tongue. . . .  Then he had nothing 
to go on to tell him how long he would be inconvenienced!” (600). Treatments for 
insomnia and neurosis often focused on the exact opposite: control of physical 
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conditions and imposition of regularity.  Yet, participation in the war introduced the 
opposite conditions into the soldiers’ lives.  Furthermore, other physical conditions 
leading to idiosyncrasy contributed to lack of control rather than its increase.  For 
example, Tietjens, under bombardment, finds his intellectual faculties reduced rather 
than heightened by the discipline he must show.  Ford writes, “There was so much 
noise it seemed to grow dark.  It was a mental darkness.  You could not think.  A 
Dark Age!” (637).  The Dark Ages, the period before the Renaissance, represents a 
time during which education and literacy, as well as the valorization of intellect, 
diminished.  The mental darkness Tietjens is experiencing under the bombardment is 
worth comparing to a passage in which Ford discusses the function of discipline: 
It was a very great achievement to have got men to fire at moments of 
such stress with such complete tranquility.  For discipline works in two 
ways:  in the first place it enables the soldier in action to get through 
his movements in the shortest possible time; and then the engrossment 
in the exact performance begets a great indifference to danger.  When, 
with various-sized pieces of metal flying all round you, you go 
composedly through efficient bodily movements, you are not only 
wrapped up in your task, but you have the knowledge that that exact 
performance is every minute decreasing your personal danger. (581) 
 
Here discipline is not presented as control over one’s thoughts, but as the ceding of 
one’s thoughts to training; it removes idiosyncrasy.  The soldier ceases to be an 
individual, in control of his environment; rather, he is under the control of his learned 
behaviors.  Despite its discursive presentation, discipline is not truly self-control 
taken to an excess; it is the willing relinquishment of that control to a series of 
prescribed motions and behaviors.  Given the contrast presented in text between the 
theory of discipline as desirable and healthy and the actual reality of war experience, 
the idiosyncratic conditions of both time and environment introduced by participation 
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in the war seems to counter to the idea that regularity increases discipline, which, in 
turn, increases one’s ability to adapt to idiosyncrasy while maintaining mental and 
emotional control.  Soldiers could not be expected to be regularized in a situation in 
which regularity is impossible, leaving the conclusion that they were merely expected 
to be able to control themselves to the extent that it allowed them to follow orders and 
act without thought.  Self control as mastery of the self, then, is mythical; it is merely 
the consequence of authoritative control. 
For Sherston, the idiosyncrasy of war time and reality has a similar effect and 
consequent revelation.  His schedule and duties require that “there was a working 
party every second night, which meant being out from seven o’clock till after 
midnight” (310).  He acknowledges that such a lifestyle changes the way in which he 
sees time itself:  “Sooner or later I should get windy myself.  It was only a question of 
time.  But could this sort of thing be measured by ordinary time, I wondered” (310).  
Time, for Sherston, cannot be understood in terms of set schedules or hours for 
waking and working.  Time is merely a function of extent to which he can maintain 
his composure.  He continues, “Trench life was an existence saturated by the external 
senses; and although our actions were domineered over by military discipline, our 
animal instincts were always uppermost.  While I stood there then, I had no desire to 
diagnose my environment” (311).  Similar to Tietjens, Sherston displays a sense that 
discipline is only a façade, especially in such idiosyncratic conditions.  He can 
maintain the appearance of discipline, just as Sylvia can maintain the appearance of 
morality through her focus on physical beauty, but in reality, Sherston sees himself as 
an animal, one who reacts rather than plans and controls.  He falls back on his 
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training to determine his actions.  This notion runs contrary to the British ideal of 
constitutional self-mastery and control.  No degree of discipline can completely inure 
humans to environmental hardships.  Even if the outer expression is one of calm, the 
inner state may be completely opposite, as Sherston and Tietjens illustrate.  
Henry also expresses the fear that discipline is not enough to protect people from 
breaking down as a result of the war.  In a conversation about the seeming endless 
nature of the war, Henry responds that it must inevitably end, but only because “It 
will crack somewhere” (20).  Catherine responds, “We’ll crack.  We’ll crack in 
France.  They can’t go on doing things like the Somme and not crack” (20).  Both of 
them acknowledge that the nature of the war itself leads to breakdown.  Much later in 
the novel, once he has given up his role in the war, he thinks, “If people bring so 
much courage to this world the world has to kill them to break them, so of course it 
kills them.  The world breaks everyone and afterward many are strong at the broken 
places.  But those that will not break it kills” (249).  Henry comes to view breaking or 
cracking in a positive light.  Breaking actually protects people.  Those who refuse to 
break or are unable to do so, like Septimus, end up dying.   The only way to survive is 
to first crack and then be repaired, like Sherston.  Remaining too disciplined for too 
long only leads to death, as it would have for Henry if he had confronted the military 
police attempting to arrest him rather than escaping them. 
Insomnia as Literary Device 
 While all three of the novels this chapter discusses illustrate insomnia in 
phenomenologically similar ways, pointing to it as physical evidence of resistance to 
the disciplinary mechanisms of the military, a reaction to the horrors and stresses of 
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war, and a time for characters to reassert their individuality and personal priorities, 
the texts make use of insomnia in different ways as a structural device.   For Ford and 
Sassoon, insomnia expresses a sense of liminality.  Both of their protagonists, 
Tietjens and Sherston, are caught in liminal positions.  For Tietjens, his marriage to 
Sylvia is liminal, as is his relationship with Valentine.  Through much of Parade’s 
End, Tietjens remains married to Sylvia for the sake of appearance, despite their 
emotional and physical separation.  His marriage to her is a consequence of his 
valorization of conservative morality, as he uses the marriage to protect her public 
image.  Many instances of Tietjens’ insomnia are used to reflect the liminality of this 
marriage, as he often has insomnia at times when their marriage is the subject of his 
thoughts or public discussion.  For example, I have already discussed the passage in 
which he stays up at night to review the history of their marriage after Morgan’s 
death.  Another example occurs when Sylvia’s scandalous behavior, running off to 
France with Perowne, threatens to be a matter of public knowledge.  Later that night: 
Tietjens fell, nevertheless, at once prey to real agitation.  For a long 
time he pounded from wall to wall and, since he could not shake off 
the train of thought, he got out at last his patience cards, and devoted 
himself seriously to thinking out the conditions of his life with Sylvia.  
He wanted to stop scandal if he could; he wanted them to live within 
his income, he wanted to subtract that child from the influence of its 
mother.  These were all definite but difficult things. . . .  Then one half 
of his mind lost itself in the rearrangement of schedules… (79) 
 
In this passage, we see Tietjens struggling to direct his thoughts, and consider his 
marriage calmly, but his mind itself is in a liminal state, as one half focuses on his 
marriage, while the other half focuses on “the rearrangement of schedules.”  Further, 
this passage describes the liminality of his marriage, as he is within this liminal state 
of insomnia experiencing the liminality of a divided mind.  He simultaneously wants 
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to protect Sylvia and live as a married couple, at least financially, but remove her 
from her role as mother.  His role as father is a bit doubtful though, referring to his 
son as “that child” and “it,” thus neither by his name or even by his gender, and 
certainly not possessively, as in “our” child or “my” child (he suspects the child his 
not his).  Interestingly, when Sylvia feigns leaving Tietjens, by leaving the country 
via Paddington Station, she does so in the early morning hours when Tietjens is 
awake in bed and can hear her directions to the driver (343). 
 Similarly, Ford uses the liminality of insomnia to mirror the liminality of 
Tietjens’ relationship with Valentine.  Their first extended interaction takes place late 
at night as they try to escape Valentine’s friend escape the legal ramifications of her 
golf course prank.  During their ride, Valentine comments that she is “not sleepy” but 
rather “loving it all” to which Tietjens responds “I’m rather loving it too!” (131).  The 
scene of their interaction takes place in a heavy fog, further obscuring their proximity, 
but also reflecting their uncertainty of where they stand in relation to each other.  In 
fact, in the fog, he “almost kissed her” (137) but restrains himself, as this action 
would violate his sense of propriety.  Tietjens finally returns Valentine home in the 
morning, but not after their relationship has been publically exposed, leading to the 
scrutiny he will experience at the military camp (143-44).  Through juxtaposing the 
origins of Valentine and Tietjens’ love with both insomnia and fog, Ford uses textual 
liminality to expose Tietjens’ personal liminality. 
 Additionally, Tietjens is in a liminality of position with regard to his military 
service.  He clearly cares a great deal about his men, given the depth to which he feels 
the pain of Morgan’s loss, and he sees the propriety of his leadership role within the 
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military, as well as his subordination to his superiors, because of his social status and 
ethics.  Yet, at the same, for reasons I have discussed earlier, he questions the validity 
of disciplining both his own body and the bodies of his soldiers.  Sherston is similar 
in this sense, feeling a responsibility to his country and sense of patriotism, yet, at the 
same time questioning the war.  As with Tietjens, the liminality of Sherston’s 
insomnia reflects his sense of being between different states:  patriotic solider and 
pacifist war critic. 
 For Sherston, as with Tietjens, one liminality begets another.  His liminal role 
regarding the war places him in a liminal situation regarding his sanity.  He feels 
himself to be perfectly sane, but must claim insanity in order to avoid a return to war.  
Further, he is caught in the liminal position of wanting to assert agency through 
renouncing the war, but his ability to assert this form of agency comes only when he 
renounces his ability to assert agency over his life more broadly and has himself 
committed to a mental hospital.  He refers to the transitional state between military 
duty and renunciation of this duty as a “double life” (490).  Insomnia plays a 
significant role in his decision-making process, as it during bouts of insomnia in 
which is resistance is born.  However, his resistance places him in a “purgatorial 
limbo” (508).  The novel ends with his admission to Slateford War Hospital (514).  
Though he has to willfully deny his own sanity, he ends up pleased with the result. 
 Hemingway uses Henry’s insomnia in a different manner.  While Henry does 
place himself, at times, in a liminal position, he is a medical worker in the war rather 
than a soldier.  His duty is to heal rather than hurt; thus his position is less morally 
tenuous.  For Henry, rather than symbolizing liminality, his insomnia represents, at 
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least in part, a fear of loss.  William Adair argues that “things happen to 
Hemingway’s protagonists:  they do not control things, they are victims.  And the 
essential thing that happens to them is loss rather than violence” (294).  Insomnia, for 
Henry, then becomes a means through which he can control himself and his 
surroundings.  He does not sleep, so he does not lose himself to it.  Adair continues, 
“Nick [of “Now I Lay Me”] and Frederic [Henry] (before he loves Catherine) may 
fear in the night that if they shut their eyes and let themselves go that their souls will 
slide out of their bodies and they will die.  But the Hemingway protagonist has 
another fear in the night, the fear of loss” (297).  Insomnia becomes a means both by 
which characters can control their souls and also avoid the temporary loss of self that 
sleep requires.  Insomnia is used in A Farewell to Arms as a way for Henry to reassert 
his selfhood when everything else in his life is increasingly destabilized. 
Conclusions 
Despite the assertions of war’s regularizing effect and the industrial emphasis 
on increasing productivity and utilizing time efficiently, as well as maintaining 
discipline, the war often appeared to do the exact opposite and lead to break down of 
discipline and much time wasted.  Ford writes about “the process of eternal waiting 
that is War”: 
You hung about and you hung about, and you kicked your heels until 
and you kicked your heels:  waiting for Mills bombs to come, or for 
jam, or for generals, or for the tanks, or transport, or the clearance of 
the road ahead.  You waited in offices under the eyes of somnolent 
orderlies, under fire on the banks of canals, you waited in hotels, dug-
outs, tin sheds, ruined houses.  There will be no man who survives His 
Majesty’s Armed Forces that shall not remember those eternal hours 
when Time itself stayed still as the true image of Bloody War!.... (569) 
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For all of industrialized society’s Tayloristic notions of increasing productivity, the 
war ended up being the exact opposite, a process of endless waiting rather than 
endless working.  The irony is that the emphasis on productivity was never 
relinquished, yet, at least according to this passage, it was hardly the soldier’s fault if 
he were not productive:  he was waiting for everyone but himself.  This type of 
reality, in the face of a completely contrary discourse of incessant productivity (even 
rest time being considered constructive), must have created a type of cognitive 
dissonance.  The citizen could never live up to the society’s expectations, mostly 
because of the authority structure itself.  Yet, at the same time, the war was portrayed 
as a means of creating ideal citizens, ones who were productive, contributing 
members of society, in control of both their time and their emotions. 
Ironically, but a logical antecedent of the contemporary discourse, war even 
came to be considered a cure for trauma because it could correct degeneracy in 
society through its emphasis on regularization and discipline, and the ideal aim of a 
cure was to send the soldier back to war as quickly as possible (Lerner 27).  
According to Showalter “The goal of wartime psychiatry was primarily to keep men 
fighting” (Female 176).  The cure for mental disorders based in trauma is primarily 
rest-based, but patients were encouraged, if not required, to remain in the army, as 
“the prospect of discharge from the army was apt to delay recovery,” at least 
according to medical authorities (Lerner 64).  War was viewed as a way to establish 
good habits, of the type needed to prevent and cure insomnia, mainly because of the 
ostensible focus on discipline and routine.  At the beginning stages of the war, the 
war was largely understood by the British community as a cleansing force: 
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The assumption of the polarity of war and peace allowed 
contemporaries to experience the declaration of war as a movement 
from normal, familiar life to an alternative existence which differed 
markedly from bourgeois society.  It was commonly felt that, with the 
declaration of war, the populations of European nations had left behind 
an industrial civilization with its problems and conflicts and were 
entering a sphere of action ruled by authority, discipline, comradeship, 
and common purpose.  (Leed 41) 
 
War, in other words, would purify society, ridding it of its degenerate elements 
through the establishment of discipline to obtain a universal societal goal of 
productivity, much in the same way requiring doctors to work rigorous and trying 
hours during their training weeded out the weak among them. 
Yet, contrary to these expectations, in reality, the war introduced the 
aforementioned idiosyncrasy, as opposed to routine and regularity, into the lives of 
soldiers, with its resultant contradictory messages.  In a sense, though the war was 
lauded for its “cleansing” abilities, it really introduced the type of “mental un-
tidiness” to which Tietjens attributes disease (614).  Ironically, just as the causes for 
insomnia are often perceived to be a result of mental “un-tidiness,” and the 
consequences of insomnia include mental impairment and clouded thinking, the 
treatments often focus on “cleaning up” one’s routine and mind.  James, similar to 
many of the medical authorities mentioned previously, argues that mental health and 
sleep are connected.  He refers to a specific mindset, which he labels “healthy-
mindedness.”  He defines “healthy-mindedness” as “the tendency which looks on all 
things and sees that they are good,” and this trait can either be naturally occurring or 
can be cultivated by the individual (“Religion” 85-86).   
Healthy-mindedness, while not necessarily connected with a particular 
religion, embodies a specific type of religious temperament.  In religious thinkers not 
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preoccupied with hellfire and damnation, James sees “the presence of a temperament 
organically weighted on the side of cheer and fatally forbidden to linger, as those of 
opposite temperament linger, over the darker aspects of the universe” (81).  In more 
extreme cases, a religious temperament can prevent the individual from feeling any 
evil at all (82).  James cites two cases in which the person who did not adopt a 
healthy-minded, religious outlook suffered from lack of sleep.  He transcribes an 
interview with a man whom he describes as “a sufficiently familiar contemporary 
type,” who claims that “[Religion] is nothing” (89).  This particular man diagnoses 
his own temperament as being “nervous, active, wide-awake, mentally and 
physically.  Sorry that Nature compels us to sleep at all” (90).  James also relates a 
letter from a woman who writes, “Life seemed difficult to me at one time.  I was 
always breaking down, and had several attacks of what is called nervous prostration, 
with terrible insomnia, being on the verge of insanity” (99).  Despite the work of 
numerous doctors, and even narcotics, the woman was not cured until she accepted 
the “New Thought” and began to adopt “a constant turning to the very innermost, 
deepest consciousness of our real selves or of God in us for illumination from within” 
(99).  Once she adopted a religious outlook, her mental and emotional problems 
ceased to trouble her.  “Healthy-mindedness” in practically any character is far from 
present in the literature of Ford, Hemingway, or Sassoon, illustrating this particular 
discursive element through its negation.  None of the insomniac characters depicted 
in Ford, Hemingway, or Sassoon can be said to have particularly optimistic or 
accepting outlooks; they are consistently portrayed as over-thinkers and people not 
cheerily accepting, but struggling to understand, their place in the world. 
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In addition to fostering the ability to think in a “healthy-minded” way, 
treatments were designed to reduce cost (of the treatment) and maximize efficiency 
(in the sense that the goal of the cure was more about returning soldiers to battle than 
actually making them feel better).  Economic motivations dictated treatment: 
Forced to handle unprecedentedly high numbers of patients with 
limited resources, doctors borrowed from industrial models, 
developing “assembly-line” techniques for making diagnoses, treating 
patients, and ruling on pension and discharge matters.  Speed and 
efficiency became the primary medical values, as methods of treatment 
and administration were centralized and rationalized, and a 
comprehensive approach to the psychic health of the whole nation was 
adopted.  (Lerner 18) 
 
Perhaps, in hindsight, such methodology seems counter-intuitive but served its 
purpose, illustrating the way in which the theories presented by the medical 
establishment served the existing power structures.   
Consequently, and not surprisingly, one possible cure for neurosis was 
thought to be productive work:  “men with psychological disabilities were channeled 
into work situations which fitted their psychological strengths and abilities” (Lerner 
19).   The “channeling” described by Lerner does not apply exclusively to soldiers 
suffering from mental illness.  In fact, the medical field made numerous attempts to 
direct physically wounded soldiers into post-war work that “complemented” their 
injuries.  Frank and Lillian Gilbreth write, “A prime necessity is to inspire the cripple 
with the feeling that he can remain, or become, a productive member of society” 
(135).  Gilbreth and Gilbreth describe ways in which people with various injuries can 
be fit into specific fields that suit them given their limitations:  “It will mean fitting 
for useful vocations of thousands, who otherwise would be dependents upon society, 
which is always a greater burden to the one so afflicted than to those of society who 
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bear the expense of such disability” (146).  Discursively, this idea of the war as a 
“cure” or “cleansing” proffered by the medical community in conjunction with the 
arm of the state serves the primary function of justifying the war itself.  The war must 
be righteous if it can “fix” the wrongs of both society and the individuals involved in 
the war.  If the war harmed instead of fixed, it was merely a matter of the weakness of 
the individual and a result of his inability to accept necessary discipline. 
Ultimately, the insomniac is one whose mind and body refuse to be 
disciplined, whether it be by choice, circumstance, or one or more countless other 
factors.  Discursively, discipline is presented as self-control, but the reality is quite 
different.  Discipline only constitutes self-control inasmuch as it entails one’s ability 
to give up that control for what one perceives to be the greater good, whether that 
consists of doing one’s duty as a soldier or being a productive member of one’s 
society.  True discipline, as self-control, is a myth.  That the very condition of 
insomnia exists proves that the mind cannot be fully in control of the body all of the 
time, nor can the individual be fully in control of his or her mind.  The revelation of 
this myth of complete self-control is very dangerous to a society that relies on 
compliance based in discipline, masked as self-control.  Therefore, those in power 
turned to the insomniacs when looking for a place to which their accusatory fingers 
could point.  Insomnia is constitutional, they argued, a flaw of the individual.    
Conveniently, much as the cure for war trauma involved returning to the war as 
quickly as possible, the cure for insomnia consisted of giving oneself over to structure 
and discipline, to quieting the questioning voices inside of one’s head in favor of 
complacency and acceptance.  For this reason the insomniac is treated as a deviant, 
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one with a pathological condition worthy of scrutiny and treatment.  It is the 
insomniac who reveals the limitations of social discipline, coming with the idea that 
the power of society is not so omnipotent as to enable the will to fully control the 
body, despite all of the citizens’ reasons for doing so.  The insomniac’s tendency to 
exist liminally, at odds with ideals of the power of the mind over the body, illustrates 
that there are ways in which citizens can fail to work towards the greater good 
without it merely being a matter of their unwillingness to subject themselves to 
discipline in the war-time situation, thereby prioritizing the individual self (as 
husband or pacifist) over the soldier-citizen. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BEAUTY SLEEP(LESSNESS):  GENDERED SLEEP PRACTICES  
 
Louis Althusser argues that “there is no ideology except by the subject and for 
subjects.  Meaning, there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this 
destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject:  meaning, by the 
category of the subject and its functioning” (115).  Ideology, which Althusser defines 
as “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” 
(109), is both produced and enacted by subjects, but also produces the subject itself.  
His use of the words “destination” and “concrete” implies that ideology has a 
physical, spatial component, specifically the human body, but more specifically, as I 
contend, the gendered body.  Further, ideology enables and requires categorization of 
subjects; gender is one such means of categorization.  As I have argued, through the 
creation of the identity category of the “insomniac,” insomnia is another means of 
categorization.  In this chapter, my goal is to examine the intersection of these two 
categories, the gendered insomniac body, as it produces and is produced by ideology.  
Because the insomniac is a discursively produced category (as is gender), as a form of 
subjectivity, this category both reflects and contributes to the creation and enactment 
of ideology.  Examining the way in which insomnia functions for different gender-
identity categories, phenomenologically, psychologically, medically, and politically 
reveals not only the ways in which ideology and gender are related to both produce 
and perpetuate such identity categories, but also the ways in which the subject can 
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expose, resist, and, therefore, change the ideology associated with such categories 
through insomnia. 
Susan Bordo, building on Althusser’s theories, argues not only that the subject 
is both product and producer of ideology, but also that the subject’s body is a surface 
upon which ideology is made visible.  According to Bordo, the body is “a politically 
inscribed entity, its physiology and morphology shaped by histories and practices of 
containment and control” (21).  The disordered body, for Bordo, is particularly 
revealing.  Writing of disorders such as anorexia, hysteria, and agoraphobia, she 
argues, “The symptomatology of these disorders reveals itself as textuality. . . .  
Working within this framework, we see that whether we look at hysteria, 
agoraphobia, or anorexia, we find the body of the sufferer deeply inscribed with an 
ideological construction of femininity emblematic of the period in question” (168).  
The disorders she describes are historically associated with women, but her argument 
can also be applied to insomnia in any gender.  Insomnia is a disorder that cannot 
exist without a culture that regulates and normalizes sleep and, as such, it often 
exposes a conflict between the insomniac and ideologically based expectations.  
Without the production of the “proper” and “normal” behaviors and conditions of 
sleep, disordered sleep is not possible.  Insofar as these proper and normal behaviors 
and conditions are related to gender, insomnia is produced and interpreted relative to 
differently gendered bodies.  In terms of symptoms of insomnia, including 
restlessness, anxiety, exhaustion, altered perception of time, frustration, and 
relationship to various forms of productivity, insomnia makes visible and exposes 
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social conditions and practices that emphasize physical and mental discipline; sleep 
as an extension of the working day; and active, economic productivity. 
In order to examine the ways in which the insomniac is produced as a 
gendered subject, I will again use a model proposed by Michel Foucault.  In the 
second volume of History of Sexuality:  The Use of Pleasure, Foucault proposes three 
analytic categories, which he applies to the analysis of sexuality: “(1) the formation of 
sciences (savoirs) that refer to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its practice, 
(3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves 
as subjects of this sexuality” (4).  I will apply a similar model to insomnia through a 
discussion of scientific and medical developments related to the study of disordered 
sleep, attempts at regulation of sleep habits and practices, and ways in which the 
insomniac becomes an identity category that is applied to bodies of different genders.  
In other words, my goal is to examine the formation of ideology as it relates to the 
insomniac’s subjectivity. 
As I argued earlier, because the individual both produces and enacts ideology 
through his or her body, it is important to discuss the implications of insomnia itself.  
What does the experience of insomnia in a given body reflect about a culture in a 
specific time period?  Further, how is one’s perception of one’s insomnia mitigated 
by culture and ideology?  Invariably, the argument is dialectical:  ideology shapes 
perception and perception shapes ideology.  As ideology shifts, so does perception, 
and then ideology and so forth.  To be perceived as an insomniac shapes the 
perception of the insomniac, which, in turn, shapes what it means to be an insomniac.  
The insomniac is not simply subjected to the power of categorization, but has an 
  
 
175 
 
active role in producing and shaping that category.  Therefore, the implications of 
categorization as an insomniac reflect the workings of power, both as power enacted 
on a subject, but the power of the subject to use his or her categorization to his or her 
benefit.  As Foucault argues in the first volume of The History of Sexuality:  An 
Introduction, power is exercised and productive, not as an “all-encompassing 
opposition between rulers and ruled,” but as part of a “machinery of production” 
operating on all levels of a social order (94).  Resistance, for example the insomniac’s 
refusal to sleep “normally” (whether intentional or incidental), is “never in a position 
of exteriority in relation to power” (95), but part of the functioning of power—it is a 
productive power in and of itself, which “undermines and exposes [power], renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (101).    In this regard, insomnia is a form 
of power insofar as it shapes perception and ideology, but also as it provides the 
insomniac a means of resistance to control of sleep as a disciplinary mechanism.  
Insomnia exposes the individual’s prioritization of the self he or she chooses to 
develop during insomniac-time, but may also expose a tension between the 
individual’s prioritization and external, ideologically-based expectations. 
Insomnia can be used to both produce and counter expectations of gendered 
subjectivity.  During the time period I am discussing, many medical professionals 
believed that males and females reacted to insomnia differently and experienced 
insomnia for different reasons, as I will discuss in more detail to come.  Thus, the 
perception of the insomniac (symptoms, consequences, diagnosis, treatment) and the 
insomniac’s perception of his or her condition is influenced by gender norms.  For 
example, a mother who stays up all night nursing a sick child is not discursively 
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considered an “insomniac”; rather, she is a “good mother.”  Whereas, a mother who 
stays up late at night pursuing other interests, perhaps because it is the only time she 
has free, would be an insomniac, but also, might be scrutinized with regard to her 
priorities.  Similarly, a man who works late into the evening to earn money for his 
family is “a good provider” or a “go-getter,” yet that same man, if he foregoes sleep 
for a non-work related activity, puts this same status in question.  As a consequence, 
examining the gendered treatment of insomnia and the insomniac can be used to 
expose, as well as challenge, gender conventions.   Because insomnia is so closely 
tied in with other aspects of one’s subjectivity, including one’s gender, but also other 
parts of one’s identity including job and familial role (areas also influenced by 
gender), any discussion of the relationship between insomnia and gender must also 
involve these other areas of inquiry. 
To conduct my examination of insomnia and gender, I will look at three 
literary texts, as well as medical and psychological texts written during the same time 
period.  The three literary texts upon which this chapter focuses are Dorothy 
Richardson’s Pilgrimage (a collection of thirteen chapter novels), H. G. Wells’ The 
Soul of a Bishop, and Elizabeth Bowen’s The Last September.  Pilgrimage follows 
the life of one female character, Miriam Henderson, as she grows into womanhood 
during the period of social and cultural transition at the end of the Victorian Era.  
Miriam is an insomniac and proud of it.  She enjoys her insomnia for the freedom and 
privacy it affords her.  Further, Miriam uses her insomnia in defiance of gender 
norms, but, simultaneously, she takes advantage of gender norms regarding sleep and 
mental health practices to attain the independence she desires.  Wells, a friend of 
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Richardson, and character in Pilgrimage (under the alias Hypo Wilson), is one of the 
figures in the novel who attempts to control Miriam’s insomnia because he sees it as 
in conflict with her ability to become a fit mother.  In his own novel, The Soul of a 
Bishop, Wells depicts the life of an insomniac, Edward Scrope.  Scrope, unlike 
Miriam, is ashamed (at least initially), rather than proud of his insomnia, but his 
insomnia performs an important role in his transformation from spokesman for the 
Anglican Church to spokesman for his own spiritual disavowal of organized religion.  
His insomnia allows him a series of revelations about the inefficacy of the Church in 
addressing the problems of the modern age and is a necessary force in his spiritual 
and personal transformation.  Yet, his insomnia puts him in a state of conflict, not 
only because it makes it physically and mentally difficult for him to perform his role, 
but also leads to the questioning of his role in the Church, which, in turn, complicates 
his role as provider for his family—his expected role based on his gender.  The final 
text, Bowen’s The Last September, depicts of a whole group of insomniacs in an Irish 
household just after World War I.   I will use this text to illustrate the ways in which a 
female author depicts insomnia within the same text differently according to the 
characters’ genders.  Additionally, I will examine the extent to which these three texts 
both reflect and challenge contemporaneous medical and psychological discourse 
regarding insomnia and the insomniac. 
Insomnia and the Body 
All three of these texts describe the ways in which insomnia becomes an 
essential aspect of the care of the self, as described by Foucault, which I discuss in the 
introductory section of this dissertation.  Especially in the first two texts, those by 
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Richardson and Wells, insomnia becomes a source of conflict for the character 
because, through their insomnia, they are caring for their non-social selves (their 
academic, artistic, and spiritual inclinations) rather than their expected social roles.  
As physician W. Johnson Smyth argues, treatment for insomnia requires attention to 
one’s individuality and background (227).  In other words, insomnia forces one to be 
regarded individually, outside of general categories of identity.  Insomnia becomes 
both a form of categorization, but also a resistance to it, as the insomniac cannot 
simply be regarded as like all other insomniacs.  Thus, insomnia becomes a bodily 
expression of resistance to fixed identity categories.  Miriam’s insomnia makes her 
question her desire for motherhood and role as caretaker (assigned to her by simple 
virtue of being a female), and Scrope’s insomnia makes him question his role within 
the Church, thereby jeopardizing his role as provider for his family.  Though friends 
and physicians advise both characters on how to treat their insomnia, and, as a result, 
resume their expected roles, the characters resist or take advantage of these treatments 
and ultimately embrace their insomnia.  Miriam embraces her insomnia because she 
sees it as a means to independence.  Scrope finds that the insomnia and its treatments 
(psychotropic and hallucinogenic drugs) afford him spiritual revelations and 
transform his, and his family’s, financial circumstances and social position. 
In his creative non-fiction text about his insomnia, contemporary writer Blake 
Butler describes his insomnia, in part, as a hyper-awareness of his body:  “The 
restless body, rolling, finding partial conditions, in continual correction, begins to feel 
simultaneously thicker and thinner, stuffed and hollow—like a wet but drying bar of 
soap, hard at the center, soft around the edges, mushy, comes off on your hands.  The 
  
 
179 
 
fidget begets a fidget” (32).  His language in this passage, aside from the expression 
of bodily sensation, is also expression through bodily sensation.  All of his sensations 
are contradictory, illustrating the contradictory nature of insomnia itself:  the body 
and mind at war over sleep, each striving to become unconscious of the other.  
Insomnia becomes a conflict both inscribed on and experienced through his body.  As 
a contradictory bodily experience, insomnia becomes a particularly useful device to 
illustrate other conflicts of the body, such as those of gender and sexuality, which can 
be expressed via the bodily experience of insomnia. 
Richardson expresses this sort of bodily awareness through insomnia in 
Pilgrimage. Miriam often stays up late at night reading, choosing insomnia despite 
being tired because it is the only time she can find to pursue her own interests, 
primarily academic ones traditionally limited to males.  Her insomnia becomes a 
means of transcending gender roles; thus, her insomnia indicates both her awareness 
of these roles and her desire to use her body to resist them.  Miriam’s reading is an act 
of rebellion against gender norms for multiple reasons, including actively reducing 
her efficacy as caretaker of children (her students) through cultivating exhaustion in 
order to gain entrance into a wider social and intellectual sphere.  One of Miriam’s 
first experiences with insomnia, described in Backwater, is presented in a morally 
ambiguous light through use of religious terminology:   
For the last six weeks of the summer term she sat up night after night 
propped against her upright pillow and bolster against the gas-jet 
reading her twopenny books in her silent room.  Almost every night 
she read until two o’clock.  She felt at once that she was doing wrong; 
that the secret novel reading was a thing she could not confess, even to 
Miss Haddie.  She was spending hours of the time that was meant for 
sleep, for restful preparation for the next day’s work, in a ‘vicious 
circle’ of self-indulgence.  It was sin. (1: 282) 
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Miriam clearly finds her reading experience pleasurable.  She chooses to stay awake 
and read, she enjoys reading, and she enjoys the time and space that being awake 
alone at night allows her.  However, her pleasure is tinged (and perhaps intensified 
by) guilt, as she has a distinct sense that she is doing something that she should not.  
And, in fact, proper sleep habits are often equated with morality.  For example, in a 
1919 book on child rearing, author A. B. Barnard comments, “The formation of good 
habits is the basis of morality and intellectual efficiency” (99).  Yet, Miriam resists 
forming “good” habits of sleep.  She knows that it is her responsibility, as a teacher 
(caregiver), to be prepared for the next day’s lessons.  In choosing not to sleep, she is 
willfully using her body to detract from her effectiveness at filling her role. 
In this passage from Backwater, Miriam views insomnia as a moral concern, 
using words like sin and confess, but also as a medical issue, reflecting both Victorian 
and Edwardian medical literature, which often conflated morality and science; the 
literature frequently represented disease and disorder as caused by a combination of 
physical and moral irregularities.  Miriam discusses her insomnia as a form of “self-
indulgence.”  Physician Silas Weir Mitchell, originator and proponent of the “rest 
cure,” which was designed to treat patients diagnosed with hysteria and neurasthenia, 
also uses this type of language.  Mitchell’s rest cure, which he explains in his text Fat 
and Blood (1885), involves a regimen of seclusion, rest, and diet (emphasizing milk 
and raw meat as fattening agents) (44), with a combination of controlled exercise or 
electricity and massage to compensate for the absence of muscle movement (55).  It 
prohibits amusements, like reading or sewing, in order to render patients more 
obedient and responsive to the doctor's orders (58).   
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Mitchell views hysteria not only as a disorder to be treated medically, but also 
as a form of selfishness and self-indulgence on the part of the patient.  His patients, 
most of whom were female, are not considered “productive” members of their 
households and “failed” at fulfilling familial duties.  He describes his patients as 
“invalids, unable to attend to the duties of life, and sources alike of discomfort to 
themselves and anxiety to others” (9).  Mirroring Miriam’s (somewhat ironic) 
description of her insomnia as “sin,” Mitchell writes of the “moral degradation” of his 
patients (39), whose sickness serves to “cultivate self-love and selfishness, and to take 
away by slow degrees the healthful mastery which all human beings should maintain 
over their emotions and wants” (40).   While in this scene Miriam does not suffer 
from hysteria, she does expose a discursive presentation of women who acted 
contrary to their expected caregiver roles as selfish and immoral through her 
characterization of her decision not to sleep as a self-indulgent act, focusing on her 
own “wants” because it may affect her ability to teach and care for her students. 
Further illustrating Miriam’s simultaneously moral and medical 
characterization of insomnia, she refers to her insomnia as “a vicious circle.”  The 
idea of the “vicious circle” in medical literature is outlined in a 1913 text, Vicious 
Circles in Disease, by physician Jameison Hurry.  Hurry argues that chronic disease 
is a product of “vicious circles,” in which “two or more disorders are so correlated 
that they reciprocally aggravate and perpetuate each other” (xiii).  These types of 
diseases are an example of nature’s “beneficent influence” becoming “maleficent” 
(xiii).  At this stage in Pilgrimage, which Richardson began writing two years later in 
1915, Miriam does not yet see her insomnia as a possible symptom of hysteria (as she 
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will, following her mother’s suicide); however, she does express Hurry’s idea of 
correlation and perpetuation with regard to her insomnia.  Her lack of satisfaction 
with her job creates her desire to find satisfaction during her undisturbed time (sleep 
time), which, in turn, leads to a lack of sleep, making her already dissatisfying job 
even more difficult and arduous.  She continues to attempt to find an escape through 
her nightly reading, which aggravates her exhaustion, which increases the difficulty 
of her job, and the circle continues.  Her insomnia is both product and cause of her 
sense of dissatisfaction with her life and her desire to find satisfaction independent of 
her assumed role, reflected through her bodily actions. 
According to Bordo, the body is “a surface on which the central rules, 
hierarchies, and even metaphysical commitments of a culture are inscribed and thus 
reinforced” (165).  She argues that disorders are a means of exposing “fragility and 
lack of power in the face of a decisive male occupation of social space” (171).  The 
disorders that she discusses, such as anorexia and hysteria, are disorders of idealized 
femininity (168), as I describe earlier, which Miriam’s insomnia is not.  Miriam’s 
insomnia is not reflective of her domesticity (agoraphobia) or her desire to take up 
less physical space and practice self-denial to provide for  others (anorexia).  Rather, 
her insomnia challenges, rather than perpetuates, such an ideal since she sees it as a 
form of self-indulgence and intellectual expansion.  However, Miriam’s insomnia 
shares many characteristics that the female anorexic embodies—self-control, 
discipline, determination, which are stereotypically “male” characteristics (Bordo 
171).  She uses her insomnia to learn about herself and to pursue interests outside of 
those deemed appropriate for a woman of her time period.  Miriam sees self-
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consciousness as a means of comprehending, and thereby entering the “world of 
men” (Hanscombe 48).  Gillian Hanscombe argues that “Richardson sees Miriam’s 
gradual acquisition of insight and control as an act of consciousness rather than an act 
of will, that is, as intellectual rather than moral virtue” (54).  On several occasions, 
Miriam describes herself as being more male than female, or thinking in a masculine 
way.  For instance, she thinks, “Perhaps I can’t stand women because I’m a sort of 
horrid man” (1: 404).  She uses her insomnia as a time to occupy traditionally male 
spaces.  She does this intellectually, in part through reading.  For example, she desires 
to talk to her employer about her reading “man to man, about the book.  She could not 
do that.  Everything she said would hurt her, poisoned by the hidden sore of her 
incapability to do anything for his children” (1: 383).  In this passage, she wants to 
meet her male employer, Mr. Corrie, as an intellectual equal, but knows it would only 
ruin his image of her as an appropriate governess for his children because she would 
be stepping outside of her assumed female role by asserting her intellect.  Her desire 
to meet him as a man (“man to man”) illustrates her desire to step outside of the 
feminine caregiver role, but she understands this redefinition of herself only makes 
her household position more tenuous. 
Yet, even in identifying with men, she feels aversion as well:  “How utterly 
detestable mannishness is; so mighty and strong and comforting when you have 
mewed up with women all your life, and then suddenly, in a second, far away, utterly 
imbecile and aggravating, with a superior self-satisfied smile because a woman says 
one thing one minute and another the next” (1: 423).  She realizes that, try as she 
might, men will never meet with her on an equal level, and despite her sense of 
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independence and pride in her intellect, many will persist in seeing her as inferior and 
weak.  She realizes she will never be (nor does she want to be) the person others 
come to expect simply because she is a woman:  “For a long time she sat blankly 
contemplating the new world that was coming.  Every one would be trained and 
efficient but herself” (1: 244).  She has made it a point not to cultivate efficient sleep 
habits.   Miriam’s body does not want to conform to the expectations placed upon it, 
and her language in this passage indicates her sense of a social drive towards 
maximization of productivity and efficiency, which requires every individual to play 
his or her part effectively.  Yet, she resists playing this part. 
More tellingly, Miriam’s insomnia allows her not only to use her body as a 
force of rebellion, but to experience her body itself as a contradiction of gender 
norms.  Her insomnia allows her to perceive her body differently, as not only a 
feminine body; thus it is through her insomnia that she is able to transcend discursive 
representations of womanhood.  Her views are supported by contemporary medical 
attitudes that differentiate female insomnia from male insomnia and see femininity 
itself as a cause of insomnia.  As A. W. Macfarlane argues, “Sleeplessness or 
disturbed sleep is apt to appear in females from causes peculiar to the sex” (279).  
These causes, according to MacFarlane, include puberty, menopause, menstruation, 
pregnancy, and giving birth (279), or, in other words, nearly any condition unique to 
female biology (with the exception of puberty, which MacFarlane does not discuss as 
a cause for insomnia in males).  Further, insomnia “chiefly affects those of neurotic 
temperament, with highly-strung and unduly sensitive nervous systems, and those 
debilitated by neurasthenic conditions” (MacFarlane 279).  The latter statement is the 
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second sentence of his chapter entitled “Insomnia Peculiar to Females,” so, while it 
would seem that although people of any gender might be “highly-strung” or “unduly 
sensitive,” clearly these are conditions he equates with women and sees as worth 
mentioning at the start of this chapter.  Incidentally, he never actually addresses these 
psychological conditions in this chapter; he has other chapters devoted to 
psychological conditions, which makes his mention of neurosis quite interesting, and 
seemingly gratuitous at this point.  Notably, MacFarlane’s text does not include a 
chapter entitled “Insomnia Peculiar to Males,” indicating that biological factors 
exclusive to masculinity are, by themselves, not causes of insomnia. Further, devoting 
a chapter to females suggests that males are the assumed standard of normalcy against 
which females are judged. 
Yet, Miriam’s insomnia is not caused by a condition such as menstruation, 
menopause, or pregnancy (at least not in this particular passage with regard to 
pregnancy).  During one bout of insomnia, she has an experience of her body as 
“other” to the bodies of women: “it was only when she was alone and in the intervals 
of quiet reading that she came into possession of her hands,” which “came between 
her and the world of women” (1: 283).  Miriam views her hands as masculine, so they 
serve as a bodily signifier of that which differentiates her from other women.  The 
language she uses to describe her hands is language of strength, as she sees hands that 
“when the two were firmly interlocked they made a pleasant and curious whole, the 
right clasping more firmly, its thumb always uppermost, its fingers separated firmly 
over the back of the left hand palm, the left hand clinging, its fingers close together 
against the hard knuckles of the right” (1: 283).  She identifies more with her right 
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hand, which she sees as “larger… kindlier, friendlier, wiser” than her left, which is 
“less reassuring… narrower, lighter… more flexible, less sensitive” (1: 283).  Her 
choice of words is interesting, as she uses traditionally masculine language to 
describe the hand with which she identifies, words like firmly, larger, wiser, hard, but 
her left hand is described in traditionally feminine terms with words like clinging and 
more flexible. In identifying herself in a masculine manner, she acknowledges that 
she wants to be treated as an intellectual and social equal, for example engaging in 
discussions of information in newspapers, which allowed anyone to “know as much 
as the men sitting in arm chairs if they chose” (1: 243), but she understands that she 
does not necessarily want to play a male role either, as men are “ignorant” (1: 443).   
According to Elaine Showalter, female writers emerging from the Victorian 
era were in a position of conflict (again pointing to the aptness of insomnia as a 
device).  Many desired, as Virginia Woolf says, to “tell the truth about [their] own 
experiences as a body” (qtd. in Showalter, “Killing” 340), yet found this “truth” to be 
perceived as “unthinkable, unspeakable, or unprintable” (Showalter, “Killing” 342).  
Showalter continues, “The Angel in the House commands that [this truth’s] existence 
should be avoided, denied, or suppressed” (“Killing” 342).  Richardson, in her 
attempt to represent female experience through writing does not avoid “truth,” but 
instead creates a character who feels oppressed by expectations placed upon her 
because of her gender, yet still internalizes these expectations and questions her 
ability to successfully rebel against them.  She is telling the story of a female’s 
struggle with repression and her internalization of repressive mechanisms. 
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A useful parallel example of the paradoxical female struggle with repression 
is present in the way in which female writers use humor to both express and comply 
with oppression by defining themselves through it, which assumes oppression as part 
of their identity.  For example, Katharine Streip summarizes Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
argument regarding the female use of humor:   
Woman, as a relative being, receives meaning through her relation 
with her ‘oppressors.’  Although injured by them, she is also 
complicitous with their injustice.  She resents her status and yet she 
sanctions it and identifies with her oppressors’ interests.  Her injury is 
central to how she defines both herself and him, the worm who has 
injured her. (119)   
 
Viewing the female as someone not free to express her experience openly, as 
oppressed, and as defined, not independently, but in relation to her oppressor and his 
interests points to her status as that of the “other.”  She is only a “relative” being, 
defined relationally, with the definition of female being understood as “not-male.”  
She is not the dominant authority in society, but becomes a subject of that authority.  
Maleness is the norm against which femaleness is compared.  One way in which 
Richardson’s writing can be read, then, is as a narrative of “otherness,” as a struggle 
for identity against an oppressive force, but still in part determined by that force.  She 
expresses the thoughts and feelings of a woman subjected to systematic repression; 
she tells the story of that repression and its effects.  Yet, Miriam sees herself not only 
as “other” to men, but “other” to women as well, and it is her insomnia that facilitates 
this understanding. 
As Joan W. Scott argues, while it is valuable to include non-normative 
viewpoints as an alternative to traditional representations of history, presenting these 
viewpoints as alternative, without inquiring as to how and why they came to be seen 
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this way, is problematic:  “The evidence of experience then becomes evidence for the 
fact of the difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, 
how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the 
world” (777).  The danger becomes that “the evidence of experience . . . reproduces 
rather than contests given ideological systems” (778).  Therefore, Pilgrimage should 
be read not only as a representation of the sciences, systems of power, and 
subjectivity related to being an insomniac woman, but also the ways in which Miriam 
comes to realize and reacts to the notion that specifically as a female, her insomnia is 
particularly problematic because of her femininity.  She sees insomnia as a means of 
rebellion, but it is also important to consider against what she needs to rebel, and why 
she feels rebellious rather than rebelled against.  Additionally, that she faces 
corrective measures shapes her identity, and, therefore, influences the way in which 
she views the world.  Her identity and worldview are both colored by her status as an 
insomniac female.  Miriam does not just experience insomnia; she experiences 
insomnia as a woman.  This experience takes on a dialectical paradigm:  her 
experience of insomnia shapes her identity, which then shapes her experience, which 
further influences her sense of identity, and so on. 
In Wells’ The Soul of a Bishop, Scrope, like Miriam, has a similarly bodily 
experience of insomnia that allows him to express anxiety over his role in society.  
Early in the text, Wells gives a description of the physical and mental conditions 
surrounding Scrope’s insomnia:   
Immediate trouble arose from his loyalty [to the King].  He had 
followed the King’s example; he had become a total abstainer and, in 
addition, on his own account he had ceased to smoke.  And his 
digestion . . . was deranged.  He was suffering chemically, suffering 
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one of those nameless sequences of maladjustments that still defy our 
ordinary medical science.  It was afflicting him with a general malaise, 
it was affecting his energy, his temper, all the balance and comfort of 
his nerves.  All day he was weary, all night he was wakeful.  He was 
estranged from his body. (6-7) 
 
Scrope’s body is a political entity, and as a result of using it to make a political 
statement (support the King), he places himself in a state of conflict, resulting in 
insomnia.  Scrope uses his body to support the existing order and tradition; whereas 
Miriam uses her body to defy it.  Both attempts result in sleeplessness, yet Miriam 
relishes her sleeplessness while Scrope, at least here, detests it.    For Miriam, 
challenging conventions gives her a sense of power and contentment, yet for Scrope, 
reifying conventions leaves him feeling uneasy and ill.  Miriam’s insomnia is an act 
of defiance, where Scrope’s is a result of conformity.  Through Miriam’s insomnia, 
she becomes more familiar with her body and comes to understand it better, but for 
Scrope, his insomnia initially causes him to be “estranged from his body.” 
Part of this explanation for the disparity of bodily reactions comes through the 
characters’ oppositional social stances.  Miriam welcomes a change from older ways 
of being and defining femininity.  Yet, Scrope is a conservative.  Accordingly, the 
time frame during which The Soul of a Bishop takes place is extremely relevant.  The 
text, published in 1917, spans the early years of World War I.  Modris Eksteins 
argues, “the British looked on [the war] as a struggle to preserve social values, 
precisely those values and ideals which the prewar avant-garde had so bitterly 
attacked:  notions of justice, dignity, civility, restraint, and ‘progress’ governed by a 
respect for law.  For Victorians and even the mass of Edwardians, morality was an 
objective matter” (118).  Miriam, whose story takes place before the war, is one of the 
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attackers of those values, but Scrope is much more conservative.  Scrope’s desire to 
follow the model of the King, and by doing so show both his restraint and morality, 
points to this desire to return to the ways of the past.  However, his adverse physical 
reaction to his political and spiritual attempt at conservatism points, through the 
consequence of his insomnia that will result in the changes in perception he 
experiences, to his initially unconscious awareness of the futility and ultimate failure 
of such conservatism. 
Bowen also presents insomnia as an act of political expression and expression 
of gender roles through the body.  One can see such a treatment of insomnia in a 
scene in which multiple characters, male and female, within the same household 
experience insomnia simultaneously.  Francie and Hugo, a married couple visiting the 
Naylor’s country home where the bulk of the action of the text takes place, both lie 
awake in bed together, but maintain their separate experiences of insomnia through 
their gender roles.  Bowen writes about the couple’s experience: “till well on into the 
night they lay beside each other under the darkness in an intent and angry silence” 
(151).  When Francie breaks the silence, Hugo’s response is angry:  “Look here, if 
you can’t sleep you’d better take something”  (151).  Clearly, Hugo cannot sleep 
either, but takes on the dominant role of medical advisor, “treating”  his wife, with no 
suggestion that he should “take something” for himself as well despite his own 
insomnia.  He seems to believe he can handle his own insomnia, but she needs to 
medicate hers.  Part of his anger rests with the fact that “he could not bear her to 
intrude upon his wakefulness” (151), indicating his desire to dominate the time and 
space of their shared insomnia.  Bowen continues, “Whichever way he turned in that 
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mournful freedom—and the perspectives of his regret opened fanwise, profound 
avenues, each white at the end with a faceless statue—she would come stumbling 
after him, hand to heart.  ‘Try and sleep,’ he said, and sent her away angrily” (151-
52).  In his state of insomnia, which he views, like Miriam as a form of freedom, he is 
also encumbered by his role as “leader” of the family.  Based on his reaction to 
Francie, he resents this role and wants her to stop “stumbling after him.” 
Francie has her own experience of insomnia, also clouded by gender, 
expressed through her body:   
She feigned sleep rigidly, hardly bearing to lie there.  Her mind 
clenched tight, like a fist, at the isolation of this proximity.  She longed 
to resume the life of day downstairs in the empty rooms.  She had lain 
awake in the South of France hearing palm trees creak in the gritty and 
dry wind, hooked-back shutters rattle against the wall; she had lain 
awake in town with her room a battle of lights through the thin blinds, 
lights like her thoughts flashing and crossing—But across this battle-
piece, under the long lances, had swarmed, like Uccello’s roses, small 
comforts, the tenderness of imagined contact.  She had wept because 
he was not with her.  Now a nostalgia for that solitude, for a wall so 
patient and smooth to the reaching hand where there was now a 
sleeper, came on her, quenching tears.  He thought she slept. 
 
In this passage, we see an example of woman as a “relative being” as described by 
Streip earlier.  While Hugo’s insomnia is not because of Francie, but rather in spite of 
her, Francie sees Hugo as central to her insomnia.  During her insomnia, she attempts 
to control her body, by remaining rigid in bed and pretending to sleep, in order to 
pacify Hugo, where he makes no such adjustments for her.  She also uses her body, 
and its rigid position, to deceive him, to make him feel as though she is sleeping and 
he has his isolation, but in truth, he does not.  So, her insomnia becomes a source of 
power over him, allowing her to observe him without his awareness.  Further, while 
her earlier bouts of insomnia were nostalgic, in her ability to think of Hugo 
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pleasantly, her current insomnia is much less so because of his proximity.  Isolation in 
proximity is much more painful, for her, than isolation with separation because it 
reveals the true extent of her emotional distance from her husband, which was 
previously masked by spatial distance.  Most significantly, while he attempts not to 
think of her during his insomnia, during her insomnia, she willfully thinks only of 
him, but does so through her remembrances of past insomnias. 
 Aside from mutual resentment of their positions within the marriage, the 
insomnia of both Francie and Hugo is retrospective; both think of the past.  During 
his insomnia, Hugo thinks of “regret,” which inevitably comes from past actions, as 
one cannot think with regret on what has not yet been done.  Francie’s insomnia is not 
filled with regret from her past, but happier memories of missing her husband 
(somewhat ironically); if anything, her past becomes part of her lament over her 
present.  A third character in the household experiences insomnia on that evening, 
which is also focused on thoughts of the past.  Bowen writes: 
Laurence could not sleep either.  There must have been something at 
dinner. . . .   
 He lit a candle, blinked at the startled flame and blew it out 
again.  Darkness resumed, with an uncomfortable suggestion of 
normality.  There seemed proof that the accident of the day, of action, 
need not recur.  And from this blank full stop, this confrontation of a 
positive futurelessness, his mind ran spiderlike back on the thread spun 
out of itself for advance, stumbling and swerving a little over its own 
intricacy.  He caught trains he had missed, rushing out to the boundless 
possible through the shining mouths of termini, re-ordered meals in a 
cosmopolitan blur, re-ate them, thought of thought but sheered away 
from that windy gulf of a fateful clapping of empty book-covers.  Far 
enough back, in a kind of unborn freedom, he even remade marriages.  
(152-53) 
 
Food is a recurring motif throughout Bowen’s text, used to contrast the ordinary, 
everyday elements of life with the political and social turmoil of the society the text 
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describes (related to both the aftermath of World War I and the persistent, recurring 
conflict between the British and Irish).  Food becomes a primary motif through 
Laurence’s insomnia, as he first remembers “something at dinner” causing his 
insomnia, then envisions the ordering and eating of meals he might have had.  Food 
is, in fact, one of the most frequently cited medical causes of insomnia by physicians 
from this time period, as we see both in this text and in Wells’.  For example, an 
article written in 1925 argues that “It was not to be forgotten that insomnia, especially 
in the shape of morbid sleep, was frequently caused by toxic states of the blood—for 
example, such as might be due to abnormal functioning of the digestive system” 
(Hutchinson 776-77).  Disrupted eating leads to disrupted sleeping. 
Even more important to Laurence’s insomnia is its backward movement, with 
his mind running “spiderlike” through the past that led him to his present state.  
Laurence’s insomnia, much like Hugo’s from earlier, is a state from which he can 
imagine control over others, using his insomnia to envision series of events that he 
authorized, but only retrospectively.  Further elaborating on this theme of authorship 
through insomnia is the way in which his insomnia shifts from his own thoughts to 
the imagined thoughts of another, female, character, who is no longer present: 
And alarmed by the dragging tick of the watch at his pillow, slowing 
down as the mortal sickness of Time, he turned over and thought in a 
fury, he could not think why Laura should have married Mr. Farquar. . 
. .  Her confusion had clotted up the air of the room and seemed, in 
that closest darkness under the ceiling, to be still impending.  Here, 
choked up under the sweep of the bed curtains, she had writhed in 
those epic rages, against Hugo, against Richard, against any prospect 
in life at all; biting the fat resistant pillows until once she had risen, 
fluttered at her reflection, dabbed at her eyes, buttoned a tight sleek 
dress of that day’s elegance over her heaving bosom, packed her 
dresses in arched trunks (that had come back since to rot in the attics) 
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and driven off, averting from the stare of the house an angry profile. 
(154) 
 
Through his insomnia, which brings attention to the delayed movement of time as 
well as to the past, he authorizes Laura’s own insomnia, imagining her in a neurotic 
state, rebellious against her marriage and life.  As he imagines Laura’s insomnia, he 
also imagines her body, with visions of her “tight sleek dress” and “heaving bosom.”  
The reason he gives for Laura’s marriage, “confusion,” is really his own confusion, 
projected onto her.  He also gives Laura’s imagined insomnia a physical component, 
through his use of terms like “clotted,” “choked,” and “writhed,” indicative of her 
alleged “confusion” and frustration displayed through her body.  Not only does he 
authorize Laura’s behavior and motives, he authorizes her body as well, controlling it 
in a way similar to that of Hugo as he suggests his wife take sedatives to treat her 
sleeplessness.  Laura is not within reach or control of Laurence, but through his 
ability to imagine her, he can imagine control over her as well. 
  Lois Farquar, product of the marriage between Laura and Mr. Farquar, is a 
young ward of the Naylor family coming of age in the time following World War I, 
who expresses a sentiment regarding her femininity similar to that of Miriam, and 
does so through a discussion of insomnia.  In a conversation with her friend Marda, 
who was recently engaged to be married, Lois expresses skepticism of gender roles 
and discomfort with her unstable social position, related to her status as ward, but 
complicated by the fact that as a woman, her ability to establish herself independently 
is limited.  Lois states that she would “like to be related; to have to be what I am.  Just 
to be is so intransitive, so lonely” to which Marda replies, “Then you will like to be a 
wife and mother. . . .  It’s good thing we can always be women” (142).  Lois is 
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searching for a stable place in society, as she is currently in a liminal and volatile 
social position.  However, like Miriam, Lois responds by saying, “I hate women.  But 
I can’t think how to be anything else. . . .  But I wouldn’t like to be a man.  So much 
fuss about doing things” (142).  Lois, like Miriam, sees herself as trapped between 
two genders, desiring full identification with neither, but instead wanting to establish 
her own category.  She seems to desire the independence associated with masculinity, 
the ability to not rely on her adoptive family and have to meet their demands and 
expectations, but does not want to deal with the “fuss” associated with being a man 
either; she makes men appear petty, and almost effeminate, where Miriam 
characterizes them as “ignorant.”  Lois expresses, also like Miriam, a desire to go 
abroad, but has thus far been prevented from doing so “because of the War” (142).  
Ultimately, what Lois wants is to escape conventional gender roles and political 
subjectivity, which she links to the war.  Bowen writes, “She wanted to go wherever 
the War hadn’t.  She wanted to go somewhere nonchalant where politics bored them, 
where bands played out of doors on hot nights and nobody wished to sleep” (143).  
Insomnia becomes an escapist fantasy.  Despite the many similarities between Lois 
and Miriam expressed in this passage, the final statement indicates a differentiation 
between them.  Miriam’s insomnia is an act with political implications, enabling her 
to integrate into and occupy traditionally male spaces.  Lois has a different vision of 
insomnia, as apolitical.  Where Miriam’s insomnia is integrative, allowing her to 
extend her role to academic and social realms outside of the domestic sphere, Lois 
depicts insomnia as a direct means of avoidance of the political.  The implication is 
that politics and the war make people want to sleep, perhaps in an effort to escape 
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consciousness for a time, again an expression of conflict through the body.  She 
envisions insomnia as a new form of escapism, where sleep as escape is no longer a 
necessity.  But, being apolitical through the desire to avoid politics, is, to an extent, a 
political act.  She is calling for a conscious dismissal of politics and the war through 
extended consciousness itself.   
Miriam’s insomnia as a political act, aside from simply giving her time and 
space to consider and defy the limitations placed upon her because of her gender, 
entails her ability to use her insomnia to explore spaces beyond the domestic realm, 
the space traditionally relegated to women.  She seeks to inhabit traditionally male 
spaces physically, through walking around the city and visiting tea houses and 
restaurants, which she frequently does at night.  Scott McCracken writes of teahouses 
as a space where she can transcend gender:   
In the early chapter novels of Pilgrimage, the ABCs [teahouses] allow 
her to be similarly “amphibious,” when they act as staging posts or 
thresholds between her private room in the boarding house and the 
public life of the city.  In this context, the café not only allows “private 
behavior in a public place,” but, between her room and the street, it is 
a space where public and private meet.  As such, the chain teashop is a 
productive space, the narrow stage upon which Miriam can perform a 
new kind of gendered subjectivity, which is neither conventionally 
masculine nor feminine.  (133) 
 
Miriam uses her nocturnal walks as a means of inhabiting public and private spaces.  
The urban site of her wanderings, especially in the chapter novel Clear Horizon, just 
prior to her departure for her rest cure, comes to represent her growing confidence 
and desire to exert independence, and she becomes someone who “had dared to 
venture alone, driven by cold and hunger, into the mystery of a London restaurant just 
before midnight” (4: 329).  Peter Baldwin notes that nocturnal urban wanderings 
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presented an especial danger to women of the nineteenth century, who had “no safe 
way to travel through the city at night without a man’s protection” and in doing so 
faced “the possibility that something very unpleasant could happen to [them]” (152).  
As society modernized and the streets became increasingly safer for lone women, 
their sense of freedom increased.  Miriam’s nocturnal walks reflect her sense of 
confidence and a break from older insecurities.  In addition, her late night walks 
represent Miriam’s adaptation into a modernizing and rapidly urbanizing society.   
Insomnia and Urban Spaces 
Georg Simmel argues that the fast pace and rapid movement of life within the 
metropolis “promoted a highly personal subjectivity” (414).  Simmel’s argument is 
reflected in the following passage relating one of Miriam’s nocturnal walks: 
[She] swiftly crossed the wide, empty roadway, feeling as she reached 
the far, opposite pavement, which was still just within the circle of her 
London homeland, strength to walk, holding back thought, on and on 
within her own neighbourhood until, stilled by the familiar presences 
of its tall grey buildings, and the trees detachedly inhabiting its quiet 
squares, the inward tumult should subside and leave her to become 
once more aware of her own path, cool and solid beneath her feet; so 
that when presently she encountered Amabel, the events of the long 
evening, if, by that time, in her own mind, they were already irrelevant 
and far away, might be left, by mutual consent, shelved and untouched 
until they should come forth to fulfill, one by one, their proper role as 
lively illustrations for the points of intensive colloquies. (4: 337) 
 
Through her nocturnal walk, she had “become more aware of her own path,” she is 
“within her own neighborhood,” and she can control the thoughts “in her own mind.”  
The repeated use of the possessive “own” reiterates her feelings of ownership, over 
her mind, body, and surroundings, leading to the “highly personal” sense within this 
passage.   Her late night solitude in the urban setting allows her to repossess herself, 
allowing her to pursue her own path and control the dissemination of knowledge 
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about herself, both to herself and to her friend.  She uses her walking to cross new 
boundaries, both physical and mental.  Commenting on the function of boundaries in 
urban spaces, Walter Benjamin writes, “The city is only apparently homogenous.  
Even its name takes on a different sound from one district to the next.  Nowhere, 
unless perhaps in dreams, can the phenomenon of the boundary be experienced in a 
more originary way than in cities" (88).  The idea of the boundary is important within 
this passage, as Miriam’s mind is only quieted once she is “within the circle of her 
London homeland” upon crossing the street to her familiar territory.  Both authors 
acknowledge urban exploration as a means of interpreting subjectivity.  For Simmel, 
this subjectivity is individualized, as the individual is forced to distinguish himself 
from the chaos of the metropolis.  For Benjamin, urban life stretches the boundaries 
of the self, making the subject aware of heterogeneity and connectivity.   
Miriam’s experience of urban wandering can be said to have both functions 
and allow her to gain control over her subjectivity through resisting traditional roles 
and expectations.  In her argument regarding humor in the literature of Jean Rhys, 
Streip argues that women are not traditionally seen as funny because “it is difficult to 
identify with them as subjects.  How can women be recognized as separate in their 
narcissism if they are valued for their nurturing, if they are experienced as someone 
‘related to’ rather than identified with?” (124).  Ultimately, Miriam’s insomniac 
wanderings, a result of her initial use of sleep time as time for self-exploration, allow 
her to cultivate an independent identity, as someone capable of narcissism, of putting 
the self first, rather than as someone “identified with” or through the role of caretaker 
(one is never just “caretaker,” but always caretaker of something or someone), 
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escaping this role through taking her rest cure abroad, and these walks also allow her 
to explore her place within the city, which affords her confidence.  She is connected 
to her environment and takes power from that connection.  Throughout Pilgrimage, 
Miriam struggles with and comes to resent the position of caretaker, and her 
insomniac practices directly influence her rejection of Victorian female stereotypes. 
Lois Cucullu, in an argument about the Victorian novel of insomnia and 
somnambulism, argues that “The intrusion of these texts into nightly sleep coheres 
with the intrusion occurring around the city into its nocturnal hours” (306).  One 
example Cucullu utilizes is Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula, which “concerns the 
female body's internalization of overstimulation and modern restlessness in which the 
next result has everything to do with sexual modernity and even perhaps with . . . 
metronormativity” (304).  Novels such as Dracula exhibit a sense of anxiety over a 
world which allows for increasing amounts of female independence, similar to 
Mitchell placing blame on industrialization for a heightened amount of cases of 
nervous hysteria among women (Bassuk 250).  Women were indeed breaking circles, 
but they were breaking the circles of routine to which Miriam fears awakening rather 
than breaking circles of “disorder” resulting in a renewal of their domestic duties.  
William James argues that “what is called our ‘experience’ is almost entirely 
determined by our habits of attention” (Habit 172).    He raises the point that to which 
we choose to attend creates our experience.  Miriam displays a shift in her attention, 
fostered by her ability to use the privacy and space of sleep time, to better understand 
herself as a subject and expose and resist her assigned subjectivity to create an 
independent subjectivity rather than a relational one. 
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Like Miriam, Scrope’s experience of urbanity influences his subjectivity.  He 
ponders God as he walks around London:  “He no longer felt that God was in Pall 
Mall or St. James’s Park, whither he resorted to walk and muse.  He felt now that God 
was somewhere about the horizon…” (92).  Wells continues, “The world had become 
opaque and real again as he walked up St. James’s Street and past the Ritz.  He had a 
feeling that he was taking the afternoon off from God” (92).  To this point, the bishop 
was overwhelmed by his new sense of God, yet his urban experience provides him 
with some relief and he is able to feel a renewed sense of stability.  Simmel argues: 
The metropolitan type of man . . . develops an organ protecting 
himself against the threatening currents and discrepancies of his 
external environment which would uproot him.  He reacts with his 
head instead of his heart. . . .  Intellectuality is thus seen to preserve 
subjective life against the overwhelming power of metropolitan life” 
(410).   
 
Scrope’s urban walks return him to a more intellectual understanding of God, but the 
effects are only temporary, as “All the relief and benefit of his experience in London 
had vanished out of his life” (116) after he leaves the city. 
Insomnia as Resistance 
One final example of Miriam’s insomnia as a response to gender roles is 
exposed through a discussion she has with Hypo Wilson, Richardson’s character 
based on Wells.  Hypo views her insomniac tendencies as indicative of childishness 
and irresponsibility.  He interrogates her with regard to her sleep habits, asserting that 
she “ought to sleep” (4: 319). “Sleeping only at dawn,” Hypo continues, “is a not a 
habit to be cultivated” (4: 322).  In this passage, Hypo patronizes Miriam, asserting 
masculine authority over her pursuit of individuality (and possible rejection of 
motherhood), but also over the way in which she chooses to use her body.  Hypo puts 
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his comments in medical terms, echoing the language of child rearing literature, such 
as that by physician L. Emmet Holt, who writes that “quiet and peaceful sleep is a 
sign of perfect health” (120).  Holt continues, “Disturbed sleep or sleeplessness may 
be due to causes purely nervous.  Such are bad habits acquired by faulty training” 
(120).  Habit, according to James, involves paths which are formed within the body 
and mind, enabling one to repeat the same task with increasing efficiency (Habit 8-
10).  However, even though habits can be cultivated for useful purposes, they can also 
be harmful:  “Many so-called functional diseases seem to keep themselves going 
simply because they happen to have once begun. . . .  Epilepsies, neuralgias, 
convulsive affections of various sorts, insomnia are so many cases in point” (10).  
Curing these disorders merely involves a disruption of the habit through means such 
as medication (James, Habit 10).  James essentially presents the same view of 
nervous diseases as Hurry does, only James sees as habit what Hurry sees as a 
component of a vicious circle.  Both agree that in order for a habit to be broken or a 
disease to be cured, invention and disruption of the cycle is necessary. 
This philosophy of disruption of habit as cure is reflected in Hypo’s language 
when he speaks of Miriam’s willful insomnia as “not a habit to be cultivated.”  
According to his logic, the more she gets into the habit of insomnia, the more difficult 
it will be for her to break this habit when she is required (through becoming a wife 
and mother) to follow a more regularized schedule.  Miriam’s interests at this point 
do not include marriage and motherhood, so she views Hypo’s comments as an 
affront to the identity she has cultivated (rather than the habit):  “Surprised and stung 
by the sudden, public discrimination, by its implied . . . repudiation of the envy and 
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admiration he had so often expressed in regard to her own independence of sleep and 
food, she forced herself to concentrate on his question” (4: 319).  Unlike both 
Laurence and Scrope, she does not blame her insomnia on her diet, and sees herself as 
“independent” with regard to food.  She understands Hypo’s comments about her 
sleep habits as reflective of his view of her as destined for motherhood, as he believes 
all women should be:  “’You, Miriam,’ ran his message, ‘booked for maternity, must 
stand aside, while the rest of us, leaving you alone in a corner, carry on our lives’” (4:  
321).  This same combination of science with a narrow conception of femininity 
centered on the role as mother and nurturer expressed by Hypo is similar to Mitchell’s 
presentation of hysteria as a disease of body, mind, and morality.  Hypo, through his 
counsel, is attempting to direct Miriam to her “proper” role in life, just as Mitchell 
saw it his duty to not only cure his patients physically and mentally, but serve as their 
moral counselors (Mitchell 62). 
However, this conversation between Miriam and Hypo is not simply a 
representation of his assertion of power over her, but also illustrates the power which 
Miriam is able to utilize through her exposure of and resistance to his expectations of 
her.  She understands the role she is supposed to embrace, but willfully refuses to do 
so.  When speaking with Hypo about familial devotion, she says: 
You may call the proceeding [devotion] by any name you like, choose 
whatever metaphor you prefer to describe it—and the metaphor you 
choose will represent you more accurately than any photograph.  It 
may be a marvelous incidental result of being born a woman and may 
unify a person with life and let her into its secrets—I can believe that 
now, the wisdom and insight and serene independent power it might 
bring.  But it is neither the beginning nor the end of feminine being.  It 
wasn’t for my Devon-border grandmother who produced twenty-two 
children. (4: 331) 
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She sees the ability to be devoted, as a wife or mother, as part of her identity, but not 
as the main or only part of her identity.  Further, she understands that other women 
have felt this way before her.  Hypo becomes bored by this line of discussion and 
loses interest in her comments, but through the rejection of defining herself in terms 
solely based in relation to those she cares for, she is exercising a form of power.  She 
is also judging his reaction to her comments and expectations of her.  In doing so, she 
is rejecting an assigned identity. 
Hypo views Miriam as a biological entity, a woman destined for motherhood, 
but through her insomnia, Miriam rejects this classification as the primary motivator 
of her character.  Miriam has a conflicted view of medicine and science, ultimately 
taking advantage of this scientific/biological view of herself to escape the 
ramifications of this perspective.  In the penultimate chapter novel, Dimple Hill, 
Miriam expresses both her skepticism of science as well as her desire to take 
advantage of it, thinking of her supposed “rest cure” as an element of her “newly 
dawned determination to exploit, for the sake of its attendant possibilities, the verdict 
of a science she half despised” (4: 443).  The Pilgrimage series parallels Miriam’s 
approach to science and medicine through its inclusion of scientific and medical 
discussions that reflect contemporaneous medical belief with the intent of exposing 
and challenging the limitations of such a model for understanding behavior and 
character.  In some cases Miriam’s thought underscores scientific thought, yet there is 
always an element of skepticism and cynicism directed towards these reflections.  For 
example, illustrating Miriam's simultaneously moral and medical characterization of 
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insomnia yet ultimate skepticism towards it, she refers to her insomnia as “a vicious 
circle,” as I have discussed earlier.   
As Pilgrimage continues, Miriam comes to equate her behavior, including her 
insomniac tendencies of exploration, with the perpetuation of hysteria, and views this 
“hysteria” as directly related to her dissatisfaction with limitations and expectations 
of her because of her gender, often expressed as and through insomnia.  Stacey Fox 
writes that Miriam reads an article on the “lymphatico-nervous” class, a class in 
which Miriam tentatively places herself: 
In assuming the role of diagnostician, Miriam reads her life through 
the diagnostic framework provided by the article, and “all she had 
suffered in the past,” the trauma of her mother's death, her inability to 
fit in with other people, her dissatisfaction with conventional feminine 
roles, her restlessness and her search for a productive feminine 
identity, come to stand as symptoms of her lymphatico-nervous 
disorder.  The classificatory model is not explicitly gendered, but the 
symptoms of the “lymphatico-nervous class”—“no energy, no 
initiative, no hopefulness, no resisting power; and sometimes bilious 
attacks”—recall the symptoms of her mother.  (79) 
 
Through her identification with the symptoms described in this article, she is 
“interpellated into this scientific model and, as a result, can only register her life in 
pathological terms” (Fox 79). At this point, Miriam has internalized the discursive 
views of feminine weakness and incapability of handling insomnia.  Even as Miriam 
attempts to rebel against the idea of the female as weak, she comes to fear that her 
insomnia may, in fact, lead to a nervous breakdown because of her alleged weakness 
(Fox 80).  Miriam registers the causes of her insomnia, restlessness and 
dissatisfaction, as well as its results like lack of energy and initiative, as possible 
indicators of hysteria.   
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Hurry, like Miriam, sees insomnia as an integral part of vicious circles of 
neurasthenia (2), especially as related to what he calls the “habit” subset, which 
entails an “exaggerated reflex irritability of the nervous system” (3).  Insomnia, which 
is often accompanied by “depression and malnutrition” (8), intensifies neurasthenia, 
acting as an “obstinate complication” (6).  Hurry argues, “Insomnia also plays a large 
part in the causation and perpetuation of insanity” because it strains the nervous 
system (13).  It forms a part of a vicious circle:  “Neurasthenia may cause insomnia 
which intensifies neurasthenia” (236).  Since not sleeping becomes part of the circle 
of disease, sleep, then, is a way of disrupting the circle:  “Sleep is another of Nature's 
methods of breaking Circles, especially in neurotic disorders which are complicated 
by insomnia” (243).  This text illustrates a discursive view of insomnia as both cause 
and symptom of psychological disorder, and sleep as a possible remedy for 
psychological disorder because it breaks the circle of sleeplessness.  Hurry’s theories 
correlate with Miriam’s fears about the relationship between her behavior and her 
habits and decisions. 
Miriam’s understanding of the relationship between her sleep habits and her 
ostensible propensity for psychological collapse is further intensified by her mother’s 
relationship to sleep.  Towards the end of Honeycomb, Miriam’s mother suffers a 
nervous breakdown, which eventually leads to her suicide.  Miriam and her mother 
both cite lack of sleep as one of the major factors in Mrs. Henderson’s psychological 
disintegration, as Miriam thinks, “’Dr. Ryman is giving her bromide . . . she can't 
sleep without it.’  Sleeplessness, insomnia . . . she can't see the spring . . . why not?” 
(1: 475).  The passage continues, “… bottles of bromide, visits, bills, and mother 
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going patiently on, trusting and feeling unhelped.  Going on.  People went . . . mad.  
If she could not sleep she would go . . . mad….” (1: 475).  Both Miriam and her 
mother equate sleep with a relief from the mother’s disorder; sleep provides a respite 
from the mother’s tortured consciousness, which Fox interprets as a result of her 
being “progressively ground down by the misogynist Mr. Henderson, leading to the 
hopelessness which caused her death” (79).    
Mrs. Henderson’s illness and treatment closely resemble that of hysterical 
patients under the care of Mitchell.  Just as Mitchell asserts the complete authority of 
the doctor to make decisions for the patients and establish complete dependence of 
his patients, Mrs. Henderson is “’in Dr. Ryman's hands.’  Dr. Ryman is treating her.  
Mrs. Poole said Dr. Ryman was a very able man”  (1:  475).  Miriam doubts Dr. 
Ryman’s ability to understand his mother's condition, asking, “how did he know more 
than anyone else?” (1: 475), yet her mother allows the treatment to continue, despite 
its ineffectiveness.  In addition, just as Mitchell suggested hired nurses because 
family members would give in to the selfish patient’s whims (49), the Hendersons are 
encouraged to “behave as if there was nothing wrong with her” because “there is 
nothing wrong but nerves” (1: 475), indicating a dismissal of nervous disorders as 
“real” conditions.  Further resembling Mitchell’s thoughts on his patients, Mrs. 
Henderson’s illness is expressed as having an element of selfishness, her cure 
requiring her to “forget about herself” (1: 475).   
Just before Mrs. Henderson’s suicide, Miriam attempts to stay awake at night 
to nurse her mother.  She is very conscious of her mother’s inability to sleep, as she, 
herself, struggles to stay awake:  “She read on till the words flowed together and her 
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droning voice was thick with sleep.  The town clock struck two.  A quiet voice from 
the other bed brought the reading to an end.  Sleep was in the room now.  She felt 
sure of it” (1: 487).  The belief that her mother is able to fall asleep allows Miriam to 
sleep herself; however, the relief is only momentary, and she awakens to her mother 
having a hysterical fit.  She again brings her mother to the doctor, but again, his 
treatment is futile.  On their way home, Mrs. Henderson says, “’God has deserted me’ 
. . . ‘He will not let me sleep.  He does not want me to sleep. . . .  He does not care’” 
(489).  Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Henderson commits suicide.  In this passage, her 
language reflects her thoughts both that her insomnia perpetuated her psychological 
disorder, but also that it had moral implications.  She felt punished by God, perhaps 
as a result of her failure to adequately play her part as wife and mother.  Ellen Bassuk 
suggests that female hysteria is rebellion against being forced into and constrained by 
the role of caretaker, wife, and mother; the hysterical woman refused to fill the role 
and required others to care for her instead (253).  Mrs. Henderson appears to be aware 
that her hysteria has a rebellious component to it; however, she also has internalized 
the legitimacy of the role she was supposedly intended to fill and feels guilt at her 
inability or refusal to do what is expected of her. 
A character similar to Mrs. Henderson, who provides further insight into 
insomnia as a symptom of a conflicted sense of expectations of femininity, is Rhys’ 
semi-autobiographical character Sasha Jensen, who appears in her text Good 
Morning, Midnight.  Sasha, who was at one point married with a child, was 
abandoned by her husband and lost her child prior to the main action of the novel.  
Though Mrs. Henderson still has her husband and children around her, her situation is 
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similar to Sasha’s in that both women are unable to fulfill their wife and mother roles.  
Also like Mrs. Henderson, Sasha is extremely tortured mentally, and her depression 
manifests as an inability to sleep.  Sasha, unable to cope with her insomnia, 
repeatedly resorts to a nightly combination of alcohol and Luminol in an effort to 
make herself pass out.  She has no tolerance for insomnia, as Miriam does.  For 
instance, Rhys, in a first person presentation of Sasha’s thoughts, writes, “I could not 
sleep.  Rolling from side to side. . . .” (12).  This time of insomnia reminds Sasha of 
her past, in which she remembers her marriage to Enno, but her memories are soon 
overtaken by the ugliness of her environment, a dingy hotel room in which she 
imagines insects crawling on the walls around her.   
Sasha quickly gets out of bed, and she takes a second dose of Luminol, which 
allows her to sleep immediately (13).  This instance is only one of many in which 
Sasha uses Luminol to sleep, sometimes staying in bed up to fifteen hours a day (86).  
She would much rather sleep than be tired because when she is tired, “everything is 
like a dream and you are starting to know what things are like underneath what 
people say they are” (121).   For Sasha, as for Miriam, being awake for too long 
allows for exploration and revelation.  However, unlike Miriam, Sasha does not like 
what she learns; it leaves her feeling frightened rather than empowered.  Both women 
realize the artifice behind the way in which people behave, but while Miriam decides 
to challenge what people expect of her and the way in which they judge her, Sasha 
shrinks from their judgment and becomes increasingly unable to handle the pressures 
of social encounters, knowing that she has failed to fill the role for which she is 
marked.  Sasha and Mrs. Henderson present two examples of characters who 
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internalize the discursive presentation of females as destined for marriage and 
motherhood, but also of females as inherently weak and unable to handle the excess 
of thought insomnia brings. 
Miriam, however, is different from Sasha and Mrs. Henderson.  Ultimately, 
Miriam is cynical about the way in which the doctors treated her mother and the role 
for which others feel she is destined.  Instead she exhibits a “refusal and appropriation 
of the power relations embedded in the medical diagnosis” (Fox 93).  For example, 
after a consultation with the doctor Ashley Densley, she thinks: 
In the stupor of relief that fell upon her, relaxing the taut network of 
her nerves and leaving her seated as of old, infinitely at ease and at 
home within the friendly enclosure, she waited for his facts, the 
‘medical facts’ she had for so long scornfully regarded as misreadings 
of evidence isolated from the context of reality, inertly going their way 
until another group of facts, equally isolated from reality, brought 
about a fresh misreading.  But the facts she was now to hear, drawn 
from the real of Sarah’s being regarded from the point of view of 
Sarah who, in spite of her experiences, still unconsciously endowed all 
specialists with omniscience, would carry conviction borrowed from 
hope that Sarah’s faith might introduce a power that would carry all 
before it. (4: 373-74) 
 
Not only does she recognize any diagnosis Densley might proffer as inaccurate and 
based upon misinterpretation of her character, she sees a possible source of power 
that might come from his diagnosis.  By putting “medical facts” in quotation marks, 
she expresses her skepticism, further enhanced by what she sees as the inevitability of 
his “misreading” of her condition.  She also distinguishes herself from Sarah, who 
takes the word of physicians without question. 
Consequently, Miriam comes to regard her chosen insomnia not as an act of 
selfishness, but as an independence and individuality—at time for exploration and an 
opportunity for freedom.  She regards sleep similarly to the way in which Richardson, 
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who refers to sleep as a “nightly task” (qtd. in Marcus 65) does.  Richardson views 
sleep not as an escape from one’s life, but rather as chance for renewal and 
understanding:  “Richardson would express a resentment of the use of the day in the 
service of the night (as opposed to sleep serving to renew the self for the day)” 
(Marcus 64).  In her response to a book by H. A. Foster, entitled Studies in Dreams, 
Richardson claims that she perceives dreaming and dream analysis as “wasting time” 
(qtd. in Marcus 63).  Conversely, an ideal function of the dream and sleep time would 
be not to provide an escape from consciousness but to provide “a direct consideration 
of things as they are, undisturbed by the sense of time and place, and sometimes of an 
undisturbed consideration of all that we are” (qtd. in Marcus 64).  Richardson, like 
Lois Farquar, does not view sleep as a respite from the self as Mrs. Henderson and 
Sasha do, one both of them want desperately; rather Richardson wants to make use of 
sleep time for uniting the past and present self in order to better understand our own 
consciousness (Marcus 65). 
Much like Pilgrimage, Wells’ The Soul of a Bishop both mirrors and exploits 
scientific and medical discourse regarding the relationship between sleeping and 
mental hygiene.  Both texts use the scientific and medical disciplines against 
themselves.  For example, in describing Scrope’s first experiences with insomnia, 
Wells gives both personal and medical justifications: 
The night after his conversation with [his daughter] Eleanor was the 
first night of the bishop’s insomnia.  It was the definite beginning of a 
new phase in his life. 
 Doctors explain to us that the immediate cause of insomnia is 
always some poisoned or depleted state of the body, and no doubt the 
fatigues and hasty meals of the day had left the bishop in a state of 
unprecedented chemical disorder, with his nerves irritated by strange 
compounds and unsoothed by familiar lubricants, and the core and 
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essence of his trouble was an intellectual distress.  For the first time in 
his life he was really in doubt, about himself, about his way of living, 
about all his persuasions.  (34) 
 
Wells incorporates two different causes of the bishop’s insomnia; the first is the 
consequence of a conversation with Eleanor in which she discusses her desire to 
pursue education outside of the household.  Her desire for independence leads him to 
question his own motivations and position within the Church.  The second reason 
given for Scrope’s insomnia is some sort of chemical imbalance combined with 
working long hours, which he associates, like Laurence (but unlike Miriam) with 
food.  The explanation given in the text, a chemical disorder in combination with 
overwork and poor diet, was, in fact, in accordance with popular theories on insomnia 
from the time period of the text.  Regarding overwork, an article written in 1900 by 
physician James Sawyer explains that overwork alone is not enough to account for 
insomnia:  “I advise you to be wisely suspicious as to accepting work as a cause of 
insomnia.  Nature provides that disposition to rest shall follow work.  It is mostly 
worry, not overwork, or it is work under wrong conditions which brings unrest” 
(1628).  Sawyer’s passage is suggestive in that, as the text proceeds, we come to learn 
of the dissatisfaction Scrope has with his job.  However, as both Sawyer and Wells 
seem to contend, overwork alone is not enough to cause insomnia, which Wells 
clearly indicates through positioning the beginning of Scrope’s insomnia after his 
worrisome conversation with his daughter, rather than simply as a cause of his work.   
With regard to the idea of chemical imbalances, one common explanation for 
insomnia is an imbalance of blood in the brain.  As one of Scrope’s doctors, Dr. Dale, 
argues, “My theory about your case is that this [kidney trouble brought on by 
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drinking local water] produced a change in your blood, quickened your sensibilities 
and your critical faculties just at a time when a good many bothers . . . came into your 
life” (73).  Dale suggests a combination of physiological and psychological factors.  
With regard to the importance of blood flow and sleep, MacFarlane asserts that there 
is a correlation between insomnia and changes in blood distribution:   
As the causation of sleep from the earliest times has been supposed to 
depend in some manner upon alterations in the blood-supply of the 
brain, it will be useful to consider preliminarily some points in 
connection with these vascular arrangements, more especially as the 
cause of so many forms of insomnia is to be found in some 
interference with the normal blood-supply, either as regards quantity 
or quality, or both combined. (11) 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Scrope, at least in part, attributes his insomnia to 
his recent decision to emulate the model of the King, and abstain from tobacco and 
alcohol, referring to the fact that his nerves were “unsoothed by familiar lubricants.”  
Scrope appears to believe that part of the cause of his insomnia is an imbalance 
created by his change of habits and his doctor adds contaminated water to the 
equation, but also acknowledges the “bothers” he is facing.  Wells uses all of these 
factors in combination—the bishop’s discomfiture with his daughter’s desire for 
education and independence, his growing misapprehensions regarding his job, and his 
attempt at the politicization of his body as a conservative reaction to social change—
to create a medical and psychological basis for the bishop’s insomnia.  As Wells puts 
it, “this intellectual insecurity extended into his physical sensations” (35).  His use of 
conditions reflected in the medical literature of his time period contextualize Scrope’s 
insomnia to make it relevant not only to his personal experience, but his social and 
historical experience. 
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Interestingly, Scrope’s insomnia is also rooted in gender conflict.  Wells 
writes: 
It was not only that the world of his existence which had seemed to be 
the whole universe had become diaphanous and betrayed vast and 
uncontrollable realities beyond it, but his daughter had as it were 
suddenly opened a door in this glassy sphere of insecurity that had 
been his abiding refuge, a door upon the stormy rebel outer world, and 
she stood there, young, ignorant, adventurous, ready to step out. (35) 
 
In the conversation with his daughter that sparked his mental unrest, he is disturbed 
by her desire to “find out for [herself] what all this trouble about votes and things 
means” (32),  Further, she hopes for an education outside of her home:  “I would like 
to go to Newnham or Somerville—and work.  I feel—so horribly ignorant.  Of all 
sorts of things.  If I were a son I should go” (32).  He protests, and she again replies to 
him that “If [she] were a son, you wouldn’t say that” when he suggests she remain 
home and read to further her education  rather than going out into the world (32).  For 
Scrope, his daughter’s desire to be treated as a son reflects a society in collapse:  
“Since the passing of Victoria the Great there had been an accumulating uneasiness in 
national life. . . .  Not that Queen Victoria had really been a paperweight or any 
weight at all, but it happened that she died as an epoch closed, an epoch of 
tremendous stabilities” (17).  His ability to simultaneously assert and dismiss the 
importance of Queen Victoria speaks to his skepticism of the role of women in public 
life.  On the one hand, he reflects on her stabilizing influence, but on the other, he 
attempts to only view her death as coincidental to the social changes that followed. 
Treatments 
At first, Scrope searches for medical, rather than existential, cures for his 
insomnia.  Again we see contemporary theories on treatments of insomnia reflected in 
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the text.  At first, he turns to his friends for advice:  “he had now experimented 
ignorantly and intensely with one or two narcotics or sleeping mixtures that friends 
and acquaintances had mentioned in his hearing” (48), including the use of opium to 
which he becomes mildly addicted.  More importantly, his pursuit of a treatment 
leads to a change in character:  “For the first time in his life he became secretive from 
his wife” (48).  Wells creates a parallel situation in which the bishop both hides his 
doubts about his role within the Church with his surreptitious attempts at drugging 
himself to sleep, as he “would have liked to discuss the perplexities in which he was 
entangling himself . . . but his own positions were becoming so insecure that he 
feared to betray them by argument” (48).  He finds himself acting in a way he 
considers “physically and morally evil” (49).  His secrecy regarding his doubts of the 
Church’s doctrines coincides with the secrecy of his attempts at self-medication. 
Given the failure of his attempts at self-medication, which only leads to “an 
intensification and vivid furnishing forth of insomnia” (48), as well as “his character 
being undermined by the growing nervous trouble” (49), he eventually seeks the 
assistance of a physician, Dr. Brighton-Pomfrey, who diagnoses him with 
neurasthenia (71).  Neurasthenia is a somewhat amorphous mental disorder used to 
describe a variety of mental and physical symptoms including anxiety and insomnia.  
According to Rankin, in an article compellingly entitled “Neurasthenia:  The Wear 
and Tear of Life” (1903), though neurasthenia is “sometimes ill-defined and always 
capable of variation,” it generally “may be regarded as a derangement of function 
resulting from exhaustion of nervous energy” (1017).  Continuing, Rankin explains 
that neurasthenia “attacks men more frequently than women, and is specially apt to 
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affect those of neurotic inheritance, or those who live under physical and mental 
tension” (1107).  Often, as is the case with Scrope, “the patient, who has been 
indefinitely out of health for some time, is at last driven to the doctor because of this 
sense of langour, to which has lately been superadded sleeplessness and impaired 
digestion” (Rankin, “Neurasthenia” 1107), symptoms from which Scrope is clearly 
suffering.  Neurasthenia, according to Rankin, is a condition which requires both 
physical and moral treatment:  “rest is the first and obvious indication, and it must 
always be both mental and physical.  Its power for good is intensified by the moral 
effect exercised on the patient by his physician and his surroundings” 
(“Neurasthenia” 1019). In fact, Rankin suggests that the Weir-Mitchell treatment, 
discussed earlier with regard to Miriam, “will yield the best results” (“Neurasthenia” 
1019).  Through the possible diagnosis of neurasthenia applied to Scrope by his 
doctor, much is revealed about his situation:  his nervousness and anxiety, his 
frustration with his attempts at self-medication that drive him to seek medical 
attention, and his sense of being morally lost and turning to a doctor (Brighton-
Pomfrey), who “prided himself on being all things to all men” (161). 
Scrope is not fully satisfied with the idea of resting to cure his neurasthenia 
because he has “much to do” and fears a “loss” of “practical efficiency” (71), again 
indicating the relationship, as Miriam draws, between insomnia and inefficiency.  His 
new doctor, Dr. Dale, provides an alternative explanation of his mental condition:  
“You see, the trouble in such a case as this is peculiarly difficult to trace to its sources 
because it comes just upon the border-line of bodily and mental things.  You may take 
a drug or alter your regimen and it disturbs your thoughts, you may take an idea and it 
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disturbs your health” (71).  Dale, explaining insomnia as a liminal condition 
indicating an imbalanced body and mind, continues: 
But I go off from the idea that every living being lives in a state not 
differing essentially from a state of hallucination concerning the things 
about it.  Truth, essential truth, is hidden.  Always.  Of course, there 
must be a measure of truth in our working illusions, a working 
measure of truth, or the creature would smash itself up and end itself, 
but beyond that discretion of the fire and the pitfall lies a wide margin 
of error about which we may be deceived for years.  So long as it 
doesn’t matter, it doesn’t matter.  (72) 
 
Dale argues that something has happened to Scrope, probably fostered by his recent 
relocation to Princhester and its related sense of uprootedness and change in physical 
atmosphere, that disrupted Scrope’s “working illusions.”  Dale argues that the 
“loosening of the ties that bind a man to his everyday life and his everyday self is in 
nine cases out of ten a loosening of the ties that bind him to everyday sanity” (75).  In 
this section of the text, Dale plays both physician and psychologist to Scrope, offering 
a dual diagnosis of sorts.  Scrope is a bit cynical of the psychological end of Dale’s 
analysis, dismissing it as “Phenomena and noumena and so on and so on.  Kant and 
so forth.  Pragmatism” (72), but becomes much more interested in what Dale has to 
say when Dale discusses a possible drug of his own invention that might be helpful.  
His intention is not to “[drug] oneself back to the old contentment” but to “drug 
[Scrope] on to the new” (76).   In fact, after Scrope takes Dale’s prescription, he does 
experience a new sort of contentment.  For example, whereas before, the war seemed 
infinite and hopeless, after Dale’s drug, “he saw the war as something measurable, 
something with a beginning and an end, as something less than the immortal spirit in 
man.  He had been too much oppressed by it” (79-80).  Dale’s drug does allow him 
the contentment he desires, at least for a time. 
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Drugs were, and still are, a common recourse for those with insomnia.  
Sawyer explains: 
In the severer forms of psychic insomnia we must often at once secure 
sleep by the action of some efficient hypnotic.  I prefer opium or 
chloral.  By the use alone of one of these drugs we can often quickly 
cure acute insomnia depending upon some mental shock or strain.  
You will find that a few nights of sound and sufficient sleep, 
artificially induced by the exhibition of a reliable hypnotic, will do 
more than anything else to restore to the brain the power of sleeping 
without further aid from drugs.  Besides chloral hydrate, opium, 
morphine, and the other soporific derivatives of opium, the chief 
hypnotic drugs are sulphonal, trional, paraldehyde, amylene hydrate, 
and the bromides, to which may be added alcohol and affusion of the 
head with cold water. (1627-28) 
 
The purpose of the use of such drugs was to break the cycle of insomnia, much in the 
way that Hurry describes.  Insomnia creates insomnia, but sound sleep can create a 
change in the mental pattern or habit of insomnia.  Yet, despite their alleged efficacy, 
such drugs are not without extreme risk.  Sawyer attributes the loss of “many human 
lives” to overdose because of self-administration, and cautions against allowing 
patients to “swallow chloral or any other of the dangerous but valuable hypnotics 
whenever he feels so disposed” (1628), which is, of course, what Scrope begins to do. 
Dale leaves Scrope with a phial of his concoction, instructing Scrope to “Take 
it only . . . when you feel you must” but promising that “When you want more I will 
make you more” (77).  Clearly, he ignores the caution Sawyer advises, through 
allowing his patient to self-administer the drug he has provided.  Indeed, Scrope does 
begin to use the drug somewhat dangerously, and it has significant effects on his 
psyche.  His first usage of the drug results in not only his change in position on the 
endlessness of World War I, but leads him to the sense that “something snapped—
like the snapping of a lute string—in his brain” (82).  Wells continues, “With a sigh 
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of deep relief the bishop realized that this world had vanished” (82).  Whereas his 
insomnia forces him to acknowledge the changing state of the world, taking Dale’s 
drug removes him from the world altogether, and it is a feeling he quite enjoys.  The 
hallucinogenic effects of this drug become more prominent as time progresses; he 
removes his Episcopal livery and converses directly with God: 
“Oh God!” he cried, “God my Captain!  Wait for me!  Be patient with 
me!” 
 And as he did so God turned back and reached out his hand.  It 
was indeed as if he stood and smiled.  He stood and smiled as a kind 
man might do; he dazzled and blinded his worshipper, and yet it was 
manifest that he had a hand a man might clasp. 
 Unspeakable love and joy irradiated the whole being of the 
bishop as he seized God’s hand and clasped it desperately with both of 
his own.  It was as if his nerves and arteries and all his substance were 
inundated with golden light. . . .  
 It was as if he merged with God and became God. . . .  (88-89) 
 
The bishop’s vision of God, made possible through his insomnia and pursuit of its 
treatment, reinforces his view of God and desire to follow God, but culminates in his 
rejection of the Church: 
It may seem strange to the reader that this bishop who had been 
doubting and criticizing the church and his system of beliefs for four 
long years had never before faced the possibility of a severance from 
his ecclesiastical dignity.  But he had grown up in the church, his life 
had been so entirely clerical and Anglican, that the widest separation 
he had hitherto been able to imagine from this past had left him still a 
bishop, heretical perhaps, innovating in the broadening of beliefs and 
the liberalizing of practice . . . but still with the palace and his 
dignities, differing in opinion rather than in any tangible reality from 
his previous self.  (90) 
 
Rankin comments that insomnia makes “Moral responsibilities multiply, and a 
progressive perception of the greater verities of existence creates new concepts of 
duty, which add to the burden of each day’s endeavour” (“Broken Sleep” 77).  
Scrope’s insomnia certainly follows this pattern.  Hence, we can view the bishop’s 
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insomnia teleologically.  His discontentment with various positions he is expected to 
adopt within the Church, in combination with his initial resistance to social change 
generate his insomnia, which in turn results in his renouncement of his position and 
break with the Church.  Consequently, his break with the Church leads to his pursuit 
of his own independent religious doctrine, which is in the spirit of the revelations he 
has while under treatment for his insomnia.  His insomnia creates the threshold over 
which all of the other changes in his faith and life take place. 
Whereas for Miriam, insomnia becomes a welcomed signifier of her growing 
independence specifically because it allows her access to spheres from which her 
access had previously been limited because of her gender, the bishop’s insomnia is 
unwelcomed because it prohibits him from fulfilling his role as provider for his 
family assigned because of his gender.  His role as provider for his family and as 
leader in the Church is complicated in multiple ways by his insomnia.  The physical 
symptoms of his insomnia and its subsequent exhaustion make his job quite difficult 
to perform, as he struggles to prepare and present his sermons.  His moral and 
spiritual crisis, both cause and symptom of his insomnia, culminates in an address in 
which he both renounces the Church and criticizes its role in the world, all quite 
publically.  During a confirmation ceremony, intended to welcome the young to full 
participation in the Church, he shocks the crowd as he proclaims: 
All ceremonies . . . grow old.  All ceremonies are tainted even from the 
first by things less worthy than their first intention, and you, my dear 
sons and daughters, who have gathered to-day in this worn and ancient 
building, beneath these monuments to ancient vanities and these 
symbols of forgotten or abandoned theories about the mystery of God, 
will do well to distinguish in your minds between what is essential and 
what is superfluous and confusing in this dedication you make of 
yourselves to God our Master and King.  For that is the real thing you 
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seek to do today, to give yourselves to God.  This is your spiritual 
coming of age, in which you set aside your childish dependence upon 
teachers and upon taught phrases, upon rote and direction, and stand 
up to look your Master in the face.  You profess a great brotherhood 
when you do that, a brotherhood that goes round that earth, that 
numbers men of every race and nation and country, that aims to bring 
God into all the affairs of the world and make him not only the king . . 
. of an united mankind. (141-42) 
 
The opening part of his sermon renounces the role of the Church, positing it as an 
obstacle to God, and creates a sense of the falsity of distinction among religions.  In a 
confirmation ceremony predicated upon the learning of Church doctrines and 
fostering participation in a specific ideology, Scrope denounces religion, with its 
ceremonies and doctrines, as the proper means of worshipping God.  The next part of 
his sermon does little to appease the shocked group of parishioners: 
It is your privilege, it is your grave and terrible position that you have 
been born at the very end and collapse of a negligent age, of an age of 
sham kingship, sham freedom, relaxation, evasion, greed, waste, 
falsehood, and sinister preparation.  Your lives open out in the midst of 
the breakdown for which that age prepared. . . .  Our country is at war 
and half mankind is at war, death and destruction trample through the 
world; men rot and die by the million, food diminishes and fails, there 
is a wasting away of all the hoarded resources, of all the accumulated 
well-being of mankind; and there is no clear prospect of any end to 
this enormous and frightful conflict.  Why did it ever arise?  What 
made it possible?  It arose because men had forgotten God.  It was 
possible because they worshipped simulacra, were loyal to phantoms 
of race and empire, permitted themselves to be ruled by idiot and 
usurper kings. (145-46) 
 
In this second part of his address, not only does Scrope criticize the Church for its 
reliance on ceremony and artifice, but he also blames it, at least in part, for the Great 
War.  Because of the Church (and others like it), people developed both a sense of 
complacency and misplaced attachments, leading to division, devastation, and death.  
They worshipped not God, but symbols.  False division of mankind, argues Scrope, 
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cultivated by religious practice and distinctions, made the war possible, and the 
generation of those about to be confirmed is reaping the outcome. 
Insomnia and Gender Roles 
After Scrope’s sermon, which he describes as a trance of sorts, Canon Bliss 
attempts to explain away his ideas through allegations of “illness”:  “you had a kind 
of lapse—an aphasia.  You mutilated the interrogation and you did not pronounce the 
benediction properly.  You changed words and you put in words” (148).  Scrope, on 
the other hand, asserts both his sanity and desire to leave the pulpit.  Shortly 
thereafter, his wife, Lady Ella, sends for a doctor.  Later that night, Scrope “had a 
temperature of a hundred and a half” and is advised by his doctor to stop thinking of 
“these things” (149).  But, Scrope realizes that he cannot stop his thoughts continues 
on his course of changed belief. 
The one obstacle he has preventing a complete break with the Church is his 
role within his family.  During a bout of insomnia prior to the incident of the sermon, 
Scrope ponders the impact a full declaration of his feelings would have on his wife:  
“His wife became as it were the representative of all that held him helpless. . . .  It 
was clear to him that any movement towards the disavowal of doctrinal Christianity 
and the renunciation of his see must first be discussed with her. . . .  And he could not 
imagine telling her except as an incredibly shattering act” (108).  Consequently, he 
“left things from day to day, and went about his episcopal routines” (108).  
Eventually, he tells her his feelings (before the sermon), to which she responds, “I 
know you have been sleepless, but I have been so ready to help you. . . .  My life is all 
but to be of use to you” (138).  To this point, she saw only the symptoms, but had no 
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understanding of the root of Scrope’s troubles.  Much like Cannon Bliss, her advice is 
that he seek a doctor, rather than break with the Church. Yet, after his unexpected 
sermon, he can no longer hide his feelings from other members of the Church, and he 
understands that he has jeopardized their family’s security. 
When he does quit the Church, the ultimate effect is one of unsettling and 
uprooting his family.   Wells writes, “Never was the whole world of a woman so 
swiftly and comprehensively smashed.  All the previous troubles of her life seemed 
infinitesimal in comparison with any single item in this dismaying debacle.  She tried 
to consolidate it in the idea that he was ill, ‘disordered’” (170).  Naturally, she blames 
his insomnia:  “In the past he had always been a very kind and friendly mate to her, 
but sometimes he had been irritable about small things, especially during his seasons 
of insomnia; now he came back changed, a much graver man, rather older in his 
manner . . . but rigidly set upon his purpose of leaving the church” (171).  His 
decision to leave the Church threatens not only his source of income, but also his 
family’s home, provided by the Church, as well.  His family is forced to move into a 
much smaller abode and subsist on a much smaller income.  To mitigate the crisis for 
his family, he attempts to work under the patronage of Lady Sunderbund, a wealthy 
American heiress with whom his new doctrines resonate, yet he rejects her patronage 
when he realizes she does not want to renounce the Church at all, but merely create 
one in a new form.  Ultimately, his family is reduced to poverty, but his wife, given 
her sense of duty, chooses to follow him regardless of their circumstances, though she 
never fully understands his motives.  In a final bout of wakefulness at two in the 
morning, the bishop realizes the conclusion of his spiritual quest, accepts that he will 
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have no ministry of his own, and realizes that he is ultimately alone in his manner of 
understanding God (at least within his family of women).   
Richardson criticized Wells for his portrayal of female characters:   
So far he has not achieved the portrayal of a woman, with the one 
exception of Leadford’s mother.  His women are all one specimen, 
carried away from some biological museum of his student days, 
dressed up in varying trappings, with different shades of hair and 
proportions of freckles, with neatly tabulated instincts and one vague 
smile between them all.  (“Crank” 400)   
 
Lady Ella’s blind following of her husband regardless of her disagreement with him, 
her reduction of her husband’s spiritual crisis to the effects of a disordered mind 
perpetuated by insomnia, as well as her inability to understand the faith to which her 
husband ascribes, reinforce Richardson’s accusation, made more than a decade before 
The Soul of a Bishop was published.  Perhaps this is why, in her portrayal of Hypo 
Wilson, Wilson is only able to view Miriam as a biological entity; he can never fully 
understand Miriam’s motives, and sees her insomnia as not part of her maturation, but 
rather an obstacle to it.  Lady Ella is a “biological” character, and Hypo can only view 
women “biologically.” 
Francie’s insomnia in The Last September is illustrated in similarly biological 
terms by the males in her life, her husband, Hugo, especially.  Francie suffers from 
chronic ill health, which her husband simultaneously cultivates and denies, claiming 
that she is “fit for anything nowadays” (18) despite her fears to the contrary.  Bowen 
describes the ways in which he dictates her sleeping behaviors, telling her that she 
should “lie down for a bit” because it will “freshen you up though you don’t need it” 
(19).  She does, in fact, desire the rest as she “was so very tired from motoring. . . . 
Her thoughts ached” (18), and she acquiesces to Hugo’s ministrations.  More 
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significantly, Hugo dictates her physical positioning as she rests, according to his own 
beliefs:  “He made a valley for her head between the two pillows—he did not believe 
it rested anybody to lie with their head high—and she lay down on the bed with her 
head in the valley” (19).  Francie understands that Hugo plays the dominant role in 
their relationship, though she realizes it appears to be quite opposite to outsiders:   
They might well say she had taken the brilliant young man he’d once 
been and taught him to watch her, to nurse her and shake out her 
dresses.  And she knew she could, now, never explain to Myra what 
she had failed to explain twelve years ago—when there had been so 
much less to justify—how Hugo was too much for her altogether. (20)   
 
While it might appear that Francie is using her power to require someone else to care 
for her, quite the opposite is true.  Hugo uses his care of Francie as a mechanism of 
control, simultaneously asserting her strength, but reifying her infirmity.  But the true 
extent of his ability to control her behaviors, especially those related to sleep, is 
apparent when others in the household act as enforcers of Hugo’s regime.  For 
instance, Lady Naylor says to Francie, in a manner very similar to Hugo’s, “You must 
go and lie down—you’re looking as fresh as a rose but I know how Hugo insists upon 
it” (82).  Both Hugo and Lady Naylor send contradictory messages to Francie; she 
does not appear to be tired, but needs to rest nonetheless.  Towards the end of the text, 
Lois comments about the sleep of a child: “Livvie kicked all night, she will be a 
horrible wife” (236).  Through this comment and those made regarding the control of 
Francie’s sleep, Bowen illustrates the idea of feminine docility within a marriage 
through the manipulation sleep behaviors.  Women who sleep rigidly so as not to 
disturb their husbands, like Francie, are also controlled by their husbands.  Women 
  
 
225 
 
who sleep fitfully, like Laura (who abandons her husband and family) or Livvie, are 
much more difficult as wives and less likely to be controlled.   
These three texts indicate a fascinating relationship between sleep and gender.  
Throughout the texts, we see men’s attempts to control either their own sleep, as with 
Scrope, or the sleep of the women around them, as is the case with Hypo Wilson or 
Hugo.  Consequently, the women either succumb to their control (or at least the 
appearance of it), as does Francie, or resist it, like Miriam.  Sleep becomes another 
means of domination over the female body, but female bodies react very differently to 
such domination.  According to Alan Derickson, the relationship between sleep and 
women had a great deal to do with their eligibility for marriage: 
As early as 1906, physician Emma Walker, writing in Ladies’ Home 
Journal, deployed the term “beauty sleep” in discouraging young 
women from late-night activities:  “As a rule, girls do not realize what 
a very important element of beauty is the early bed-hour.  It is not until 
they begin to see the lines coming and dark circles appearing that they 
wonder if late hours have anything to do with these fingermarks of 
time.”  Women’s magazines continued to play on fears that excessive 
wakefulness would undermine good looks.  (18)   
 
Further, governmental regulations on sleep, particularly in the United States, 
“targeted those whose sleeplessness posed a threat to general welfare.  From that 
perspective, in the earliest part of the twentieth century the most important safeguards 
were extended to wage-earning women whose reproductive capabilities served 
societal interests and supposedly depended on adequate rest” (Derickson 27).  Bassuk 
argues that: 
The belief in primacy of the reproductive organs in women was used 
to support the notion that a woman’s major responsibility was to 
propagate the race.  Because doctors assumed that each organism 
possessed a finite amount of vital energy and was a closed system, 
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anything that diverted women’s energy from the reproductive function 
. . . must be avoided.  (251) 
   
Thus, the motivations to control female sleep represent an attempt at limiting the roles 
of women to those of showpiece (good marital prospect) and mother.  Sleep becomes 
necessary for women for the purposes of preserving their looks and protecting their 
fertility, or, in other words, ensuring that they will reproduce successfully.  However, 
as Miriam argues “If you define life for women, as husbands and children, it means 
that you have no consciousness at all where women are concerned” (3: 222). 
Prior to World War I, “idle middle-class women” were perceived as “the chief 
clientele for nervous disorders” (Showalter, Female 195).  Many doctors, such as 
Mitchell, “believed that women were fundamentally inferior to men and that their 
nervous systems were more irritable” (Bassuk 251).  Thus, there appears to be more 
danger associated with females with insomnia, especially those like Miriam who 
choose insomniac behavior through the pursuit of interests other than marriage and 
child-rearing.  However, these texts indicate that this notion is overly simplistic.  For 
example, both Miriam and Scrope need their insomnia to reveal their sources of 
underlying conflict.  Miriam’s insomnia reveals her conflict with gender norms and 
Scrope’s reveals his conflict with the relationship between the Church and modern 
society.  Insomnia offers a solution for both characters; for Miriam, it enables her to 
incur on spheres beyond the domestic, and for Scrope, it forces him to confront, 
rather than attempt to ignore, his conflicts in pursuit of what he sees as a more honest 
spiritual path.  The insomnia of both Scrope and Miriam lead to their supposed 
mental breakdowns, which ultimately afford them a “rest” from their duties that they 
find repugnant.  Miriam, who should be “weaker,” handles her insomnia much more 
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successfully than Scrope does (though, given her mother’s suicide she sometimes 
doubts this ability).  Where Scrope tries numerous methods, including powerful and 
dangerous drugs, to rid himself of insomnia so that he can return to his initial role 
within the Church and his family, Miriam cultivates her insomnia as a source of 
power and independence.  Even when she seeks the help of doctors like Densley, she 
does so with no intention of ridding herself of insomnia, but rather of ridding herself 
of the conditions she finds untenable.  She never attempts to “cure” herself of it, but 
rather resists cures and exposes them as attempts to corral her individuality and force 
her into the role of mother and caretaker.  Other female characters, including Mrs. 
Richardson, Sasha Jensen, and Francie, ones who see themselves as “relative beings” 
do not handle their insomnia well and see it as a form of punishment for their 
inadequacy in fulfilling their wife-mother roles.  They do not handle their insomnia 
well because they are judging themselves against external, rather than internal 
expectations, and insomnia perpetuates their sense of judgment.  As Miriam explains, 
“Women were there, cleverly devised by nature to ensnare man for a moment and 
produce more men to bring scientific order out of primeval chaos” (2: 122). 
Subjectivity 
Insomnia is a necessary component of each character’s subjectivity and does a 
great deal in shaping their perceptions of the world.  For example, when Scrope first 
begins to experience insomnia, Wells writes, “It was as if he discovered himself 
flimsy and transparent in a world of minatory solidity and opacity.  It was as if he 
found himself made not of flesh and blood but tissue paper” (34-35).  The bishop’s 
insomnia parallels his growing sense of the destabilization of his place within the 
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world.  He can no longer see himself as fixed in the role that he has played for 
decades, but begins to see this role as incredibly fragile and malleable.  As his 
insomnia continues, his sense of detachment from the world increases:  “Again in a 
slight detail he marked his strange and novel detachment from the world of his 
upbringing.  His hallucination of disillusionment had spread from himself and his 
church and his faith to the whole animate creation” (38).  Once he loses his sense of 
place in his world, as the stability of his subjectivity is undermined through his 
insomnia and the perceptual changes it engenders, he finds himself as “other” to the 
world with which he is familiar.  But because he must, at least for a while, function 
within the bounds of his old world, he sees himself as a person divided:  “During his 
spells of insomnia he led a curiously double existence” (43).  Eventually he comes to 
a realization that makes him quite uncomfortable, at first, thinking that “he was the 
most unreal thing in the universe.  He was a base insect giving himself airs.  What 
advantage has a bishop over the Praying Mantis, that cricket which apes that attitude 
of piety?  Does he matter more—to God?” (118).  In this passage, we see the bishop’s 
new view of spirituality emerging, a spirituality in which customs and doctrines are 
subsumed to an overall sense of unity under God.  However, he is not yet comfortable 
with his new stance:  “He was afraid of greatness.  He was afraid of the great 
imperatives that would take hold of his life.  He wanted to muddle on for just a little 
longer.  He wanted to stay just where he was, in his familiar prison-house, with the 
key of escape in his hand” (119), the “key” being Dale’s hallucinogenic drug.  The 
bishop’s desire to “muddle on” within his “prison-house” indicates his resistance to 
his re-imagined role in the world, but it is this same resistance that perpetuates his 
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insomnia.  In this passage, he is conflicted over the use of Dale’s drug, which would 
alleviate his insomnia, but also open him to the visions that make his participation in 
the Anglican Church untenable.   Throughout the text, Scrope’s insomnia and 
subjectivity are interrelated; because of his insomnia, his role shifts from that of 
servant of his Church and King to servant of God alone.  Consequently, he must also 
sacrifice his role as provider for his family, another change in subjectivity altered 
through his insomnia. 
Much as Scrope’s insomnia shapes his perception of his relationship to the 
world, Miriam’s does the same.  By simple virtue of being a woman, she is ensnared 
in the role of caretaker to a neighbor, the perpetually ill and dependent Miss Dear.  
Because of her desire to maintain independence, she refuses to define herself in this 
way and rejects this role forcefully.  To Miss Dear’s finance, Mr. Taunton, she says: 
You are very much mistaken in calling on me for help . . . ‘domestic 
work and the care of the aged and the sick’—very convenient—all the 
stuffy nerve-racking never-ending things to be dumped on women—
who are to be openly praised and secretly despised for their 
unselfishness—I’ve got twice the brain-power you have.  You are 
something of a scholar; but there is a way in which my time is more 
valuable than yours.  There is a way in which it is more right for you 
to be tied to this woman than for me.  Your reading is a habit, like 
most men’s reading, not a quest.  You don’t want it disturbed. (2: 279) 
 
In this passage, Miriam declares her own subjectivity, as a woman and intellectual, 
but not as a caretaker.  She allows herself to place her intellect above that of Taunton.  
Much of her ability to make this assertion comes through her insomnia, as it relates to 
her reading at night.  That insomniac-time enables her to put her intellectual self first, 
over her role as caregiver to her pupils, and enables her to view this part of her time 
as equally, if not more, valuable than Taunton’s time.  From Miriam’s comments, it 
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seems as though he feels it is quite natural for his reading time to be undisturbed, but 
for hers to be sacrificed to fulfill her more “natural” role as a woman, yet she, rather 
than feeling ashamed of spending her nights awake as she first does, realizes that her 
insomniac, intellectual and exploratory self is the exact self she wants to prioritize, 
even at the expense of a man’s time.  She refuses to subsume her own interests to that 
of Taunton’s and in doing so, situates herself not as relative to him, but relative only 
to herself and her own priorities. 
Bowen’s text is a bit different than Pilgrimage and The Soul of a Bishop in 
that the characters generally remain stable despite the instability around them.  The 
exception is Lois, who, in the course of the novel, falls in love with a man named 
Gerald and loses him to fighting with the Irish rebels.  Initially, Lois equates insomnia 
with being happy, either through an apolitical society as discussed earlier or happy in 
marriage:  “One of the things Lois chiefly wanted to know about marriage was—how 
long it took one, sleeping with the same person every night, to outlive the temptation 
to talk well into the morning?  There would be nothing illicit about nocturnal talking. 
. . .  Would conversation, in the absence of these prohibitions, cease to interest?” (10).  
Insomnia, rather than being rebellious, becomes an expression of love.  Yet, as the 
text progresses, she comes to see sleep as the sign of happiness, as when she thinks of 
Gerald: “she glimpsed a quiet beyond experience, as though for many nights he had 
been sleeping beside her”  (128).  When Lois witnesses Hugo’s affections for Marda 
(instead of his wife Francie), she is unable to sleep (168), again relating insomnia to 
dissatisfaction in marriage. Later, when her relationship with Gerald becomes 
unstable, this instability is expressed through insomnia.  Bowen writes, “Still no 
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answer, as though he were asleep.  And indeed he felt, as at the approach of sleep, an 
immense indifference.  She, tortured by the loneliness of insomnia, had to cry out:  
‘Won’t you even just try—won’t you just kiss me?’” (282).  Lois, who resists, then 
accepts the idea of being a wife (which is ultimately denied to her in the way she 
imagines when Gerald dies), her views of insomnia change accordingly. 
Emil Cioran asks of his readers: 
Have you have had the brutal and amazing satisfaction of looking at 
yourself in the mirror after countless sleepless nights?  Have you 
suffered the torment of insomnia, when you count the minutes for 
nights on end, when you feel alone in this world, when your drama 
seems to be the most important in history and history ceases to have 
meaning, ceases to exist?  When the most terrifying flames grow in 
you and your existence appears unique and isolated in a world made 
only for the consummation of your agony? (18) 
 
Though masked as questions, Cioran’s interrogation draws some conclusions:  
insomnia is a disorder of radical individualization, forcing the sufferer to valorize his 
or her own suffering and view the self as “unique and isolated” within the world.  
Further, it removes the insomniac from generalized historical significance and places 
his or her own history above general history.  As a form of subjectivity on its own, 
insomnia has the function of removing the individual from historical subjectivity, 
though not subjectivity altogether.  For this reason, insomnia allows people to expose 
and escape other forms of categorization, specifically those of gender.  However, the 
sleeping world—those not experiencing insomnia, still strive to relocate the 
insomniac within history, but the insomniac’s perspective of himself or herself is 
forever altered.  Insomnia changes both Miriam and Scrope.  Their insomnia allows 
them to redefine themselves outside of the boundaries of their historical 
categorizations.  Bowen, however, presents insomnia in a different light.  Her 
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characters do not change because of insomnia, but rather as they change, so do their 
views of insomnia.  This difference speaks to the disparate goals of the texts.  All 
three texts depict individuals acclimating to a new society with various levels of 
resistance or compliance.  However, Miriam and Scrope (eventually) come to 
welcome and require change; Bowen’s characters, on the other hand, seek stability.  
Regardless of the different approaches these texts take to the relationship between 
insomnia and subjectivity, they assert the importance of this relationship in shaping 
and reflecting one’s ever-fluctuating identity within the world, presenting insomnia as 
a form of transcendence into previously inaccessible categories of subjectivity and 
escape from categories, which for many reasons, have become unsustainable for the 
individual.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
I CAN SLEEP WHEN I’M DEAD:  RESTLESSNESS AND STATUS 
 
In the essay “Sleeping and Waking,” F. Scott Fitzgerald writes, “It appears 
that every man’s insomnia is as different from his neighbor’s as are their daytime 
hopes and aspirations” (63).  His observation not only echoes the idea of insomnia as 
a highly individualized disorder, but also links insomnia to social role and what a 
“man” aspires to become.  Fitzgerald’s idea of “hopes and aspirations” is perhaps 
related to Max Weber’s description of “labour as a calling” (121), a calling that had 
spiritual, as well as practical implications, which Weber discusses in his famous work 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930).  To an extent, insomnia 
takes on a socio-economic component inasmuch as it is linked to a person’s daytime 
drives and ability to meet vocational demands.  Further linking his insomnia to 
vocation through his repetition of the word “work,” Fitzgerald writes, “My own 
experience with night pests was at a time of utter exhaustion—too much work 
undertaken, interlocking circumstances that made the work twice as arduous” 
(“Sleeping” 64).  Overwork, which I have discussed in previous chapters as a cause of 
insomnia, especially when that work is mental, clearly plays a role in Fitzgerald’s 
insomnia.  More importantly, his drive towards overwork, and its resultant 
restlessness, does too.  This drive, the sense that one should keep busy and undertake 
“too much work,” has deep roots in capitalist mentality.  
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Fitzgerald’s linkage among the drive towards self-improvement, the role of 
work in reaching aspirations, and the association of work with restlessness and 
insomnia reflects a Western capitalist mentality with Protestant origins.  The drive to 
produce and the restlessness associated with this drive are explained by Weber:  
The religious valuation of restless, continuous systematic work in a 
worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same 
time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, 
must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion 
and attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of 
capitalism. (116) 
 
In addition to illustrating a relationship between restlessness and faith, Weber’s 
argument extends to the idea that to not be working is sinful, immoral behavior, 
further explaining this compulsion towards work Fitzgerald displays.  According to 
Weber, “Waste of time is thus the first and in principle deadliest of sins. . . .  Loss of 
time through sociability, idle, talk, luxury, even more sleep than necessary for health, 
six to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation” (104).  Waste, 
the worst form of sin as Weber asserts, can take the form of too much sleep, but 
insomnia itself, if not spent productively, can also be construed, according to the 
dictum above, as waste because it is not time in labor or recuperating from labor, but 
rather “idle” time.  Fitzgerald’s association between aspiration and restlessness may 
not necessarily be religious, but is certainly ethical.  For Fitzgerald, this “restlessness” 
manifests as insomnia, which is the time of confrontation between what a “man” is 
and what he hopes to be.  He struggles with this insomnia because it is time that he is 
not tackling the overwhelming amounts of work he has taken on; similarly, as we can 
see with Fitzgerald’s numerous depictions of the dissolute and immoral lives of the 
idle wealthy,  wasting time when one could or should be working creates a sense of 
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restlessness and dissatisfaction.  For Weber, restlessness takes on a dual meaning, in 
part as a bridge or path to fulfilling both economic and spiritual goals, but if not spent 
productively as with insomnia, as a form of sinful indulgence.   
Paul Lafargue, a Marxist social critic, presents an altogether different view of 
the function of rest and restlessness in reaching one’s potential, and he views work 
(or lack of rest) as “the cause of all intellectual degeneracy, of all organic deformity” 
(23).  Where Weber sees degeneracy (at least from an analytical, if not personal, 
perspective) in laziness, Lafargue points to an “intellectual,” rather than moral 
degeneracy that comes when one cannot be idle at all.  His main purpose in his essay 
“The Right to Be Lazy” is to attack the ideology later explored by Weber, which 
exalts what Lafargue refers to as “the religion of work” (28).  Lafargue, contrary to 
Weber, argues that persistent restlessness and need for work are ultimately destructive 
to one’s aspirations and self-fulfillment.  The hope of finding meaning through labor 
alone is impossible: 
This delusion is the love of work, the furious passion for work, pushed 
even to the exhaustion of the vital force of the individual and his 
progeny.  I, who do not profess to be a Christian, an economist or a 
moralist, I appeal from their judgment to that of their God; from the 
preachings of their religious, economics, or free thought of ethics, to 
the frightful consequences of work in a capitalist society. (23) 
 
He disavows religion referring to “their God”, but not his own, and part of his 
problem with religion is its correlation between work and holiness or purported 
goodness.  The consistent drive to work, Lafargue argues, ruins the laborer, as well as 
his family (28), so certainly has moral consequences, if not spiritual ones.   Rather 
than allowing the laborer to reach moral or economic aspirations, work increases 
“individual poverty” and assures “that becoming poorer, you may have more reason 
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to work and become miserable” (32).  Similarly, Fitzgerald argues that his overwork 
and subsequent insomnia led him to “hating the day because it went towards night” 
(“Crack-Up” 72), thus fostering misery.  Fitzgerald continues, noting the destructive 
character of his insomnia with relation to his work ethic:   
In this silence there was a vast irresponsibility toward every 
obligation, a deflation of all my values.  A passionate belief in order, a 
disregard of motives or consequences in favor of guess work and 
prophecy, a feeling that craft and industry would have a place in any 
world—one by one, these and other convictions were swept away” 
(“Crack-Up” 78).   
 
Fitzgerald, of course, is not a laborer of the type Lafargue addresses; however, 
Fitzgerald’s exhaustion, a product of his own form of labor, does evoke the 
consequences of which Lafargue warns.  Fitzgerald simultaneously points to the need 
for restlessness in exposing aspirations, but the danger of restlessness in becoming an 
obstacle to those same aspirations. 
Despite their opposing views on the value of work for self or spiritual 
fulfillment, Weber and Lafargue do agree on the danger of doing no work at all.  
Weber, for instance, states, “Sloth and idleness are such deadly sins because they 
have a cumulative character. . . .  They are the antithesis of a methodical life” (236).  
Larfargue, who encourages some laziness, which he refers to as the “mother of arts 
and noble virtues” (51) seeks a balance between complete sloth and overwork, 
suggesting that all work equally, for three hours a day (34).  In agreement with 
Weber, Lafargue argues that the overwork of the laboring class and subsequent sloth 
of the rich harms not only the laborers, but also the upper classes.  Men who live off 
of the work of others are “condemned to laziness and forced enjoyment, to 
unproductiveness and over consumption.  But if the over-work of the laborer bruises 
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his folk and tortures his nerves, it is also fertile in griefs for the capitalist” (38).    In 
Lafargue’s opinion, no good comes from perpetual restlessness in either the drive to 
work or to stand idle and bored while others work.  The work of many creates 
indolence in a few, and neither condition is ideal.  For Weber, good can certainly 
come from the drive to work hard, but sloth breeds hedonism and immorality.  
Fitzgerald’s novel The Beautiful and Damned clearly indicates his agreement with 
this point made by both Weber and Lafargue, by illustrating the disastrous 
consequences of indolence, dissolution, and hedonism due to the failure of the 
individual to engage in productive work.  Fitzgerald’s own comments point to the 
need for balance as well, asserting the harm in too much work, but acknowledging the 
compulsion to do so and its resultant sense of restlessness. 
Fitzgerald is not alone in his depiction of unfulfilled social or economic 
aspirations as productive of individual strife.  Much of what Fitzgerald describes in 
The Beautiful and Damned as a conflict between desire and capability corresponds 
with what sociologist Émile Durkheim refers to as anomie.  According to Durkheim: 
No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are 
sufficiently portioned to his means.  In other words, if his needs 
require more than can be granted, or even merely something of a 
different sort, they will be under continual friction and can only 
function painfully.  Movements incapable of production without pain 
tend not to be reproduced.  Unsatisfied tendencies atrophy, and as the 
impulse to live is merely the result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken 
as the others relax. (82) 
 
For Durkheim, no one can be content if they want more than they can reasonably 
afford or attain.  Fitzgerald’s protagonist, Anthony Patch, raised in wealth, but 
lacking his own means of subsistence supports Durkheim’s claim, as we watch him 
struggle to maintain a lavish lifestyle despite his inability to do so.  Similarly, as he 
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becomes enslaved by his own indulgences in alcohol, women, and parties, his 
intellectual pursuits, for example, his desire to write (in a year abroad after college he 
writes “some ghastly Italian sonnets” (8), for example), do, indeed, atrophy, as does 
his desire even to remain alive.  As he exclaims to his future wife, Gloria, “I do 
nothing, for there’s nothing I can do that’s worth doing” (65).  He continues in an 
attempt to rationalize his sloth, “But I want to know just why it’s impossible for an 
American to be gracefully idle. . . .  I don’t understand why people think that every 
young man ought to go down-town and work ten hours a day for the best twenty years 
of his life at dull, unimaginative work” (65).  Even so, without work, he does not find 
himself any happier than he would have been at a job.  His laziness leads to self 
indulgence, leading to more laziness, and so forth.  To a great extent, Fitzgerald 
expresses Anthony’s struggle with his chosen idleness and its consequences through 
his insomnia, as this chapter will argue. 
 Likewise, other modernist authors, such as Waldo David Frank, in the novel 
Holiday and E. M. Forster, in A Passage to India make a similar connection between 
anomie and insomnia.  For both Frank and Forster, anomic conditions are created not 
as much by class distinctions as they are racial and colonial interactions and 
hegemonies.  Anomie occurs when characters are exposed to a mode of living, 
whether economic or based in freedoms of behavior and access, that they, themselves, 
are unable to attain.  Victoria Hade, for instance, sees a mode of living in the black 
laborer John Cloud that she will never, as a white woman, be able to achieve.  And, in 
Forster’s novel, Dr. Aziz’s freedoms are limited because he is colonial subject, yet 
one who constantly interacts with the British rulers who have a greater freedom of 
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movement and behavior.  These texts all contain characters whose insomnia reflects a 
conflict among their social aspirations, the work that they do or do not do, and their 
class status (as reflected by wealth, ethnicity, and status within a colonial society).  
Further, these texts indicate a discrepancy between the pure drive to work and the 
ability to attain privileged status through work alone.  In all three texts, insomnia 
becomes a device through which the characters’ anomie is realized and explored.    
Insomnia and History 
Because I am looking at insomnia as it is related to economic and social 
status, some background information on the relationship among sleep, class, and the 
necessity of work is useful.  One major distinction between pre-modern times and 
modern times in Western society comes with this relationship.  The way in which this 
relationship has changed is especially informative when relating insomnia to capitalist 
systems of production.  While many academics argue that insomnia is a condition of 
modern life, A. Roger Ekirch suggests that modern academics falsely idealize the 
sleep of pre-industrial peoples:  “Implicit in modern conceptions of sleep before the 
Industrial Revolution remains the wistful belief that our forebears enjoyed tranquil 
slumber, if often little else, in their meager lives” (285).  On the contrary, “early 
modern slumber was highly vulnerable to intermitted disruption, much more so, in all 
likelihood, than is sleep today” (Ekirch 288).  Ekirch notes that a seventeenth century 
healer reported that over twenty percent of his two thousand patients complained of 
insomnia (290).  Granted, this evidence is not a “scientific” study of insomnia, rather 
it is anecdotal, but still indicates that a significant portion of the population, 
particularly the under-classes, had trouble sleeping. 
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The primary difference between insomnia in pre-modern eras and insomnia of 
the Modernist period is the direct correlation in pre-modern times between the 
likelihood of insomnia and being of the lower social classes specifically because of 
lower class living environments.  As Ekirch argues, while the wealthy undoubtedly 
suffered insomnia at times due to stress, “those with the fewest resources to cope with 
life’s problems remained the most ‘wakensome,’ or vulnerable to insomnia” (290).  
This correlation existed primarily because the lower classes had less access to 
comfortable sleep for a number of reasons.  One major reason the lower classes often 
had trouble sleeping was fear; “Of all mortal emotions, fear most often broke sleep,” 
claims Ekirch (290).  Fears could be related to subsistence, but also to physical 
danger such as that presented by robbers and other criminals (291).  In addition, 
where the rich could afford comfortable beds, the poor were often more likely to 
endure sleep spaces that “were ill suited to peaceful repose” for reasons including 
noise either from urban traffic in the city or animals in the country (292), as well as 
poorly insulated and poorly ventilated homes that made sleep uncomfortable (293).  
Other interferences with the sleep of the lower classes included the necessity of night-
work (in addition to, rather than as a replacement for daytime labor) (Ekirch 161).  I 
find this information about insomnia in pre-modern societies informative because it 
throws into such sharp contrast the insomnia of modern times.  Insomnia in pre-
modern times was often what I will refer to as “environmental” insomnia—it has a 
direct correlation with environmental circumstances:  lack of comfort, safety, food or 
time to sleep.  This type of insomnia had not been eradicated by the Modernist period 
or even today, and it remains an issue of the under-classes.   
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In modern times, we see an increased level of the visibility of insomnia.  As 
Ekirch argues, one of the consequences of industrialization was a “pushing back of 
the darkness” (333) inherent in more abundant nighttime lighting, as well as more 
regulated (rather than idiosyncratic and personalized) night work.  With this reduction 
of darkness came surveillance:  “Critics complained that the light was too harsh.  If 
night became more accessible, it also became less private, on the job and off.  Not 
only could the human eye now see a farther distance, but there were infinitely more 
eyes in public by which to be observed. . . .  All persons faced greater scrutiny at 
night” (Ekirch 333).  With greater visibility comes a great awareness of individual 
habits, exposing individuals whose habits do not conform to an increased likelihood 
of intervention.  Thus, the nighttime habits of people became a matter of public 
concern and scrutiny rather than a private behavior unobserved by outsiders.  As late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century studies into fatigue attest, poor sleep habits 
among the poor were a matter of concern only inasmuch as poor sleep affected 
productivity, even if concern over the poor sleep of the poor in and of itself was not 
generally an issue when it did not affect outsiders.  In pre-industrial times, the poor 
man or woman’s lack of productivity due to exhaustion was mostly his or her own 
problem.  However, in industrial times, insomnia had greater social implications 
beyond the individual’s experience, as it may harm a wider group of people beyond 
the individual worker and his or her family.  For example, if a farm laborer gets into 
an accident on his farm because of exhaustion, he and his family may suffer.  But, if a 
factory worker causes an industrial accident because of that same exhaustion, the 
stakes are much greater, for the other employees who may be injured, but more so for 
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the employer who loses labor time, laborers, and has to pay the cost of repairs.  
Insomnia is more of an issue because not only is it more visible, it creates a broader 
range of complications for a larger group of people. 
The Modernist period, for reasons I have discussed in previous chapters, also 
gave rise to a whole new type of insomnia, unrelated to manual labor or 
environmental circumstance.  Insomnia, as that suffered by characters like 
Fitzgerald’s Anthony and Frank’s Virginia, is not due to lack of comfortable sleeping 
spaces, fear of intruders, or outside disturbances, but is instead based in social 
anxiety.  Because this new form of insomnia exists due to internal, rather than 
external circumstance, the insomnia of modern times takes on another discursive 
angle in terms of its perception as a disorder of the individual rather than the 
environment.  As I discussed in the second chapter, fatigue was of great social 
concern during the Industrial era.  However, the focus of the medical discipline was 
not generally on conditions of poverty creating disrupted sleep (though such 
conditions certainly existed), but rather aimed towards the middle and upper classes 
who could exert greater control over their sleeping environment and health-related 
routines such as proper diet and recreational exercise (which requires free time and 
energy).  A wealthier person might seek treatment for sleeplessness, but a laborer’s 
sleeplessness would not be noticed until it became a problem for his or her bosses.  
Thus, to be diagnosed or treated for insomnia generally required access to doctors and 
psychologists, but also relied upon the assumption that one could control one’s 
sleeping environment.  As such, during the modern age, insomnia is discursively 
understood as less connected to external environment and more to internal 
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environment, including one’s own mind and bodily conditions.  In fact, physical 
labor, with its exhausting capabilities, was largely thought to prevent insomnia, and 
the less educated and prestigious were thought to be less prone to suffering from it 
because of the relative (alleged) inactivity of their minds; perpetual physical 
discomfort is no longer discursively significant to insomnia as a condition. Insomnia 
is no longer a condition of circumstance, but more so a condition of individuality, and 
also, more clandestinely, status.  Though anyone may suffer from insomnia, 
treatments are aimed towards those who have the time for sleep and resources to 
cultivate a “proper” sleeping environment.  Insomnia itself becomes anomic in the 
sense that a tension exists between having hopes of sound sleep and having the ability 
to sleep soundly.  The poor, whose disruptive environments often precluded their 
hopes of sound sleep, did not assume sound sleep was even possible—exhaustion was 
an inevitable given.  Yet, the wealthier, who could afford at least the environmental 
conditions allowing for good sleep, but could not attain it, experienced a tension 
between aspiration and attainability because of insomnia, making it, in this sense, a 
disorder of privilege. 
Insomnia of the Superfluous Man 
Fitzgerald’s character Anthony, in The Beautiful and Damned, is an excellent 
example of a character who suffers from insomnia related to social status and 
position.  Anthony is in a unique position of social privilege within this text, as he is 
raised with all the trappings of luxury, has become used to those trappings, yet loses 
his financial support halfway through the text.  Initially, Anthony’s insomnia is based 
in his anxieties caused by his privileged position and the pressures it entails, and later, 
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it is based in his anxieties about maintaining his position.  He cannot use his privilege 
to eliminate his insomnia; in fact, his privilege (and attempts at maintaining it) 
exacerbates his condition.  He “fits in” excellently with upper class society, but 
cannot adjust his lifestyle when his economic circumstances change fostering his 
sense of anomie, nor can he uses his class status to protect himself against 
unhappiness and anxiety.  Fitzgerald replicates Anthony’s tenuous and anomic social 
position (trapped between desire for the luxury to which he has grown accustomed 
and his inability to sustain it) through his liminal depiction of Anthony’s character.  
 From the beginning of the text, Anthony is characterized liminally and 
nocturnally.  As the story opens, we learn that Anthony “has as yet gone no further 
than the conscious stage” and he wonders if he is “a shameful and obscene thinness 
glistening on the surface of the world like oil on a clean pond” (3).  These opening 
sentences suggest Anthony’s inability to access his own depths, with both the 
metaphor of remaining always in the “conscious stage” thus not reaching 
unconsciousness, and the image of his existence only on the surface of a (much 
deeper) pond.  Anthony views himself in a dual light.  In part, he believes that he is 
“exceptional,” “thoroughly sophisticated,” and “well adjusted to his environment,” 
but there is a conflict between his positive, socialized view of himself as a member of 
the elite and his awareness of his own superficiality since he has lived his life to this 
point with no real sense of earning his status or motivation to become self-reliant.  
Being born into wealth leaves Anthony trapped in a state of developmental delay, as 
he is given the resources and education with which to make his own way in the world, 
yet lacks the motivation to do so; he is liminally trapped between external wealth and 
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internal impoverishment.  Fitzgerald characterizes him as “a man who was aware that 
there could be no honor and yet had honor, who knew the sophistry of courage and 
yet was brave” (3), indicating his fundamental internal contradiction, bordering on 
hypocrisy.  Anthony’s  ultimate, unattainable hope is to “accomplish some quiet 
subtle thing that the elect would deem worthy” so as to “join the dimmer stars in a 
nebulous, indeterminate heaven half-way between death and immortality” (3).  Of 
course, what this “thing” may be, Anthony has yet to figure out, and he puts much 
more effort into avoiding this revelation than fostering it.  All he is sure of is his 
desire for approval from “the elect” and nothing more.  The language Fitzgerald uses 
in his initial descriptions of Anthony is the language of liminality, as he describes a 
character who both loathes and vaunts his superficiality, values appearance but is 
aware of its shallowness, and takes pride and comfort in, but also has contempt for, 
his upper class status because, through privileging him, it has ruined him as well.  
More significantly, however, Fitzgerald uses images of consciousness to illustrate 
Patch’s character.  He is trapped in the “conscious stage,” so, despite hints at a deeper 
level of self-awareness of his unconscious self, he has yet to truly access this part of 
his being.  His ultimate hope is essentially to attain a state of perpetual insomnia, 
neither fully present nor fully eradicated by death because he can enact no other 
alternatives, or at least thinks he cannot. 
Anthony’s initial characterization as an ontological insomniac, trapped 
between the conscious world of artifice and appearance and the unconscious world in 
which he could possibly some day access his inner self and the way in which he truly 
hopes to give his life meaning, persists throughout the opening pages of the text.  As 
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we learn, Anthony’s given name is Anthony Comstock Patch; however, “the 
Comstock dropped out of his name to a nether hell of oblivion” (5).  Again, we get 
the sense of his complete identity lying below an inaccessible surface, with hints of 
its presence but access withheld.  Not surprisingly, in addition to his insomniac soul, 
Anthony has also suffered from chronic insomnia, related to a fear of illness, since 
adolescence:  “It was as a concession to his hypochondriacal imagination that he 
formed the habit of reading in bed—it soothed him.  He read until he was tired and 
often fell asleep with the lights on” (7).  While early in his life, his reading essentially 
allows him to indulge his fear of the dark (and death through assuaging his 
hypochondria), later in life, his “reading,” or, more accurately, book-purchasing, 
takes on a materialistic component:  “He laid the foundations for a library by 
purchasing from a wandering bibliophile first editions of Swinburne, Meredith, and 
Hardy, and a yellowed illegible autograph letter of Keats’s, finding later that he had 
been amazingly overcharged” (8).  Notably, Fitzgerald never references Anthony 
actually reading these texts, especially not the “illegible” letter of Keats, thus 
indicating that his love of books serves a purpose other than intellectual interest or 
pursuit.  Initially, his reading is a distraction, preventing him from having to 
acknowledge his own thoughts and fears.  Later, books become showpieces for his 
library, symbols of economic status, rather than subjects of intellectual interest.  He 
buys books not to read them, but to own them. 
Further relating insomnia to materialism, or, more specifically, the 
obfuscation of the internal through a focus on the external, Fitzgerald writes that as a 
child, “His stamps were his greatest happiness . . . he lay awake at night musing 
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untiringly on their variety and many-colored splendor” (7).  Again, we see Anthony’s 
obsession with appearance, as he focuses on their colors and the breadth of his 
collection (as opposed to their individual artistry or the emotional or creative 
significance of the places they represent). He seems to always be fighting his 
insomnia, both as a boy and later in life with alcohol and women rather than objects.  
His insomnia comes to represent his awareness of the “vague melancholy that was to 
stay beside him through the rest of his life” (6), but also representative of his attempts 
to escape that melancholy through the accretion of material goods.  For example, 
rather than muse on his unhappiness and fear at night to get to its source, the 
childhood version of Anthony occupies his mind with either reading or pondering his 
stamp collection—both distractions from thoughts about himself.  As an adult, he has 
a similar experience of insomnia after a successful date with Gloria:  “In bed that 
night with the lights out and the cool room swimming with moonlight, Anthony lay 
awake and played with every minute of the day like a child playing in turn with each 
one of a pile of long-wanted Christmas toys” (127).  Again, his insomniac thoughts 
are described in material terms.  Rather than stamps, in this case, he is treating the 
moments of his prior happy day, specifically the distraction from melancholy that 
Gloria initially provides, as material objects, to be “played with” for his amusement 
and distraction.  His moments are things to him.  But, of course, the excitement a 
child has over toys on Christmas is short-lived and somewhat superficial; the joy is 
only temporary and cannot be sustained over the course of a lifetime, only 
remembered.  Anthony’s insomnia in these scenes is an insomnia of avoidance, rather 
than confrontation as it is with many other characters, but it is also an insomnia that 
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hints at a not readily (or willingly) accessible part of Anthony’s nature that loathes 
what he is and dreads what he is already becoming. 
Another means Fitzgerald uses to characterize Anthony as an insomniac 
through allusions to spiritual ills is the repetitive symbolism of vampirism used to 
describe the various women with whom Anthony associates.  He was born to an 
“anaemic lady” (5) immediately relating his character to blood disorder.  In addition, 
his friend Muriel Kane had been “told constantly that she was a ‘vampire,’” (83).  
This association connects Anthony to a woman who subsists through draining the life 
of others.  Most telling, however, is the “vampirism” of his wife, Gloria.  Gloria, in 
recounting a friend’s description of herself claims, “[Mrs. Granby] thinks I may be a 
vampire” (186).  She is indeed a vampire, in the economic sense that she survives 
through her dependence on others, but also because of her desire to make her life 
nocturnal.  Gloria’s true goal in life is to rest.  When Anthony asks her what she 
hopes for in life, she replies, “I want to sleep. . . .  I want to just be lazy and I want 
some of the people around me to be doing things, because that makes me comfortable 
and safe” (66).  She lives for the night, essentially, but more so the night in which she 
is completely vulnerable to and dependent upon the attentions and care of others.   
She never wants to act or work for herself, relishing her own languor.  She does not 
want to be herself in mind, but only in body, an object cared for by those around her.  
Anthony continually finds himself surrounded by vampiric women, creating a further 
connection between himself as a central point amongst these women, and heavily 
associated with their nocturnality, dependence, and spiritual and physical anaemia.   
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The vampire not only has literary significance as a perpetual insomniac and 
liminally trapped soul, but medical and moral significance as a figure of extreme 
depletion for those around him or her.  Silas Weir Mitchell, in Fat and Blood, refers 
to “an hysterical girl” as “a vampire who sucks the blood of the healthy people about 
her” (49).  For Mitchell, healthy blood means a healthy life, and thus, the female 
“vampire” is literally draining the life and energy of those around her.  While Gloria 
is not medically diagnosed as “hysterical,” her desire to live in complete dependence 
upon those around her in order for her to sleep comfortably reflects Mitchell’s 
position on the vampiric girl as a drain on her family.  If sleep is a state of 
vulnerability and surrender of the self, then Gloria’s desire to “sleep” reflects this 
drive to subsist on the energies of those around her, which, as both Lafargue and 
Weber assert, leads to moral atrophy.   
Not only does Anthony surround himself with vampiric women, his own 
lifestyle comes to mimic that of the vampire, living only by what he can take from 
others, and spending his days in bed while his evenings are active.  He is a Dracula-
like figure to those around him, both controlling and perpetuating their insomnia and 
soullessness through his own.  Throughout the texts are allusions to Anthony’s 
dependence on his grandfather for subsistence, as well as his non-standard sleep 
habits.  For example, he wanders New York at two in the morning (117), stays awake 
all night picturing his “ideal” future with Gloria after their misguided purchase of a 
house that they could not afford (178), stays awake brooding over the unhappiness of 
his marriage shortly thereafter (210), and lays in bed all day after abruptly quitting a 
much needed job he only held briefly (231).  His life is full of nighttime activities, 
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most of which include drunken parties and all of which are drains on his finances.  
One of these nighttime parties culminates in a crisis, as his mortified grandfather 
disinherits Anthony after unexpectedly arriving at a drunken shindig (293).  His 
grandfather’s arrival signifies the end of his practical ability to live vampirically, but 
like the vampire, he cannot be changed without ceasing to exist, and he refuses to 
change his lifestyle and habits accordingly. 
Given its associations with vampirism and the liminal, “nebulous” state of 
Anthony’s soul, his insomnia is frequently tied in with his morality.  Fitzgerald uses 
Anthony’s insomniac state as a heterotopic place from which Anthony can possibly 
redeem himself from his frivolous and empty life (yet fails to do so); thus Anthony’s 
morality and class status are inextricably linked.  It is during certain periods of 
insomnia through which we see Anthony getting glimpses of the origins of his 
perpetual melancholy.  For example, Fitzgerald describes Anthony sitting sleepless in 
his apartment after a night of drinking: 
Back in his apartment, the grayness returned.  His cocktails had died, 
making him sleepy, somewhat befogged and inclined to be surly. . . .  
Oh, he was a pretentious fool, making careers out of cocktails and 
meanwhile regretting, weakly and secretly, the collapse of an 
insufficient and wretched idealism.  He had garnished in his soul the 
subtlest taste and now he longed for old rubbish.  He was empty, it 
seemed, empty as an old bottle— (56) 
 
In this liminal state between consciousness and unconsciousness Anthony briefly sees 
the “grayness” of his life; gray is a liminal color, neither black nor white.  But, he also 
notes that even his regret is not strong enough to make him change, and he has lost 
any idealism, however “wretched” and “insignificant” it once was, and tied, through 
the image of the empty bottle to his vice.  Further, he acknowledges his own 
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soullessness, in the sense that he has focused the energies of his soul on pursuit of his 
external display of “taste” rather than anything of internal value.  This passage does 
not end with a full stop, but rather a dash, indicating that Anthony’s thoughts are not 
completed, but instead interrupted.  Importantly, they are not interrupted by 
unconsciousness, which would allow him a release from his semi-conscious hell, but 
rather a reawakening, courtesy of Gloria at the door to his apartment.  He remains, as 
Fitzgerald states earlier in the novel, as “going no further than the conscious stage” 
(3) in his thoughts.  Gloria’s disruption of his thoughts returns him to the “dazzling” 
(57), yet distracting quality of his daily life.   The insomnia that could have led 
Anthony to unconsciousness, but more importantly an awareness of his unconscious 
self, motivations, and the true nature of the problems that have been eating away at 
him, culminates in a return to the “dazzling” façade of his everyday being. 
Anthony has a similar semi-revelatory moment just before the beginning of 
his doomed marriage to Gloria.  On the eve of his wedding, he goes to bed excited for 
the “union of his soul with Gloria’s, whose radiant fire and freshness was the living 
material of which the dead beauty of books was made” (148).  Again, he associates 
Gloria with living death, but in a way that Anthony thinks to be flattering at the time.  
He compares her to “the dead beauty of books” indicating that the purpose of a book, 
for him, is in its external beauty, rather than its ability to bring something alive within 
his mind or soul, as it, itself, is dead. And beauty, effeminized here, is also equated 
with both death and femininity.  His attempt at sleep is disrupted by a screaming 
sound from outside, and again, his insomnia reveals the emptiness of his life: 
Anthony stood by the window a moment longer before he returned to 
bed.  He found himself upset and shaken.  Try as he might to strangle 
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his reaction, some animal quality in that unrestrained laughter had 
grasped at his imagination, and for the first time in four months 
aroused his old aversion and horror toward all the business of life.  The 
room had grown smothery.  He wanted to be out in some cool and 
bitter breeze, back in the corners of his mind.  Life was that sound out 
there, that ghastly reiterated female sound. . . .  Burying his face in the 
pillows he tried in vain to concentrate upon the details of the next day.  
(150) 
 
In this passage, as in the aforementioned one, there is the association of the feminine 
and death (the “ghastly” laughter), but also with femininity and animality.  The 
woman he hears is somehow less than human simply because of her spontaneous 
moment of happiness (and even femininity itself).  Perhaps because of this “animal” 
quality in her laugher, her display of her enjoyment of life, he equates this sound with 
life as much as death, but life itself for him is a sort of death.  The idea of death in life 
is associated with the feminine here, which is especially telling as he is about to unite 
his life with Gloria’s.  Again, Anthony resists any true revelation this episode might 
bring.  Notably, Fitzgerald writes that Anthony wants especially to reach “the corners 
of his mind,” but ultimately resists this impulse and attempts a return to the 
superficial, specifically the details of his wedding the next day.  As in the passage 
before, we see Anthony vacillating, at the point of insomnia, between a revelation of 
and resistance to his spiritual emptiness, as well as the living death he foresees as 
marriage to Gloria, and a desire to push this revelation back into the unexplored 
corners of his (un)conscious mind.  Though in this passage, Anthony does indeed fall 
asleep, the sleep is incomplete, as when he awakes “it [is] only five o’clock,” which 
upsets him because “he would appear fagged at the wedding” (150).  His return to 
consciousness, after unfulfilling and incomplete unconsciousness, is greeted at once 
by a return to material and appearance-related concerns. 
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Anthony’s most insightful points of self-reflection come at a time when he is 
falling asleep, yet is neither fully asleep nor fully awake.  Peter Schwenger refers to 
this time as “a zero degree of existence,” which, for him is “an existence preceding 
either the world’s categories or those that one determines for oneself in order to 
determine a self.  Such categories, general or particular, fall away with the onset of 
sleep” (48).  Schwenger’s analysis of the moment just prior to the onset of sleep helps 
to explain Anthony’s experience in the two situations I have just described.  In these 
moments, he sees himself apart from the socialized role he fills, without the 
distractions of his life.  He comes face to face with his most basic self and is horrified 
by the emptiness and grayness of that self and his choices, likening his existence to an 
empty bottle.  Simon Wortham argues that the onset of sleep eliminates the 
distinction between the self and others (141).  Perhaps, for this reason, during these 
periods of near-sleep, Anthony loses his ability to take comfort in his elevated social 
position.  When he is awake, he can fall back on socially determined roles (though 
these roles become increasingly destabilized within the text) and use his social 
position to distract from who he thinks he might be or might want to become.  But, 
with the onset of sleep, he is reduced to his most essential self, without the ability to 
compare himself to others, and does not like what he sees that self to be. 
Thus far, I have explored Anthony’s insomnia on two levels.  In one sense, the 
insomnia functions phenomenologically as a point of possible, yet refused, revelation 
for him.  It allows him a brief glimpse into the parts of his consciousness that he has 
heretofore been denied access, posing the possibility of redemption, yet denying this 
redemption through an unwillingness or inability to press further.  His experience of 
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insomnia is described as a struggle between revelation and denial, each time resisting 
revelation through a focus on the material.  His constant return to a consideration of 
the tangible in his life points to his desire to mute considerations of the intangible 
elements of his existence that cannot be measured in economic terms.  When he has 
insomnia, he stifles his thoughts that come bubbling towards the surface of his 
consciousness through a return to the trappings of his social status, whether it is an 
attractive woman, a stamp collection, or the plans for his wedding day.  In another 
sense, the insomnia functions symbolically as a representation of Anthony’s liminal 
existence, as a man who has higher philosophical and spiritual aspirations, but neither 
the desire nor drive to define or attain them.  He has the intelligence to recognize the 
futility of his life, but does not use this intelligence to alter its course.  He is also a 
liminal figure in the sense of his ability to depend on others.  Through much of his 
life, he has never had to work to earn a living, and was always cared for by his 
grandfather, so is fully dependent on that grandfather for his subsistence.  Yet, the 
sort of stable dependence that would allow restful, comfortable sleep (the kind Gloria 
wants) eludes him, and his relationship with his grandfather remains tenuous.  As 
secure as his life has always been, his future is equally insecure. 
Women as Remedy 
He hopes that Gloria will allow him to sleep, and uses her to allay his 
insomnia, just as he will use Dot, a woman with whom he has an affair, later in the 
text.  When he first meets Gloria, she is described as “the end of all restlessness, all 
malcontent” (107).  Shortly after the purchase of their country home, she “had lulled 
Anthony’s mind to sleep” (191).  So, her influence at times seems promising, as 
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though she will give him the peace he desires; he wants to slip into the routine of 
married life with Gloria, so he no longer has to make difficult decisions or force 
himself to change with hopes that being a husband is enough for him.  However, 
despite Anthony’s perceptions of Gloria as a soporific agent, the text indicates that 
she will ultimately do more to disrupt his sleep than enable it.  For example, when he 
is nodding off while contemplating the emptiness of life, it is Gloria’s visit that 
awakens him (55).  When he thinks of her dating other men, he cannot sleep (123).  
When he goes on a date with her, he is unable to sleep the whole night afterwards 
(127).  When he is about to marry her, he cannot sleep on the eve of his wedding 
(129).   After they purchase their new home, they stay awake all night with 
excitement (178).  And, after she and Anthony fight, he “stayed awake to brood upon 
the day, vaguely angry with her, vaguely dissatisfied” (210).  Gloria contributes more 
to Anthony’s insomnia than helps it.  She is not the solution he needs to allow him the 
rest he desires. 
Seemingly, Anthony’s insomnia is an ontological condition, bound up with his 
anomic conflicts of identity.  But it is important that these issues of identity remain 
consistently tied to his social class and the position of members of his class in 
American society at the time period before and after World War I that the text covers.  
His wealth at a young age affords him the privileges of time and study to gain insight 
into life, yet, at the same time, prevents him from leading what he knows would be a 
more meaningful life.  Both the ontological and phenomenological aspects of 
Anthony’s characterization as an insomniac are intrinsically connected to his social 
class, and this connection via insomnia contributes greatly to the social critique 
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Fitzgerald includes in this text.  According to Craig Monk, though Fitzgerald 
minimized the novel’s political intent, “his fiction seems, at some level at least, 
concerned with problems related to the political developments of the post-war era in 
the United States” (69).  Monk describes the political statement of this text as 
connected to “the disillusioning realization that there are limits to human 
accomplishment” which “was the lesson learned by all liberals as the lasting realities 
of the post-war period became manifest” (70).  Once liberals lost political power after 
World War I with the election of Republican candidate Warren Harding in 1920, their 
dreams of exerting powerful influence over the shaping of post-war Europe were 
thwarted by a movement to international isolationism (Monk 61).  Just as Anthony 
understands the power and influence he might have in his life, he realizes the futility 
of those same hopes, understanding that they will never be realized, similar to the 
failure of liberals to exert influence over world affairs and really make a mark in 
Europe.  His insomnia, symbolic of this struggle, also becomes symbolic of the 
anomic tensions of his generation, which struggled between the desire to shape world 
affairs and the inability to do so in a meaningful way. 
Monk argues that “the war is the root of social disillusionment in the novel” 
(66).  World War I provided “the restless generation” a distraction from the leisurely 
monotony of their lives, but once hopes of attaining influence and purpose from war 
participation were dashed, the war only became a source of destruction of hopes and 
dreams (66).  Anthony has his own dreams related to the war; he enlists, hoping to 
fight, but more importantly, hoping to be killed:  “It was all very purposeless and sad 
when Anthony told Gloria one night that he wanted, above all things, to be killed” 
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(308).  But even the idea of dying for his country (or himself) is futile.  Through the 
war, he seeks both the unconsciousness and honor he desires, and again, Fitzgerald 
uses Anthony’s sleep to reflect upon the position in which Anthony places himself.  
In military camp, prior to being sent away to fight, Anthony can finally sleep with at 
least some hope of giving his life purpose and value.  Fitzgerald writes, “For the first 
time in his life he could throw himself down on his cot between dinner and afternoon 
drill-call, and seeming to sink with each moment deeper into a bottomless bed, drop 
off immediately to sleep, while the noise and laughter around him faded to a pleasant 
drone of a drowsy summer sound” (318).  His ability to finally participate fully in 
something, with a clear goal in mind, allows him to rest at last. 
But even this rest is short lived for Anthony, and he again becomes restless.  
He begins an affair with a woman named Dorothy Raycroft, or more commonly, Dot, 
which “was an inevitable result of his increasing carelessness about himself” (324).  
Again, he realizes the futility of his involvement in the war effort and resumes his 
previous attitude of indolence and immorality, trying to assuage his restlessness 
through physical fulfillment.  The affair with Dot is a result of his moral exhaustion 
and he unites with her for the same flawed reasons he marries Gloria:  “The girl [Dot] 
promised rest; the hours in her company each evening alleviated the morbid and 
inevitably futile poundings of his imagination” (325).  The initial sense of purpose 
joining the army allowed Anthony eventually culminated in his awareness of the 
futility of his actions.  The futility of Anthony’s participation in the war perhaps 
reflects Fitzgerald’s sentiments on the false hope for influence the war fostered in 
America and the futility of those hopes.  Once Anthony realizes that he remains 
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ultimately purposeless, he again becomes restless and seeks repose in the material, 
trying to stifle the “poundings of his imagination” that tell him he is again acting in a 
misguided manner.  Dot becomes a new version of his stamp collection or his 
physical experience of his first moments with Gloria; she is a way to distract his mind 
so he can rest while conscious, but still does not provide him with the 
unconsciousness he so desires.  Of course, the affair with Dot does not serve its 
purpose and renders Anthony only the most temporary comfort and happiness. 
Consequently, Dot plays a significant role in the perpetuation of Anthony’s 
liminal state at the end of the novel.  Thinking he has severed ties with her when 
planning his return from the war and the resumption of his marriage with Gloria, he is 
dismayed that Dot returns to him and threatens suicide.  After speaking with her on 
the phone, Anthony “found himself walking slowly away, repeating over and over 
that it was futile to worry.  He had best go back to his tent and sleep.  He needed 
sleep.  God!  Would he ever sleep again?  His mind was in a vast clamor and 
confusion” (347).  The woman he hoped would help him rest, like all of his other 
feeble, lazy, and misguided attempts at happiness, perpetuates his insomnia.  But, 
again, we see Fitzgerald employing the language of futility and sleep as an escape 
from worry, which Anthony needs, but cannot have. 
Insomnia as Ontological State 
Dot does not kill herself, but continues to inflict pain on Anthony even after 
his return from the army.  His final fall, ironically coinciding with success in his 
lawsuit against his grandfather’s estate and the acquisition of the financial security he 
has always supposedly desired, comes just after Dot visits him in his apartment.  Her 
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visit enrages him, and he threatens to kill her.  Once she leaves, “a thick, 
impenetrable darkness came down upon him and blotted out thought, rage, and 
madness together—with almost a tangible snapping sound the face of the world 
changed before his eyes…” (446).  That “snapping sound” represents Anthony’s final 
descent into a state of semi-conscious liminality, that denies him both full 
consciousness, but equally importantly, unconsciousness.  He regresses into a child-
like state from which he believes his grandfather to still be alive (447).   
In the final paragraphs of the text, Fitzgerald describes Anthony’s condition: 
Anthony Patch, sitting near the rail and looking out at the sea, was not 
thinking of his money, for he had seldom in his life been really 
preoccupied with material vainglory, nor of Edward Shuttleworth [his 
grandfather’s lawyer who committed suicide after the lawsuit], for it is 
best to look on the sunny side of these things.  No—he was concerned 
with a great series of reminiscences, much as a general might look 
back upon a successful campaign and analyze his victories.  He was 
thinking of the hardships, the insufferable tribulations he had gone 
through.  They had tried to penalize him for the mistakes of his youth.  
He had been exposed to ruthless misery, his very craving for romance 
had been punished, his friends had deserted him—even Gloria had 
turned against him.  He had been alone, alone—facing it all.  (449) 
 
The opening line of this passage is worth noting, as it reveals Anthony’s underlying 
disavowal of the material, though many of his thoughts and actions seem to indicate 
otherwise.  The ironic tone of this passage, through the self-aggrandizement of his 
“insufferable tribulations,” indicates the dissonance between Anthony’s self-
perception as victim and his role as perpetrator of his own misery.  This final 
description of Anthony takes place during the day, and he is very much awake, but 
his state of consciousness is of an insomniac nature.  His mind is not in the present, 
but rather travelling back through time and his thoughts become illogical and 
paranoid, simulating the train of thought one may have during a period of insomnia.  
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Most significant, though, is his sense of isolation, which is the same isolation of 
which one is aware during a bout of insomnia.  He has a sense of being awake, yet 
utterly alone in the world, completely cut off from others and unable to communicate 
with them.  His insomnia, in this passage, is a time of re-visitation, as it is for so 
many insomniacs, and, more significantly, it must take place in mental, if not 
physical, isolation.  Sadly, it is the state in which Anthony will remain for the rest of 
his life, never able to reach the unconsciousness and attain the rest he desires. 
Emmanuel Levinas describes insomnia in the following way: 
Insomnia is constituted by the consciousness that it will never finish—
that is, that there is no longer any way of withdrawing from the 
vigilance to which one is held.  Vigilance without end.  From the 
moment one is riveted there, one loses all notion of a starting point or 
finishing point.  The present is welded to the past, it is entirely the 
heritage of the past:  it renews nothing.  It is always the same present 
or the same past that endures.  A memory would already be a 
liberation with regard to the past.  Here, time begins nowhere, nothing 
moves or shades off.  (Time 48) 
 
Levinas’ description of insomnia articulates Anthony’s mental state at the end of the 
novel.  He is, indeed, “welded to the past,” preoccupied with not a single memory that 
might bring him some happiness, but “a great series of reminiscences.”  His paranoia 
assures that he remains in a state of perpetual vigilance with no end in sight (other 
than his eventual death), and his present and past are inseparable.  The closing section 
of the story makes clear that Anthony will never find relief from perpetual 
consciousness.  In the preliminary statement of Studies in Hysteria, Josef Breuer and 
Sigmund Freud argue that in cases of hysteria, “all that is present is what might be 
called a symbolic relation between the cause and the pathological phenomenon, a 
relation such as healthy people form in dreams—so, for example, psychical pain is 
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joined by a neuralgia or the feeling of moral disgust by vomiting” (9).  They assert 
that the hysteric expresses psychic trauma through physical symptoms.  In combining 
the arguments of Breuer and Freud on hysteria with those of Levinas on insomnia, we 
can see a similar outcome in Anthony.  Anthony, immersed in a perpetually liminal 
state throughout his life is condemned to this state in illness, unable to attain relief 
through unconsciousness which can bring the resolution and outlet dreams afford.  In 
his life, he is trapped between conscious rationalizations of his actions and 
unconscious awareness of their futility, which he is never quite able to realize.  His 
final physical state expresses this same sense of being trapped.  He is physically 
immobilized and left mute, yet in a state of simultaneous awareness of his 
surroundings and delusion regarding his complicity in creating them.  By the end of 
the text, his inability to express himself at all mirrors his inability to express to 
himself his own culpability in his final state.  His physical immobility represents his 
psychical immobility through his failure to act in ways designed to achieve anything 
other than an untenable stasis, in which he will permanently remain.  
Anthony’s insomnia and his social status are integrated in several significant 
ways.  Firstly, his wealth facilitates his insomnia and his lifestyle cultivates it.  Peter 
Baldwin, for example,  notes the “uselessness” of the “pleasure seeking upper 
classes” especially as it relates to their ability to live nocturnally (81).  Anthony 
embodies this sense of “uselessness” and exhibits it through his insomnia.  He has the 
luxury of not being required to work, at least for his adolescence and young 
adulthood, which enables him to sleep and wake when he pleases, and he becomes 
fully immersed in the night life of the early part of the twentieth century.  Everything 
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in Anthony’s life has been set up for him to require the least amount of effort on his 
part, including the cleaning and maintenance of his luxurious Manhattan apartment.  
His one business requirement is his once weekly meeting with his broker, which 
“varied from semi-social chats to discussions of the safety of the eight per cent 
investments, and Anthony always enjoyed them” (12).  His lifestyle allows him to 
stay up late at night, drink heavily, and live with a minimal sense of responsibility. 
But, this “pleasant” sort of insomnia is a double-edged sword.  Just as 
Anthony can enjoy a life with few demands placed upon him, the persistent 
knowledge of the emptiness of this lifestyle haunts him and exacerbates this 
insomnia.  His dazzling life grows increasingly disenchanted, leading him to 
decisions that intensify his insomnia and trap him in the life he finds so depressing:   
Over and against these things was something which his brain 
persistently analyzed and dealt with as a tiresome complex but which, 
though logically disposed and bravely trampled under foot, had sent 
him to a library which had none of the books he most wanted. . . .  He 
found himself in a growing horror and loneliness.  The idea of eating 
alone frightened him; in preference, he dined often with men he 
detested.  Travel, which had once charmed him, seemed, at length, 
unendurable, a business of color without substance, a phantom chase 
after his own dream’s shadow.  (54-55) 
 
His hatred of his own life forces him not to make changes, but to continue along the 
same path, similar to the way in which an insomniac’s fear of insomnia can foster 
insomnia itself.  The friction between his knowledge that he can and should be doing 
something more meaningful with the resources he has been given, combined with the 
knowledge that he has, is, and will fail at doing so, constitutes the anomic state of 
being that perpetuates his insomnia. 
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Anthony is an excellent example of the anomic individual.  In the beginning 
of the text, he has the “means” to succeed in terms of wealth, but has never been 
taught to assert himself or actively pursue meaningful goals, so his needs and his 
internal means are out of synch.  The more he tries to find a direction, yet fails, the 
more pain he experiences, eventually diminishing both his interest in trying at all and 
in living altogether.  When he has lost his fortune, his desire to live comfortably, 
which is his fallback position, also becomes threatened, so he persists in a life he 
cannot afford without taking reasonable steps towards remedying the solution.  He is 
trapped between maintaining an unfeasible lifestyle that he has been taught to expect 
and forsaking this lifestyle to become a more complete person.  Yet, neither option, 
the wealth or the meaning, are within his grasp after his grandfather disinherits him.  
His desire to be successful on his own behalf ends up atrophied by the end of the text, 
much like his desire for material comfort. 
Insomnia can trap the insomniac in this same anomic cycle which Anthony 
experiences throughout the text.  An insomniac may plan a good night’s rest to be 
“productive” the next day, but another insomniac night can lead to another late 
morning and “wasted” afternoon.  As we see with Anthony, this insomniac instinct 
comes to fruition after he finally does obtain a job to support himself and Gloria.  
Fitzgerald writes, “His determination to stay in at night during the week did not 
survive, and a good half of the time he came to work with a splitting, sickish 
headache and the crowded horror of the morning subway ringing in his head.  Then, 
abruptly, he quit.  He had remained in bed all one Monday, and late in the evening” 
(231).  Quitting his job makes him “more depressed and discouraged than he had 
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been at any time since their marriage” (231), but this depression is not enough to 
change his behavior.  He is part of a vicious cycle of expecting failure and 
disappointment, thereby creating failure and disappointment, much as expecting 
trouble sleeping creates trouble sleeping. 
Gloria’s Insomnia 
Just like Anthony, Gloria frequently suffers insomnia for a number of reasons.  
The vampiric Gloria, whose life’s aspiration is to “sleep” often finds herself unable to 
do so.  She first exhibits signs of insomnia after her marriage to Anthony, likely as a 
result of her dissatisfaction with her life and the failure of this life to provide her the 
protection and rest she desires.  According to Monk, “In the absence of true, lasting 
happiness, Fitzgerald’s characters seek solace in shallow pleasures. . . .  Finally, in 
desperation, Gloria embraces her mother’s belief in ‘Bilphism,’ in the education and 
reincarnation of the soul” (68).  Monk argues that Gloria’s adoption of this new 
system of belief reflects a desperate attempt to rationalize her purposeless existence 
(68).  She becomes interested in a spiritual other-world to distract herself from her 
spiritless reality, much in the same way Anthony uses his stamp collection as a child.  
As she argues, “it’s always seemed to me that if I were unconsciously learning 
something here it might not be so meaningless,” to which Anthony replies, “You’re 
not learning anything—you’re just getting tired” (303).  She needs the other-world to 
give hope to her everyday world.  Appropriately, one of the first descriptions we get 
of Gloria’s insomnia comes because of the adaptation of this system of beliefs:   
Gloria’s penchant for premonitions and her bursts of vague 
supernaturalism were a surprise to Anthony.  Either some complex, 
properly and scientifically inhibited in the early years with her 
Bilphistic mother, or some inherited hypersensitiveness, made her 
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susceptible to any suggestion of the psychic, and, far from gullible 
about the motives of people, she was inclined to credit any 
extraordinary happening attributed to whimsical perambulations of the 
buried.  The desperate squeaking about the old house on windy nights 
that to Anthony were burglars with revolvers ready in hand 
represented to Gloria the auras, evil and restive, of dead generations, 
expiating the inexpiable upon the ancient and romantic hearth.  One 
night, because of two swift bangs downstairs, which Anthony fearfully 
but unavailingly investigated, they lay awake nearly until dawn. (187)   
 
Where Anthony turns his attention to the material (threats of robbers), Gloria remains 
fixated on the materialization of the other-worldly.  Hearing what she feels to be 
ghostly noises, she is unable to sleep, especially because she feels unprotected by 
Anthony and his “unavailing” efforts to keep them safe, which, of course can be read 
as symbolic of the state of their marriage.  If we look at her spirituality in terms of her 
efforts to distract herself from the problems of her earthly life, her insomnia can be 
interpreted as a desire to experience the spiritual for some sense of fulfillment.  She 
refers to ghostly acts as “whimsical” and relates them to the “ancient and romantic” 
hearth in her home; these are hardly suggestions of fear, but rather a romanticized 
world view that offers a somewhat pleasant, if at least amusing, alternative to the 
restful sleep she is denied.  
Aside from other worldly concerns, Gloria suffers from insomnia for very 
worldly reasons.  In one case, after Anthony is disinherited by his grandfather, Gloria 
lies awake contemplating the effects of aging on her appearance:  “As the long night 
waned she grew supremely conscious that she and beauty were going to make use of 
these next three months [until her twenty-ninth birthday]” (393).  She is especially 
concerned with aging for financial reasons, even over those of vanity.  Now that 
Anthony has no money, she hopes to earn her living through one of the limited means 
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available to women of her class and education: she hopes to become an actress.  She 
knows her looks are the only path to this career.  Unfortunately, her poor sleep of the 
night before makes her ill for an extended period of time, and she defers her plans of 
auditioning until the week before her birthday (394-95).  Her hopes of being on the 
screen remain unrealized when she is passed over for a “younger woman” (403). 
Gloria also suffers from insomnia when Anthony leaves for the army to 
prepare to fight in World War I.  Fitzgerald writes: 
Two o’clock saw her dry-eyed, staring with steady persistent grief into 
the darkness, remembering, remembering unmercifully, blaming 
herself for a hundred fancied unkindnesses, making a likeness of 
Anthony akin to some martyred and transfigured Christ. For a time she 
thought of him as he, in his more sentimental moments, probably 
thought of himself.  (361) 
 
Again, her insomnia is related to her position as wife of a soldier, but more 
importantly, it provides her an opportunity to empathize with her husband.  
Interestingly, however, the empathy she cultivates about Anthony is of a delusional 
nature, as he is far from a Christ figure, living his life in order to avoid suffering, 
rather than to sacrifice for others.  Even his enrollment in the military was a means of 
avoiding suffering and finding permanent unconsciousness rather than an act of valor 
and self-sacrifice. 
Thus, for both Anthony and Gloria, insomnia and social position are 
interconnected in complex ways.  The lifestyle they have which allowed them to 
sustain insomnia for years in relative comfort eventually prevents them from 
adjusting to new circumstances when their comfortable lifestyle is denied to them by 
Anthony’s grandfather.  Further, the conflict between Anthony’s aspirations and his 
actual capability to fulfill those aspirations leave him trapped in a liminal state 
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between wealth and poverty, action and inaction, and distraction and despair.  
Likewise, Gloria’s disillusionment with Anthony’s ability to reform keeps her trapped 
in a marriage which she still hopes will someday be restful.  The “restlessness” 
Weber describes as part of the motivation of Western capitalism and the insomnia of 
aspiration described by Fitzgerald exist within Anthony, yet instead of acting on this 
restlessness with the goal of what he would consider a “meaningful” achievement (he 
does not exactly know what this means, which is part of the problem), Anthony 
attempts to stifle that restlessness through his lifestyle.  Gloria, instead of making him 
accountable for his inaction, retreats into her own other-worldly belief system and 
resorts to what Fitzgerald calls “the negative principle ‘Never give a damn’” (203).  
When their affluent lifestyle fails them and they can no longer be distracted from their 
problems through parties and alcohol, Anthony’s mind snaps completely, leaving him 
in a state of continuous mental and emotional waking isolation.  Gloria is forced to 
become his babysitter, and live as a woman who appears to others to be “sort of dyed 
and unclean” (448).  For both, the makings of their fallen state and hints at the futility 
of their attempts to avoid their fall are apparent in the nature of the insomnia they 
both experience throughout the novel. 
Insomnia of Limitation 
Much like Anthony Patch, Waldo Frank’s character, Virginia Hade 
experiences an insomnia of anomie.  In order to explain the wealthy and white 
Virginia’s insomnia, we can compare it to the impoverished, black John Cloud’s 
untroubled sleep, as the text itself does.  Toni Morrison argues that with regard to 
issues of race implicit or (less frequently) explicit in literature: “[T]he subject of the 
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dream is the dreamer.  The fabrication of an Africanistic persona was reflexive; it was 
an extraordinary meditation on the self, a powerful exploration of the fears and 
desires that reside in writerly consciousness, an astonishing revelation of longing, of 
terror, of perplexity, of shame, of magnanimity” (208).  Frank illustrates this type of 
meditation through the thoughts of Virginia, a white woman.  Virginia uses John, 
both literally through her accusations of rape and assault, but also metaphorically, as 
a vehicle through which she can express her own fears and desires.  Morrison 
continues: 
There is no romance free of what [Herman] Melville called ‘the power 
of blackness,’ especially not in a country in which there was a resident 
population, already black, upon which the imagination could articulate 
the fears, the dilemmas, the divisions that obsessed it historically, 
morally, metaphysically, and socially.  This slave population seemed 
to volunteer itself as objects for meditation on the lure and elusiveness 
of human freedom, on the outcast’s terror and his dread of failure, of 
powerlessness, Nature without limits, inborn loneliness, evil, sin, 
greed. . . ; in other words, on human freedom in all terms except those 
of human potential and the rights of man.  (211-12) 
 
Virginia embodies, through her insomnia, this sort of articulation which Morrison 
applies to the Romantic text more generally.  John becomes for Virginia an object of 
contemplation, but she does not contemplate John as a unique individual, but as a 
relative being, exposing her own limitations and anxieties and idealizing the freedom 
and limitless nature that he purportedly represents.  She uses him for the purposes of 
her own attempts at self-awareness and escape from her own perceptions of bondage. 
Though, in many ways Virginia and John are reflections of each other in terms 
of the freedom of body they desire, John’s very clearly defined social role with no 
prospect of mobility enables him to sleep well.  This is not to say John is content in 
his lower position or to glorify his social status in any positive way, but if he is not 
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content, he is stable.  He does not lose any sleep over the possibility of wasted 
aspirations because he is all too clear on the limits to which he can aspire; whereas, 
Virginia’s ability to grasp at mobility, while facing the reality of her immobility, 
renders her sleepless.  On some levels, Virginia envies John’s security of social 
position (however insecure this position makes him in terms of security of 
personhood), and, rather than attacking those who oppress her (the white males who 
surround her), Virginia lashes out against John because it is only against him that her 
words have authority.  She attempts to assert power not by resisting the racist and 
misogynistic hegemonies of the American South in the 1920s, but by becoming the 
epitome of Southern social paradigms, however falsely contrived her position is:  the 
helpless woman victimized by the sexually violent and immoral black man who needs 
the white males around her to seek revenge on her behalf.  Through his text, Frank 
critiques the social system that cultivates and perpetuates such paradigms. 
Frank both asserts and resists these paradigms through the names of the 
primary characters.  Virginia Hade’s name is reminiscent of both the South itself (the 
state of Virginia) and hell, with the closeness of her surname to Hades.  Thus, her 
name conflates southern-ness and descent into the underworld.   As Morrison notes, 
“racial ideology” affects not only the racialized “other,” but also “the mind, the 
imagination, the behavior of the master” (208).  Frank illustrates this effect in terms 
of moral and physical damnation itself.  Conversely, John Cloud’s last name invokes 
connotations of ascent and transcendence.  The name “John” comes to represent the 
everyman, not the “other” but the average.  For Frank, he is symbolic of the norm 
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rather than relativity to a norm.  He is the standard of comparison; whereas Virginia’s 
name is rooted in relativity to her place in the South. 
Despite Virginia’s abuse of John, she realizes she is merely falling into 
prescribed roles and perpetuating, rather than challenging the cycles of racism, 
sexism, and violence that permeate her world and damn her soul.  Her daytime 
actions are in accord with the corruption of her values equated with life in the South, 
but her insomnia reveals both her knowledge of her own corruption, as well as her 
awareness of the need to resist those very same values she ultimately ends up 
reifying.  Our first introduction to Virginia’s inner consciousness begins with her 
insomnia:  “Virginia Hade lies in her broad mahogany bed, awake.  –I am afraid of 
sleep.  That’s why my eyelids tremble and burn; that’s why my hands hold rigid on 
my brow” (64).  Her insomnia makes her aware of her physicality, but more 
importantly that her physicality (white womanhood) is corrupt, as she thinks, “There 
is a poison in your body, and it lurks in knots.  If you draw in your leg, the poison 
lingers” (64).  Later, in the course of her insomniac train of thought, she thinks, “—
Lord, won’t You let me sleep?  Look:  I’m stretched out.  The poison can flow away, 
if only You’ll let it. . . .  —Sleep .. dream world… writhing shapes writhe out And 
stand upon my breasts And stand upon my mouth Forcing my lips!” (67).   This 
“poison,” or perceived corruption of her body, manifests itself most fully in her 
awareness when she tries to sleep and has only herself and her body with which to 
contend.  She is aware that the very movements of her body influence the movement 
of her supposed internal corruption.  The way in which she describes both her 
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insomnia and feelings of corruption also have religious implications, as she looks to 
God for both sleep and purification.   
Her insomnia is also intrinsically connected with her work on her family’s 
plantation.  She thinks: 
Is it wrong to work?  How hard I work… Bob is a loafer, and Papa’s a 
Judge. …  Ticketing Answering mail Billing and crediting and 
shipping  Sending the sugared fruit to the sour North ..  What does it 
do but wear away The shell of sleep The shell of ease, Baring the 
nerves that hunger!  Tiring my mind, tiring my decency So that my 
soul lies naked under this black night! (65-66) 
 
In this passage, she presents her work as essentially unsatisfying, but also 
contributing to a restlessness of the soul that prevents her sleep.  She sees her work as 
“tiring her decency,” and, therefore, seems to understand her own role in the South’s 
moral corruption and exploitation of black laborers.  Her work also pits her against 
her white family members who do not have to work as hard as she does, revealing the 
inequality of her relationship with the white males in her life.  She must work to earn 
a voice in her family, but her father and brother do not have to do the same.  They can 
merely observe and pronounce judgment, be heard without having to earn a voice. 
The most interesting points of Virginia’s insomnia revolve around her heavily 
racialized (and racist) view of the night.  Race, for her, is conflated with both the 
darkness of her soul and her sexuality, highlighting the main tensions she faces 
throughout the text, and culminating in her duplicitous instigation of John’s lynching 
and murder.  She refers to the night as “a raping nigger!” (66) and considers that “the 
night . . .  Breeds niggers!” (68).   Despite her use of overtly racist language, she 
seems to possess an understanding of the falsity of her description of the night as a 
“raping nigger” and the association of blacks with nighttime.  Just as John Cloud is 
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falsely accused of and murdered for rape (he is NOT “a raping nigger” as she and 
others characterize him), she sees “darkness” within herself rather than as part of the 
racialized “other.”  She asks, “Why can’t I sleep?  Are my insides dark?  Will they 
flood out if I sleep, Wash my white soul black?” (69), hoping for a transformation of 
her soul.    Then, she finally declares, “My soul’s not white!  Death’s white:  my soul 
wants to live. . . .  Soul, you’re a little black babe under my heart” (70).  The thoughts 
that conclude this monologue indicate that, for Virginia, it is not the perceived 
“blackness” within her that becomes a force of death, but is instead equated with her 
desire to live without restraint.  Here Virginia is making use of what Morrison refers 
to as “a fabricated brew of darkness, otherness, alarm, and desire” (212).  This 
association with internal blackness allows her to “employ an Africanistic persona to 
articulate and imaginatively act out the forbidden in American culture” (Morrison 
224).  She wants to act in ways that are forbidden to her because of her whiteness and 
femininity, but articulates such desires in terms of their “blackness” reflecting both 
her resistance to and internalization of racist social norms and beliefs. 
The language of the section of the text that depicts Virginia’s insomnia 
structurally recreates in readers the insomniac experience.  Throughout this section, 
the language is abrupt, both fixating on various ideas and flowing freely from image 
to image.  The section contains very little finite punctuation, mostly relying on the use 
of question marks, exclamations, and ellipses, rather than full stops.  The chaotic, 
flowing nature of this passage reflects the turmoil and tension within Virginia’s mind, 
as well as her conflicting views on race and gender.  Virginia is herself a liminal 
character, given the privileges of white skin and wealth, but the disadvantages and 
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limitations of femininity.  If we look at Virginia in terms of Durkheim’s theory of 
anomie, we can see a clear conflict between the desire for autonomy denied to her 
because of her gender and the power and freedoms afforded those of her race and 
class.  At the same time, she understands that blacks have their own power as well, 
and this power angers her.  After stabbing herself with John’s knife, she says, “But I 
am strong, John Cloud.  Have no fear.  I’ll meet you at your height” (183).  John, for 
Virginia, despite his low social status, has perceived freedoms she does not and can 
command attention she cannot.  After watching him swim in the hot summer 
afternoon, she says to him, “I’d love to do that too.  Run free.  Ride free.  Swim 
free… Be free, John, too” (164).  John is, of course, very far from free on many 
levels.  He knows that so much as a misinterpreted glance at a white woman could 
mean his doom (and a false accusation by one is his doom).  His body is under 
constant scrutiny and control.  Yet, Virginia perceives his ability to use his body in 
ways that she interprets as free because they are denied to her as the height of 
freedom.  She cries, “I am John Cloud” (170), but the knowledge that because she is a 
woman, she cannot and never can be John Cloud causes her to destroy him though an 
attempt at destroying herself, as she stabs herself with his knife, representing both a 
sexual act and act of self-destruction. 
John’s Sleep 
Unlike Virginia, John is very sure of his position in the world (surety and 
content should not be confused, however).  He acknowledges that “the cabin ‘n’ the 
swamp is chokin’ me” (21), yet he tells his mother “how lovely is our world. . . .  
Don’t you see how I loves..  how I loves.. our land!” (23).   His land is equated with 
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the nighttime:  “Our land!  Our night, it is!  Our breathin’, singin’ world!” (24).  On 
the other hand, the world of whites is not nearly as harmonious.  When describing 
night in the white part of town, John says, “Yo’ ought to see the night yonder on 
Main Street, Mammy.  Night’s all broken with jagged ugly lights.  Night’s runnin’ 
away from Main Street, all de time.  It’s our night, Mammy, an’ it’s our red lan’” 
(24).  He does not want what the whites have, so there is no sense of “aspiration” to 
be like those he cannot be, but more importantly, he does not aspire to have what the 
whites have because he does not want what the whites have; he sees it as corrupted.  
While John’s social position is untenable, his assurance of himself and relationship to 
the world around him is secure.  When he dives into the water, which is described as 
both sleeping and somnolent (138), he can experience pure, physical ecstasy, 
something denied to Virginia because of gender limitations placed upon her 
experience of her own body.  But, for John “An ecstasy is air, kissing his arms, his 
shoulders, lipping his chest as he flings off his shirt.  An ecstasy is air, clasping his 
thighs, his stomach, his legs.  John stands naked in the clasping air, between earth and 
water .. drinking the air he needs” (139).  The physical world does not frighten him as 
it does Virginia, but rather affords him both pleasure and sustenance; it gives him all 
he needs.  Despite his social immobility, he is able to experience his physical body, 
and through this body a perspective of connectedness with the land on which he lives 
and work, that Virginia is alienated from. 
After a long day working, John sleeps well.  While Virginia tosses and turns, 
struggling with hatred of herself and others, John declares to himself, “My flesh is 
whole!” upon lying down on his cot, listening to the sounds of the night outside from 
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the porch of his house (60).  For John, “Sleep is a sure peace whose balm lies swiftly 
near and casts its magic even upon the day.  John is awake .. but easeful in his 
waking.  Sleep is near. . . .  John feels the alchemy whereby this pent black world, 
drenching in ignorance and pain and soil, shines fair” (61).  The time before sleep, 
which to Virginia reveals corruption and violation, shows John something entirely 
different.  John clearly sees the “ignorance,” “pain,” and “soil” of the world, but the 
night, specifically the time before sleep, provides an end to this worldly suffering and 
exposes the possibility of a beautiful life.  As he falls asleep, “His body lies prone and 
sweetly wakeful within the magic of his folk” (61). 
He is lying in bed awake, but the wakefulness is both short lived and pleasant 
for John.  As with Virginia, we get a transcript of John’s inner monologue, but unlike 
Virginia’s, his is both coherent and replete with peaceful images.  For instance, he 
thinks, “There’s a white dream that stands between my mouth and Mary’s, A white 
sunbeam in my soul.  I’ll climb it.  That’s what it’s fo’!  I’ll vault with the white 
sunbeam!  Empty pale world .. world of the Free, Wait till I come an’ warm you:  
wait till I come an’ fill you” (62).  Rather than a conflict with his physical self, John 
experiences a sense of both peace and hope.  Whiteness, which for the white Virginia 
is evil, is for John an obstacle whose conquest could be glorious.  He neither exalts 
nor vilifies whiteness, but sees it simultaneously as an obstacle to freedom and a 
means to it as well.  Night is the time when he can envision his necessary place in the 
natural, rather than social, world, and this presence is a positive one, rather than 
Virginia’s “black” and “poisoned” vision of herself.  John’s monologue is also much 
shorter than Virginia’s as he quietly and peacefully falls asleep.  As Frank writes, 
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“Night is not made for thought.  Fantasy dances in oblique moon-motes.  Vision tides 
like a sea upon the tree-tops, drenching darkness in magic.  John is asleep” (63).  As 
he is not his own enemy, neither is the night, and he does not have to fight for sleep.  
Night returns him to harmony with the natural world around him and leaves the 
concerns of the social world for the daytime. 
Sleep and Death 
Virginia cannot indulge in the same fantasies as John, nor can she feel as 
comfortable with her body as he does in this scene and the one in the water; or, 
perhaps she can but is socialized against doing so.  In order to do so, she attempts to 
become John, first by kissing his girlfriend Mary, then by observing John’s naked 
swim and commenting on his body, and finally by stabbing herself with his knife (the 
sexual suggestiveness of this action is significant).  But, Virginia cannot become 
John, fails in her half-hearted attempt at suicide, and ultimately destroys what she 
cannot be by instigating a riot and allowing John to be lynched by not speaking the 
truth.  As John’s lynching occurs, Virginia again experiences insomnia,  but insomnia 
which indicates the possibility of a sense of peace engendered through her actions.  
Initially, she feels at peace, as Frank writes, “She lies at ease within her bed,” but this 
peace is short lived as she becomes “concerned in her own quiet” (227).  She 
becomes increasingly conscious of her body again, watching “a toe thrust up within 
the sheet” (227).  Despite her initial sense of peace, she starts to question herself:  
“Why am I not waiting also?  What am I so quiet?” “But,” writes Frank, “she knows 
she is not waiting.  She is replete.  She can stir a toe and watch it lift the linen” (227).   
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Though she remains “lying quiet in her sheet” the questions in her head 
become louder and more persistent:  “Did I make it?”  “Dare I stop what I did not 
create?”  “Will I go [save John Cloud]?”  “And what is ‘saving’?  And what is ‘John 
Cloud’?”  “Who made this wound?”  “Will I go?”  “Am I down there?  Am I your 
victim, John?”  “Did you make the storm of Nazareth that hunts you?  make it to hunt 
you?  make me make Nazareth hunt you?” (229).  The silence that she had previously 
experienced is now punctuated by Frank’s interjection of “Murmur.  Murmur” (229).   
She becomes both increasingly awake and frenetic and more aware of her body.  The 
murmuring ceases and silence returns, but again it is short lived.  This time, the 
silence is punctuated not by a murmur, but by a howl.  Frank writes, “The shutters of 
her room shiver:  HOWL .. bursts in her room” (230) breaking any sense of silence 
and peace she once felt.  Her final question is “Will I go?” (230).  She does not go, 
and John is attacked by an angry mob and immolated.  Finally, while John is burning 
to death, Virginia does sleep: “Virginia, soothed by the silence, sleeps in her bed” 
(233).  She finds the rest she wants, but readers are left with the sense of the futility of 
the temporary peace she has found as she will have to live with knowledge of her 
responsibility for John’s death. 
In Frank’s text, insomnia is used as a structural device to illustrate one’s 
ability to be at peace with his or her place in the natural and spiritual world, or, rather 
to transcend or fail to transcend that place.  John can transcend his social status in the 
time before sleep and envision a grander image of the world’s potential beauty.  
These moments of realization and peace come as he falls asleep, not exactly 
experiencing insomnia, but instead a winding down of his thoughts.  Because he is 
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allowed these moments of transcendence, yet also realizes their practical limitations, 
he does not experience the same level of anomie Virginia does.  He already has what 
he desires and has already learned the limits of his desire. Virginia, on the other hand, 
is in a double bind.  She is allowed some of the benefits of wealth and privilege, but 
denied a more spiritual and physical relationship with the world around her through 
her body as John has.  My argument here is not that John is somehow “closer to 
nature” than Virginia, but rather that John understands, in a way Virginia does not, 
the superficiality of social hegemony and is able to find solace when he is removed 
from society, which primarily takes place at night as he is trying to sleep.  John is 
frustrated and angered by the constant corruption he faces, but he does not allow that 
corruption to reach the core of his being, as Virginia, with her greater complicity, 
does.  The expectations placed upon her by the white males around her force her to 
simultaneously resist and participate in contemporaneous social hegemonies.  She 
attempts to transcend both race and gender, but when that fails, she falls back on the 
stereotype of the innocent white woman victimized by the sexually aggressive, 
animalistic black male.  Of course, John is neither sexually aggressive nor 
animalistic, and Virginia knows this to be the case, yet uses these classifications to 
destroy him.  She wants to be what she thinks he is, but because she does not truly 
understand what he is because of racial and sexual barriers, she can only be a force of 
destruction, both of herself and John.  These tensions within Virginia’s mind prevent 
her from sleeping until what she cannot be or have is gone.  Insomnia reveals the 
struggles of gender and class Virginia faces and the limited and horrific options she 
has to feel a sense of power. 
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Insomnia in the Colonial Text 
Virginia Hade and John Cloud live in an American society rigidly divided 
along lines of race and class, and, as such, their sleep is related to their disparate 
positions, drawing attention to both what makes them different, as well as what 
makes them alike.  We see a similar paradigm in British literature with regard to sleep 
in colonial societies in E. M. Forster’s novel A Passage to India.  Frantz Fanon, in his 
essay “Colonial War and Mental Disorders,” argues that colonialism itself creates 
psychological disorder:  “in this war psychiatric phenomena entailing disorders 
affecting behavior and thought have taken on importance where those who carry out 
the ‘pacification’ are concerned, or that these same disorders are notable among the 
‘pacified’ population” (249).  In his essay, Fanon describes countless cases of mental 
disorder related to colonial practices.  One common feature discussed in many of 
these cases is the subject’s insomnia.  As Fanon argues, “It is the painful, suffering 
body that calls for rest and peace” (289).   
As I noted earlier, oppression affects not only the oppressed, but also the 
oppressor.  It is a force of corruption for all involved.  Yet, even the oppressed are not 
without some power.  As Foucault argues, “Power comes from below; that is, there is 
no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of 
power relations, and serving as a general matrix” (History I, 94).  In other words, the 
exertion of control over others requires also an exertion, if not exhaustion, of energy 
and resources to affect that control.  The ability to require this assertion of resources 
is a form of power to which oppressed classes have access and resistance to control 
requires further exertion on the part of ruling classes.  In a sense, the oppressed force 
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the hand of the oppressor, determining action in order for the oppressor to perpetuate 
domination.  But the cost of this exertion is often damaging to the oppressor, as well 
as the oppressed. For Forster,  the oppressive, colonial system in India brings out the 
worst in people, corrupting and harming both the rulers and ruled.  As Adela Quested 
thinks of her fiancé Ronny Moore, “India had developed sides of his character that 
she had never admired” (80).  His position of authority in India damages his 
character, causing his corruption through his efforts to exert control over subjects. 
In A Passage to India, Forster places the country of India itself in a similar 
position as John Cloud, where India is both the oppressed and the source of tension 
for its oppressors.  Fanon argues that in a colonial system, “The colonized people find 
that they are reduced to a body of individuals who only find cohesion when in the 
presence of the colonizing nation” (294).  Forster illustrates Fanon’s argument 
through his personification of India itself, as described through the view of the 
British, for whom he writes, “This pose of ‘seeing India’ … was only a form of ruling 
India; no sympathy lay behind it” (306).  The British constantly attempt, and fail, to 
see India as a unified whole.   “Seeing India” for Forster means dominating its people 
by authorizing them through interpretation, so they are seen not as individuals but as 
a whole nation, much in the way Virginia sees John Cloud as an image of her own 
racialized fantasies of physicality and sexuality, using him through her depictions of 
him, rather than using her depictions to understand him as a unique individual in any 
meaningful way.   
Forster describes India in terms of its liminality, being almost asleep and 
restlessly awake, beginning each of the novel’s three sections with a description of 
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the country itself.  He further characterizes India as being in a paradoxical position of 
being incredibly ancient, yet not fully formed.  Of this novel, Edward Said argues, 
“Forster’s using India to represent material that according to the canons of the novel 
form cannot in fact be represented—vastness, incomprehensible creeds, secret 
motions, histories, and social forms” (200).  The country is massive, yet the 
characters are often claustrophobic.  There is a deep spirituality underlying the 
pettiest of political quarrels.  India is represented in the novel at multiple levels, 
including the level of the social, exposing systems of domination, but also the 
spiritual, as we learn that Mrs. Moore comes to India with “an easy” goal:  “To be 
one with the universe!” (208).  In attempting to realize this goal, vague and clichéd in 
its presentation, she uses India as the subject of her self-reflections, again in a way 
similar to Virginia’s use of John.  India becomes the land through which both its 
inhabitants and visitors attempt to connect with spirituality, yet also find out how 
distant spiritual understanding is because India is only imagined in terms of their own 
conceptions of spirituality, rather than on its own terms.  They can never “see” India 
because their vision of India is always occluded by their vision of what India 
represents in Western culture.  At the opening of the book’s third and final section, 
Forster writes, “God is not born yet—that will occur at midnight—but He has also 
been born centuries ago, nor can he ever be born, because he is Lord of the Universe, 
who transcends human processes.  He is, was not, is not, was” (283).  We have in this 
passage the language of paradox and incomprehensibility; as long as the characters 
remain human and view the world through their human biases and preconceived 
ideas, this paradox cannot be resolved. 
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Forster situates this conception of God at a liminal moment, both on the verge 
of awakening (being born) and sleeping (having been born centuries ago—perhaps 
now exhausted or unconscious).  If we look at the moment of falling asleep as Jean-
Luc Nancy describes it, a falling away of the self from the self, Forster’s God exists 
in this moment of the simultaneous “is,” “was not,” “is not,” and “was.”  In other 
words, God exists on the threshold between consciousness and unconsciousness that 
humans cannot grasp in their experience.  As Glen Allen argues, India “has no unity 
itself” (937).  Yet, in the novel we have two characters in particular who attempt to 
reconcile the ancient India with the new and developing (rather than developed) 
India:  Dr. Aziz and Mrs. Moore.  Aziz is an Indian native, yet attempts to befriend 
and embrace the British nationals who now control and inhabit his country.  He wants 
to see a peace brokered and puts himself on the front lines.  Mrs. Moore, on the other 
hand, is a visiting British national, but different in that she shows deference for Indian 
culture (for example, she removes her shoes before going into the mosque with Aziz) 
and sympathizes with the native inhabitants in a way the other British characters 
largely fail to do.  These are the two characters who experience insomniac states the 
most significantly throughout the text.  Their insomnia, then, can be interpreted as an 
attempt (a failed attempt, as Forster suggests any attempt to “understand” India would 
be) to comprehend the significance of India itself and its liminal place in the world.  
They are not merely sleepwalking through the country, turning their eyes from 
injustice.  Forster writes, “Inside its cocoon of work or social obligation, the human 
spirit slumbers for the most part, registering the distinction between pleasure and 
pain, but not nearly as alert as we pretend” (132).  If most of the characters, then, are 
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merely slumbering their way through life, it becomes significant to note the 
observations of those who experience troubled sleep, like Aziz and Mrs. Moore. 
Allen argues that much as in the West, “light and sun imagery in Hindu 
philosophy is associated with intelligence,” yet, “Forster [in a scene describing a 
match illuminating the Marabar Caves] is pointing to the inadequacy of intelligence 
or reason in its effort to discover within the limits of its categories the ultimate nature 
of the universe” (943).  Given Forster’s conception of the failure of light to render all 
things comprehensible, it is important that Aziz’s and Mrs. Moore’s contemplations 
take place in the dark and in a space of consciousness between “enlightened” daytime 
thought and unconscious thought.  When Aziz is ill with a fever, for example, and he 
dozes, “his thoughts wandered over the varied surface of life” (101).  Life is not 
cohesive and continuous for Aziz, but rather infinitely complex.  Sitting awake in bed 
conversing with Fielding, who has visited him, Aziz is able to clearly articulate the 
position on India of many Westerners:  “Here’s your home. . . .  Here’s the celebrated 
hospitality of the East.  Look at the flies.  Isn’t it jolly?  Now I suppose you want to 
be off, having seen an Oriental interior” (115).   Aziz understands that for many 
Westerners, “seeing” India is merely an accretion of experiences with no true 
consequential empathy.  However good their intentions may be, for Westerners, 
seeing is equated with domination and “real” Indian life becomes a sort of side show 
for cultural amusement. 
Mrs. Moore has a similar realization, when, exhausted, she is hoping for a 
nap, but kept awake by Adela’s conversation.  Forster writes, “She felt increasingly 
(vision or nightmare?) that, though people are important, the relations between them 
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are not . . . centuries of carnal embracement, yet man is no nearer to understanding 
man” (135).  Like Aziz, she understands that to “see” something is not to empathize 
with it, and the reliance on imposed social boundaries can only separate people from 
each other.  Forster’s use of “vision or nightmare?” in this passage points to the 
ephemeral nature of Mrs. Moore’s revelation.  It is not an “enlightened,” daytime 
thought, but a truth revealing semi-hallucination brought about by exhaustion.  It is 
the type of realization only made possible without the full use of consciousness, or, 
rather, beyond the limits of daytime consciousness.  Upon leaving India, Forster 
describes Mrs. Moore as having “had come to that state where the horror of the 
universe and its smallness are both visible at the same time—the twilight of the 
double vision in which so many elderly people are involved” (207).  She is able to see 
the universe in terms of irresolvable paradox, which Forster notes involves “the 
twilight of double vision,” and seems to imply that seeing the universe means simply 
understanding that it cannot be seen singularly.  The view itself is uncertain and 
associated with the space between light and dark, consciousness and unconsciousness. 
When she abruptly awakens in the middle of the night during her departure 
from India, she fully understands its incomprehensibility:  “’I have not seen the right 
places,’ she thought . . .  ‘So you thought an echo was India; you took the Marabar 
caves as final? . . .  What have we in common with them, or they with Asirgarh?’” 
(209-10).  She understands the failure of the “cohesion” colonizers assert over those 
whom they colonize.  India cannot be a singular experience, something reducible to 
an overall sentiment or epiphany gathered through a series of cultural observations, 
but is rather a combination of binaries and contradictions.  Just as we only “know” 
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sleep because we are not awake and know waking only as not being asleep, India can 
only be “known” through being unknowable.  In a sense, it is similar to the Kantian 
sublime; what we can comprehend points to something beyond comprehension, only 
approaching comprehensibility through its very incomprehensibility. 
Where Mrs. Moore’s attempts at understanding India take place on a semi-
spiritual level, Aziz’s understandings are more bound with social liminality.  For 
example, even after his name has been cleared in the trial over the assault on Adela, 
his sleep suffers.  He says to Cyril Fielding, “It is those who stop in the country, not 
those who leave it, whom such a story [of his alleged attack on Adela] injures.  
Imagine my dismay and anxiety.  I could scarcely get a wink of sleep. First my name 
was coupled with her and now it is yours” (272).  This passage expresses Aziz’s 
understanding of relations between the British and Indians.  His knowledge of the 
perceived harm done through the linking of a British citizen’s name with that of an 
Indian, despite his earlier efforts at befriending the British and Fielding’s statements 
to the contrary indicate that he has come to understand, in part through his insomnia, 
the incompatibility of the two cultures on the colonial front.  He knows his name has 
no power beyond India, as “those who leave it” will not be affected by such a 
coupling, but understands that while in the country, Indian-British friendships are 
unsustainable.  Because association with his name cannot harm those who leave, 
these damaging relationships exist only within and because of the colonial regime. 
Forster, like both Fitzgerald and Frank, has a dual purpose in his use of 
insomnia.  On one hand, a character’s insomnia reveals the liminality of their 
position, social or spiritual.  Mrs. Moore comes to India to find answer to her own 
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spiritual questions, but realizes, through her insomnia that those questions cannot be 
answered, and the practices of Indian governance interfere with such revelations.  
Aziz, who at first hopes to become the friend of the British, realizes, also during 
states of insomnia, the futility of such efforts so long as a system of colonial 
domination is in place.  On the other hand, insomnia not only exposes the liminality 
of belief, but also the liminality of social position.  Mrs. Moore has come to India to 
view Indians as equals, and ultimately cannot do so.  Similarly, Aziz hopes to foster a 
sense of equality between Indians and British, but also fails.  They are both positioned 
between the two disparate societies.  As with Fitzgerald’s Anthony Patch and Frank’s 
Virginia Hade, insomnia is symbolic of the character’s liminal social position, with 
hopes of mobility but not access to it, but also evidence of the character’s ultimate 
uncertainty about their ability to give their lives the meaning they desire because of 
their social position; thus, insomnia has both phenomenological associations, as it is a 
part of their everyday experience, and ontological ones, as it reflects their state of 
being in both the social and spiritual world.  In essence, insomnia unites these two 
worlds, illustrating that they cannot and refuse to be separated from each other. 
Insomnia and Female Labor 
Thus far, I have discussed insomnia as it relates to those in a position of 
liminal and precarious states of privilege, specifically dealing with those who have 
hopes of social elevation but face serious obstacles to such attainments, as well as 
those, like John Cloud and Mrs. Moore, who see the disconnection between social 
aspiration and meaningful spirituality.  However, to be fair, insomnia has a more 
utilitarian side, and it also strikes the under-classes, primarily because they have to 
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work nights for the sake of subsistence.  This type of insomnia, forsaking sleep to 
work, has historically taken place for centuries.  According to Ekirch, “Among the 
hardest workers—night in, night out—were women.”  For women, continues Ekirch, 
“Night brought little seeming relief.  Often, to paraphrase a contemporary, work was 
exchanged for work.  Domestic tasks invariably extended the days toil” (163).  We 
see examples of women working all day and then into the night in the works of 
American authors John Steinbeck and Gertrude Stein.  While my intent in this 
argument is not to deny women’s ability to use insomnia as a time and space of 
agency and reflection, it is important to note a disparity between women’s access to 
the night world and that of men.  Baldwin argues that through much of the nineteenth 
century, women’s access to public spheres at night was severely restricted.  Going out 
into public at night was both a subject of social disapprobation and practical danger; 
for the most part, women who ventured out at night had better do so with a male 
companion, or risked physical and verbal harassment and violation (154).  While the 
twentieth century and its related illumination afforded women more freedom to 
venture out into the night, efforts were still made to limit women’s access to the 
public sphere after dark supposedly for their own good (Baldwin 180). 
Accordingly, much of the nighttime behaviors we see with women occur 
mainly within the domestic realm (Richardson’s Miriam is a noteworthy exception, as 
discussed in Chapter 4).  Steinbeck’s novel, The Grapes of Wrath, includes a 
character, Ma Joad, who chooses insomnia for the sake of protecting and preserving 
her family, indicating her internalization of this role, as well as the limitations it 
places upon her.  Due to the combination of the advent of mechanized farming and 
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the devastation of farmable lands in the Mid-West that occurred during the Dust 
Bowl, the Joad family is forced to leave their farm, which no longer supports them, to 
try and find work in California.  To prepare for the trip, the family stays up all night 
packing their belongings.  Ma is the leader of the family:  “They waited for her to 
come back across the darkening yard, for Ma was powerful in the group” (103).  She 
is the one who “started the fire roaring” (104), which allows the family both to eat 
and to have the light by which they can continue their preparations.  At one point, Jim 
Casy, a former preacher accompanying the family on its journey, comments that Ma 
“looks tar’d,” to which Tom (Ma’s son) replies, “Women’s always tar’d … That’s 
just the way women is…”  However, Casy notes that she seems “tar’der than that. 
Real tar’d, like she’s sick tar’d.”  Ma overhears Casy’s comment, and “Slowly her 
face tightened, the lines disappeared from the taut muscular face.  Her eyes sharpened 
and her shoulders straightened” (108).  Despite her exhaustion, Ma makes an effort to 
prevent her family from realizing how tired she is.  She knows that she must lead 
them through the preparations and sacrifices her physical well-being to do so.  She 
chooses insomnia to protect her family.  By making her insomnia relative to her 
position as caretaker, she reveals the limitations of this assumed role, but through her 
enactment of this role and denial of its damaging effects, she illustrates her own 
strength and integrity. 
Ma’s self-sacrifice continues throughout the trip to California.  For example, 
on the way there, she “had folded her hands in her lap, had retired into a resistance 
against weariness” (164).  Throughout the novel, she watches over her other family 
members as they sleep, and even sedates the family’s grandfather who refuses to 
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leave his home in order to bring him along (127), but hardly ever sleeps herself.  She 
says to herself, “I pray God we gonna get some res’.  I pray Jesus we gonna lay down 
in a nice place” (217).  For Ma and the rest of the family, California (at least until 
they actually get there) represents a promised land, a heaven from which they can 
cease to be like those others forced off their land who “Walk arou’ like they was half 
asleep” (77) and begin anew.  It is a land of redemption, but it is also the place where 
she hopes to finally find some rest.  She knows that until she gets there, she must 
sacrifice her own sleep in order to maintain her vigil over the rest of her family; until 
then, her work is incomplete and she cannot sleep.  When California turns out to be 
an utter disaster (no work, no food, no shelter, family in ruins as Tom is forced to 
escape the police and Rose of Sharon has a miscarriage), Ma’s inability to sleep 
persists:  “Ma turned restlessly in her sleep.  Her eyes started wide open” (447).  
Because her family is not safe, Ma never gets the rest she requires.  Her sacrifice is 
highly spiritualized—she is the family’s protector and guardian.  She sees it as her 
vocation to care for them and keep the family together, and because her family is 
poor, she takes on the brunt of the responsibility for their care through the sacrifice of 
her sleep.  As long as she is unable to protect her family, though not through lack of 
trying, she remains unable to sleep.  Her insomnia does not indicate that she has sins 
with which she must reckon, as with Anthony or Virginia, but rather that she has a 
strong sense of guiding purpose which keeps her awake and ever-vigilant. 
Stein provides a similar example in the novella “The Good Anna” from Three 
Lives.  Stein’s character Anna, like Ma Joad, works tirelessly to care for those around 
her, and in doing so, sacrifices her own health and welfare—she sees this role as 
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caretaker as an intrinsic part of her identity connected to both her social position as a 
member of the servant class and her femininity.  In the beginning of the story, Anna is 
defined through her exhaustion, as Stein notes that “Anna led an arduous and troubled 
life” (7).  She sacrifices herself to her work because “To her thinking, in her stubborn, 
faithful, german soul, this was the right way for a girl to do” (23).  Her faith in the 
social role into which she was born motivates her tireless work:   
Anna really did believe with all her might.  It was her fortune never to 
live with people who had any faith, but then that never worried Anna.  
She prayed for them always as she should, and she was very sure that 
they were good. . . .  Anna found it hard to always know why it was 
that things went wrong.  Sometimes her glasses broke and then she 
knew that she had not done her duty by the church, just in the way that 
she should do.  (46)  
 
The ironic tone of this passage suggests Anna finds a great deal of fault with those 
around her, but sees their reform as part of her vocation.  Ultimately, she does not 
blame herself when “things went wrong,” but rather the failings of others, which she 
takes on as her own responsibility.  Part of her hard work involves caring for her dogs 
and the people around her:  “Periods of evil thinking came very regularly to Peter and 
to Rags and to the visitors within their gates.  At such times Anna would be very busy 
and scold hard” (8).  Here, Stein emphasizes the religious nature of Anna’s work by 
associating her business with the prevention of evil and her association of any sort of 
failure, like her glasses breaking, as a religious failure, though not her own lack of 
belief.  Her role as a woman is also a role as a savior.  She is not corrupted by wealth 
like those she works for, but can rather use her ascetic position as one of reformer. 
Stein also emphasizes the exhaustion Anna feels through illustrating Anna’s 
stubborn refusal to rest:  “No argument could bring her to sit an evening in the empty 
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parlour . . . and tired as she was, she would never sit down during the long talks she 
held with Miss Mathilda” (17).  Anna’s sense of position (she is Miss Mathilda’s 
servant) and her drive to fulfill her duties, which she largely sees as protecting those 
around her from either want or evil, result in an exhaustion that ultimately threatens 
her life.  Eventually, Anna is persuaded to rest and she undergoes an operation meant 
to restore her to health, but only after being assured that her household duties will be 
covered.  However, even the operation and period of rest has little success.  Stein 
writes, “When she was once more at work for her Miss Mary Wadsmith, all the good 
effect of these several months of rest were soon worked and worried well away.  For 
all the rest of her strong working life Anna was never really well.  She had bad 
headaches all the time and she was always thin and worn” (23).  Her concerns for 
others keep her awake at night as well, as we learn that “She worked and worked all 
day and thought all night how she could save” (59).  Literally, Stein is writing about 
Anna saving money (so she can give it to others), but her use of the word “save” had 
a dual meaning—Anna also tries to save people; this is how, despite her relatively 
inferior social position she can give her life meaning.  She does not have wealth or 
property to sacrifice to others, so she sacrifices her sleep and well being.  Her need to 
save others keeps her awake.  By the end of the story, “Anna grew more tired, her 
headaches came oftener and harder, and she was now almost always feeling very sick. 
She could not sleep much in the night” (61).  Throughout the story, Anna transcends 
her physical suffering to fulfill the sense of duty as a woman that her faith instills in 
her and this tendency causes her to lose her health.  Anna is very similar to Ma Joad 
in the way she sacrifices her body to protect those around her, limited to the domestic 
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realm, and the form which this sacrifice takes is her constant and perpetual 
restlessness; for both women, religious belief combined with lack of material 
resources through which they can aid those around them cause their willful insomnia. 
Conclusions 
Characters of all social positions, races, and genders have trouble sleeping and 
experience insomnia, but the reasons for this troubled sleep differ from character to 
character and are largely contingent upon status.  Poor characters, like Ma Joad and 
Anna, sacrifice their bodies through sacrificing their sleep because it is all they truly 
have to give and their “giving” is limited to the domestic realm because of their 
gender and class status.  Similarly, John Cloud essentially sacrifices his body at the 
end of Holiday by not resisting the lynching because it too is all he has.  On the other 
hand, characters who are in a position to use their wealth and power to give their lives 
purpose come, through their insomnia, to the realization of the falsity of material 
goods to provide and ensure happiness.  When Anthony Patch finally gains the 
financial security he desires, it does not enable him to rest and experience 
unconsciousness, but rather does the opposite; it places him in a state of permanent 
insomnia.  Because, as Anthony realizes, the wealth is never really what he wanted, 
he cannot rest easy once he has it, and at the same time, the wealth is his primary 
obstacle to finding out what it is he really wants.  It is a glittering distraction, keeping 
him awake at night.  Mrs. Moore has material wealth, but wants spiritual wealth as 
well.  But, like Anthony, social position (her role in a colonial empire) becomes an 
obstacle.  She cannot have a “pure” experience of India because of the very reasons 
she has come to India in the first place, to “see” what Britain now owns.  Virginia 
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Hade is in a similar position of complicity with corruption, unable to be free because 
of the freedoms she participates in denying to others.  Virginia falls back on her 
teachings, becoming the epitome of what she hates, and Mrs. Moore, with her final 
revelations of futility, dies. 
In all of these texts, insomnia is a chronotope of revelation and becoming.  In 
is in times of insomnia characters realize the falsity of social position and see status 
as an obstacle to fulfillment, rather than the means to fulfillment they were socialized 
to believe it is.  Insomnia is the physical enactment of anomic tension created by the 
visibility of realms to which individuals are denied access due to their class, race, 
gender, and status.  Anomie is liminal:  one is trapped between desire and attainment 
of desire.  Likewise, the liminality of insomnia, being trapped between sleeping and 
waking, reflects restlessness and discomfort in a situation where one should be able to 
rest (the comfort of one’s own bed).  Further complicating this dynamic is the 
valorization of restlessness (though not insomnia) as a marker of productivity and 
moral goodness within a capitalist paradigm.  Yet, as many of the characters I have 
discussed illustrate, restlessness neither fosters material productivity, nor reveals a 
state of moral goodness.  If anything, it gets in the way of both.  Rather, the 
restlessness associated with insomnia, in these literary texts, exposes the immorality 
of characters like Virginia and Anthony, and the incomplete morality of others like 
Mrs. Moore.  And, these texts very clearly indicate the interrelationship between 
morality and social position, specifically through the characters’ behaviors during and 
reactions to their insomnia. The isolation and thought-time of insomnia forces these 
characters to face themselves not as social beings, but as individuals forced into an 
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untenable social position, but also allows them to realize the consequences of their 
position.  Whether that position comes with poverty, as it does for Anna or Ma Joad, 
or through an abundance of material comforts, as with Virginia Hade and Anthony 
Patch, insomnia foreshadows the ultimate collapse of who these characters thought 
they could and should be.  It does  bring about reflection and revelation, but when that 
revelation is obfuscated by social circumstance, the hopes brought about by such 
revelation atrophy.  Having insomnia without being able to learn from the insomnia 
renders insomnia symbolically meaningful yet futile with regard to action and 
behavior.  All of these characters are doomed by their own exhaustion, which is 
merely a consequence of the roles they have been expected to fill. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
A VISION OR A WAKING DREAM:  INSOMNIAC LITERATURE 
 
John Keats closes the final stanza of his poem “Ode to a Nightingale” with 
two questions:  “Was it a vision, or a waking dream? / Fled is that music:—do I wake 
or sleep?” (8.9-10).  His uncertainty about his state of consciousness is significant.  
This poem, about the liminal space between life and death, which he relates to the 
space between sleeping and waking, asserts that it is from this liminal space that 
poetry itself is produced.  For Keats, a Romantic poet, this space allows for reverie, 
and reverie for contemplation and art.  Arguably, this drowsy state of reverie for the 
Romantics became insomnia for the Modernists.  Where Keats finds himself being 
lulled to sleep, unsure of whether or not he has yet to reach unconsciousness, his 
modernist counterparts find themselves vigilantly awake, wondering if they will reach 
sleep at all.  Yet, the liminality and significance of this space remain.  The question, 
“Do I wake or sleep?” remains an important one because the answer itself, as Keats 
suggests through even asking this question, resists such binary classification. 
Writing about authorship and the space between consciousness and 
unconsciousness, Maurice Blanchot argues: 
[I]t is thus toward another sort of language entirely—the language of 
writing, the language of the other that, outside of everything, outside 
of consciousness and unconsciousness, in the element that vacillates 
between waking and reawakening, we know ourselves (not knowing 
this) to be always already deported. 
 Of course, the separation, which seems to affect the one and 
the other and divide them infinitely, can in its turn give place to a 
dialectical process.  (Disaster 79-80) 
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This dialectical process, the vacillation between the sleeping and waking self and the 
way each changes and shapes the other, for Blanchot, is also that which allows for the 
language of writing.  According to Peter Schwenger, “Any page of a novel is a 
threshold zone, whose words simultaneously partake of the waking and the dreaming 
worlds”  (21).  He continues, “writing always takes place in a liminal zone, neither 
wholly on the page, nor wholly in the mind” (23).  Insomnia, which Schwenger 
characterizes as “almost always more liminal than simple wide-awakeness” (ix) and 
which for many, as I discussed in the second chapter may very well be a series of 
vacillations between sleeping and waking, is a time and space encompassing this 
dialectical process discussed by Blanchot from which writing emerges, especially in 
the Modernist period, during which insomnia was so culturally and historically 
significant.   
 Mikhail Bahktin provides useful language through which to discuss both the 
phenomenology and ontology of insomnia as it relates to authorship.  Bahktin uses 
the term chronotope to define the interrelationship of time and space:  “We will give 
the name chronotope (literally, ‘time-space’) to the intrinsic connectedness of 
temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (84).  
While in this definition of the chronotope, Bahktin is referring to a specific element in 
the text itself (the insomniac’s experience of time when in bed awaiting sleep is an 
example), the association between time and space also has significant implications for 
the authorship of the text itself.  Bahktin argues: 
We might put it as follows:  before us are two events—the event that is 
narrated in the work and the event of narration itself (we ourselves 
participate in the latter, as listeners or readers); these events take place 
  
 
297 
 
in different times (which are marked by different durations as well) 
and in different places, but at the same time these two events are 
indissolubly united in a single but complex event that we might call 
the work in the totality of its events, including the external material 
givenness of the work, and its text, and the world represented in the 
text.  (255) 
 
Thus, for Bahktin, an inextricable relationship exists among the time and space 
contained within the text, the time and space of authorship, and the time and space of 
readership.  This relationship among these disparate chronotopes as they are related to 
the phenomenological and ontological experience of insomnia, for characters, 
authors, and readers, are the subject of my inquiries in this chapter. 
If one were to compile a list of modernist authors, and choose from this list at 
random, chances are quite good that the authors selected would be insomniacs.  
Among the insomniac Modernists, we can find names such as Marcel Proust, Franz 
Kafka, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, and 
Vladimir Nabokov, to name just a few of numerous examples.  Modernists are not the 
only authors to suffer insomnia, and other notable insomniacs from literary history 
range from Homer and William Shakespeare to Gustave Flaubert, Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, and Charles Dickens (Schwenger 149).  In short, a connection appears to 
exist between insomnia and authorship, and it is the nature of this connection I seek to 
explore in this chapter, specifically as it relates to modernist literature.   
In his 1865 text, entitled On Wakefulness, physician John Hammond proposes 
a possible explanation as to why authors are more prone to insomnia than others 
through making the connection among cultural refinement, propensity towards 
excessive thought, and insomnia:  “As nations advance in civilization and refinement, 
affections of the nervous system become more frequent, because progress in these 
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directions is necessarily accompanied by an increase in the wear and tear of those 
organs through which perceptions are received and emotions excited” (39).  
Hammond argues that despite increasing levels of material comfort and hygiene made 
possible by modernization, instances of insomnia become more, not less, prevalent 
specifically because of an increased stimulation of perceptive and emotional faculties.  
In other words, the less one has to guard against environmental dangers, the more one 
can devote time to thought, yet thought sometimes begets over-thought, which begets 
insomnia.  As Hammond asserts, “irregular or excessive cerebral action”  leads to a 
heightened propensity towards sleeplessness (40).  For Hammond, a combination of 
intelligence and sensitivity to perceptions of the world produce insomnia.  
Accordingly, he believes that “the more active the mind the greater the necessity for 
sleep, just as with a steamer, the greater the number of revolutions its engine makes 
the more imperative is the demand for fuel” (12).  Using mechanistic language, 
Hammond not only equates mental stimulation with insomnia, but asserts that those 
who are the most mentally stimulated, and therefore sleep less, should actually be 
sleeping more because their mental faculties are more in need of restoration. 
Hammond’s arguments derive from his theory that all bodily organs and 
tissues are in a constant state of decomposition when in use, only to be remedied 
through periods of rest and inactivity (11).  In the case of the brain, “Its substance is 
consumed by every thought, every action of the will, by every sound that is heard, by 
every object that is seen, by every substance that is touched, by every odor that is 
smelled, by every painful or pleasurable sensation, and so each instant of our lives 
witnesses the decay of some portion of its mass and the formation of new material to 
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take its place” (12).  This “formation of new material” can only take place during the 
comparative rest of sleep, which allows restoration of the mental faculties because not 
all parts of the brain are at work.  Interestingly, from Hammond’s perspective, sleep 
and intellect are in a paradoxical relationship:  while heightened intellect leads to 
propensity to poor sleep, poor sleep leads to a reduction of intellect.  He cautions, 
“Upon the intellectual powers the mischief [of insomnia] is still more serious. . . .  
[M]any a noble spirit has been utterly prostrated by habitual loss of rest” (43).   Citing 
multiple case studies of literary authors as patients whose work suffers from their 
inability to sleep, the treatment he consistently finds to be most effective for restoring 
“normal” sleep patterns is a hiatus from intellectual activity (43-44; 62-68). 
Hammond is not alone in his association between insomnia and those who 
perform mental labor.  While A. W. MacFarlane, writing about a quarter of a century 
later, disagrees with Hammond that those who do active brain work require more 
sleep, he agrees with the correlation between high brain function and the tendency 
towards sleeplessness: 
The more highly-cultured races sleep for a shorter time than those in 
the lower grades of civilization.  Active brain-workers require, and 
probably get, a smaller amount of sleep than those who are engaged in 
manual labor, and still less than those who spend their days in frivolity 
and idleness.  They live their lives more fully.  Some of the most acute 
and brilliant thinkers and writers of the present day sleep 
comparatively little, from the power, probably, that they posses of 
concentrating their sleep (illustrating the quality of sleep).  Brain-
workers are peculiarly liable to sleeplessness.  The cerebral cells, 
being in constant use, are apt to remain active after work has been 
abandoned, and while this is the case, sleep is prevented. (45) 
 
Despite the obvious racially and economically motivated (not to mention racist and 
classist) ethnocentrism of MacFarlane’s claim (as well as Hammond’s to a lesser 
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degree), he makes two important points, which seem to be in conflict with each other, 
and are both in contradiction with Hammond’s assertions of the correlation between 
intellect and sleep requirements.  MacFarlane argues that those of heightened intellect 
“probably” know how to sleep more efficiently than others, and, therefore, require 
less sleep, not more, as Hammond suggests.  Examples such as Thomas Edison, 
famous for allegedly subsisting on naps in his workshop, and Napoleon, notable for 
sleeping little, but at will, come to mind (MacFarlane 44).  Yet, sometimes “brain-
workers” remain unable to turn off their brains, and thus, have difficulty falling 
asleep, which suggests not efficient consolidation of sleep, but time relegated for 
sleeping spent unwillingly awake, sometimes rather painfully as the personal, non-
fiction writings of some authors suggest.  Either way, MacFarlane concludes brain 
workers not only get less sleep, they need less sleep.  Unlike Hammond, MacFarlane 
does not see reduced sleep as hampering to a powerful intellect. 
Literary authors appear to have similarly divergent views on the purpose and 
necessity of sleep, as expressed in their journals and other autobiographic writings.  
Vladimir Nabokov, for example, expresses resentment towards the need for sleep, 
seeing it as wasted, unproductive time.  He values his insomnia as a necessary 
component to his literary productivity because of the time it affords him to work.  
Nabokov, true to form, holds nothing back in his own devaluation of sleep.  In his 
autobiographical work, Speak, Memory, Nabokov discusses his sleep habits and 
views on the practice of sleep: 
All my life I have been a poor go-to-sleeper.  People in trains, who lay 
their newspaper aside, fold their silly arms, and immediately, with an 
offensive familiarity of demeanor, start snoring, amaze me as much as 
the uninhibited chap who cozily defecates in the presence of a chatty 
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tuber, or participates in huge demonstrations, or joins some union in 
order to dissolve it.  Sleep is the most moronic fraternity in the world, 
with the heaviest dues and the crudest rituals.  It is a mental torture I 
find debasing.  The strain and drain of composition often force me, 
alas, to swallow a strong pill that gives me an hour or two of frightful 
nightmares or even to accept the comic relief of a midday snooze, the 
way a senile rake might totter to the nearest euthanasium; but I simply 
cannot get used to the nightly betrayal of reason, humanity, and 
genius.  No matter how great my weariness, the wrench of parting with 
consciousness is unspeakably repulsive to me.  (108-09) 
 
His case is particularly interesting in response to MacFarlane’s remarks on the ability 
of the actively-minded to consolidate sleep because of his expression of his ability to 
avoid sleeping whenever possible.  Nabokov, not one to soften his statements for the 
sake of amicability, has some sardonic words for sleep and its constituents, depicting 
sleep as a conformist ritual of the avoidance of consciousness and agency.  While 
many texts, both literary and medical, present sleep in pleasant light, as a respite from 
the worries and cares of the day, Nabokov argues that sleep is quite the opposite.  It is 
not only a window to viewing possible drug-induced horrors, but also a form of 
“torture.”  Nabokov is not the first to equate sleep with a temporary loss of the self, 
which he views as a “betrayal of reason, humanity, and genius,” but he is relatively 
unique in the virulence of his repulsion to this mental hiatus.  By bringing in terms 
like “euthanasium,” he equates the blind following of sleep-related rituals and 
deference to sleep with blind participation in the fascist and dictatorial regimes he left 
Europe to escape.  For Nabokov, giving oneself willingly over to sleep is as absurd as 
giving oneself willingly over to violent oppressors.  Being a staunch anti-Freudian (he 
“[rejects] completely the vulgar, shabby, fundamentally medieval world of Freud, 
with its crankish quest for sexual symbols . . . and its bitter little embryos spying, 
from their natural nooks, upon the love life of their parents” (Speak 20)), it stands to 
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reason that Nabokov sees little value in the analysis of his unconscious thoughts or 
images from his dreams.  Strikingly, Nabokov also rejects the equalizing factor of 
sleep, both for its biological commonality (“moronic fraternity”) and its elements of 
socialization (“crudest rituals”).  He does not share the insomniac’s hope of being 
able to sleep “normally” like everyone else, but instead resents that he needs to sleep 
like everyone else does.  He may not have the power of efficiently “concentrating 
[his] sleep,” to which MacFarlane alludes (though he appears to wish for it), but 
certainly possesses the “liability to sleeplessness” MacFarlane describes. 
Though many writers have confessed to similarly troubled sleep, not all 
writers share Nabokov’s outright disdain for it.  Many writers view sleep as 
necessary, presenting a view more akin to that of Hammond, who argues that more 
mental labor requires a greater amount of sleep.  Kafka, for instance, wrote 
specifically to “shut [his] eyes,” according to statements made in his journal (qtd. in 
Flaherty 215), indicating his pressing desire to sleep despite it not coming easily to 
him.  Sleep appears to be something Kafka actively sought, and his writing was the 
means through which he could release his thoughts enough to find rest.  Much as the 
writing instructor will often encourage his or her students to “write to discover what 
you think,” Kafka needed writing to process thought, the expression of which allowed 
a temporary escape.   
F. Scott Fitzgerald, like Kafka and Nabokov a notorious insomniac, describes 
sleep in much more seemingly pleasant terms than Nabokov does, writing in an essay 
about sleep,  “Sleep—real sleep, the dear, cherished one, the lullaby.  So deep and 
warm the bed and the pillow enfolding me, letting me sink into peace, nothingness” 
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(“Sleeping” 67).  Fitzgerald emphasizes the idea of sleep as an escape from the world, 
one which he desires.  But, his language also indicates an infantilizing of the sleeper 
by referring to sleep as a “lullaby.”  The bed becomes like the womb, welcoming him 
back to its enclosure, to a state of stasis and inertia, such as the one Sigmund Freud 
describes in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.”  For Freud, humans vacillate between 
life-affirming drives and life-denying drives.  Freud argues that “the goal of all life is 
death” and as such, life “must aspire to an old state, a primordial state from which it 
once departed” (Beyond 78).  Fitzgerald’s description of the comfort, security, and 
encompassing enclosure of his bed evokes a sense of his desire to return to this 
“primordial state” of “nothingness.”  Sleep is an escape for Fitzgerald, an escape from 
life into temporary death, so it would seem. 
Regardless of the disparate presentations of sleep from the literary 
community, some consistency does exist within the medical community.  From the 
nineteenth century until today, a majority of medical practitioners in the sleep field 
agree that sleep is a biological necessity though they may disagree on how much 
sleep is needed for any given individual (a debate that continues today).  Literary 
authors, on the other hand, are divided:  some see writing as a means towards the 
pleasant relief of sleep, while others see sleep as an obstacle to completing their 
writing.  While both groups acknowledge the need for sleep, they place different 
values on it.  The former relates sleep to biological necessity, the other to authorship. 
 However, my purpose in this chapter is not to debate the value of sleep, nor is 
it to discuss the ways in which authors valorize or demonize sleep in their works.  
Rather, my goal here is to fill a crucial gap in the connection between insomnia and 
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authorship with which I began this chapter.  While MacFarlane and Hammond 
overtly connect an over-active or highly intellectual mind to an increased propensity 
towards insomnia, I choose to examine a variation on this theme:  how does the 
inability to sleep shape the productions of an over-active mind?  More specifically, 
what contributions does insomnia make to creativity and authorship?  My objective in 
this chapter is not to draw connections between the insomnia of authors and the 
insomnia of characters to make biographical assumptions, but instead to illustrate the 
ways in which the chronotope of insomnia structures the modernist text, both in 
content and form.  In other words, in this section, my desire is not to show why or 
how a given character (or an author for that matter) experiences insomnia, as I have in 
previous chapters; my purpose is to illustrate how the insomnia of the author relates 
to the structure of the text and the experience of the reader.  How is the time and 
space of the author’s insomnia reflected in the time and space of the text?  
MacFarlane and Hammond argue that mental activity generates insomnia; whereas, I 
posit that insomnia generates the unique type of mental activity necessary and 
intrinsic to the creation of texts, especially the modernist text.  It does so not merely 
in terms of giving one time and isolation with which to work, but also in shaping 
one’s perspective in a manner that influences one’s interpretation of the world.  This 
insomniac interpretation of the material world of the author is then transferred onto 
the author’s generation of the world of the text.  The texts I will discuss in this 
chapter are not simply a consequence of the author’s insomnia, nor are they a cause of 
it or cure for it.  Instead, they are structurally determined, at least in part, by the 
phenomenology of the author’s insomnia.  Features of the experience of insomnia and 
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perceptual changes it allows are then represented within the text, both through the 
actions and thoughts of characters and the relationship between time and space within 
the text itself.  Insomnia is not only a result of the creative process, but also necessary 
to it both temporally and spatially, and the way in which both time and space are 
experienced differently in the state of insomnia become apparent through the ways in 
which modernist texts are often structured. 
To this end, I plan to explore two different directions with regard to the 
function of insomnia as it relates to the modernist text.  One direction of inquiry deals 
with the way in which the experience of insomnia shapes the text itself in terms of its 
relationship to narrative time and space.  Much of the reasoning behind this argument 
stems from my position that there is a great deal of affinity between one’s state of 
mind during a period of insomnia and one’s state of mind during the act of writing.  
Both states share a liminality of subjectivity, an act of partial, yet incomplete loss of 
the self.  Herschel Farbman, for instance, argues that “there is no subject present in 
sound sleep to whom anything might seem” (35).  Just as an author transitions from 
the role of subject (human, citizen, gendered body, member of a given race and class), 
to the role of creator of subjectivity within his or her texts, yet remains trapped 
between both states in the act of writing, the insomniac is placed in a similar position 
of consciousness of the self in an attempted transition to the loss of the self sleep 
entails, from being a subject in the material world to being an author of dreams in the 
unconscious world.  This liminal space of writing is similar to the liminal space 
between sleeping and waking because of its transitory nature and the space of 
movement from the mind to the page and beyond.  In terms of temporality, Farbman 
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argues that “Writing must go on in order to finish and finish in order to go on” (70).  
The same can be said of insomnia, which both traps the subject between states of 
awareness of subjectivity and loss of subjectivity, but also entails a constant 
movement towards an end (sleep), as it requires that end occurs for it to exist at all 
because without the need for sleep, insomnia is not possible. 
The relationship between insomnia and authorship extends beyond simply the 
liminality of the time and space of writing, especially in the case of the modernist 
text.  The phenomenological experience of insomnia shares numerous structural 
features with modernist literary works.  Michael Greaney explains, “Modernist 
literature—stream-of-consciousness narrative, interior monologue, the absent-minded 
trance of involuntary memory—can be read as dispatches from the hinterlands of 
sleep, the effusions of a hyperactive mind a substantially deactivated body” (5).  As 
Greaney notes, some of the symptoms, or “structural features” of insomnia are 
expressed in modernist literature as textual devices.  Both insomnia and the modernist 
text have elements similar to what one experiences during insomnia including an 
intense focus on individual psychology, a heightened awareness of the passage of 
time yet simultaneous sense of frozen time, a basis in the routine and everyday 
experience, and a continuous vacillation between immersion in a stream of thought 
and return to self-consciousness.  This consciousness of oneself during insomnia 
manifests as the inability of the insomniac to find true immersion in the stream of 
thoughts leading towards sleep, as these thoughts are constantly disrupted by either 
the self or outside stimuli.  As Schwenger argues, “Sleep comes by means of the flow 
of one’s thoughts, a flow that becomes a drift” (3).   But, for insomnia, this “drift” is 
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constantly interrupted by a return to the realization of the state of insomnia (checking 
the clock, shifting positions in bed, getting up and walking around).  Similarly, the 
modernist text frequently breaks the reader from full immersion in the characters’ 
thoughts and experiences through its self-referentiality and tendency to draw attention 
to its own structure and fictionality.  While I completely agree with the correlations 
Greaney lists between the various devices of modernist novels to the experience of 
insomnia, I would posit an additional layer of correlation, and this layer is the holistic 
experience of the text as also insomniac in nature, obeying larger patterns of cyclical 
time and memory, as well as disruption of and immersion into streams of 
consciousness. 
This holistic experience of the text relates both to the relationship between 
insomnia and the author, as well as insomnia and the reader.  If, as I argue, the 
author’s experience of insomnia structures the production of the literary text and its 
use of various devices, perspectives, and temporality/spatiality, and the author 
transfers this structure to the mind of the reader through the process of reading, then 
the insomnia of the text is not exclusive to the author; it becomes the reader’s 
insomniac perception and experience as well.  Another element of my argument is to 
describe the ways in which reading the modernist text transfers the experience of 
insomnia to the reader.  Not only does the act of reading put one into a liminal state of 
mind, akin to the insomnia of authorship, but it also can engender the actual 
experience of a state similar to insomnia, for example, racing thoughts, an altered 
sense of the passage of time, and even anxiety or frustration.   For example, Bryony 
Randall argues: 
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Remaining aware of clock time, of the time taken up in the practice of 
reading, the reader’s attention will be only partially engaged with the 
text, and will still be fully aware of external objects and pressures.  At 
the other end of the spectrum, losing the sense of clock time, being 
immersed in the time the text describes, will be a kind of all-
embracing attentiveness, perhaps even involving a loss of sense of self. 
(166) 
 
Bryony Randall situates the reader, at least one who is fully immersed in the act of 
reading, in a position almost similar to that of the author, in a liminal state of mind 
between the text and the self.  This reader can easily lose a sense of time, but can 
similarly be returned to awareness of time’s passage, depending on the amount of 
immersion into the text the reader experiences.  Schwenger discusses a passage in 
which Marcel of Swann’s Way by Marcel Proust drifts off to sleep while reading and 
has a dream-like experience of himself within the text (38).  Regarding Marcel’s 
experience and the experience of the reader more generally, he refers to “the fusion of 
the dreaming and waking states at the page’s surface” (40).  For Schwenger, reading 
is “the place where consciousness is taken over by something else that thinks 
otherwise than do our daylight minds” (40), similar to the “nocturnal thoughts” of the 
insomniac described by Elizabeth Bronfen.  Bronfen argues, “[Insomniacs] open out 
to an encounter with what Hegel calls the night of the world in which the self reaches 
the navel of all coherent self-conceptions, where it has insight into its own 
unfathomability” (159) because insomniacs are “compelled to endure a state of body 
and mind that severs them from the consciousness of the day” causing them to 
emerge as “a radically subjective spirit” (160).  Just as the reader experiences a state 
of consciousness differentiated from ordinary daytime consciousness through 
immersion into reading, thus becoming a subject of the text he or she is reading, the 
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insomniac also experiences an otherness of thought, becoming subject of his or her 
insomnia.  Our experience of the world mediates our experience and awareness of our 
consciousness and perceptions, but, as I argue, there is a correlation between this 
mediation as it relates to insomniac-consciousness and readership as both are related 
to the slippage of subjectivity, the former towards sleep and the latter towards 
immersion in the text. 
To make my argument, I will examine three texts in which not only do 
characters experience insomnia, but are themselves insomniac in their structure and 
have the capacity to transfer this sense of insomnia to readers.  These texts are James 
Joyce’s Ulysses, Nabokov’s Lolita, and Richard Wright’s Black Boy.  Ulysses, I will 
argue, is an insomniac text both for its temporalization of day only in relation to 
night, as well as through the constant alterations of stream of consciousness passages 
with metafictional devices used to jar the reader out of full immersion not in the text, 
but in its narration, drawing attention to the “otherness” of textual thought.  Lolita 
illustrates the power of insomnia as a creative force, as narrator and protagonist 
Humbert Humbert uses his insomnia to create both his narrative and the character of 
Lolita.  As in Joyce’s novel, the daytime passages are all placed in relation to 
Humbert’s night-thoughts, and the night-thoughts are those which move the novel 
both forwards and backwards in time and action.  Wright’s Black Boy is different 
from both Ulysses and Lolita in that it is not a fictional, but rather an autobiographical 
text.  However, Wright’s experiences recounted through this text use the otherness of 
night thought to reveal the tensions of the characters’ daytime lives, and the text is 
also structured as an unending and unfulfilled, yet ultimately hopeful, quest for restful 
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and secure peace.  Through these texts, I will argue that significant parallels exist 
both among insomnia and the production of texts, as well as the conventions of the 
modernist text, and between insomnia and the experience of the reader of these texts.   
Insomnia as Narrative 
Literary texts are particularly useful in the understanding of insomnia both 
because of their ability to illustrate the phenomenology of the insomniac experience, 
as well as the similarities between the work one may do in fields such as medicine or 
psychology in studying the individual character and the work an author does in 
creating his or her characters.  Evidence of this connection comes through the 
widespread use of both the material and methodology of literature in medical and 
psychological studies of sleep and insomnia.  Hammond, for example, quotes Don 
Quixote’s Sancho Panza to express to his readers the nature of the experience of sleep 
(Wakefulness 43).  Though there is often a tendency to separate conclusions and 
observations drawn within art and science and view them as oppositional in both 
purpose and methodology, many in the medical discipline look to literary texts as 
case studies (Sigmund Freud is one notable example), as well as construct medical 
texts using literary forms, such as the narrative.  Additionally, many literary authors 
are involved in medical practice.  Notable examples include Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
and Anton Chekov, both of whom were also physicians. 
In an address entitled “Shakespeare as a Guide in the Art and Practice of 
Medicine” by British physician Sir St-Clair Thomson, M.D., given in 1919, St-Clair 
argues that Shakespeare is “one author which every medical man should study 
deeply” (901).  He looks to Shakespeare for information on various aspects of the 
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medical field, including a history of medicine and regard for the medical profession 
(902), but also for insight into medical conditions, such as digestive disorders and 
fainting (905).  Of course, one of the issues on which St-Clair seeks Shakespeare’s 
knowledge and experience is that of sleep.  He writes, “There is one function of the 
mens sana in corpora sano which I never appreciated to its full value until taught by 
Shakespeare, and that is the importance of sound, sufficient and regular sleep” (908).  
He continues, “Indeed, it has been suggested that the poet himself must have suffered 
from sleeplessness, so vividly does he describe the horror of insomnia, so wisely does 
he regard the invoking of sleep, and so warmly does he praise the value of being able 
to steep our senses in forgetfulness” (908).  To illustrate his point, St-Clair cites four 
of Shakespeare’s plays: Macbeth, Measure for Measure, Cymbeline, and Henry IV, 
Part II.  From his study of Shakespeare’s work, he concludes that sleep is an under-
appreciated and natural “course in the cure of disease” and “that the sweat of industry 
is the best soporific” (909). Through Shakespeare’s work, St-Clair draws practical 
conclusions applicable to his patients, but also emphasizes the importance of using 
literary works as valued educational texts providing descriptions of symptoms and 
cures.  The literary plays an important role in the creation of medical texts about 
insomnia for a number of reasons.  Such texts can effectively teach us about the 
phenomenology of insomnia and the insight of authors into human experience should 
not be overlooked, but more importantly the emphasize the interrelationship between 
the medical and the literary.  Both involve the use of narratives to explore the 
phenomenological.  Just as an author might describe an insomniac experience within 
his or her literary work, a physician does the same in his or her case studies, as well 
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as relies on the patient’s own narrative of his or her symptoms in the process of 
diagnosis and treatment.  Insomnia is a unique condition in that physician cannot 
diagnose or treat it without the patient’s narrative.  As Kenton Kroker notes, “the 
physician [facilitates] treatment of what the patient already [knows] to be the 
problem” (350).   
In short, insomnia is a condition that both facilitates the production of 
narratives, as the insomnia narrates his or her insomniac thoughts and perceptions, 
and requires narratives for medical diagnosis and treatment, inasmuch as one must 
describe the insomnia and its surrounding circumstances to the doctor and the doctor 
attempts to generalize about the condition as it applies to both the sufferer and others 
based on the patient’s narrative.  One of the first insights with regard to insomnia and 
the creation of texts comes with the relationship between the environmental 
conditions related to insomnia and the function of these conditions for the author.  To 
return to the passage from Nabokov’s autobiography cited earlier, it is clear, given his 
hatred of having to sleep at all, that Nabokov sees productive value in his insomnia, 
and often spent “a sleepless night of verse-making” (Speak 268).  Dreaded by him as 
a child (Speak 266), his insomnia later became useful to his career, so that his friends 
began “commending [his] nocturnal labors” (Speak 267).  Part of the reason Nabokov 
and writers like Fitzgerald and Kafka were able to use their insomnia productively 
comes with the physical conditions insomnia affords, a combination of idleness and 
isolation.  For Nabokov, this time was used actively writing, at least sometimes.   
For Fitzgerald, it was used for contemplation.  During bouts of insomnia, 
which he refers to as “a period of silence,” Fitzgerald “was forced into a measure that 
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no one ever adopts voluntarily:  I was impelled to think.  God, it was difficult!  The 
moving about of great secret trunks” (“Crack-Up” 78).  The “silence” for Fitzgerald 
gives spatial element to his thoughts, which he can envision as concrete objects 
within his mind.  His imagery here is paradoxical, as it both renders thought as 
something predating his awareness of it, a thing in his mind that only awaits his 
“discovery” in a sense, a discovery that insomnia makes possible.  Yet, at the same 
time, his ability to discover these thoughts is limited, as they are locked up in “secret 
trunks,” that though moveable, still remain closed.  Fitzgerald continues, commenting 
that he “had done very little thinking” and that, the more he thinks, the more he 
realizes that “there was not an ‘I’ anymore—not a basis on which I could organize my 
self respect. . . .   It was strange to have no self” (“Crack-Up” 79).  By maintaining 
the secrecy of these “trunks” of thought, which seem to exist simultaneously within 
and independent of his own mind, Fitzgerald effectively upends Descartes’ cogito:  
arguing instead, “I think; therefore, I am not.”  Insomnia is the point at which he is 
both able to “lose” his subjectivity, but remain conscious of this loss.  This experience 
of loss of the self in the transference (“moving about”) of one’s thoughts reflects the 
liminality of authorship, in which the author transfers thought to the page so that 
these thoughts can exist external to, yet intrinsically connected with, the author’s self. 
Insomnia creates an ideal circumstance for thought because it is often 
experienced in a state of isolation united with idleness, as one lies in bed awaiting 
sleep, which Bronfen suggests “offers a psychic state and stage for an encounter with 
one’s most intimate desires and anxieties” (160), or rather forces an individual to 
confront the existence of thought itself and the relationship between thought and 
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awareness of existence.  Virginia Woolf also discusses the way in which one’s 
perspective changes both as a result of illness and time spent in bed:   
[Illness] invests certain faces with divinity, sets us to wait, hour after 
hour, with pricked ears for the creaking of a stair, and wreathes the 
face of the absent (plain enough in health, Heaven knows) with a new 
significance, while the mind concocts a thousand legends and 
romances about them for which it has neither time nor taste in health. 
(“Ill” 6)  
 
For Woolf, illness changes our relationship to ourselves, and therefore others, 
represented in this passage metonymically as “faces.”  Significantly, it gives the ill 
person the ability to authorize these “faces,” endowing them from his or her unique 
perspective with a different significance, generated by the ill individual rather than 
the person the face signifies.  Through illness, we do not just contemplate others, but 
actually create them in an image we determine, an act of authorship.  While insomnia 
and illness are far from synonymous, some of the significant features of illness to 
which Woolf points (isolation, time spent in physical inactivity, prolonged periods of 
waiting) are characteristics of insomnia as well.  Woolf further notes the way the 
world changes from the view of the supine, arguing that “the sky is discovered to be 
something so different from this [everyday view] that it really is a little shocking” 
(“Ill” 13).  The combination of these two conditions of isolation and idleness 
facilitates and encourages thought, but more importantly the transference of thought, 
even if that thought is not necessarily desirable but inevitable, as Fitzgerald, Bronfen, 
and Woolf observe.   
Of these combined conditions of idleness and isolation and their resulting 
influence on perception, Walter Benjamin writes: 
  
 
315 
 
Among the conditions of idleness, particular importance attaches to 
solitude.  It is solitude, in fact, that first emancipates—virtually—
individual experience from every event, however trivial or 
impoverished:  it offers to the individual experience, on the high road 
of empathy, any passerby whatsoever as its substitute.  Empathy is 
only possible to the solitary; solitude, therefore, is a precondition of 
authentic idleness. (805) 
 
Solitude allows the solitary individual to differentiate between perception and 
“objective” experience.  In doing so, the individual can cease to view experience 
through only one lens, but rather creates a multiplicity of possibilities of reflection 
from various subjective viewpoints.  In other words, being able to reflect on 
experience from without, not as participant, but as observer, is necessary in the 
production of empathy, the ability to imagine experience from a different perspective.  
To do so, one must be able to separate the experience from one’s subjective 
experience of the experience.  To this end, Jonathan Crary makes an interesting point, 
citing the work of Hannah Arendt, specifically her text The Human Condition.  Crary 
writes, “For an individual to have political effectiveness, there needed to be a balance, 
a moving back and forth between the bright, even harsh exposure of public activity, 
and the protected, shielded sphere of domestic and private life” (21).  Crary’s concern 
is that with the constant influx of information and perpetual infiltration of the public 
into the domestic sphere via technologies such as social networking and mobile 
phones, which for many occupy a space on the bedside table when one is sleeping, 
this private space for reflection is increasingly threatened.  One is too busy 
experiencing to ever remove oneself from that subjective position of experience.  
Arendt’s concern may be with “political effectiveness,” but the same logic can apply 
to writing and artistic creation.  To write, one needs a separation between public and 
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private, and insomnia, when one is isolated from the world, provides this isolation 
(which would more have been the case in the Modernist period, where computers, 
cell phones, and social networks did not offer twenty-four hour access to the public 
and even fellow insomniacs).  As Bryony Randall argues, “Creativity … is itself 
evidence of duration” (55).  Aside from images or ideas with which to work, authors 
need time, time often provided by insomnia.  Since literary works require reflection 
on the part of the author (they do not merely transcribe events, but comment on them 
as well), solitude and literary creation are most certainly closely related.   
Benjamin’s argument is particularly interesting with regard to the creation of 
the literary text and the author’s ability to both empathize with his or her characters to 
create them and transfer this sense of empathy to readers through their own 
movement of thought inasmuch as this movement is controlled by the text.  He argues 
that solitude is a necessary condition for empathy, and insomnia, whether in the form 
of Nabokov’s active writing or Fitzgerald’s inevitable thinking, surely allows for such 
solitude.  Because of the change in perception solitude allows, the novelist is capable 
of replacing the thoughts and mindset of the readers with those of the characters, 
through a transmutation of emotion to imagery, but of course, to do so, one must first 
understand emotion, made possible through empathy, a consequence of solitary 
reflection.  Further, the novelist can then enable his or her readers to empathize as 
well.  While insomnia is not necessarily intrinsic to this process for every novelist, for 
some, it certainly plays an important role.  The novelist can create a text in which the 
reader feels as though he or she has become a part of the world of other people, thus, 
separating lived experience from individual perception of experience. 
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Benjamin continues, “idleness, in the bourgeois society that knows no leisure, 
is a precondition of artistic production.  And, often, idleness is the very thing which 
stamps that production with the traits that make its relation to the economic 
production process so drastic” (805-06).  Though Benjamin is not very specific in this 
passage as to the “relation to economic production” of the production of art, one can 
conclude that he views the two as in a state of tension.  Conditions of economic 
production often require a very black and white relationship between activity and 
inactivity.  Activity means the production of material or otherwise tangible goods and 
services (including tasks such as caring for children), and inactivity is a state 
necessary to prepare oneself for such production, echoing the mechanistic model of 
the body and its accumulation and replenishment of resources posited by Hammond.  
However, in terms of economic production, no room for idleness exists outside of its 
function as a time for necessary rest.  As E. P. Thompson argues with regard to 
capitalist ideology, “the labourer must not loiter idly” (83).  He or she is rewarded 
“for the productive consumption of time,” which includes time spent sleeping (91).  
The laborer’s rewards, according to Thompson, “are wage incentives and expanding 
consumer drives” or in other words, “palpable” (91).  Even our use of the phrase 
“time spent sleeping” (or doing anything else for that matter) implies time as a 
commodity or a form of currency to be exchanged for a commodity.  However, for 
the artist, author or otherwise, reward comes not through labor, but specifically 
through a uniquely productive form of idleness often provided through insomnia.  A 
writer’s rewards may be “palpable,” in terms of earning royalties from a financially 
successful book or receiving critical praise, but often they are not.  Rewards come in 
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the form of the ability to cultivate and express insight if only to oneself—a reward 
that cannot be measured or understood in material terms. 
Thus far, a clear correlation exists between the insomnia of authors, the 
solitude and idleness it engenders, and the realizations of empathy and insight 
available only through such solitary and idle thoughts.  It places the author in a 
liminal state, not dissimilar to the process of writing itself (Schwenger xii).  As 
Schwenger observes, the processes of reading and writing are similar in their 
liminality:  “While literature is here the means of understanding liminal states, the 
reverse is also true:  liminal states throughout are used to speak of the ways in which 
literature is itself is a liminal state, for the writer and the reader” (xii).  Therefore, not 
only does insomnia provide the conditions by which the empathy and insight 
necessary to literary creation are cultivated, but the liminality of insomnia also 
mimics the processes of both writing and reading.  Much as an insomniac often loses 
control of his or her thoughts, as they drift from present, past, and future, the reader’s 
internal voice is replaced by that of the text.  Additionally, for the reader there is 
dissociation between material conditions (the physical reading environment) and the 
mental production of the world of the text.   
Bronfen writes that insomnia and its related “nocturnal thinking,” “seeks to 
explore a scene of philosophy in which our eyes are open, our hearing alert, our spirit 
attentive, our words ready for a mobilization that is as yet uncertain, even while 
drawing its strength from the certainty that the morning is still a long way off” (161).  
The author is one who can “mobilize” the uncertain words and put forth the “scene of 
philosophy” experienced through his or her “nocturnal thinking.”  Bronfen argues that 
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night is “a privileged site for an existential openness to the other, to being outside and 
beyond material existence, which is also the domain of modern textuality” (22).   
Again, Woolf expresses a similar insight with regard to illness, emphasizing its ability 
to change our perceptions by leaving us alone with them (“Ill” 23).  The author is able 
through both authorship and insomnia to be open to the other through both the 
experience of and creation of the other.  Because a text creates its own reality, the text 
exists outside of the objective material world of day-to-day life; insomnia creates a 
passageway to this world.  
Literature, then, is in a unique position not only to confer empathy towards 
characters on the reader through eliciting the character’s thoughts in the reader’s 
mind, but also the mental state of the author himself or herself, mitigated further 
through the narrator, as the author’s words in the narrator’s voice replace the reader’s 
internal monologue and the text’s scenes replace the reader’s environment.  Further, 
literature can also give expression to the author’s physical, as well as mental state.  
Woolf, in her essay “On Being Ill” writes of her astonishment that most authors do 
not choose to write about experiences of illness, which she finds surprising given the 
power of the body to influence one’s perceptions of the world:   
All day, all night the body intervenes; blunts or sharpens, colours or 
discolours, turns to wax in the warmth of June, hardens to tallow in the 
murk of February.  The creature within can only gaze through the 
pane--smudged or rosy; it cannot separate off from the body like a 
sheath of a knife of the pod of a pea for a single instant; it must go 
through the whole unending procession of changes, heat and cold, 
comfort and discomfort, hunger and satisfaction, health and illness, 
until there comes the inevitable catastrophe; the body smashes itself to 
smithereens, and the soul (it is said) escapes.  But of all this daily 
drama of the body there is no record.  People write always of the 
doings of the mind; the thoughts that come to it; its noble plans; how 
the mind has civilised the universe.  They show it ignoring the body in 
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the philosopher’s turret; or kicking the body, like an old leather 
football, across leagues of snow and desert in pursuit of conquest or 
discovery.  Those great wars which the body wages with the mind a 
slave to it, in the solitude of the bedroom against the assault of fever or 
the oncome of melancholia, are neglected.  (4-5) 
 
In this passage, Woolf notes the power the body has over the mind of the writer, 
especially when it “enslaves” the mind, or in other words, the body and mind are in 
conflict, as in the case of insomnia.  The body does not necessarily compose the 
perceptions of the individual on its own, yet the ill body produces a distinctive lens 
through which experience is mediated and, therefore, perception is filtered.  Often, 
argues Woolf, we can pretend the body does not exist as it is related to thought—
thoughts exist independently of the body, in a different realm.  But, illness forces us 
to realize this correlation, as we can no longer separate physical condition from 
mental condition.  It is not so much that this relationship does not exist in “normal” 
healthy daily experience, but that a body that does not draw attention to itself through 
pain renders itself ignorable.  Woolf also points particularly to this battle between 
mental and bodily awareness happening in the bedroom, which is suggestive of the 
sleep space as battle ground, and later refers to sleeplessness as a potential literary 
“villain” (6).  Insomnia, as a condition of or akin to illness, draws the insomniac’s 
attention to the easily underestimated relationship between bodily sensation and 
perception.  Most importantly, Woolf’s acknowledgement of literature’s tendency to 
devalue the physical body, despite the body’s power to influence thought and 
behavior, particularly when it malfunctions, illustrates her era of writing as a possible 
turning point in literature.  Earlier in this essay, she acknowledges the work of 
Thomas DeQuincey, given his writing about his experiences with opium abuse, as 
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one of the few exceptions to the general neglect of the body in literature, and her 
insomniac contemporary Proust as the one of the only to address bodily concerns with 
any sense of depth, but asserts that there is a general lack of such writing (4).  Woolf 
is ultimately illustrating the importance of bodily states and sensations in influencing 
perception and interpretation, but also calling on authors to give the body the 
prominent role it deserves in literature because of the prominent role of the body in 
daily life and experience.  Because insomnia is both a physical and mental 
experience, the fact that it should be incorporated into texts in the ways Woolf 
suggests, as a means of “[gazing] through the pane” of the body, it would seem that 
her contemporaries agree with her argument, and incorporate bodily experience, via 
insomnia to literary texts, more so in the Modernist period than previous literary eras.  
If we then add to the structural qualities of the modernist text Woolf’s desire to give 
the body its own source of expression in the literary work, we can see why insomnia 
becomes so crucial to the modernist novel.  It combines bodily and psychological 
experience during a specific historical time and place.   
Insomniac Structures 
To describe a model for the way that insomnia can structure texts, and more 
specifically the modernist text, it is useful to describe the experience of insomnia 
first.  While not all insomniacs have the same experience and the experience of 
insomnia is often linked to other aspects of one’s subjectivity such as class or gender, 
it is informative to have a general model in mind.  Take, for example this passage 
from the “Penelope” section of Joyce’s Ulysses: 
frseeeeeeeefronnnng train somewhere whistling the strength those 
engines have in them like big giants and the water rolling all over and 
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out of them all sides like the end of Loves old sweet sonnnng the poor 
men that have to be out all night from their wives and families in those 
roasting engines stifling it was today Im glad I burned the half of those 
Freemans and Photo bits leaving things like that lying around hes 
getting very careless and threw the rest of them up in the W C Ill get 
him to cut them tomorrow for me instead of having them there for the 
next year to get a few pence for them have him asking wheres 
Januarys paper and all those old overcoats I bundled out of the hall 
making the place hotter than it is the rain was lovely just after my 
beauty sleep I thought it was going to get like Gibraltar my 
goodness… (754-55) 
 
Molly Bloom’s internal monologue relating her thoughts during a bout of insomnia 
presents a microcosm of many of the features that one could include in an insomniac 
literary text.  The first feature is the text’s relationship to temporality, associating the 
action of the text specifically to sleep, but even more specifically to sleep as a 
woman, as she considers the concept of “beauty sleep.”  Significantly, the text is not 
related to sleep in general but sleep during a specific time and space, as her insomniac 
thoughts are influenced by her surroundings, indicated by their shift as a result of the 
train’s whistle and her thoughts regarding her home.  Time is presented both 
chronologically, and cyclically, as her mind races forward in time, planning a future, 
imagined conversation with her husband, yet also backwards through her memory.  
She is simultaneously lulled into this stream of consciousness, yet jarred out of it by 
external factors, including the sound of the train and the warmth of her house.  She is 
also notably empathetic in this passage, as the sound of the train reminds her of the 
situation of its workers, as they remain separate from their loved ones at night.  Her 
thoughts are blurred together, as they race forward with no discernible separation, 
indicated by the lack of punctuation.  Finally, while the diction, syntax, and pace of 
the passage suggest anxiety and frustration through the fast pace of this whole 
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section, she still acknowledges positive consequences to insomnia as she uses it to 
contemplate her future plans. 
If one were to stretch the features included in Joyce’s passage over the course 
of a novel, it would invariably be a novel structured by insomnia; similarly, even 
reading this passage conveys to the reader the sense of anxiety and frustration she 
feels as she lies awake.  Many modernist texts encompass some of the features of this 
passage, including cyclical time, intense focus on psychology, and fragmentary 
experience, and when used in combination, the texts can provide a structural literary 
model of the experience of insomnia.  To begin, there are numerous examples of 
modernist texts that open with an awakening, or in other words a body separated from 
sleep.  Ulysses is one such example:  “Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the 
stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and razor lay crossed” (3-4).  
The novel then proceeds to describe his morning routine and breakfast.  Joyce 
doubles this theme of awakening by reproducing a similar scene in the opening of the 
first section of the second book of the novel (“Calypso”) with the novel’s protagonist, 
Leopold Bloom, preparing breakfast for himself while his wife Molly remains asleep 
in their bedroom upstairs (55).  While this text does not open with the actual 
experience of insomnia, it does open with a significant feature of insomnia:  
wakefulness related to the sleeping state.  By situating the novel temporally in the 
morning, the wakefulness of the text is placed in direct contrast to sleep; the 
characters were recently asleep, but now they are awake.  The wakefulness is not 
independent of sleep, but has a closely implied relationship to it.    
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Similarly, Nabokov’s Lolita begins with awakening as well, but an awakening 
of a different sort:  sexual awakening.  As the novel proper opens (I am temporarily 
excluding Nabokov’s ironic forward written by the fictional John Ray, Jr., Ph.D.) 
with the lines, “Lolita, light of my life, fire of my loins” (9), “Lolita” has clearly 
ignited the narrator’s sexual urges, awakening him in ways he has not experienced 
since his pubescence.  The opening line of the second paragraph, “She was Lo, plain 
Lo, in the morning…” (9) again emphasizes her role as a stimulant through the 
immediate connection of Lolita with the morning itself.  His reference to her in the 
morning situates her memory as closely related to his nighttime experiences.  She is 
not just “plain Lo” but only “plain Lo” “in the morning.”  “Lo” itself is one of the 
many variations of her character; others include Lolita, Lola, Dolly, Dolores, and 
Mrs. Richard F. Schiller.  Much as it begins with Humbert’s sexual re-awakening 
courtesy (he alleges) of Lolita, the novel ends with Humbert preparing for his death, 
essentially putting both himself and the writing of novel to rest.  Yet, his last thoughts 
are not of death as sleep, but rather the perpetuity of immortality, another sort of 
unending wakefulness, as he writes, “I am thinking of aurochs and angels, the secret 
of durable pigments, prophetic sonnets, the refuge of art.  And this is the only 
immortality you and I may share, my Lolita” (309).  Using words like “durable” and 
“immortality,” this passage evokes a sense of the unending.  Bronfen writes, 
“Insomnia draws attention to the threshold between ordinary diurnal thinking and 
nocturnal recognition relentlessly focused on the nothingness subtending all earthly 
existence” (161).  The opening and closing passages of Lolita make the same 
associations when put together, first with the ordinary, everyday morning vision of 
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Lo, and then with Humbert’s consciousness of the end of his earthly existence and the 
possibilities of what he may leave behind. 
Ulysses, as well, ends not with sleep, but with a sense of the infinite.  It begins 
with awakening, but ends with insomnia.  As Bill Hayes notes, Homer’s The Odyssey 
ends with Penelope and Odysseus preparing for bed:  “Wary of being deceived by the 
gods, Penelope forces Odysseus to reveal the ‘great secret’ of their marriage bed. . . .    
Immovable, literally rooted to the earth, the bed is the center of their home, symbolic 
of their love for one another” (Hayes 79).  Odysseus’ proof of knowledge of this 
secret allows both he and his wife to finally get some sleep, together.  Joyce has a 
different (and I would argue uniquely modernist) variation on this ending, in his own 
revision of Homer’s work, which ends not with rest, but with insomnia.  The last 
section of the novel (“Penelope”) consists solely of Molly’s train of thought as she 
lays awake in bed, thinking over her many secrets and those of her husband (the 
passage I cited earlier was just a short part of a very long sequence).  Ulysses takes 
place over the course of a single day.  Joyce’s decision to use this diurnal temporality 
implies the importance of the presence of sleep to the text.  Molly’s wakefulness is 
not simple, everyday wakefulness, but rather wakefulness specifically engendered 
through the absence of sleep.  In other words, the novel does not end with Molly 
being awake, but rather with her being unable to sleep.  Her husband joins her in bed 
later in the section, and the presence of the sleeping Bloom next to her, whom she 
wishes would “sleep in some bed by himself with his cold feet on me give us room 
even to let a fart God or do the least thing better yes hold them like that a bit on my 
side piano quietly sweeeee theres that train far away pianissimo eeeeeeee one more 
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song…” (763), reminds Molly of both her inability to sleep and the constraints which 
her marriage places upon her (also note the shift in thoughts from contemplation to 
material circumstance, as her stream of thoughts is again interrupted by the train’s 
whistle).  Joyce uses insomnia as an ending to illustrate the perpetuity and seemingly 
infinite nature of Molly’s thoughts, but also to relate the daily life of Bloom and 
Molly to their sleep habits.  His decision to make Molly an insomniac in this scene, 
rather than united in separate sleep with Bloom is perhaps indicative of this text’s 
modernity—their bed does not contained their shared secrets, but their separate ones, 
making them fragmentary, even as a couple sharing a single sleeping space. 
Though Wright’s Black Boy is different from Ulysses and Lolita in that it is an 
autobiographical, rather than fictional text, like both it begins with an awakening and 
ends with a failure to sleep.  The first words of the text are “One winter morning in 
the long-ago, four-year-old days of my life…” (3).  Through this allusion to the 
morning, Wright opens the text with an awakening, situating the autobiography in 
direct relation to sleep.  In the passage to come, one in which Richard attempts a 
prank and accidentally sets fire to his family’s home, Richard is awakened both to the 
discrepancy between intent and outcome, as well as to the complexity of the 
relationship with his family.  He will not get too much rest after this opening 
sequence as his social, self, and familial conflicts gain traction throughout his 
adolescence.  Again like Ulysses and Lolita, the ending of this novel tends towards 
the infinite.  The text closes with the following paragraph:  “I would hurl words into 
this darkness and wait for an echo, and if an echo sounded, no matter how faintly, I 
would send other words to tell, to march, to fight, to create a sense of hunger for life 
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that gnaws in us all, to keep alive in our hearts a sense of the inexpressibly human” 
(384).  Much like the closing passage of Lolita, in which Humbert claims to share 
immortality with Lolita through his words, Wright creates a similar sense of the 
perpetual vigilance of language, but specifically language moving through darkness.  
Like Nabokov, he gives words agency, or at least hopes they have the ability to carry 
out his wishes even when he cannot.  While people may sleep, words do not, and can 
carry with them the power of the infinite.  Though this closing passage does not deal 
explicitly with sleep (incidentally other sections of the text do specifically describe 
Wright’s failure to sleep as related to hunger that “gnaws” in him), it does suggest an 
unending wakefulness through the text itself. 
Thus far, I have given examples of modernist texts that utilize awakening and 
insomnia to temporally situate the novels, thereby connecting the texts both to sleep 
and to diurnal rhythms.  What I have not yet explained is what makes this tendency 
specifically Modernist, as certainly plenty of examples of texts from any given 
literary period include similar imagery, though not necessarily similar structure.  As I 
have posited, the beginning of Modernist period came with the outbreak of World 
War I.  This temporal connection is of particular importance to my argument, as I 
have argued in my first chapter.  Additionally, the amount of people made physically 
and mentally ill because of the war, either because of physical or psychological 
trauma made the perceptual changes Woolf explains as part of the experience of 
illness a widespread phenomenon.  As Trudi Tate argues, any modernist literature 
written after 1914 is inevitably war literature (3).   
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Such widespread helplessness, both for soldiers and civilians, perhaps 
contributed to a new sort of narrative developed during the Modernist period, a type 
of narrative that speaks to feelings of anxiety, frustration, and immobility.  Greaney 
refers to this type of narrative as: 
 [T]he “world-from-a-bed” tradition in twentieth-century literature, a 
tradition in which the spectacle of modernity is glimpsed not from the 
boulevard but from the bedroom.  Unlike the flâneur, that mobile 
eyewitness of the modern cityscape, the horizontal subject is distanced 
from the spectacle of modernity in ambiguous ways.  On the one hand, 
this figure is luxuriously insulated from the demeaningly humdrum 
chores of everyday work and survival:  the world-from-a-bed narrative 
traces the workings of a mind that is conscious of everything except 
the body to which it belongs.  On the other, horizontality can be an 
unenviable predicament, one that speaks of infirmity, paralysis, and 
claustrophobic immobilization.  (4-5) 
 
Just as I have argued in previous chapters that the insomnia is a bodily manifestation 
of social mores, expectations, identity categories and anxieties, Greaney’s observation 
creates a similar correlation between lived-experience and narrative structure.  The 
anxiety and changes in the experience of temporality World War I fostered became a 
new sort of narrative, one from which an anxious, immobile person, isolated from yet 
a witness to the everyday, narrates from a position of reclusion.  This reclusion may 
be physical, as is the case of Proust’s Marcel in In Search of Lost Time, but it may 
also be metaphorical.  Take Humbert Humbert as an example:  one may read him not 
as an urban flâneur, but as an American flâneur, as he travels the country observing 
the various idiosyncrasies of American culture.  However, these observations are 
made specifically from a series of beds, or, more specifically, the various motel 
rooms in which he stays, so he is more of the horizontal flâneur Greaney describes.  
While he is exploring American culture, he is never integrated into it or interacting 
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with it as the true flâneur does.  Rather, he is “luxuriously insulated” from the 
everyday, avoiding any sort of “normal” daily existence.  Additionally, his obsessive 
love for Lolita renders him immobile, claustrophobic, fearful and anxious. 
This new post-war sense of temporality that shaped the societies in which 
modernist authors lived is still present in their texts.  They do so especially through 
the endings of their texts, which I have discussed earlier.  Humbert speaks of a love 
for Lolita that transcends time.  Since this love has been the essence of his 
destruction, images of devastation and the infinite are used in combination.  Susan 
Mizruchi argues that there is a connection between Humbert’s (“a European refugee”) 
experience of both the first and second world wars and his sense of time:  “In part 
because he is so anxious about the passing of time, Humbert, is obsessed with dates.  
Throughout the narrative, he keeps us informed of the year, sometimes the date and 
weather, and even the seasonal peculiarities of the place he happens to be” (632).  His 
obsession with dates and times provides evidence of his anxiety over time, trying to 
retain some sense of control and awareness over something that is clearly beyond his 
grasp.  Joyce, through his fragmentation of the marriage of Bloom and Molly, 
illustrated through his twist on the ending of Homer’s The Odyssey, illustrates the 
ignorance and confusion, as well as discontinuous sense of temporality of their daily 
lives.  Wright ends his autobiography with a sense of never-ending battle, through his 
use of words such as “march” and “fight.”  Though none of the authors I have cited in 
this chapter were directly involved in the conflict of World War I, the war’s influence 
on their experience of disrupted temporality and continuity, which I discuss in detail 
in the introductory chapter, is evident in all three texts. 
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Another relationship between the modernist text and the experience of 
insomnia comes through the text’s use of temporality, not by day-night associations, 
but rather through a vacillating movement between past, present, and future.  Also as 
I posit in the introductory section, insomnia before the war was often an insomnia of 
anxiety regarding the future.  Yet, in the modernist insomniac passage, we see 
insomnia as fixated not only on the future, but also on the present and past.  Eluned 
Summers-Bremner describes the insomniac’s experience of time: 
In its unpredictability, insomnia brings that idiosyncrasy back to the 
insomniac’s small world of one—no one knows when the sleep train 
will arrive, or the thought-light go out—yet, intriguingly, it also 
mimics industrial modernity, transposing into the night world 
operations that have become routine in the day.  Like the factory-
owner, insomnia thinks ahead and, once started on its labours, builds a 
senseless momentum.  Like the bells and timers factory-owners 
installed to track worker productivity, insomnia refuses to allow us to 
be oblivious to our surroundings, to the fact of night.  The clock’s 
strike or digital display repeatedly jolts or frustrates us.  (122) 
 
Summers-Bremner’s discussion of sleep as a train is certainly relevant to Molly’s 
inclusion of the sound of the train in her insomniac thoughts, as she unites regulated, 
external time with her own experience of time in bed.  In her description of the 
insomniac’s experience of time, Summers-Bremner raises several key points.  
Initially, she notes that as much as we seek to regulate and designate the use of time, 
insomnia makes all such systems of order futile, as we can see in the chaotic nature of 
Molly’s thoughts.  Similarly, Humbert may be hyper-vigilant with regard to dates, 
seasons, and years, but this acknowledgement does not prevent Lolita’s aging beyond 
the realm of the “nymphet.”  Similarly, the insomniac may diligently set aside eight 
hours for sleep in his or her schedule, but that does not ensure eight hours of sleep 
will take place, nor does the constant thought “If I fall asleep now, I can still get X 
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hours of sleep…” ensure any sort of control over sleep quantity.  Insomnia also, as 
Summers-Bremner states, “brings the day into the night,” which occurs in various 
ways dependent upon the insomniac, who may, on the one hand, spend insomniac 
time considering daytime worries or may give up on sleep altogether and become 
active in doing some type of work or leisure activity typically done during standard 
waking hours.  Further, while the insomniac may become temporarily lost in a train of 
thought, he or she is always brought back to an awareness of the passage of time, 
making the night seemingly both endless and all too fast, as hours of potential sleep 
pass away.  Time stands still and moves ahead independent of our wants or desires. 
What Summers-Bremner describes here in relation to time is an ebb and flow 
of the insomniac’s thoughts, as they drift from daytime cares or memories of the past 
to future worries and anxiety over the ever-shortening time left to sleep.  However, 
control of these thoughts, much like control over time, is beyond the insomniac’s 
powers.  The insomniac’s consciousness moves from immersion in a stream of 
thought to a return to the surface world with realizations of time’s passage.  Further 
complicating matters is an idea I discussed in the second chapter, the idea that 
insomniacs often sleep more than they realize.  So, part of the insomniac’s experience 
may well be loss of consciousness without consciousness of consciousness’s loss.  
This cyclical forward and backward movement both through time and states of 
consciousness mirrors our actual cycles of sleep, an important subject of inquiry 
pursued by one of the foremost sleep researchers during the Modernist period, 
Nathaniel Kleitman.  As Kleitman argues regarding his observations after nearly forty 
years of research, which began in the 1920s: 
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While water and ice are as easily distinguished from each other as 
wakefulness is from sleep, in both situations temperature data can 
furnish valuable information.  Liquid water may be close to freezing, 
with its molecules rather sluggish, or it may be near the boiling point, 
its molecules about to erupt into steam; ice may be about to melt or it 
may be very cold.  And so it is with sleep and wakefulness.  The depth 
of sleep is not the same throughout the night, and by the use of various 
criteria, depth-of-sleep curves have been plotted. (678) 
 
In this passage, Kleitman notes the distinction between sleep and waking, but also the 
slippery nature of this distinction.  David Randall explains the cycles to which 
Kleitman alludes further:  “Researchers . . .  realized that sleep is made up of five 
distinct stages that the body cycles through over roughly ninety minute periods” (23).  
These stages include the first stage, in which the sleep is “so light that if you wake up 
from it, you night not realize that you have been sleeping”; the second stage, which 
marks a transition from light to deep sleep; the third and fourth stages of deep sleep 
(the fourth stage is “the farthest your brain travels from conscious thought”); and the 
fifth, REM stage, is “when most dreams occur” (D. Randall 23).  Incidentally, 
Kleitman is the researcher best known for having made famous the “discovery” of 
REM sleep.  The body then repeats this cycle of ascent and descent from and to 
unconsciousness multiple times through the hours spent sleeping.  Additionally, 
dreams occupy the space in the sleep cycle closest to reawakening—they are both 
phenomenologically and temporally the closest to consciousness.   
If we apply this sleep cycle to the cyclical thoughts of the insomniac, we can 
see the progression of “light” insomnia, where the insomniac has not yet realized he 
or she will not be sleeping (when exactly does not yet having fallen asleep become 
insomnia, after all?).  Then, the second stage connotes a realization of insomnia.  The 
“deepest” stages of insomnia (comparable to stages three and four of the sleep cycle) 
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are reflected in the insomniac’s seemingly endless train of thought, which typically 
alternates between past and future, and in some cases, even unconsciousness.  The 
final, lightest stage of sleep mirrors the insomniac’s return to awareness of his or her 
current condition of insomnia and the passage of measurable clock time.  While this 
cycle of insomnia is more idiosyncratic than sleep cycles in terms of time spent in 
each phase, the relationship between the insomniac and his or her consciousness 
fluctuates throughout the period of insomnia.  Keeping in mind that the widespread 
illness and disorder brought about by World War I created a new awareness of the 
physical body in shaping perception and experience, it makes sense that the modernist 
literary text displays a close relationship between the bodily experience of insomnia 
and reflects this experience through the narrative. 
Another way through which the structure of the modernist literary work can 
both illustrate for and cultivate in readers a sense of insomnia is the presentation of 
temporality as cyclical.  Molly, for instance, moves from present to past to future in 
her thoughts.  Additionally, time in the final pages of Ulysses is not only cyclical, but 
simultaneously frozen and moving rapidly.  The time it seems to take to fall asleep 
when one has insomnia appears to be unending.  Yet, a hyper-awareness of time’s 
passage (watching a clock, or hearing church bells marking the passage of hours) 
makes time appear to fly, despite the sense of its standing still.  The process of 
insomniac thought Molly’s passage describes mimics the cycles of sleep, albeit 
broken sleep, so that these circadian rhythms become distorted.  While these cycles 
are cycles of sleep, they also mirror the various stages of insomnia as presented in 
literary texts.  The first stage is a liminal one—the point at which one is moving from 
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simple wakefulness to the realization of insomnia.  The second is a transition into the 
deeper stages of insomnia, as marked by the stream of consciousness flow of memory 
(third and fourth stages).  The fifth stage is the stage of moving from insomnia to 
wakefulness, as in the case of Molly becoming aware of Bloom’s entrance to the 
bedroom or the bells and train whistles outside. 
In Ulysses, Molly’s experience of insomnia demonstrates the cycle I have just 
described.  Her thoughts jump from present to past to future, and are disrupted by 
outside noises (the train whistle and the church bells) (726; 772) and the presence of 
Bloom sleeping near her (771).  She tries to sleep, but finds herself unable to do so, 
and as she struggles, she becomes aware of time’s passage:  “theres Georges church 
bells wait 3 quarters the hour wait 2 oclock well thats a nice hour of the night for him 
to be coming home at” (772).  Molly continues, “a quarter after what an unearthly 
hour I suppose theyre just getting up in China now . . . let me see if I can doze off 
12345 what kind of flowers are those they invented…” (781).  This section lacks any 
punctuation until the very end, illustrating the racing thoughts of the insomniac.  
Molly’s mind shifts from counting to flowers with no transition; all of her thoughts 
blend into each other.  Additionally, though much of the content of the passage is 
focused on the past, as she traces the origins of her relationships with both Bloom and 
Blazes Boylan, the passage also indicates a heightened awareness of time, as the 
church bells remind of her the lateness of the hour.  Though Molly expresses 
frustration at her inability to sleep, the passage ends on positive hopeful note, as she 
remembers accepting both Bloom’s marriage proposal in the past and says “Yes” in 
acceptance of their future and the possibility of a simultaneous future with Boylan:  
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“yes I said yes I will Yes.” (783).   The final line of the story places past “said,” 
future “will,” and present statement “Yes” in association with each other, much as her 
insomnia makes her experience past, future, and present simultaneously. 
Of course, the example of Molly’s insomnia is just that, a literal case of 
insomnia, with all of its movements from past to present and to getting lost in thought 
to an awareness of time’s passage and the external world.  On a larger scale, 
Nabokov’s Lolita follows a similar pattern with relation to temporality.  According to 
Elizabeth Prioleau, in Lolita “time and space move backward, doubles proliferate, 
language fractures into new combinations” (428).  She continues, “Central to man’s 
condition, Nabokov believes, is an imprisonment in time which is ‘spherical and 
without exits’ (Memory, p. 10)” (429).  Nabokov’s sense of time is that of the 
insomniac and is evident in the way Humbert constructs his narrative.  The novel 
begins with Humbert’s framing of the past as he traces the origins of his pedophilia to 
a, possibly imagined, childhood relationship with a young girl named Annabel Leigh 
(an obvious allusion to Edgar Allan Poe’s famous poem, “Annabel Lee”).  While 
initially, the opening sections of the novel immerse the reader in Humbert’s 
remembrances of the past, these visions of his past are then connected to his anxieties 
over his present and fears of the future:   
I leaf again and again through these miserable memories, and keep 
asking myself, was it then, in the glitter of that remote summer, that 
the rift in my life began; or was my excessive desire for that child only 
the first evidence of an inherent singularity?  When I try to analyze my 
own cravings, motives, actions and so forth, I surrender to a sort of 
retrospective imagination which feeds the analytic faculty with 
boundless alternatives and which causes each visualized route to fork 
and re-fork without end in the maddeningly complex prospect of my 
past. (13) 
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Humbert’s writing of his own experience of having memories is significantly related 
to the experience of insomnia on many levels.  Notably, the past, the future, and the 
present are not separated for Humbert, but are complexly interconnected.  He is 
looking to his past to find something about his present, but also trying to find his 
present in his past.  He views his past as complex, yet its complexity lies in the future 
movement of his constantly multiplying attempts at analysis. This cycling between 
past, present, and future analysis of the past represents the insomniac’s drift into 
streams of consciousness in which memories and anxieties become intertwined.   
Another  important feature of this passage is Humbert’s seemingly infinite 
capacity to analyze.  He can find no conclusion to his thoughts, as they multiply and 
build on each other, or, as he puts it “fork and re-fork without end.”  Even the word 
“re-fork” is suggestive, as a “re” implies a return to something or a repetition, yet “re-
forking” is also a movement forward, infinitely replicated.  Here, Humbert’s analysis 
of his own thought process expresses a sense of over-determination.  Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari argue that “the unconscious itself [is] fundamentally a crowd” 
(29).  In their terms, “the Wolf is the pack” (31).  While Nabokov, whom I have 
described earlier as virulently anti-Freudian, in this passage rejects any simple one-to-
one correlation between symbol and meaning, the idea of images from the 
unconscious having this infinite capacity for meaning as proposed by Deleuze and 
Guattari makes sense.  For Humbert, every image or memory creates an infinite 
amount of related ideas that can split into endlessly different directions (one can 
understand Nabokov’s affinity for the writings of Jorge Luis Borges).  So, while the 
actual narrative itself is constrained to what is on the page, Humbert implies infinite 
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possibilities of meaning that lay underneath the narrative structure, as well as the 
temporal consequences of finding oneself lost in perpetual over-analysis.   
The passage from Lolita is a microcosm of the text itself.  The novel 
consistently drifts back and forth between Humbert’s memories and his attempts to 
editorialize and analyze himself and his actions in the context of those memories.  As 
he becomes immersed in the past, retelling the story, awareness of the present and 
future is constantly interspersed, primarily in the form of an address to the text’s 
audience of the future, treating them as though they are listening in the present.  For 
example, immediately upon narrating the process of his search for Lolita after she has 
left him, he writes, “This book is about Lolita; and now that I have reached the part 
which (had I not been forestalled by another internal combustion martyr) might be 
called “Dolorès Disparue,” there would be little sense in analyzing the three empty 
years that followed” (253).  This is not the first instance in which Humbert creates 
another fictional text from his own text, a future book derived both from his past 
experience and future completion of his current narrative.  Here, both Humbert and 
the reader are brought out of the memory to both the present and the future.  
Humbert’s consciousness drifts from his past (and his disruptive habit of over-
analyzing that past) to his concerns of both the present (his writing of the narrative 
and the elements essential to it), as well as the future (the imagined reader’s 
experience of the text).  Humbert can only predict a future audience, as he 
apostrophizes to Lolita, “neither of us is alive when the reader opens this book” (309).  
His thoughts are very much a combination of past, present and future, and there is a 
forwards and backwards cyclical movement throughout the text. 
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Thus far, we have a beginning of the text that slowly integrates us into the 
world of the pedophile, just as the insomniac slowly realizes he or she will not be 
sleeping much on a given night, which I have characterized as the first stages of 
insomnia.  Humbert’s thoughts drift towards the past throughout the text, and often 
get lost in this past, as an insomniac may temporarily become lost in a stream of 
consciousness, which are the deeper stages of insomnia.  Yet, this same movement 
towards the past is constantly reunited with the present and the passing of time 
towards the end of Humbert’s life (he knows, as he writes, that he will soon be 
executed, another move reminiscent of Poe).  At the very end of the novel, Humbert 
is completely removed both from an immersion in his act of narration and brought 
back to the surface world, as he realizes the “real-world” consequences of his writing 
in the form of a possible embarrassment of the now dead (but he does not know she is 
dead) Lolita, as well as his imminent death.  Nabokov, of course, further complicates 
this schema through his inclusion of “John Ray, Jr., Ph.D.’s” opening remarks, telling 
readers that “’Mrs. Richard F. Schiller’ died in childbed,” (4), which foretells of 
Lolita’s death before Humbert’s narrative has even begun, yet forestalls the reader 
from knowledge of this event until he or she has neared the end of the text and learns 
of Lolita’s marriage to Richard Schiller (in the case of a reader with an extremely 
astute memory), or, more significantly, the reader re-reads the text, beginning the 
cycle anew, but now with the knowledge that Lolita has been doomed to an early 
demise from the start.  Even his act of requiring the reader to re-read the text to have 
a more complete grasp of its implications is insomniac in nature.  Insomnia relies on 
the disruption of cyclical patterns of sleeping and waking; Lolita is similarly 
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disruptive, not allowing the reader to “rest” at the end of the text, but requiring that he 
or she return again to the start, to a re-awakening of the text with the newfound 
knowledge that Lolita has died before it has all begun. 
Most significantly contributing to the insomniac temporal structure of this 
novel is Humbert’s project of producing Lolita.  Carol Shloss relates Nabokov’s past 
experience with the way in which he links temporality and textuality in the 
production of texts:   
Though [exile from Russia] deprived him of opulence and aristocratic 
prerogatives, these losses were important not because they caused 
discomfort, but because they engendered a perspective:  loss of 
childhood homeland became, for Nabokov, a model for all losses of 
time, and his subsequent vulnerability a spur to re-examine the nature 
of wealth and the methods of recouping the tangible world’s 
disintegration.  (224) 
 
Perhaps Nabokov hated sleep for a related reason:  it is lost time.  So, Humbert, a 
chronic insomniac, often uses his sleep-time to produce the Lolita he desires in 
numerous ways I will describe.  Schloss continues, “Nabokov plays consistently with 
the analogy between building identity and building a text, and asserts in both 
instances his invulnerability to misfortune” (225).  Much as the text is a production of 
Lolita, it is also a production of himself, as he begs of the reader, “Imagine me; I shall 
not exist if you do not imagine me” (129).  Like Fitzgerald, his thoughts alone do not 
make real his existence.  Only the reader’s thoughts can do so.  Humbert clearly 
presents his constructed text as a guard against his separation from Lolita, not while 
alive, but in the afterlife.  His story is meant to immortalize their relationship, but also 
to present it in the carefully shaded light under which he has crafted his narrative.   
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In introducing both his pedophilia and the profile of the “nymphet,” Humbert 
makes several notable references to the relationship of the nymphet to time.  For 
instance, he writes, “[In my description of the nymphet] it will be marked that I 
substitute time terms for spatial ones.  In fact, I would have the reader see ‘nine’ and 
‘fourteen’ as the boundaries--the mirrory beaches and rosy rocks--of an enchanted 
island haunted by those nymphets of mind and surrounded by a vast, misty sea” (16).  
In this passage, time has a tangible presence, manifesting in the physical transition to 
and then from “nymphet” within a certain age window.  Similarly, for the insomniac, 
the hours of going to bed and having to emerge from bed to face another day, are 
similar boundaries of insomnia.  Further, he writes, “the elusive, shifty, soul-
shattering, insidious charm that separates the nymphet from coevals of hers as are 
incomparably more dependent on the spatial world of synchronous phenomena than 
on that intangible island of entranced time where Lolita plays with her likes” (17).  To 
recognize a nymphet, “You have to be an artist or a madman, a creature of infinite 
melancholy” (17).  Again, we see Humbert producing the nymphet out of a 
coincidence of time and space.  He looks at the “world of synchronous phenomena” 
not as a world delineated by time, but by space, much as the insomniac’s experience 
of time is also linked to the sleeping space.  For example, one who is tired but cannot 
sleep at business meeting does not have insomnia (at that moment), but one who is 
tired and cannot sleep in his or her bed does have insomnia.  Similarly, merely being 
between the ages of nine and fourteen does not make a young girl a nymphet; she 
must be linked to other physical conditions, such as “the slightly feline outline of a 
cheekbone” or “the slenderness of a downy limb” (17).  There must be a concurrence 
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of temporality and spatiality exclusive only to the nymphet, just as there is a similar 
concurrence in the case of insomnia. 
Unsurprisingly, then, insomnia is one of the conditions through which 
Humbert produces Lolita and Lolita, both as narrative and as character.  But it is also 
meant to produce the Lolita he desires.  He writes, “What I had madly possessed was 
not she, but my own creation, another fanciful Lolita—perhaps, more real than Lolita; 
overlapping, encasing her; floating between me and her, and having no will, no 
consciousness—indeed no life of her own” (62).  What he wants is not a living human 
being, but a sleeping one.  He acknowledges that his textual Lolita is not “real” but 
only his “own creation” without any personal agency, much like a person asleep.  
Interestingly, his first “official” molestation of Lolita comes after he has drugged her 
to sleep (while lying awake next to her observing her every movement).  His ability to 
monitor and manipulate her sleep, while he remains vigilantly awake, is intrinsically 
related to his ability to (or attempt to, at least) control her.  He sees her and his 
insomnia as closely intertwined, and writes, “So how could I afford not to see her for 
two months of summer insomnias?” (66).   His “insomnias,” which he typically 
describes as plural, become a necessary state in his relationship to Lolita.  For 
example, it is during his insomnia that he plots the means by which to gain control 
over Lolita:  “As I lay in bed, erotically musing before trying to go to sleep, I thought 
of a final scheme how to profit by the picnic to come” (54).  His intent is to lure 
Lolita into the woods to molest her, while her mother remains unaware.   When this 
plan fails, he develops another fantasy, which involves impregnating Charlotte so as 
to place her in “a prolonged confinement” which “would give [him] a chance to be 
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alone with [his] Lolita for weeks, perhaps--and gorge the limp nymphet with sleeping 
pills” (80).  His fantasy of control over Lolita requires that she be asleep, and his 
planning takes place when he fails to sleep. 
While he never does impregnate Charlotte before her death, his idea of using 
sleeping pills on both mother and daughter becomes his course of action:  “I saw 
myself administering a powerful sleeping potion to both mother and daughter so as to 
fondle the latter through the night with perfect impunity” (71).  His plan requires two 
basic factors:  their susceptibility to sleep and his confidence in his insomniac ability 
to remain vigilant and active “through the night.”  In the scheme to use sleeping pills, 
Humbert’s relentless insomnia (or “insomnias”) becomes a source of power.  If he 
can be awake while Lolita and Charlotte are sleeping, unconscious, and unaware, he 
can do with them as he pleases.  But, because he realizes the permeability of the 
barrier between sleep and wakefulness, he must be careful to strengthen this barrier 
through the use of sedatives.  He begins experimenting on Charlotte’s sleep while 
Lolita is away at camp, trying various sedatives and doses to find the right formula by 
which to render her completely unconscious without her noticing his machinations.  
He describes the steps he takes to bring his plan to fruition: 
Throughout most of July I had been experimenting with various 
sleeping powders, trying them out on Charlotte, a great taker of pills.  
The last dose I had given her (she thought it was a table of mild 
bromides--to anoint her nerves) had knocked her out for four solid 
hours.  I had put the radio at full blast.  I had blazed in her face an 
olisbos-like flashlight.  I had pushed her, pinched her, prodded her--
and nothing had disturbed the rhythm of her calm and powerful 
breathing.  However, when I had done such a simple thing as kiss her, 
she had awakened at once, as fresh and strong as an octopus (I barely 
escaped).  This would not do, I thought; had to get something still 
safer.  At first, Dr. Byron did not seem to believe me when I said his 
last prescription was no match for my insomnia.  He suggested I try 
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again, and for a moment diverted my attention by showing me 
photographs of his family.  He had a fascinating child of Dolly’s age; 
but I saw through his tricks and insisted he prescribe the mightiest pill 
extant.  He suggested I play golf, but finally agreed to give me 
something that, he said, “would really work”; and going to a cabinet, 
he produced a vial of violet-blue capsules banded with dark purple at 
one end, which, he said, had just been placed on market and were 
intended not for neurotics whom a draft of water could calm if 
properly administered, but only for great sleepless artists who had to 
die for a few hours in order to live for centuries.  (94) 
 
Humbert’s reference to “great sleepless artists” echoes Hammond and MacFarlane’s 
correlations between “brain-workers” and sleeplessness, illustrating the degree to 
which they are connected:  only the “great” ones are candidates for the maximum 
dosage of sleeping pills.  Though Humbert later realizes that “the purple pills did not 
even belong to the big and noble family of barbiturates, and though it might have 
induced sleep in a neurotic who believed it to be potent drug, it was too mild a 
sedative to affect for any length of time a wary, albeit weary, nymphet” (128), his 
attempted use of such pills is significant.  This passage playfully illustrates the 
authoritative physician, skeptical of Humbert’s motives, giving him a placebo in 
place of a strong narcotic.  But, more importantly, this passage points to Humbert’s 
desire to control through sleep.  His nightly observations are quite reminiscent of yet 
another of Poe’s tales, “The Tell-Tale Heart,” in which the narrator spends a week 
observing the sleep of his murder victim, plotting the perfect time to act without 
awakening the old man whom he kills.  Humbert is similarly vigilant in his 
observations of Charlotte, and renders her comical through the various experiments 
he performs on her.   
After Charlotte’s death, when it comes time to try his experiments on Lolita, 
he turns to the literary to illustrate how, through the manipulation of her sleep, he 
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attempts to become her author or creator.  Once he drugs her with the ultimately 
ineffectual purple pills, he spends a whole night of heart-burn ravaged insomnia 
observing every minutia of her sleep, waiting for the right moment to act.  Yet, the 
right moment does not arrive, as her sleep remains fairly light and she responds to his 
movements and presence.  While waiting, he composes a fantasy version of their first 
coital encounter in which he can have his way with her, yet, by keeping her unaware, 
maintain her innocence:  “She was fast asleep again, my nymphet, but still I did not 
dare to launch upon my enchanted voyage.  La Petite Dormeuse ou l’Amant Ridicule” 
(129) (another example of a theoretical text Humbert “invents” in the novel).  By 
giving their “story” a title, Humbert emphasizes his authorship of Lolita, but can only 
do so once he has diminished her agency through manipulating her sleep.  Yet, his 
insomnia fails him, and “Time and again, my consciousness folded the wrong way, 
my shuffling body entered the sphere of sleep, shuffled out again, and once or twice I 
caught myself drifting into a melancholy snore” (131).  Of course, his plan to molest 
the unconscious Lolita fails and she is quite conscious when they “consummate” their 
relationship:  “by six she was wide awake, and by six fifteen we were technically 
lovers” (132).  She resists, through awakening, his attempts to create her in the image 
of the innocent object he desires, takes on some form of agency, however perverse, in 
their sexual relationship, and in doing so, refuses to take on the form he desires.  She 
may be his lover as he desires, but she will not be the untouched virgin for whom he 
hopes.  As James Tweedie argues, “Humbert’s main source of anxiety is the 
realization that Lolita maintains an identity outside his self-contained realm, and in 
his memoirs, he searches for a medium to enforce her isolation while permitting his 
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singular mannerisms to survive” (161).  One “medium” Humbert attempts to use is 
the sleeping pills, which both “enforce her isolation,” as she is literally cut off from 
the world when asleep, and also strip her of her individual identity, as with sleep 
comes the loss of individually acknowledged subjectivity.  Particularly revealing is 
the mention Humbert makes of Lolita’s “sobs in the night—every night, every 
night—the moment I feigned sleep” (176).  Here, we can see the war between their 
two subjectivities, where they both use the sleep of the other to become more 
themselves.  When others are asleep, there is no longer a need to hide oneself—the 
problem becomes what occurs when one only appears to be asleep and inadvertently 
reveals something to an aware observer.  Tweedie continues, “But in moments of 
despair, he realizes the difficulty, even impossibility of such a project because he is a 
prisoner not only of his solipsism but also of his own narrative, a mirror of sorts, 
which reflects its author as accurately as its ostensible subject” (161).  In constructing 
his narrative, Humbert has constructed himself as a subject as much, if not more, as 
he has constructed Lolita, and Nabokov subjugates all of his characters.  Tweedie 
views Humbert as a “liminal” figure (161), and this liminality can be read as the 
liminality of authorship, a sort of insomnia between awareness of subjectivity and 
loss of subjectivity, but evident of the inescapability of subjectivity when conscious.  
This novel, then, takes on an insomniac temporal structure for a variety of 
reasons.  It is insomniac, in part, because of the constant fluctuations between and 
melding of past and present that we see in Humbert’s narrative, as well as Humbert’s 
hyper-awareness of the passage of time.  It is also situated between an awakening 
invocation of a mortal subject and an awareness of impending death concurrent with a 
  
 
346 
 
closing apostrophe to an immortal image, whom, as we learn from the start of the text 
that frames Humbert’s narrative, is no longer alive, but can only be re-subjugated 
through language.  As Prioleau argues, numerous circumstances in the novel, 
including shocking and accidental deaths of both Humbert’s mother and Charlotte, 
“all bespeak a reversal of rational, sequential experience in his ‘memoir’” (433).  The 
events of the text rely on the insomniac’s vigilance, but also note the failure of that 
vigilance despite the will to maintain it, illustrating insomnia as a conflict of will and 
desire.  Most significantly, the text posits insomnia as the temporal space of 
authorship, as Humbert requires both his insomnia and Lolita’s sleep to create her as 
the subject of his desire.  Through the text, we see Humbert’s struggle to control his 
own subjectivity through his wakefulness and alertness, yet, he still becomes the 
subject of the narrative, and, quite comically, a subject to be studied by “parents, 
social workers, educators” who must “apply [themselves] with still greater vigilance 
and vision to the task of bringing up a better generation in a safer world” (6).  The 
passage just cited is the last sentence of the introduction written by “John Ray, Jr., 
Ph.D.,” which encourages the reader’s vigilance as a mirror to Humbert’s, 
emphasizing the reader’s own possible insomnia (“vigilance”) generated by the text.  
But, as the text suggests through the obvious irony of “Ray’s” introduction, even 
extreme vigilance is fallible. 
Literary texts play with temporality in a way that relates the narrative to 
insomnia, but the autobiographical Black Boy does as well.  Wright’s non-fiction text 
can be viewed as a melding of past and present.  His rewriting of his past from the 
vantage point of the present, with an eye towards the future at the end, indicates the 
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fusion of these three temporal states.  In many ways, Wright is doing through his 
writing exactly what Hayes does in his periods of insomnia, when he “[recalls his] 
entire life” (3) as a way to put himself to rest.  In describing his decision to begin his 
own writing, he writes: 
I picked up a pencil and held it over a sheet of white paper, but my 
feelings stood in the way of my words.  Well, I would wait, day and 
night, until I knew what to say.  Humbly now, with no vaulting dream 
of achieving a vast unity, I wanted to try and build a bridge of words 
between me and the world outside, that world which was so distant 
and elusive that it seemed unreal. (383-84)   
 
His desire to begin writing his story is a story of waiting, in this case not for sleep, but 
for the words of the story itself to emerge, a waiting that takes place both during day 
and night.  Writing for Wright, like sleeping for an insomniac, is an end to the period 
of waiting for “a bridge” to a “distant and elusive” world when the waiting ends. 
As he tells the story of his upbringing, Wright describes the relationship 
between his insomnia and the conditions of his life.  Of the relationship between his 
family’s poverty and his insomnia, he writes: 
Hunger stole upon me so slowly that at first I was not aware of what 
hunger really meant.  Hunger had always been more or less at my 
elbow when I played, but now I began to wake up at night to find 
hunger standing at my bedside, staring at me gauntly.  The hunger I 
had known before this had been no grim, hostile stranger; it had been a 
normal hunger that had made me beg constantly for bread, and when I 
ate a crust or two I was satisfied.  But this new hunger baffled me, 
scared me, made me angry and insistent. (14) 
 
This passage is of particular importance because of its use of temporality.  Wright, as 
he acknowledges in this passage, was no stranger to hunger.  Yet, until his hunger 
awakens him and instigates his insomnia, he had been able to remain relatively 
independent of it.  However, once his hunger awakens him, we see a union of past 
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(hours and weeks of insufficient food) and present (awakening hungry).  One does not 
instantly experience hunger, but rather becomes hungry, or at least hungry in the way 
Wright describes, over a period of time; his type of hunger is an accretion of various 
hungers, related to lack of food, but more importantly his race, class, family 
relationships, physical habitation, and a variety of other elements of his subjectivity.  
The moment of insomnia that prompts his future actions (“beg constantly for food”), 
unites his past with his present, but also determines his future course of action. 
Other examples of Wright using the time and space of insomnia as a temporal 
device include a passage in which Wright spends his first night living with his uncle 
and finds out he must sleep in the former bedroom (and bed) of his deceased cousin:   
I groped into the dark room and fumbled for the bed; I had the illusion 
that if I touched it I would encounter the dead boy.  I trembled.  
Finally I jumped roughly into the bed and jerked the covers over my 
face.  I did not sleep that night and my eyes were red and puffy the 
next morning. . . .  The next night was the same; fear kept me from 
sleeping” (94).  
 
In this passage, we see the time and space of insomnia as a convergence of past, 
present, and future.  In the textual present (which is also the textual past as Wright 
recreates his narrative), young Richard is forced to confront both his family’s past 
(the death of his cousin) and his own future (a new life with his aunt and uncle) 
simultaneously.  His sleeplessness continues for a week:   
I spent another sleepless night, shivering in the dead boy’s room—it 
was not my room any longer—and I was so frightened that I sweated.  
Each creak of the house made my heart stand still.  In school the next 
day I was dull.  I came home and spent another long night of 
wakefulness and the following day I went to sleep in the classroom.  
When questioned by my teacher, I could give no answer.  Unable to 
free myself from terror, I began to long for home.  A week of 
sleeplessness brought me near the edge of nervous collapse.  (94-95) 
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His insomnia becomes so problematic that not only does it have an adverse effect on 
his education, it also leads to a confrontation with his aunt and uncle that eventually 
results in a beating and a return to his grandmother’s house, as he can no longer stand 
to live with them.  Insomnia becomes yet another turning point for Richard, forcing 
him to confront his family’s past and significantly impacting his future. 
One additional insomniac episode again speaks to the unification of past, 
present, and future within the text.  Wright writes:   
I used to lie awake nights and think back to the early days in Arkansas, 
tracing my mother’s life, reliving events, wondering why she had 
apparently been singled out for so much suffering, meaningless 
suffering, and I would feel more awe than I had ever felt in church.  
My mind could find no answer and I would feel rebellious against all 
life.  But I never felt humble.  (156) 
   
In this passage, we see Richard thinking not only about his own past, but about his 
mother’s.  However, his mother’s past goes back even farther than her actual lifespan, 
as Wright seems to trace her sufferings not only to her experience, but to the 
historical experience of both African Americans and women.  His thoughts move 
towards the past, through his reminiscences, as they simultaneously lead him to an 
attitude of future rebellion.  This rebelliousness leads to a confrontation with his 
uncle, interestingly about time itself.  Richard snaps at his uncle, who has asked for a 
confirmation of the correct time.  He writes, “I was tired, sleepy; I did not want to 
look at the watch again, but I was satisfied that, on the whole, I had given the correct 
time” (157).  His uncle challenges his timekeeping, eventually leading to physical 
threats both from the uncle to Richard and from Richard to the uncle, as Richard 
threatens to slash his uncle with razors if his uncle attempts to beat him again.  This 
motif of time itself as a source of conflict underscores the importance of insomnia as 
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a temporal-structural device, as these insomniac moments of convergence continue to 
fuel the narrator’s anger, determine his future actions, and force him to confront his 
and his family’s past.  The scenes I have described in these paragraphs deal directly 
with experiences of insomnia, but they have overall structural significance as well, 
and serve as a model for the narration as a whole.  These scenes are microcosms of 
the structure of the text, which seeks to draw connections between confronting one’s 
individual and historical past in a way that makes future actions almost inevitable.  
Just as his insomnia leads to poor performance in school, despite the narrator’s innate 
intelligence and love of reading and learning, his forced confrontation with the 
conditions of his and his family’s past create a circumstance from which anger and 
rebellion become almost pre-destined.  Throughout the text, Wright gives a sense of 
acting in a way he knows to be morally and ethically questionable, citing instances of 
various confrontations with family members, school or neighborhood children, and 
even drunkenness at a young age, but he also describes these various scenarios in a 
way that makes his actions seem as though they are beyond his control, much like his 
insomnia or the next-day exhaustion that follows it.  His actions and descriptions 
consistently unite his past circumstances to his present ones, but also shape his future. 
Insomniac Language 
Not only does the modernist text have a particularly complex relationship with 
temporality, specifically waking and not sleeping, as well as the convergence of past, 
present and future, it also has a complex relationship with language (as does any 
literary work, of course).  But, just as in the way insomnia makes thoughts almost 
seem to explode and multiple, the modernist text does so through its use of language.  
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As I argued in the first chapter, World War I not only changed the individual’s 
relationship to the his or her body forcing an awareness of the body as perceptual 
filter, and his or her experience of the passage of time, but also to language.  To 
inform my current discussion, I would like to reiterate two important, and conflicting, 
points.  Language, following the war, became increasingly reliant on the binary 
(reflecting the “us” versus “them” and “good” versus “evil” mentality of the war), and 
language itself was seen as inadequate in portrayal of the war experience.  Thus, 
experience only became represent-able through the replication of experience through 
art.  What then do we make of an art reliant upon language, as literature is?  
Literature in order to convey any sense of significant meaning at all must be as much 
a representation of experience as any other art form, and it does so, in part, through its 
resistance to overly-simplistic binary language.  Insomnia, itself a form of resistance 
against the overly-simplistic binary of sleeping and waking, becomes a method of 
both creating a literature of experience and using language in a way that resists 
reduction.  Thus, it is important to pay attention to the language used within the 
insomniac sequence and text, as well as the language describing insomnia itself. 
Insomnia and language are also related because of the insomniac’s lack of 
control over the flow of language.  During a period of insomnia, one cannot stop 
one’s thoughts as they shift and multiply.  Molly’s monologue is an excellent 
example here, as are Humbert’s references to the “re-forking” of his thoughts.  In this 
sense, language becomes symbolic of insomnia itself in its refusal to be controlled.  
An insomniac may obsess over a word or phrase.  More importantly, insomnia is 
resistant to a clear, stable definition (as many doctors note that insomnia is unique to 
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each individual) rooted in binaries (what is the opposite of insomnia?).  So, we have a 
condition resistant to language in which the sufferer experiences language as just as 
far beyond his or her control as sleep itself is.  Insomnia is a contextual multiplicity; 
in other words, insomnia is both unstable in its definition and only recognizable 
through context, which involves individual circumstance, and at times misperception.  
Placed in the context of an era during which people attempted to stabilize an upended 
world through the reduction of language to binaries, yet simultaneously noted the 
failure of these binaries to convey experience, a condition that explodes both binaries 
and language is extremely relevant.   
Jacques Lacan argues that language structures experience:  “it is the whole 
structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious” in 
part because “language, with its structure, exists prior to each subject’s entry into it a 
certain moment in his mental development” (139).  “The subject,” Lacan continues, 
“is still more the slave of a discourse in the universal movement of which his place is 
already inscribed at his birth” (140). Language, for Lacan, not only structures our 
experience of the world, this structure already existing in the mind of the individual 
before the he or she is able to use language, it also immerses the individual into a 
discursively derived identity, rooted in historical time and place.  Insomnia reveals 
our inability to control both language and the relationship between our bodies and 
minds, thus essentially revealing that while such a structure may exist, this structure 
is beyond our control.  We cannot control the way our minds are structured any more 
than we can control what happens to our loved ones in a war.  This revelation is 
particularly appropriate during an era in which a sense of lost control was pervasive, 
  
 
353 
 
and one way in which the modernist text reflects this sense of lost control is through 
the use of the chronotope of insomnia in which language itself is beyond control.  
Through illustrating language as over-determined, in which meaning is unstable and 
exists only in multiplicities, instability and lack of control are made apparent. 
Regarding Modernism, Peter McHugh argues that it “persistently follows and 
works out the inevitable variability in relation between sign and meaning. . . .  
Modernism seemed to struggle to tame this variability,” and he views the “value [of 
this relationship] as uncertain” (26).  Humbert struggles with this variability as he 
tries to recount the story of his love for Lolita.  One example comes with Humbert’s 
use of Lolita’s name throughout the text.  Humbert, who says, “Oh, my Lolita, I have 
only words to play with!” (32) illustrates both the power of language to attempt to 
“[work] out” the relationship between words and meaning, but also the failure of 
language to truly consolidate and capture meaning.  For this reason among others, 
perhaps, Tweedie refers to Lolita as a text written about “a country on the slovenly 
verge of postmodernity, with its farrago of displaced images and styles” (153).  The 
word Lolita is only a word, after all.  As Tweedie points out, “Nabokov has created in 
Humbert Humbert a narrator who strives with great alacrity, even desperation, to 
capture perfectly in words a human form; the tragedy of the novel is his eventual, 
overdetermined, costly failure.  Lolita exists as a subject and object somewhere in 
Humbert’s prose, but nowhere beyond the text” (169).  In insomnia, words and 
images multiply endlessly in meaning, yet in doing so, fail to retain any meaning at 
all outside of the mind of the insomniac.  As Woolf argues, “In illness words seem to 
possess a mystic quality.  We grasp what is beyond their surface meaning” (“Ill” 21).  
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The same can be said of the word Lolita for Humbert.  Knowing that she has already 
died before the text was written, and knowing that her given name is not even Lolita, 
she is only a word, a word with infinite meanings and possibilities, but she cannot 
exist as more than a word without the text itself.  Tweedie writes, “that word both 
begins and ends his narrative, creating a closed circuit, and endlessness, a perfection 
of form redolent of his earlier narrative goals” (168).  As Tweedie illustrates, the 
word Lolita binds the text together, with awakening on one hand and death with 
hopes of immortality on the other.  While the word is in use, the novel is insomniac, 
trapped in “a closed circuit” with a sense of “endlessness”--words one would use to 
describe the ontological experience of insomnia. 
Nabokov’s insomniac usage of language extends beyond Lolita’s name into 
much of his diction and syntax.  Tweedie argues, “Down to the level of his sentence 
structure, to his penchant for periodic and (surprisingly for such a demanding stylist) 
rambling sentences, Humbert’s style reflects his aversion to ends” (160), and 
insomnia is arguably an aversion to ends also.  Much as Joyce uses Molly’s rambling, 
disconnected, and unpunctuated monologue to both express and replicate her 
insomnia, Humbert’s sentences create the same effect.  For example, Humbert writes:   
My very photogenic mother died in a freak accident (picnic, 
lightening) when I was three, and, save for a pocket of warmth in the 
darkest past, nothing of her subsists within the hollows and dells of my 
memory, over which, if you can still stand my style (I am writing 
under observation), the sun of my infancy had set:  surely, you know 
all those redolent remnants of day suspended, with the midges, about 
some hedge in bloom or suddenly entered and traversed by the 
rambler, at the bottom of a hill, in the summer dusk; a furry warmth, 
glowing midges.  (10) 
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The length of this sentence suggests Humbert’s inability to end it, as it continues on 
and on, with parenthetical interjections, images of liminality, and acknowledgement 
of both mental and syntactic rambles.  Though Humbert is ostensibly trying to put the 
image of his mother to rest and quickly introduce and dismiss her presence in his life, 
this sentence does anything but, and ends with images of a permanent sense of being 
trapped between daylight and nighttime, not fully awake, yet being unable to sleep.  
Even Nabokov’s use of the twice repeated word midge is significant to this passage’s 
meaning.  Nabokov, known for his entomological interests, deliberately chooses not 
one particular and specific image of an insect to use, but a word that encompasses 
several different species of small flying insects who occupy a wide range of habitats, 
some of whom are vampiric and transmit disease.  Nabokov, who mocks translators 
who inaccurately claim Kafka’s character Gregor Samsa is a “flat cockroach” rather 
than “a domed beetle” (Strong 55), certainly could have provided a more specific 
insect term than “midge” if he had chosen to do so.  Yet, through his choice of this 
vague and over-determined insect name, clouds of them in fact, he illustrates 
Humbert’s unwillingness or inability to pin anything down.  On the one hand, 
Humbert asserts his infancy is over and his mother is dead, but on the other, the 
images and memories persist within him refusing to come to an end, just as his 
sentence persists on the page itself. 
Nabokov’s use of spider-imagery related to Humbert is another instance of the 
over-determination of language within this text.  Humbert writes, “I am like one of 
those inflated pale spiders you see in old gardens.  Sitting in the middle of a luminous 
web and giving little jerks to this or that strand” (49).  Regarding this passage, 
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Tweedie connects the spider imagery to Humbert’s “plurality of focus” (154).  
Indeed, the image of the spider, which also makes an appearance in Nabokov’s novel 
Invitation to a Beheading, as a spider who vigilantly watches  Cincinnatus’ every 
move, illustrates both plurality and vigilance.  This spider is simultaneously creator 
and destroyer, as it weaves a web intended to trap its prey.  Similarly, Humbert is a 
creator, as he produces Lolita through his text, but upon trapping her in his web of 
machinations, he ultimately destroys her.  In addition, the spider’s ability to maintain 
vigilance over all parts of its web, the various strands it controls, mirrors Humbert’s 
perpetual vigilance over every aspect of Lolita’s conscious and unconscious activity.  
Additionally, the spider plays both heroic and villainous roles, trapping harmful 
insects in its web (as Humbert eventually traps the predatory Clare Quilty), yet also 
harming even the most benevolent of insects.  Just a spider can theoretically generate 
an infinite web, the image of the spider can generate infinite possibilities of meaning. 
Another level at which Nabokov utilizes over-determined and unending 
language is through his use of tmesis, as Tweedie notes.  Tmesis, the immersion of 
one word into another to create a whole new word or phrase, disrupts typical 
linguistic cycles and expectations.  Tweedie writes: 
Humbert repeatedly pries apart common phrases to insert the world 
outside his solipsism.  But unlike the classical model where necessity 
is parted for the sake of art, the order is reversed in Humbert’s fantasy 
world:  tmesis allows ends to rush back in.  Images that traditionally 
evoke nostalgia become symptomatic of inevitable decay. (156) 
   
One example of this “phrasal tmesis” Tweedie discusses comes with Humbert’s 
assertion that “The rapist was Charlie Holmes.  I am the therapist—a matter of nice 
spacing in the way of distinction” (Lolita 150).  The introduction of a space, 
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transforming “therapist” into “the rapist” illustrates the ways in which Humbert uses 
language, or in this case, its absence, to generate meaning.  If we look at therapy in 
the way Nabokov (controversially) suggests, as a fraudulent quest for symbols and 
manipulation of the subject, Humbert is both therapist and rapist to Lolita.  He is also 
the void between the the and rapist.  Much as the Lolita of the text is not the “real” 
Lolita, drawing readers’ attention not to her presence but her absence, Humbert’s 
attempts at creating himself are reliant on a similar void.  As readers follow 
Humbert’s narrative, it becomes clear that the Humbert produced by the text is not the 
“real” Humbert.  Rather, the text, through what Humbert does not say or do, reveals a 
very different Humbert, thus his identity is just as present in the space between 
therapist and rapist as it is in either word. 
For Joyce, the use of language within Ulysses is also highly over-determined.  
In Ulysses, nearly every word has a multiplicity of meanings; however, the Nighttown 
scene (“Circe”) presents a perfect example of novel as “threshold zone.”  Within the 
Nighttown scene, in which narration shifts between Stephen and Bloom, Joyce 
illustrates this sense of multiplicity.  The imagery is surreal, much of it hallucinatory, 
making it difficult to distinguish “real” from unreal and sleeping from waking 
consciousness.  Images constantly morph into other images and people change into 
other people.  This scene is one that blurs the lines between dream and wakefulness, 
exchanging perception with over-determined symbol and fear with nightmare.  This 
scene is a representation of liminality, both structurally (shifts of narration) and in 
terms of content (reality and hallucination).  For example, in this section, the 
“Timepiece” is given a voice, which declares “Cuckoo” three times over (469).  Even 
  
 
358 
 
this simple word, one attributed to an insentient object (notably one that measures 
time), is over-determined.  For one, the declaration marks the passage of time, 
specifically a time when most people are asleep, if we read this as three in the 
morning.  Secondly, the word cuckoo can also mean mentally unstable, which is 
fitting in a hallucinatory scene during which Bloom’s state of mind is in question.  
Thirdly, the word is phonetically similar to the earlier used word “cuckold” (469), 
used to describe Bloom’s status within his marriage to the unfaithful Molly.   Finally, 
the word becomes symbolic of the judgment placed upon Bloom (or the self-
judgment he fears) as mentally unstable and cuckolded, as sounding of the clock 
signals the presence of the jury who emerges from behind “a panel of fog” (469).  
This one over-determined word has both symbolic and structural significance within 
the text, marking time’s passage, calling Bloom to judgment, and exposing the 
instability of his psyche, as well as his marriage.  The word’s associations with time 
(three in the morning) and mental stability connect the word with insomnia as well. 
For Wright, much of the over-determination of language comes through his 
attempts at dealing with race relations, something he struggles to control but cannot.  
He is aware that as a black man, even the most innocent phrases or gestures can put 
him at great risk.  He writes of the difference in language for blacks and whites:   
[Wright’s boss’s client] had not asked me for this long explanation, but 
I had spoken at length of fill up the yawning, shameful gap that 
loomed between us; I had spoken to try to drag the unreal nature of the 
conversation back to safe and sound southern ground.  Of course, the 
conversation was real; it dealt with my welfare, but it had brought to 
the surface of the day all the dark fears I had known all my life.  The 
Yankee white man did not know how dangerous his words were.  
 (There are some elusive, profound, recondite things that men 
find hard to say to other men; but with the Negro it is the little things 
of life that become hard to say, for these tiny items shape his destiny.  
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A man will seek to express his relation to the stars; but when a man’s 
consciousness has been riveted upon obtaining a loaf of bread, that 
loaf of bread is as important as the stars.) (232) 
 
Growing up in the South, Wright is conditioned to speak in two very different 
languages, one of submission to whites, and the other of fraternity to blacks.  So, for 
him, even an expression of a most basic truth, that he is hungry, becomes problematic 
when speaking with a white person, who may interpret the statement as a complaint 
against him or herself or social hegemonies.  Not only must Wright carefully watch 
what he does say, considering every possible interpretation of his words to be sure 
and choose “safe” ones, he must also watch what he does not say, as there is power in 
the gaps of conversation as well (related also to gaps in consciousness during 
insomnia).  The significance of language is emphasized throughout this text, as the 
choice of the proper word for a given situation could be, for Wright, the difference 
between safety and threats of or actual violence against him. 
Stream of Consciousness 
The preoccupation with sleeping and waking, as well as the tendency of words 
and images to multiply in meaning, evading control as sleep evades the insomniac, 
are only some of the many textual features that equate the modernist text with the 
experience of insomnia.  Another common feature is the intently psychological nature 
of both the modernist work and insomnia.  Of course, this is not to argue that 
nineteenth century texts or contemporary works do not have any focus on 
psychology, but rather that this feature is especially important to the modernist work, 
which often emphasizes psychological development over plot development.  In other 
words, novels such as Dickens’ Great Expectations or Joseph Sheridan La Fanu’s 
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Carmilla require a lengthy of events given the intricacy of their plots.  On the other 
hand, novels such as Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, or Joyce’s Ulysses require only a 
simple explanation of the plot:  in Mrs. Dalloway, Clarissa Dalloway throws a party, 
to which she invites friends she has not seen in a long while, and Septimus Smith 
attempts, with the help of his wife, to treat his war trauma, but ends up committing 
suicide.  Likewise, in Ulysses, Harold Bloom walks around Dublin, attends a funeral, 
meets with various people, eats lunch, goes to a beach and a brothel, and comes home 
to his wife who is awake in bed.  This, of course, is not to say that either of the latter 
two novels lack in complexity, but the complexity lies primarily in the psychological 
development of the characters, rather than the intricacy of events. 
One of the structural features attributed to the psychological nature of the 
modernist text is the stream of consciousness form of narration.  William James, who 
first developed the metaphor, explains:  “Consciousness, then, does not appear to 
itself chopped up in bits.  Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly as it 
presents itself in the first instance.  It is nothing jointed; it flows.  A ‘river’ or a 
‘stream’ are [sic] the metaphors by which it is most naturally described” (“Stream” 
159).  For James, while awake, consciousness never stops.  In fact, James sees the 
only true disruption of this stream of consciousness as sleep.  He writes, “When Peter 
and Paul wake up in the same bed, and recognize that they have been asleep, each one 
of them mentally reaches back and makes the connection with but one of the two 
streams of thought which were broken by the sleeping hours” (“Stream” 158).  The 
stream to which Peter returns is Peter’s and Paul returns to Paul’s stream.  As an 
interesting aside, it might be worth considering James’ choice of the names Peter and 
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Paul in this passage, given their association with the failure of vigilant wakefulness.  
Peter and Paul were among Jesus’ disciples and play a role in Christ’s betrayal 
specifically because they fall asleep, allowing Judas to commit his act of betrayal:  
“And he come unto the disciples, and findeth them asleep, and saith unto Peter, What, 
could ye not watch with me one hour?”  (Matthew 26:40).  Jesus then asks his 
disciples to remain vigilant, but finds them asleep again:  “And he came and found 
them asleep again:  for their eyes were heavy” (Matthew 26:43).  It is while the other 
disciples sleep that Judas betrays Jesus.  Thus, if anything, James’ choice of names of 
his two sleepers has interesting connotations with the disconnect between conscious 
vigilance and the lack of awareness sleep entails.  Sleep is a betrayal of vigilance. 
The stream of consciousness and its associations with vigilance is critical in 
the modernist text.  The modernist text, if it did not invent this form, certainly 
perfected it, and many modernist literary works use this as a device.  It is not 
coincidental, in light of the changes of literature that took place after the World War I 
that I described in the first chapter, that this device becomes so popular in this 
specific historical period.  It is a device through which the text becomes experiential 
for the reader.  In other words, there is a phenomenological aspect of reading a stream 
of consciousness narration that evokes the experience of insomnia in the reader 
(whether or not the actual stream of consciousness passage takes place during the 
character’s insomnia, which often it does).  Indeed, both Ulysses and Lolita utilize 
this method of narration.  In Ulysses, the passage that consists of Molly’s insomnia 
discussed earlier is an excellent example of stream of consciousness writing.  
Similarly, both Nabokov and Wright often allow readers to become immersed in their 
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characters’ streams of thought.  Immersion in a stream of consciousness is, as I have 
argued, a phenomenological feature of insomnia (though this immersion vacillates 
according to the “cycles” of insomnia I have described earlier).  Through replicating 
this sense of immersion in this stream, the text replicates the experience of insomnia. 
Because insomnia takes place in isolation, often without outside stimuli, the 
insomniac too finds himself or herself immersed in a stream of consciousness.  While 
this stream is not exclusive to insomnia, as James notes, a heightened awareness of 
the flow of one’s thoughts is certainly characteristic of insomnia, given the lack of 
other stimuli often present as one awaits sleep in a darkened room; there is not much 
else to experience other than one’s bodily sensations and thoughts.  Modernist authors 
often use this idea of the stream of consciousness as a literary device, illustrating the 
often haphazard nature of thought, perhaps with the input of bodily perceptions 
Woolf suggests.  Thus, this use of the stream of consciousness is one way in which 
the phenomenological experience of insomnia makes its way into the modernist text.  
Take, for example, the following passage from Ulysses, as thought by Bloom:   
Did I write Ballsbridge on the envelope I took to cover when she 
disturbed me writing to Martha?  Hope it’s not chucked in the dead 
letter office.  Be the better of a shave.  Grey sprouting beard.  That’s 
the first sign when the hairs come out grey and temper getting cross.  
Silver threads among the grey.  Fancy being his wife.  Wonder how he 
had the gumption to propose to any girl.  Come out and live in the 
graveyard.  Dangle that before her.  It might thrill her first.  Courting 
death … Shades of night hovering here with all the dead stretched 
about. (107-08) 
 
In this stream of consciousness passage, we see the seeming randomness of Bloom’s 
thoughts as they flow from one subject to another.  Of course, Bloom is not 
experiencing insomnia during this passage.  But, my argument here is not that stream 
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of consciousness is an exclusive feature of insomnia (it is not), but rather that the 
individual gains a heightened awareness of the stream of consciousness in the 
insomniac state.  With regard to reading a text, the reader also experiences a 
heightened awareness of the immersion in the stream of consciousness when this 
device is used by the author.  So, in essence, while stream of consciousness for the 
character does not necessarily indicate insomnia, the phenomenology of the reading 
experience of this device replicates features of the phenomenology of insomnia. 
James envisions a model of consciousness in which thoughts flow 
continuously, yet are often trapped in “the pails and the pots” within the stream 
(thoughts on which we focus intently for a while), “still between them the free water 
would continue to flow” (“Stream” 165).  Even when one focuses on a single idea for 
a given period of time, an undercurrent of thought always remains, as we can see 
when Bloom contemplates related ideas within the above passage.  He pauses on a 
singular thought momentarily, but the next thought is already determined based on his 
surroundings.  Thus, his seemingly random movements from thought to thought 
actually correlate to his movements around Dublin.  These points of focus, for James, 
are not breaks in the stream of consciousness, but rather intrinsic to it.   Yet, if we 
take insomnia for a model, we can see that sometimes there are gaps in consciousness 
of which the subject is unaware. Bloom’s stream of consciousness displays similar 
gaps, not in awareness, but rather in the movement from one thought to another, 
another phenomenological similarity.  In other words, to be conscious of the letter to 
Martha means temporarily being unaware of his beard growing, and so forth.  In the 
second chapter, I discussed the possibility that insomniacs sleep more than they 
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know, illustrating gaps and shifts in this stream.  If this is the case, then that stream of 
consciousness is broken by unconsciousness, as James says, yet the subject is not 
aware of the unconsciousness, so, is therefore not aware that the stream has been 
temporarily severed.  The reader’s experience of reading the stream of consciousness 
narrative replicates the nature of insomniac thought with its combination of flow, 
gaps, and shifts. 
Contemporary sleep researcher Stanley Coren provides a real world example 
of his experience of unconsciousness of unconsciousness, upon arising up from a 
night in which he had believed himself to have not slept at all:   
Although I felt that I had been wide awake all night, I had actually 
been so soundly asleep that I had completely missed an earthquake 
that had brought down a large quantity of plaster from the ceiling onto 
our bed.  In fact, as I got up, two large chunks of plaster, each the size 
of a tennis ball, rolled off of my chest, where they had apparently been 
resting for an hour or more since the earthquake.  (15)  
 
Coren gives us an example of his unawareness of his consciousness transitioning to 
unconsciousness, in a way similar to that in which Bloom’s thoughts drift, without 
any apparent awareness on his part, from one impression to another.  Coren’s model 
of sleep and wakefulness is similar to James’ stream and bucket model, in which 
one’s thoughts both simultaneously focus and continue running.  Coren’s mind was 
asleep, yet despite this fact, he had a distinct sense of the continuity of his thoughts, 
though this seeming continuity was later disproven by the realization of the 
earthquake’s occurrence.  These sometimes repetitive transitions between 
consciousness and unconsciousness, all experienced under the larger umbrella of 
insomnia points to a type of consciousness that is neither fully awake nor fully asleep. 
Metafiction as Awakenings 
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This liminal consciousness can be compared to the act of writing.  As 
Farbman argues, “Writing is not just committing black ink to a white page—here with 
pens, there with presses.  The real location from which it emerges is a Grayer area” 
(15).  This “Grayer area” is a space of movement from the self to the unidentifiable 
other, the author’s consciousness as I to the author’s consciousness as text (Farbman 
48).  This “Grayer area” Farbman describes is also a state of liminality, and the author 
is essentially “falling asleep” into the text, in a transitional state between 
consciousness as subject (gendered body, citizen, and so forth) to consciousness as 
creator.  The creator-consciousness is necessarily that of the “other” to which 
Farbman alludes, as one cannot simultaneously be a subject and exist beyond 
subjectivity, as “God-like” figure ruling over the world of a text, an ante-subject to 
the subject.  Yet, the author makes this transition.  When discussing his own method 
of creating characters, Nabokov describes those authors who allow their characters to 
“take hold of them” as “very minor or insane.”  He continues, “I am the perfect 
dictator in that private world [of the created text] insofar as I alone am responsible for 
its stability and truth” (Strong 69).  Through his process of writing, he has moved 
from subject of the “real” world to creator of the textual world.  This liminal position, 
hovering between subjective reality and creation of the objective textual world is akin 
to the loss of self that happens when one falls asleep.  One moves from pure subject 
to pure object (bodily mass).  Insomnia traps someone between these two states. 
This sense of the cyclical experience of diminishing awareness of the self and 
return to the self is replicated in the modernist text through the use of metafictional 
devices.  When an author draws a reader’s attention to the fictionality of the text that 
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the reader is currently immersed in, it has the effect of temporarily preventing the 
reader’s immersion in the text, thus drawing him or her back to self-awareness.  
While Wright’s text is non-fictional, and therefore makes no effort to draw attention 
to its fictionality, it does draw awareness to its status as a text, especially through 
Wright’s discussions of the power of language to construct and mediate experience.  
Both Lolita and Ulysses are fictional texts which intentionally refer to their own 
fictionality.  In Ulysses, Joyce draws attention to the text’s structure through the ways 
in which he changes narrative style from section to section.  By continuously 
introducing not only different perspectives from which the text is written, but also 
different genre conventions, as well as literary styles, the reader’s experience of the 
text is often disrupted by the multiplicity of voices and styles to which he or she must 
adapt in the reading process. Just as in her own passage of insomnia, Molly breaks 
from one train of thought to another, at times interrupted by goings on of the material 
world inside and outside of her bedroom, the modernist text often brings readers to 
awareness that they are indeed reading a text, disrupting the flow of thought.  
Insomnia disallows the drift of thoughts into the unconscious state of sleep.  
Likewise, in the metafictional text, the reader is never able to become fully, but only 
temporarily immersed in that flow, much like the insomniac, as he or she is 
repeatedly jolted out of it when the novel draws attention to its own fictional 
structure.  In the modernist text, sleep becomes symbolic of complacency and lack of 
agency.    Characters who desire sleep, like Gloria in Fitzgerald’s Beautiful and the 
Damned or Mrs. Henderson in Dorothy Richardson’s Pilgrimage desire withdrawal 
from the world, an escape, and want to cede control of their bodies to the control of 
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others.  But, as Nabokov asserts in his description of preparation for sleep as akin to 
“[tottering] to the nearest euthanasium” (Speak 108), complacency and lack of 
vigilance are dangerous indeed.  Such complacency, when perhaps developing new 
technologies like exploding shells and mustard gas without considering their 
consequences, or lack of agency, such as Americans felt in their role regarding world 
affairs after World War I (leading to the “restless” generation that I discuss in the 
previous chapter) or Scrope in The Soul of a Bishop feels with regard to the role of 
the Church in World War I society, must be avoided.  Sleep may be a pleasant return 
to the womb as Fitzgerald describes it earlier in this chapter, but it is also akin to 
inertia and death, an ultimate state of vulnerability and helplessness.  For this reason, 
the modernist text encourages the reader to stay awake and remain vigilant. 
Nabokov repeatedly uses metafiction as a device in Lolita, as narrator 
Humbert often draws attention to the fictionality of his story.  Where Joyce 
manipulates the reader through changes in style and perspective, Nabokov does so 
through his use of Humbert’s admissions of his own “filling in the gaps” when 
recalling events, as well as through his use of often absurd, and therefore, markedly 
unrealistic language when naming characters and places.  With regard to Humbert’s 
admission of his authorial license within the text, he reconstructs a letter written to 
him by his second wife and Lolita’s mother, Charlotte Haze.  The letter is presented 
in the text as a separate entity, set apart through the use of a smaller sized font.  
However, despite the apparent transcription of this letter, Humbert writes: 
What I present here is what I remember of the letter, and what I 
remember of the letter, I remember verbatim (including that awful 
French).  It was at least twice longer. . . .  There is just a chance that 
“the vortex of the toilet” (where the letter did go) is my own matter of 
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fact contribution.  She probably begged me to make a special fire to 
consume it.  (68-69)   
 
Just as the reader is lulled both into Charlotte’s thoughts and comes to trust 
Humbert’s faithful transcription of the letter, Humbert admits that he likely made his 
own edits, reminding us that this “verbatim” letter is, in fact, highly modified and the 
narrator’s own memory of it is faulty at best.  This type of jarring realization is 
similar to the incomplete thought drift of the insomniac, where he or she can be 
completely immersed in a flow of thought leading slowly towards sleep.  Just when 
the flow feels reliable, an interruption occurs to break the sense of serenity. 
The Vigilant Reader 
How, then, does this insomniac structure apply to the reader?  While thus far I 
have talked about structural formalities of a text as being insomniac, it is also 
important to note that the text goes far beyond just mimicking insomnia through 
allusions to sleep and waking, focus on an individual stream of consciousness and so 
forth.  More significantly, the text enables the reader to feel as an insomniac does.  
Bryony Randall argues that when one remains aware of the passage of time during 
reading, “the reader’s attention will only be partially engaged with the text”; however, 
“being immersed in the time the text describes, will be a kind of all-embracing 
attentiveness, perhaps even involving of self” (166).  Take for example the 
aforementioned passage from Ulysses in which Molly has insomnia and readers 
follow along her train of thought.  As one reads the passage, one does not just note 
that Molly has insomnia; one actually experiences it.  As Molly’s thoughts are heard 
in the mind of the reader, the reader, not Molly, becomes the one with disjointed, 
slippery images racing through his or her mind.  The reader shares Molly’s awareness 
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of time only because she (not the reader) notes its passing.  The lack of punctuation in 
the final section of the novel creates a sense of urgency and desperation (for the pause 
of sleep), and successfully drags the reader along at a rapid pace. 
Similarly, metafictional devices also prevent the reader’s full lulling into a 
reading of the text.  Within the metafictional text, the world of the text is never fully 
stable, just as consciousness itself may be unstable when one has insomnia.  During a 
period of insomnia, a reader may start on one train of thought, ostensibly on his or her 
way to the “drift” that eventually becomes sleep.  At this point, one of two outcomes 
may occur.  The insomniac may either unknowingly fall asleep, only to reawaken 
with no knowledge of having slept, or the insomniac may find himself or herself 
jolted out of this train of thought, perhaps through rolling over in bed or catching a 
glimpse of the clock.  Molly’s attention to church bell’s tolling is an excellent 
example of this return to awareness of the material world.   
Conclusion 
Modernist literary texts are contextually related to sleep through their 
temporally situated relationship to both waking and sleeping.  Further, much as 
insomnia has an inevitable eventual end, but an idiosyncratic one, these texts both 
point to and question the possibility of their own perseverance beyond the content of 
the text itself, as they end with an image of the language of the text reaching out to 
the future with no stable and predictable consequence or termination.  Additionally, 
the experience of reading the insomniac text serves the dual function of immersing a 
reader in the text, yet reminding the reader that he or she is essentially only 
encountering a text, not a different state of consciousness.  The reader is never fully 
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able to lose his or her own subjective identity during the reading of the metafictional 
text.  These texts display an anxiety over temporality, often experienced by the 
insomniac, as well as a sense of the past, present, and future converging in a singular 
time and space.  In short, the experience these authors had with insomnia structured 
their understanding of the relationship between time, memory, and thought, as well as 
our understanding of our own consciousness and ability to be aware its functioning.  
Such revelations are made possible through the experience of insomnia. 
For numerous reasons, all of the texts I have discussed in this chapter 
exemplify what I am referring to as the “insomniac structure” of the modernist text.  
Modernism needed insomnia for many reasons.  First and foremost, insomnia 
becomes a device through which the text becomes not only a text, but an experience.  
World War I brought about the revelation that words alone cannot convey the 
complexity of experience.  Only experience itself (as art) can even attempt to 
replicate experience.  Specifically, insomnia is an experience of the body, and, as 
Woolf argues, experiencing the world through a consciousness of one’s body, which 
she asserts comes through illness, alters perceptions in significant ways.  It makes us 
aware of our subjectivity, as bodies, but also allows us a more actively authorial role 
in shaping our perceptions and understandings of the world and people around us.  
Further, insomnia allows authors and their characters the solitude necessary to reflect 
on the world and develop empathy, necessary both to the development of characters 
and the function of the author as creator the textual world.  The era preceding the 
Modernist period was one of rapid technological development, and development and 
action without reflection are problematic, as one creates without considering the 
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consequences of that creation.  The modernist text reminds us to reflect, and through 
the device of insomnia, forces its characters and readers to do.  The modernist text 
does not allow its readers to sleepwalk through it—its structure itself requires us to 
stay quite awake, jarring us out of any complacent acceptance of the textual world, 
just as we must avoid such complacency in our “real” lives.  We cannot even take 
language for granted anymore, much as the text and insomnia itself reveal to us the 
failure of simplistic definitions and associations, as words explode into multiple 
possibilities and meanings.  Inasmuch as language structures our experience of the 
world, the modernist text reminds us that the world is infinitely complex and must 
never be viewed from just one perspective.  By becoming, largely through the use of 
insomnia, an experience for readers, it emphasizes the fact that experience itself is 
never singular and can be shared, asserting the importance of the ability to view the 
world through someone else’s perspective, lest we risk relaxing too much into our 
own and lulling ourselves out of awareness of the world around us. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In 2004, the BBC premiered a reality show called Shattered.  The premise of 
the show was simple:  expose people to severe sleep deprivation, have them compete 
against each other to perform various tasks, and record the whole process.  The 
purpose of the show was to have contestants stay awake for just over a week, up to 
180 hours (“Shattered” Channel 4), though some reports maintain that the contestants 
were allowed up to two hours of sleep a day (“Shattered” UK Game Shows).  
Throughout the week, contestants were eliminated based on their competence during 
the various tasks they performed, including memory and coordination activities.  The 
winner of the show could earn up to £100,000, but for each instance in which the 
individual fell asleep for more than ten seconds outside of break times, the prize was 
reduced by £1,000 (the winner walked away with £97,000 in total) (“Shattered” 
Channel 4).  The show was not without its share of controversy, especially after one 
contestant, a 21 year old woman, voluntarily withdrew from the show after consulting 
with psychologists (“Channel 4”).  The show ended with a “sleep off,” during which 
the three final contestants were put to bed.  The contestant who managed to remain 
awake while in bed the longest, Clare Southern, won by keeping herself alert for 
almost two hours longer than the other two finalists; she reportedly did so by 
“[singing] to herself” and “playing blinking games” (Chapman). 
A show such as this essentially inverts discursive presentations of insomnia 
during the Modernist period.  Where I have argued that insomnia is a form of 
vigilance, this type of extended insomnia so exhausted participants as to make them 
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unsure of themselves and their surroundings; the only vigilance here is that of the 
cameras.  Where I have looked at insomnia as a form of isolation and solitude, this 
show exposes insomnia, putting it on view for the whole world.  Where I have looked 
at insomnia as a form of heightened awareness of both body and mind, this show 
rendered its participants wakefully insentient.  Where I have looked at insomnia as 
productive of a different type of thought, this show rendered insomnia so intense as to 
be thoughtless.  And, where I have looked at insomnia as a form of resistance to 
capitalist paradigms of activity and productivity, this show makes insomnia itself the 
means of profit. 
In my final chapter, I argued that Modernism needed insomnia, as a sort of 
bastion of individuality in an increasingly rationalized and dehumanized world.  It 
represented, for the Modernists, a space and time unique to the afflicted individual, 
affording him or her both time for contemplation and pursuit of individual interests 
and reflections.  It both exposed and resisted social and cultural expectations placed 
on the individual.  A show such as this effectively took that time and space away 
from the insomniac, co-opting the time and space of insomnia for profit instead.  
Insomnia is no longer something to be used by the individual, but to be used by those 
seeking to profit.  The title Shattered comes to represent this new type of insomniac, 
robbed of individuality and agency, no longer solidified in character through 
insomnia, but broken by it, dispersed like so many pixels on a TV screen.  This new 
insomniac no longer uses insomnia to resist exploitation and subjection, but instead 
embraces both. 
  
 
374 
 
Sleep researchers Steve Kroll-Smith and Valerie Gunter define sleep as “a 
nonsocial somatic state” which leaves us “unaware of a world outside the body” 
(346).  “Sleepiness,” they argue, “is being colonized as a partial state of 
consciousness requiring social and individual attention” (347).  Paradoxically, a 
condition that makes us “unaware” now requires us to be just that.  Additionally, our 
state of unawareness to the outside world becomes an issue to which the outside 
world must be made aware.  While they situate this colonization of sleepiness in 
contemporary times, I would argue this project began much earlier, primarily in the 
nineteenth century.  As is typically the case with any form of “colonization,” some 
will resist.  Insomnia afforded the Modernists resistance to the colonization of sleep.  
Insomnia, despite our best efforts to this day, can at best be managed, but certainly 
not controlled.  For the insomniac, there is no guarantee, no matter what measures are 
taken, that a good night’s sleep will come.  In an era of increasing normalization, 
generalization, observation, and control, during which privacy and unregulated time 
diminished as technology and science flourished, insomniacs shirked regulation and 
discipline.  Insomnia reminds modernist authors and their audiences of the dangers of 
permitting oneself to lapse into comfortable unawareness of the world around them 
and their role in shaping it. 
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